


Final Environmental Impact Statement for
Developing Home Port Facilities for
Three NIMITZ-Class Aircraft Carriers
in Support of the U.S. Pacific Fleet

Coronado, California • Bremerton, Washington
Everett, Washington • Pearl Harbor, Hawaii



Volume 7 – Part B
Comments and Responses for Coronado, California
July 1999



19990714 004

ERRATA SHEET

**THE FOLLOWING CHANGES ARE MADE IN THE RESPONSES TO
COMMENTS FOR PUBLIC HEARINGS FOR VOLUME 7B:**

VOLUME 7 CVN HOMEPORING EIS — NASNI RESPONSE TO COMMENTS

Comment Number	Response
H.1.33	Please refer to response to comment I.76.1 and L.4.12.
H.2.96	Please refer to response to comment I.76.1 and L.4.12.

Final Environmental Impact Statement for
Developing Homeporting Facilities for
Three NIMITZ-Class Aircraft Carriers
in Support of the U.S. Pacific Fleet

Coronado, California • Bremerton, Washington
Everett, Washington • Pearl Harbor, Hawaii

VOLUME 7 - Part B

**Comments and Responses for
Coronado, California
Individuals and Public Hearings**

July 1999



Department of the Navy

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A
Approved for Public Release
Distribution Unlimited

Introduction to Public Comment Organization

This section presents comments received during the Draft EIS public comment period, and responses to each comment. The comments received are in the form of letters or comments received at the public hearings. For simplicity, the following characterizes comments received as "letters," and each specific issue raised in each letter as a "comment." The comment letters and their responses are organized into sections for each potential CVN homeporting location: Coronado, Bremerton, Everett, and Pearl Harbor. Within each CVN homeporting location section, public comment letters are grouped by the commentor's affiliation and are abbreviated as follows: Federal agencies (F); State agencies (S); Local agencies (L); Organizations (O); and Individuals (I). Comments recorded from the Hearing Transcripts completes each comment set (H). Individual comment letters in each of these groups are numbered in the chronological order in which they were received by the Navy. For example, the first Federal comment letter received for each CVN homeporting location is identified as F.1. Specific comments are numbered as follows: F.1.1, F.1.2, F.1.3, etc. The second Federal comment letter received for each location is numbered F.2. Specific comments are numbered F.2.1, F.2.2, F.2.3, etc. State letters are coded S.1, S.2, S.3 etc.

There are a number of comment letters that include comments about more than one of the locations. In these instances, the comment letter has been assigned multiple codes for each CVN homeporting alternative location that is addressed. The specific comments relevant to that CVN homeporting location are identified. The comment letter is listed in each relevant CVN homeporting alternative location section, and only the specific comments relevant to that location are indicated.

Immediately following each comment letter are the responses to those comments, numbered to correspond to comment codes. Pages are identified by comment code, so that all pages with comments and responses to letter F.1 are indicated with this code at the bottom of the page. The table of contents following this introduction lists each comment letter, the date sent, and the corresponding code.

A number of comments on the Draft EIS were submitted in Spanish. These letters have been translated into English by a certified translator. Responses appear in both English and Spanish. On the page immediately following this introduction, the translator's certifications are presented.

Due to the number of comments received for Coronado, California, comments and responses for that site have been divided into two documents: Volume 7, Part A, and Volume 7, Part B. Comments from Federal, State, and Local agencies, as well as Organizations, are included in Volume 7, Part A, and comments from Individuals and those made at Public Hearings are included in Volume 7, Part B. Comments and responses for Bremerton, Washington; Everett, Washington; and Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, are bound separately in Volumes 8-10.

CARLOS CERECEO
STATE CERTIFIED COURT INTERPRETER
2420 MODOC RD.
SANTA BARBARA, CALIFORNIA 93105
PHONE & FAX: (805)963-4483

Judicial Council Certificate Number 300249

CARLOS CERECEO
STATE CERTIFIED COURT INTERPRETER
2420 MODOC RD.
SANTA BARBARA, CALIFORNIA 93105
PHONE & FAX: (805)963-4483

Judicial Council Certificate Number 300249

CERTIFIED TRANSLATIONS

Script and Translation of Tape Comments

AFFIDAVIT

I, CARLOS CERECEO, STATE OF CALIFORNIA COURT CERTIFIED
INTERPRETER -TRANSLATOR, JUDICIAL COUNCIL CERTIFICATION
NUMBER 300249, HEREBY CERTIFY, THAT THE ATTACHED DOCUMENTS
ARE A FAITHFUL AND TRUE TRANSCRIPTION AND TRANSLATION FROM
THE SPANISH LANGUAGE TO THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE TO THE BEST
OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND ABILITY.

Carlito Cereceo
CARLOS CERECEO
COURT CERTIFIED
INTERPRETER- TRANSLATOR
JUDICIAL COUNCIL # 300249

Santa Barbara, November 6, 1998.

CERTIFIED TRANSLATIONS

SIX COMMENTS IN SPANISH FOR THE DRAFT EIS

1 ESTRADA
2 RODRIGUEZ
2 MIRAMONTES
1 URCINO

AFFIDAVIT

I, CARLOS CERECEO, STATE OF CALIFORNIA COURT CERTIFIED
INTERPRETER -TRANSLATOR, JUDICIAL COUNCIL CERTIFICATION
NUMBER 300249, HEREBY CERTIFY, THAT THE ATTACHED DOCUMENT
IS A FAITHFUL AND TRUE TRANSLATION FROM THE SPANISH
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KNOWLEDGE AND ABILITY.

Carlito Cereceo
CARLOS CERECEO
COURT CERTIFIED
INTERPRETER- TRANSLATOR
JUDICIAL COUNCIL # 300249

Santa Barbara, November 6, 1998.

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VOLUME 7B CVN HOMEPORING EIS – NASNI RESPONSES TO COMMENTS

8/22/98

Mr. John Coon, Project Manager
Southwest Division, Naval Facilities Engineering Command
Code 05AL-JC
1220 Pacific Highway
San Diego CA 92132

Dear Sir, I feel that homeporting Nuclear Aircraft Carriers in San Diego seriously weakens our national defense.

REMEMBER PEARL HARBOR

I.1.1

We do not need another "Pearl Harbor" disaster. Parking one or more Nuclear Aircraft Carriers deep in San Diego Bay will be a repeat of December 7, 1941. The berthing place in San Diego can only be reached in high tide and is deep within the harbor. Any terrorist could simply sink a fishing boat at the entry to San Diego Bay and the Aircraft Carrier could not get to sea to defend our country. If there is a fire or nuclear accident aboard the ship there is no way to quickly float the ship to sea and out of harms way. This threatens the health and safety of everyone living in San Diego, the sixth largest city in the United States.

REMEMBER PEARL HARBOR. NO HOMEPORTING OF NUCLEAR AIRCRAFT CARRIERS IN SAN DIEGO



Jack A Brill
6260 Oakridge Rd
San Diego CA 92120
619-582 7717

VOLUME 7 CVN HOMEPORING EIS — NASNI RESPONSE TO COMMENTS

Comment Number	Response
Jack A. Brill	
I.1.1	<p>The Navy has never stated that CVNs could not transit the San Diego Harbor Channel under low tide conditions in emergency situations. Sufficient depth exists in San Diego Channels to accommodate emergency situations. CVNs under normal conditions can transit the San Diego channel under all but the lowest of "minus" tides. Since the dredging of the channel and turning basin occurred in 1998, fully loaded CVNs have large windows of sailing times at MLLW or better. The approximate time needed from taking in all lines to clearing the tip of Point Loma is 45 minutes. The location of three CVNs in San Diego poses no more of a "Pearl Harbor" threat than has existed with the three conventionally powered aircraft carriers homeported there. Please refer to response to comments O.14.6, I.37.1, and I.29.2.</p>

A wide range of hypothetical accidents was considered in the development of the analysis presented in the EIS. The hypothetical accidents analyzed indicate risks that are unlikely to be exceeded by other accidents (e.g., airplane crash, earthquake, tsunamis, or terrorism). The results of all the analyses of both normal operations and hypothetical accidents indicate that there would be no significant radiological impacts from homeporting and maintaining NIMITZ-class aircraft carriers or operating NIMITZ-class aircraft carrier maintenance facilities.

Sept. 1, 1998

John Coon
Navfaceng.com
1220 Pacific Highway
San Diego, CA. 92135-5190

I support the military & Navy
whatever they do,

I believe our ships should
be based here, so, our men
in be closer to home when
possible.

I am not afraid of any nuclear
warred ship the Navy has &
into the three Nimitz - class
clear aircraft ^{CARRIER} should be stationed
- North Island.

We cannot compare our nuclear

12.1

II

Carries with the San Onofre
Plant -

Besides I believe That The
environmental Agencies go
verbard on some of their
deas .

I will not be able to attend
one of The Public Hearings due
age and health -

Joanne Marsh

9703 wintergarden Blvd. #146
Lakeside, CA. 92040

I.2.1

VOLUME 7 CVN HOMEPORING EIS — NASNI RESPONSE TO COMMENTS

Comment Number	Response
---------------------------	-----------------

Joanne Marsh

I.2.1 Your comments are noted and are included in the Final EIS.

Richard Dittbrenner, J. D., Cand. Ph.D.

Campus:
Southwestern College
900 Ohay Lakes Road
Chula Vista, CA 91910-7299
Tel: 619.421.6700 x 5614
Fax: 619.482.6435
email: environmentalproject@juno.com

After Hours:
260 A Avenue
Coronado, CA 92118-9113
Tel: 619.437.0077
Fax: 619.437.0087
email: rdtbrenner@apnyne.com

Letter to Mr. John Coon
September 9, 1998
Page 2

Mr. John Coon
Southwest Division
U. S. Navy
San Diego, CA 92132-5190
Sent Via Fax to (619) 532-4998

Dear Mr. Coon:

**Request for Rescheduling of Public Hearing Dates for Draft EIS
(Nuclear Aircraft Carrier Homeporting) and Extension of Time for
Public Comment – Discrimination Against Citizens of the Jewish Faith**

This letter is to bring to your attention acts and omissions by the US Navy in San Diego which are contrary to the requirements of federal and state environmental policy. Both of these acts and omissions limit public participation in the Navy's environmental decision-making. These are contrary to NEPA and the Presidential Directive on Environmental Justice.

Several weeks ago, I called the Navy's information line set up for the purpose of responding to questions and concerns about the upcoming Draft EIS. I left my name, home phone number, and home address (noted above) in connection with my request to receive a copy of the Draft EIS. To date, I have not received a copy of the Draft EIS as I requested, nor have I received any communication regarding my request.

Secondly, the dates for the hearing in San Diego and Coronado should be rescheduled. By scheduling back to back hearings in Coronado and San Diego on September 29th and 30th, the Navy has done to those of the Jewish faith, that which would be unthinkable if done to members to the Christian faith. The evening of September 29th is the holy day of Kol Nidre. September 30th is Yom Kippur, the holiest day of the year on which members of the Jewish faith are obligated to spend in religious observance beginning the evening of September 29th.

Would the US Navy hold public hearings on its plans to homeport two additional nuclear powered carriers in San Diego Bay on Christmas and Easter? No? Why is the Navy asking people of the Jewish Faith to participate in public hearings on the most holy of days that it would not also ask of Christians?

I.3

The constitution calls upon the government not to discriminate in favor of one religion over another. By holding these hearings on Yom Kippur, the Navy is discriminating against citizens of the Jewish faith in favor of Christians. The Navy should reschedule the hearings and extend the time for public comment and additional 90 days. The Navy should also provide a copy of the Draft EIS to all who asked for a copy.

Please direct all correspondence to my home address as noted above.

Sincerely,

Richard Dittbrenner, J. D., Cand. Ph.D.
Professor of Law

cc:
Senator Dianne Feinstein
Senator Barbara Boxer
Congressman Bob Filner
Congressman Brian Bilbray
Mayor and City Council of Del Mar
Mayor and City Council of Imperial Beach
Mayor and City Council of San Diego
Mayor and City Council of Chula Vista
Mayor and City Council of Coronado
Mayor and City Council of National City
Mayor and City Council of Solana Beach

I.3.3

The constitution calls upon the government not to discriminate in favor of one religion over another. By holding these hearings on Yom Kippur, the Navy is discriminating against citizens of the Jewish faith in favor of Christians. The Navy should reschedule the hearings and extend the time for public comment and additional 90 days. The Navy should also provide a copy of the Draft EIS to all who asked for a copy.

I.3.1

The constitution calls upon the government not to discriminate in favor of one religion over another. By holding these hearings on Yom Kippur, the Navy is discriminating against citizens of the Jewish faith in favor of Christians. The Navy should reschedule the hearings and extend the time for public comment and additional 90 days. The Navy should also provide a copy of the Draft EIS to all who asked for a copy.

I.3.2

The constitution calls upon the government not to discriminate in favor of one religion over another. By holding these hearings on Yom Kippur, the Navy is discriminating against citizens of the Jewish faith in favor of Christians. The Navy should reschedule the hearings and extend the time for public comment and additional 90 days. The Navy should also provide a copy of the Draft EIS to all who asked for a copy.

VOLUME 7 CVN HOMEPORING EIS — NASNI RESPONSE TO COMMENTS

Comment Number	Response
Richard Dittbenner	
I.3.1	As requested, you were sent a copy of the Draft EIS.
I.3.2	The public hearings for the Draft EIS were rescheduled to October 27 and 28 in Coronado and San Diego, respectively.
I.3.3	The Navy extended the public review period an additional 30 days. The Navy has provided additional copies of the Draft EIS to those who have requested them.

Sep 10, '98

Dear Mr. Coon:

I am very much against the atomic carriers docking @ North Island where there is human work, there can also be human error! In this day of "sneaky" warfare - terrorist activity, etc. they would certainly be ripe targets. In case of an "accident", Coronado & San Diego would be destroyed, as well as thousands of people.

Such ships should be parked way out to sea w/ boats to commute to the mainland.

People in Chernobyl, Russia were probably told their plant was safe too, so we should have a lesson there, (and 3-mile Island, etc.)

I think this should be a very serious decision.

Thank you for "listening"

Ruth Hanes,
2221 Louise Dr.
Norman, Okla. 73071

P.S. My son & I own property in Coronado & I lived there 27 yrs.

VOLUME 7 CVN HOMEPORING EIS — NASNI RESPONSE TO COMMENTS

Comment Number	Response
---------------------------	-----------------

Ruth Hames

- I.4.1 A wide range of hypothetical accidents was considered in the development of the analysis presented in the EIS. The hypothetical accidents analyzed indicate risks that are unlikely to be exceeded by other accidents (e.g., airplane crash, earthquake, tsunamis, or terrorism). The results of all the analyses of both normal operations and hypothetical accidents indicate that there would be no significant radiological impacts from homeporting and maintaining NIMITZ-class aircraft carriers or operating NIMITZ-class aircraft carrier maintenance facilities.

Mr. John Coon
(Code OSAL.JC)

9-11-98

Southwest Division

Naval Facilities Engineering Command
1220 Pacific Highway
San Diego, Ca. 92132

Dear Mr. Coon.

Our family strongly objects to the
Department of the Navy's plans to home port
3 NIMITZ-class nuclear powered aircraft
carriers in San Diego harbor.

As I work at the airport, I strongly
oppose new hazardous and radioactive waste
treatment and storage facilities on North Island.

In addition to increased amounts
of pollutants in the air and harbor, the potential
risks of accidents is staggering.

We, as residents of the greater
San Diego area, should not have to live under
a cloud of fear and uncertainty regarding
a nuclear accident (especially since the US Navy
refuses to release the area downwind of an emergency,
that should be evacuated.) Stop this proposal of
any more nuclear carriers now.

Lyle R. Neptune

3221 Bancroft #10
Spring Valley, Ca. 91971

I.5.1

VOLUME 7 CVN HOMEPORING EIS — NASNI RESPONSE TO COMMENTS

Comment Number	Response
---------------------------	-----------------

Lyle R. Hestum

I.5.1 Please see responses to comments O.12.49 and I.4.1.



Mr John Cown Project Manager
Southwest Division
Naval Facilities Engineering Command
220 Pacific Highway

San Diego CA 92132-5400

I am opposed to a nuclear presence
in San Diego.

Please notify me of any public hearing
regarding the homeporting of nuclear
aircraft and the expansion of
a nuclear waste site.

161

J. Daugerty
PO Box 40454
San Diego CA 92164

VOLUME 7 CVN HOMEPORING EIS — NASNI RESPONSE TO COMMENTS

Comment Number	Response
---------------------------	-----------------

J. Doughty

- I.6.1 Although no specific issues were noted by the commentor, the Navy notes the commentor's general opinion regarding the proposed action. As requested, the commentor's name has been added to the distribution list for notifications concerning this proposed action.

To: John Coon, USN
FROM: Russell D. Hoffman
(U. S. Citizen)
RE: San Diego CVN DEIS
Date: 9/15/98

Dear Sir:

Please send a copy
of the DEIS for the

U.S. Navy's nuclear homeporting
in San Diego. I wish to review
the document as extensively as
possible and live in Carlsbad; my
schedule would preclude the many
trips to downtown San Diego such
research would entail. Furthermore
as I intend to publish my reports,
I will need to have continued
access to the document.


My address follows on page 2 *js*

9/15/98

(Page 2 of 2)

Please send (1) one
copy* of the USN DEIS
for the home porting of
CVN's in S.D. Bay to:

Russell D. Hoffman
P. O. Box 1936
Carlsbad CA 92018-1936

Thank you,


*and all related documents in
support of the NAVF position.

L7.1

VOLUME 7 CVN HOMEPORING EIS — NASNI RESPONSE TO COMMENTS

Comment Number	Response
---------------------------	-----------------

Russell D. Hoffman

I.7.1 A copy of the Draft EIS was sent to you upon your request.



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
SOUTHWEST DIVISION
NAVAL FACILITIES ENGINEERING COMMAND
1220 PACIFIC HIGHWAY
SAN DIEGO, CA 92132-5190

11000
Ser 5731.RH/3061
SEP 16 1998

Ladies and Gentleman:

Because of public interest in the Navy's Draft Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS). Developing Homeport Facilities for Three NIMITZ-Class Aircraft Carriers in Support of the U.S. Fleet, we have decided to extend the public review period approximately 30 days and to reschedule the public hearings from September to October. We believe that this extra time will allow you to thoroughly review and comment on the Navy's proposal. Your comments should be postmarked on or before November 12, 1998.

The public hearings that were scheduled in September are being rescheduled for the last two weeks in October. As soon as these dates have been confirmed, we will again notify the public through the DEIS distribution list and through the local newspapers.

Thank you for your interest in this matter. If you have questions, please contact Mr. John Coon at (888) 482-6440.

Sincerely,

Jay H. Keyes
JAY H. KEYES
Head, Business Department
By direction of the Commander

Sept 19, 1998

Mr. Keyes:

Thank you for this letter informing me of the 30 day extension. It was not necessary to spend $\frac{1}{10}$ do over night express it. \$15. A 32 cent would have been adequate. By the way, I never received the E.I.S. But not having had access to it, I am still inclined to believe that Nuclear Powered ships should not be housed in Environmentally Sensitive Areas.

I.8.1

I.8.2

→

- like the San Diego harbor or Coronado Area. It is a beautiful area and I don't think that nuclear powered ships is consistent with the fragile ecological systems.

~~area~~. I say that knowing my

Son-in-law is an Officer with

The U.S. Navy and has served on several Air Craft Carriers. But, I

still believe that it would be

wrong to expand the over-load of the nuclear powered ships in that fragile area. Please

mine) cautiously and sincerely

In this dramatic move. Our future

depends on it. Our natural world is at risk!

Respectfully,

Judy Johnson
Grandmother of 14, Naval Grandsons)

VOLUME 7 CVN HOMEPORING EIS — NASNI RESPONSE TO COMMENTS

Comment Number	Response
---------------------------	-----------------

Judy Johnson

- I.8.1 A copy of the Draft EIS was sent to you upon your request.
- I.8.2 Please see response to comment I.4.1.

MICHELE MURPHREE
2229 FROUDE STREET
SAN DIEGO, CA 92107

September 24, 1998

Southwest Division
Naval Facilities Engineering Command
1220 Pacific Highway
San Diego, CA 92132-5190

To Whom It May Concern:

I am very concerned about the nuclear reactors in the bay. Please notify me | I.9.1
of any public hearings about the nuclear aircraft carrier homeporting at the above
address.

Sincerely,

M. Murphree

Michele Murphree

VOLUME 7 CVN HOMEPORING EIS — NASNI RESPONSE TO COMMENTS

Comment Number	Response
---------------------------	-----------------

Michele Murphree

I.9.1 A letter was sent to you with the revised public hearing dates.

Sept. 21, 1998


Dept. of Navy
Mr. Gay H. Keyes

Dear sir:

I received your letter of the
change of the hearing from Sept. to
October -

I am 67 years old & not in good
health & don't have transportation
to go to the hearing.
But, you can have someone
read the letter & sent you in
support of the Navy.

Joanne Marsh
9703 Wintergarden Blvd.
#146
Fullerton CA 92630



VOLUME 7 CVN HOMEPORING EIS — NASNI RESPONSE TO COMMENTS

Comment Number	Response
---------------------------	-----------------

Joanne Marsh

- I.10.1 Your comments are noted and included in the Final EIS. Your previous letter is also included and responses provided (see letter coded as I.2 and response I.2.1).

To Mr. John Coon,

We wish to register our dismay, at the home porting of yet 2 additional Nuclear Carriers in the San Diego Bay. We have not been apprised of the environmental impact in our area, nor the risks involved, to our satisfaction.

I.II.1

My husband and I have lived in San Diego for over 50 years, and have knowledge of the toxic impact of the Navy in North Island, already. We feel that toxic waste is still a major problem, and now you are adding additional environmental concerns. These carriers and their infrastructure, are too close to our city and homes, and we have not been informed sufficiently.

Do not create a Megaport of Nuclear Carriers, in the San Diego Bay, and do not build all the surrounding infrastructure to contain its waste, and support its needs!!

In deep concern,

Anita and Irv Hosenpud
1016 Cypress Way
San Diego, California 92103

VOLUME 7 CVN HOMEPORING EIS — NASNI RESPONSE TO COMMENTS

Comment Number	Response
---------------------------	-----------------

Anita and Irv Hosenpud

I.11.1 Your comments are noted and are included in the Final EIS.

Stephen Wawrytko

7183 Canyon Hill Way
San Diego, CA 92126

October 6, 1998

Mr. John Coon
(Code 05ALJC)
Southwest Division
Naval Facilities Engineering Command
1220 Pacific Highway
San Diego, CA 92132

Subject: DEIS for Nuclear Powered Aircraft Carriers

Dear Mr. Coon:

I am **TOTALLY** against any plans to locate nuclear equipment, materials or storage facilities anywhere near San Diego. The military nuclear facilities we currently have are a hazard every day to the citizens of San Diego county. We do not need or have any desire to locate any additional military nuclear materials in San Diego county or Coronado.

I.12

As a Chemical Engineer I have worked with the design and operations of nuclear facilities and other types of engineering projects worldwide. My background, education and over twenty-five years experiences provide me with a strong knowledge of the technical, logistical and financial issues for these type of facilities. It is my firm belief that the current and proposed nuclear facilities on military property near San Diego are unsafe and harmful to the citizens around these facilities. That includes the city of San Diego, all San Diego County and parts of Arizona. I do not feel from a technical view that the military, especially the Navy, can properly operate such facilities. The dangerous chemicals the Navy dumps regularly are having long term effects on all the citizens of San Diego.

During the Vietnam era, I served as a Technical Manager in the military after graduating from college. While stationed in Germany, I saw first hand how the military handles toxic, hazardous and other materials. The military does not have any regards for local or federal regulations and always uses National Defense as an excuse to pollute any facility they occupy. Although the Navy states they comply with the EPA here in San Diego, the EPA does not have total access to their facilities. The Navy continually builds in San Diego without ever checking with local or federal agencies. In fact, they even build many facilities without any funding, knowing that if they go far enough the funds cannot be denied without Congress losing large amounts of tax dollars from their advanced construction. The military continues to burn materials on Miramar every year, which people can see from the smoke. This is illegal for the public or private sectors, but the EPA does not stop the military from polluting the air.

Page 2

The island of Coronado, San Diego Bay and the Pacific Ocean around the Navy facilities are, in my opinion, all a large environmental superfund project. The Navy continues to dump very hazardous and toxic materials on their base and in the waters around their facility. There are many cases where the Navy got caught dumping hazardous materials or venting toxic substances, but these are only the tip of very large problem. There are far more incidents of toxic dumping or accidental venting that the public NEVER hears about. The Navy continues to use National Security as a way of covering up and preventing the proper civilian agencies from monitoring their waste. Today, San Diego Bay is a very dirty and toxic waste site due to the operations of the Navy.

After our experience at Pearl Harbor, the United States should be more concerned with the effects of any attacks against military facilities. Unlike conventional materials, nuclear chemicals are far more damaging to human life and have a very long existence. Today there are more terrorists operating in the world than ever. If such nuclear facilities or Naval vessels were attacked, the discharges and fires could have irreversible damage to millions of innocent people. Instead of locating these highly dangerous vessels near large populated areas, the military should evaluate more remote and more defendable locations. A base like Coronado and San Diego Bay are extremely open to daily access from the public. The Navy cannot give the citizens of San Diego a 100 percent guarantee that their facilities will never be attacked. Yet just one incident where the Naval nuclear facilities are attacked can make San Diego county uninhabitable for centuries.

I.12.1

The Navy has very likely had nuclear discharges into the atmosphere many times in the past, but will never report these facts. It is irresponsible and immoral to locate such a large amount of nuclear material upwind and right next to the sixth largest city and the second largest populated county in the United States. The Navy is putting millions of innocent civilians, as well as their families, in great danger. Their past record and their attitude toward civilians are a strong indication of their inability to operate nuclear facilities safely and responsibly. Like many of the toxic materials the Navy discharges every day, it takes decades for the chemicals to effect or kill human beings. The Department of Defense and the Navy knows this fact and uses it as a tool to keep the public off balance.

The Department of Defense and especially the Navy does not have a very good track record with the American taxpayers. They continually lie and deny any dangerous operations until somehow the facts become public. It is well-known how they lie to the President, the Congress, technical advisors, medical personnel and people in every nation on this earth. During the cold war era the military used millions of innocent civilians as test subjects without ever telling anyone. Also the military denied using any chemicals in Viet Nam and Desert Storm yet many uniformed military personnel developed irreversible medical problems. The military continues to expose innocent people to all types of dangerous materials because they always say that civilians are expendable. They use National Security as an additional excuse for their irresponsible behavior and arrogant attitudes. It is a fact that since the Navy did the environmental research reports that these documents are false and incomplete based on their past record.

I.12.6

I.12.5

My opinions are not anti-Navy but are directed against the Department of Defense and the military leadership. My family has served in the military for several generations. I am very concerned with the quality of leadership in our armed services today. We do not have the most responsible, professional and competent Americans in the DOD or as military leaders in this country anymore. Because of budget cuts, downsizing and politics, the military today is not a very responsible organization. The older military leaders are too arrogant, self centered and have the wrong attitude about National Defense and National Security. We are no longer in the Cold War yet many military leaders operate under this same game plan. In time of war the military is in complete control and dictates their demands. This country has not been in this situation for decades yet the DOD and the military leaders still operate with this same attitude. Our military is paid by the taxpayers to serve and protect the people of this country. Unless we can control this military, the people of this country are nothing more than prisoners of a military dictatorship.

The mayor and the city council of San Diego want any and all Naval facilities they can get for this city. Their only interest is the military payroll and impact on the local economy. This does little good for the citizens if they are at extreme risk from these facilities. People all over this country are refusing to allow garbage dumps from being located in their communities. Americans' do not have the same power in trying to prevent military facilities in their own communities. We need common sense and rational thinking when we locate our military facilities. There is no rational or common sense reason for locating any nuclear powered vessels of any kind in San Diego.

Based on the facts stated above, the American taxpayers and especially the citizens of San Diego cannot trust the reports, studies or evaluations associated with this DEIS. The data will be biased, misleading and not thorough enough to cover the complete facts. Many of the problems from the nuclear materials are long term and these documents do not address these type issues. The DEIS covers the direct, indirect and short-term impacts but does not identify long term effects which the Navy knows are more critical. The public hearings will not consider the bad record and attitude of the Navy which has a SIGNIFICANT EFFECT on the operation of such facilities. Any information on the operation of the existing nuclear facilities in San Diego will be inaccurate because of these facts. Unlike a civilian facility, the military will not, have not and cannot operate such hazardous facilities responsibly and safely. By their own standard operating procedures (SOP), the military cuts corners to accomplish their military objectives.

Very concerned citizen,
S. Wawrytko
Stephen Wawrytko

VOLUME 7 CVN HOMEPORING EIS — NASNI RESPONSE TO COMMENTS

Comment Number	Response
Stephen Wawrytko	
I.12.1	Your comments are noted and are included in the Final EIS.
I.12.2	All facilities constructed by the Navy are subject to the NEPA process. No facility can be built without funding; it is impossible to do so under federal contracting regulations. The burning of materials at Miramar that you commented upon is not from any Navy operation. If smoke is seen emanating from County of San Diego landfill operations there, it is within the allowances of County of San Diego air permits issued to the City.
	In the third paragraph of your letter, you claim that the Navy currently operates outside the strict federal and local regulations in its handling of toxic and hazardous material. However, all such Navy facilities are permitted and local, state, and federal regulators audit the Navy's operation. The EPA is granted access to military facilities and issues reports on the Navy's compliance with environmental laws and regulations.
	Please see response to comment I.4.1.
I.12.3	For information on the Navy's compliance with regulations for the handling of toxic materials, please see response to comment I.12.2 immediately above.
I.12.4	San Diego historically has been home port to three aircraft carriers (CVs). The proposed action will not cause this number to increase, but only to change the type of aircraft carrier (CVN) homeported at NASNI. Therefore, there would be no change to the strategic value of San Diego as a result of the proposed action. Please see also response I.4.1. In addition, the development of reasonable alternatives evaluated in the EIS is described in section 2.3.
I.12.5	Please see response to comment O.12.33.
I.12.6	Although no specific or substantiated issues were noted by the commentor, the Navy notes the commentor's general opinion regarding the proposed action.
I.12.7	Your comments are noted and are included in the Final EIS.
I.12.8	Your comments are noted and are included in the Final EIS.
I.12.9	It is important to note that the results of all the analyses of both normal operations and hypothetical accidents indicate that there would be no significant direct or indirect or short or long-term radiological impacts from homeporting

VOLUME 7 CVN HOMEPORING EIS — NASNI RESPONSE TO COMMENTS

Comment Number	Response
	and maintaining NIMITZ-class aircraft carriers or operating NIMITZ-class aircraft carrier maintenance facilities.

October 7, 1998

Mr. John Coon
Project Manager
Southwest Division, Naval Facilities
Engineering Command, Code 05AL-JC
1220 Pacific Highway
San Diego, CA 92132

Dear Mr. Coon,

We realize that the purpose of the U.S. Navy is to protect Americans. That's great. But the prospect of three nuclear aircraft carriers homeporting in San Diego Bay strikes terror in our hearts.


I.13.1

We have heard the rhetoric: "Nuclear power is safe," "San Diego has had nuclear subs for years," "It's for the defense of our nation" (good of the many vs. good of the few?), yadda, yadda. One mistake and it's all over for San Diego.

We say "NO" to additional nuclear carriers. We'd like to see a San Diego free of nuclear-powered vessels and nuclear waste.

With friends like the Navy, who needs enemies? One day we will all be sorry when there's an "accident."

Sincerely,



Patty Mooney
2336 Sumac Drive
San Diego, CA 92105
(619) 282-6126



Mark Schulze

VOLUME 7 CVN HOMEPORING EIS — NASNI RESPONSE TO COMMENTS

Comment Number	Response
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
Patty Mooney and Mark Schulze

I.13.1 Please see response to comment I.4.1.

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Date: 10-8-98 Time: _____

To: MR. JOHN COON, Project Manager, South West Division, Naval Facilities Code OSAL-JC
Fax No.: (619) 532-4998

From: H. Bourne

Phone No.: _____

of Pages (including this sheet): _____

Message: PLEASE, NO NUCLEAR AIRCRAFT CARRIERS
in SAN DIEGO. ALL USE OF NUCLEAR POWER
SHOULD BE DISCONTINUED, FOR THE HEALTH OF
SAN DIEGO. PLEASE ALLOW OUR CITY TO STAY
BEAUTIFUL & HEALTHY. THANK YOU, H. Bourne!

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I.14.1

VOLUME 7 CVN HOMEPORING EIS — NASNI RESPONSE TO COMMENTS

Comment Number	Response
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H. Bourne

I.14.1 Your comments are noted and are included in the Final EIS.

DEVELOPING HOME PORT FACILITIES FOR
THREE NIMITZ-CLASS AIRCRAFT CARRIERS
IN SUPPORT OF THE U.S. PACIFIC FLEET

DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT

DRAFT EIS COMMENTS

Name: Joe Reed

Address: Carmelita

COMMENTS:

Military Question

What military Risks does the
NAVY envision in Bringing more
Ships & personnel To home port in
San Diego Bay From overseas Misses
with Super Advanced guidance systems?

I.15.1

Has San Diego Bay Become a Potential
PEARL Harbor Target, if so, what
Does the Navy plan to do about it?
Bringing more ships, and personnel here,
To Enjoy The Sunshine & Palm Trees?

I.15.2

Signature

6/28/98

Date

Note: This form is supplied for your convenience. You are not required to use this form. Comments of any length may be submitted to the address on the reverse side of this form. Your comments should be postmarked on or before November 12, 1998.

VOLUME 7 CVN HOMEPORING EIS — NASNI RESPONSE TO COMMENTS

Comment Number	Response
Joe Bacon	
I.15.1	<p>It is beyond the scope of this environmental document to hypothesize on a theoretical scenario involving terrorist activities in the San Diego area. In addition, the Navy does not perceive that having three CVNs at NASNI increases the security threat beyond the potential that has existed for the past several decades. The robustness of a naval vessel designed to withstand combat damage lessens the potential impact that such an act might incur. Increased numbers of CVNs is not deemed to present any significant increased risk to the San Diego area from Chinese missiles with Super Advanced Guidance Systems. See also response to comment L.4.44 and I.15.2 below.</p>
I.15.2	<p>The Navy does not perceive that having three CVNs at NASNI increases the threat from terrorists beyond the potential that has existed for the past several decades. In addition, the robustness of a naval vessel designed to withstand combat damage lessens the potential impact that such an act might incur. The very nature of a military asset diminishes its attractiveness as a target for terrorist. Not only is there a constant posture of security maintained through tightly controlled access and roving patrols, but the ability of the trained "targeted personnel" to react with deadly force increases the risk to the terrorist. Please refer to responses I.15.1 and I.37.1.</p>

DEVELOPING HOME PORT FACILITIES FOR
THREE NIMITZ-CLASS AIRCRAFT CARRIERS
IN SUPPORT OF THE U.S. PACIFIC FLEET

DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT

DRAFT EIS COMMENTS

Name: Eric Bowby
Address: 3552 Bancroft St. San Diego, CA 92104

COMMENTS:

I am opposed to more nuclear reactors in San Diego. The more we have the better the chance of having an accident. We need to find safe, alternative military strategies to replace nuclear carriers. I am certain we can do it. Please don't perpetuate the alternative using nuclear reactors because they have so many potential, catastrophic consequences.

I.16.1

Thanks for hearing
my concerns.

Signature

Eric Bowby

Date

10/28/98

Note: This form is supplied for your convenience. You are not required to use this form. Comments of any length may be submitted to the address on the reverse side of this form. Your comments should be postmarked on or before November 12, 1998.

VOLUME 7 CVN HOMEPORING EIS — NASNI RESPONSE TO COMMENTS

Comment Number	Response
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Eric Bowlby

- I.16.1 Our publicly-elected U.S. Congress and President of the United States make programmatic decisions regarding Naval ships (e.g., application of nuclear power), and thus comments regarding these decisions are beyond the scope of this EIS. The results of all the analyses of both normal operations and hypothetical accidents indicate that there would be no significant radiological impacts from homeporting and maintaining NIMITZ-class aircraft carriers or operating NIMITZ-class aircraft carrier maintenance facilities.

JACK A. BRILL
6260 Oakridge Rd.
San Diego CA 92120
(619) 582-7717 (800) 733-6178
Fax (619) 582-2243

October 28, 1998

Department of the Navy
Southwest Division
Navy Facilities Engineering Command
1230 Pacific Highway
San Diego CA 92132

I strongly oppose the home porting of Nuclear Aircraft Carriers in San Diego for the following reasons:

1. "Pearl Harbor" consequences. I remember Pearl Harbor December 7, 1941. Do not repeat this possibility. Docking three Nuclear Aircraft Carriers in San Diego is a repeat of Pearl Harbor. Nuclear Aircraft Carriers docked at the North Island quay wall can not go to sea if there is low tide. If there is high tide, they need four or more tugboats to get them out to sea. A minimum of two hours time. In case of war or nuclear power plant failure this makes the docking of the ships at the quay wall a disaster waiting to happen. We already have many nuclear submarines here in San Diego. We should not concentrate so much sea power in one port.

2. National Defense is reduced. Because of the reasons cited above the \$45 billion dollar war machines can not get to sea in sufficient time or may be seriously delayed if the entry to San Diego Bay is blocked. These ships should be somewhere they can get to sea in minutes, floated out if necessary to be able to do their job.

3. Imposed threat to city of San Diego if there is a nuclear accident aboard the ships

- A. Ships are in the very center of the San Diego population. If there is a nuclear accident there are only two narrow roads off Coronado. All of the citizens of Coronado are trapped there.
- B. No city Government would ever give approval to build a nuclear power plant on Coronado. The U.S. Navy may have the legal right to impose this type of power plant on Coronado but they do not have the moral right to do so.
- C. The Navy points to its good nuclear safety record. I remember there was a U.S.S Thresher that sunk. The Navy may not report publicly but it must have had nuclear "incidents" that have escaped public scrutiny. No system engineered by humans, built by the low bidder, maintained by humans and operated by humans can ever be perfect. A nuclear accident can and will happen. The Navy has no right to put the citizens

of San Diego at risk to this possibility. Every time the Navy boasts about its safety record they should be required to post the same warning that the SEC requires of the investment industry. **PAST PERFORMANCE IS NO GUARANTEE OF FUTURE RESULTS.**

↑ 1.17.3

↓ 1.17.4

4. Jobs issues. The need for three Nuclear Aircraft Carriers based on jobs for San Diego and adding to the economy is very risky. When the nuclear accident happens it can be a total human and economic disaster. Short-term economic advantages should never be put before long term potential disasters. The risk is too high. There is low unemployment in San Diego. The economy is stronger than ever despite the dramatically reduced defense budget.

↓ 1.17.5

5. Navy Credibility is questioned. How can any thinking human trust the Navy? Let me cite a few examples:

- A. Harbor Dredging. The Navy promised sand for the beaches along the coast. After cost over runs, the need to pollute the air and having to buy air pollution credits and other set backs the only thing delivered to the beaches was live ammunition dredged up from the harbor.
- B. The Navy has already scheduled the home porting of three Nuclear AirCraft Carriers in San Diego. They have master planned and built facilities to service these ships. Therefore the holding of these hearings is a cover up to "be legal" with no intent of really getting input from the citizens of San Diego. If the Navy really wanted the input and public acceptance for home porting these ships today's hearings would have been held before facilities were built and the harbor was dredged to accommodate Nuclear AirCraft carriers.

SUMMARY I feel very insecure with one Nuclear Aircraft Carrier in San Diego. My personal safety is threatened and the ability of the Navy to defend me in the case of war is diminished. Please find somewhere else in the world to home port these ships.

Sincerely,


Jack A. Brill

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VOLUME 7 CVN HOMEPORING EIS — NASNI RESPONSE TO COMMENTS

Comment Number	Response
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Jack A. Brill

I.17.1 The Navy has never stated that CVNs could not transit the San Diego Harbor Channel under low tide conditions in emergency situations. Sufficient depth exists in San Diego Channels to accommodate emergency situations. CVNs under normal conditions can transit the San Diego channel under all but the lowest of "minus" tides. Since the dredging of the channel and turning basin occurred in 1998, fully loaded CVNs have large windows of sailing times at MLLW or better. The location of three CVNs in San Diego poses no more of a "Pearl Harbor" threat than has existed with the three conventionally powered aircraft carriers homeported there. Please refer to response to comments O.14.6, I.37.1, and I.29.2.

San Diego historically has been homeport to three aircraft carriers (CVs). The proposed action will not cause this number to increase, but only to change the type of aircraft carrier (CVN) homeported at NASNI. Therefore, there would be no change to the strategic value of San Diego as a result of the proposed action. Please also see the response to O.13.27.

I.17.2 Please see response to comment I.17.1. for a discussion of time needed to get San Diego-based CVN underway and out to sea.

I.17.3 The Navy notes the commentor's general opinion regarding the proposed action. However, several points should be noted. First, as explained in section 7.5 of the EIS, NNPP operations and work performed at Naval bases are such that there is no need for unique emergency preparedness programs outside the base. A community near to where nuclear-powered ships are berthed needs no additional emergency planning or response capability beyond that which exists for emergencies from natural events, such as earthquakes or hurricanes.

Second, in section 7.1.4 of the EIS it is stated that "Two nuclear-powered submarines (USS THRESHER and USS SCORPION) sank during operations at sea in the 1960's. Neither was lost due to a reactor accident . . ." Thus, the commentor's assertion that these incidents were related to a failure of a nuclear-related system is not correct.

Finally, the Navy's historical record of safe and responsible operation of nuclear powered warships is discussed in Volume I, section 7 of the EIS. The NNPP pays very close attention to problems and their prevention. The approach taken is to evaluate even the smallest mistake and take appropriate corrective action to preclude recurrence. Working on the small problems helps ensure that larger problems do not occur. Notwithstanding, the Navy does not claim that such a large and complex engineering endeavor has been without problems. Equipment sometimes fails and people do make mistakes. The Navy does not

Comment Number	Response
	<p>deny that problems have occurred. However, the facts are that since the inception of the NNPP almost half a century ago, there has never been a reactor accident associated with the Program, nor has there been any release of radioactivity that has had a significant effect on the public or the environment. The approach taken is to evaluate even the smallest mistake and take appropriate corrective action to preclude recurrence. The vast majority of NNPP problems are such that they would not be considered "reportable events" or "abnormal occurrences" under NRC or DOE reporting systems.</p>
I.17.4	Please see response to comment I.5.1.
I.17.5	<p>During the BRAC CVN Homeporting ordnance was discovered within the material deposited on the beach in South Oceanside, California. Subsequent to this discovery, the Navy determined that, due to potential risks to public health and safety, the remaining material would be dredged and disposed at a designated offshore disposal site (LA-5).</p>
	<p>A geophysical survey for ordnance has been conducted at Pier J/K. This effort included debris and magnetometer survey with diver and a pile survey to identify location and size of possible debris. Also included was a hydrographic survey of the mitigation site near Pier Bravo. Even with the current available technology there can not be a 100% certainty of identifying buried ordnance.</p>
	<p>In response to comments to maximize the beneficial uses of dredged material from the proposed action, the Navy is proposing, as the preferred option, to transport dredged material from Pier J/K and mitigation site to be deposited just south of the Naval Amphibious Base for the creation of intertidal/subtidal habitat. Creation of this enhancement habitat in Navy protected waters is consistent with the Coastal Act and supports the "San Diego Bay Integrated Natural Resources Management Plan". This preferred option would minimize public health and safety risks that may result from ordnance contained in the dredged footprint. Because of this risk near shore and beach replenishment was not considered an alternative. Please see section 2.3.3.1 in the EIS for a discussion of the proposed action.</p>
	<p>A site specific explosive safety management plan will be developed in accordance with DOD Directive 6055.9, "DOD Ammunition and Explosive Safety Standards," to minimize the risks if ordnance is discovered.</p>
	<p>Final disposal would be in accordance with permit specifications and agency requirements.</p>
	<p>A decision was made early in the initial development of this EIS to not use specific aircraft carrier names or hull numbers to identify prospective replacements or decommissionings. This decision was based on the premise that</p>

VOLUME 7 CVN HOMEPORING EIS — NASNI RESPONSE TO COMMENTS

Comment Number	Response
	<p>the Navy's plans can change subject to a variety of uncontrollable circumstances, and nowhere is this more true than with "long range" plans. Consequently, with the exception of the USS ABRAHAM LINCOLN, which is homeported at NAVSTA Everett, Washington, potential specific replacements or retirements were not identified because (1) the EIS proposes the development of <i>home port facilities</i> for a particular CVN class, and (2) this approach retained plan flexibility by allowing for substitution of hulls. The LINCOLN could specifically be identified because it was neither a potential replacement nor a decommissioning candidate, but rather the subject of an examination with a focus toward increasing the efficiency of support infrastructure, maintenance and repair capabilities, and the enhancement of crew quality of life (please see section 1.1 of this EIS).</p>

Notwithstanding the discussion above, a chronology of events resulting in the potential replacements for aircraft carriers planned for decommissioning in the San Diego area is provided to help the reader understand how NASNI has customarily been home port for three aircraft carriers.

In the 1980s, the Navy reduced the size of its active aircraft carriers from 15 to 12: six in the Atlantic Fleet and six in the Pacific Fleet. Before that time, NASNI had been the homeport for at least three aircraft carriers. In the early 1970s, this included USS TICONDEROGA, USS KITTY HAWK, and USS CONSTELLATION; in the mid-1970s, USS RANGER, KITTY HAWK, and CONSTELLATION; throughout the 1980s, RANGER, KITTY HAWK, and CONSTELLATION; and in the early 1990s, a combination of USS INDEPENDENCE, (while KITTY HAWK and/or CONSTELLATION were undergoing their Service Life Extension effort in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania), KITTY HAWK, CONSTELLATION, and RANGER. All ships listed above are or were conventionally powered carriers, or "CVs."

In 1993, RANGER was decommissioned at the end of its service life and removed from NASNI, temporarily reducing the port-loading to two CVs. In 1993, a Base Realignment and Closure Commission (BRAC) action resulted in the closure of NAS Alameda, California. Because there were no CVN homeport-capable berths at NASNI, the Navy was allowed to shift both NAS Alameda CVNs to the Pacific Northwest, pending completion of construction of suitable homeport facilities at NASNI. Those facilities were the subject of an EIS entitled *Environmental Impact Statement for the Development of Facilities in San Diego to Support the Homeporting of One NIMITZ Class Aircraft Carrier* (DON 1995a). The actual vessel that fulfilled the BRAC mandate and assumed the role of RANGER was USS JOHN C. STENNIS (CVN-74). Arriving in August 1998, STENNIS took over one CVs worth of facility support infrastructure at NASNI. NASNI has had the historical capacity to support three aircraft carriers.

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Comment Number	Response
	<p>In 1998, INDEPENDENCE (at that time the Navy's "forward deployed" carrier) reached the end of its service life and was decommissioned. KITTY HAWK was designated as its replacement and left NASNI in July 1998, 20 months after the Notice of Intent for this EIS, and relocated to Yokosuka, Japan. This resulted in a reduction of the port loading at NASNI to two homeported aircraft carriers. The USS NIMITZ is currently undergoing an extended maintenance period on the East Coast and will require a homeport berth within the Pacific Fleet area. Long range plans indicate that the most likely arrival date on the West Coast for NIMITZ would be early 2002. <i>Were the Preferred Alternative selected</i>, this would bring NASNI back to its historical three carrier port-loading baseline.</p>
	<p>USS CONSTELLATION is expected to reach the end of its service life in approximately 2003. At that time, NASNI would once again experience a reduction in port loading to two homeported carriers <i>if the Preferred Alternative were selected by the Navy</i>. The same long range plans addressing NIMITZ also involve replacing CONSTELLATION with the USS RONALD REAGAN. It is anticipated this will happen in 2005. Once again, <i>if the Preferred Alternative were selected</i>, it would bring NASNI back to its historical three carrier port-loading baseline.</p>
	<p>The closure of Naval Air Station (NAS) Alameda, California, and the relocation of two CVNs to fleet concentrations in San Diego and the Pacific Northwest were carried out in compliance with the 1993 Defense Base Realignment and Closure Commission (BRAC) recommendations. Consequently, the Department of the Navy constructed homeporting facilities for one CVN at NASNI (DON 1995a) and one at Puget Sound Naval Shipyard (PSNS), Bremerton, Washington (DON 1995b). New facilities were needed at NASNI in order to support the homeporting of a CVN, since prior to 1998, there had been no CVNs homeported there. At the time the Navy proposed the construction of facilities at NASNI to support a homeported CVN, the Navy prepared an EIS to present the analysis of potential environmental effects associated with that action. A Final EIS for that project was completed in November 1995. In this Final EIS, the Navy stated, "The proposed action of this EIS does not affect facilities and activities required for the two conventionally powered carriers (CVs) that are currently homeported in the San Diego area. However, as the older CVs are decommissioned, they will be replaced with newer CVNs. Therefore, a decision to establish the capability to support one CVN in the San Diego area makes it reasonably foreseeable that future decisions on where to homeport additional CVNs (CV replacements) beyond the year 2000 could result in their being proposed for homeporting in the San Diego area. This EIS, therefore, considers the potential cumulative environmental impacts of CV replacement and homeporting a total of three CVNs in the San Diego area. The Navy is not, however, developing proposals addressing where to homeport new CVNs beyond the year 2000 at this time. When the Navy does develop such a proposal, it will prepare the appropriate</p>

VOLUME 7 CVN HOMEPORING EIS — NASNI RESPONSE TO COMMENTS

Comment Number	Response
	<p>NEPA documentation." This statement was intended to provide public disclosure of reasonably foreseeable future actions that were not ripe for decision at that time. This is in accordance with 40 CFR 1508.7. The 1995 EIS also states, "This EIS, therefore, considers the potential cumulative impacts of CV replacement and homeporting a total of three CVNs in San Diego." See the 1995 EIS, Volume 1, Chapter 6 (DON 1995a).</p>

The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California evaluated the Navy's 1995 EIS with regard to the segmentation issue raised by the City. The District Court was aware of the Notice of Intent (December 1996) for this EIS before rendering its decision on the 1995 EIS in May 1997. The District Court concurred with the Navy's implementation of NEPA, and concluded that the Navy had not understated the potential effects of a larger project by preparation of two documents (segmentation). In a Court order dated May 12, 1997, the Court stated, "Because the Court finds that no proposal to homeport three CVNs existed prior to the issuance of the Final EIS, the Final EIS's analysis of the possible cumulative impacts of potential additional home ports suffices under NEPA."

DEVELOPING HOME PORT FACILITIES FOR
THREE NIMITZ-CLASS AIRCRAFT CARRIERS
IN SUPPORT OF THE U.S. PACIFIC FLEET

DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT

DRAFT EIS COMMENTS

Name: Andy Dickinson

Address: _____

COMMENTS:

We have a reason for us people living here because we are fighting for the safety of ~~our~~ our city SAN DIEGO. Would if we do go to war with Iraq or cuba, who knows but the NAVY should not have the nuclear weapons here. If we do ~~in~~ they will go for SAN DIEGO because they know that we have some why not ~~all~~ all the ~~big~~ cities of California or on the west coast pacific like why SAN DIEGO. Why shouldn't it be at least north of CALIFORNIA our city has to much history and is very valuable to all the people of SAN DIEGO

I.18.1

Signature

Date

10/28/98

Note: This form is supplied for your convenience. You are not required to use this form. Comments of any length may be submitted to the address on the reverse side of this form. Your comments should be postmarked on or before November 12, 1998.

VOLUME 7 CVN HOMEPORING EIS — NASNI RESPONSE TO COMMENTS

Comment Number	Response
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Andy Dickinson

- I.18.1 The Navy does not perceive that having three CVNs at NASNI increases the threat from terrorists beyond the potential that has existed for the past several decades. In addition, the robustness of a naval vessel designed to withstand combat damage lessens the potential impact that such an act might incur. The very nature of a military asset diminishes its attractiveness as a target for terrorist. Not only is there a constant posture of security maintained through tightly controlled access and roving patrols, but the ability of the trained "targeted personnel" to react with deadly force increases the risk to the terrorist.

DEVELOPING HOME PORT FACILITIES FOR
THREE NIMITZ-CLASS AIRCRAFT CARRIERS
IN SUPPORT OF THE U.S. PACIFIC FLEET

DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT

DRAFT EIS COMMENTS

Name: Ana Maria Estrada
Address: 2005 K St San Diego CA 92101

COMMENTS:

Pues yo estoy muy preocupada por los Barcos que han llegado aqui en San Diego por el aire contaminado por la Salud y por las enfermedades del arma de los mios y nuestros les pedimos comprension por esa mios

L19

Ana Maria Estrada
Signature

10/28/98
Date

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CERTIFIED TRANSLATION OF A DRAFT EIS COMMENT

Name: ANA MARIA ESTRADA
Address: 2005 K St. San Diego, CA. 92102

COMMENTS:

WELL, I AM VERY WORRIED DUE TO THE SHIPS THAT HAVE COME HERE | I.19.1
TO SAN DIEGO, FOR THE CONTAMINATED AIR, FOR THE HEALTH, FOR
THE ILLNESS OF ASTHMA FOR THE CHILDREN AND OLD PEOPLE AND
WE ASK FOR YOUR UNDERSTANDING TOWARDS THE CHILDREN.

ANA MARIA ESTRADA 10/28/98

VOLUME 7 CVN HOMEPORING EIS — NASNI RESPONSE TO COMMENTS

Comment Number	Response
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Anamaria Estrada

- I.19.1 The air quality analysis in the Draft EIS is based on compliance with national and state ambient air quality standards. These standards represent allowable atmospheric concentrations at which the public health and welfare are protected and include a reasonable margin of safety to protect the more sensitive individuals in the population, such as elderly people and children. Since the proposed action alternatives would not exceed any ambient air quality standard, public health would be protected from the effects of the proposed action alternatives. Toxic air contaminants (TACs) emissions from the proposed dredging and disposal actions at NASNI would produce insignificant health impacts to the public.

El análisis de la calidad del aire en el Draft EIS (Estudio de Impacto al Medio Ambiente) está basado en el cumplimiento con las normas de la calidad del aire ambiental nacional y estatal. Estas normas representan las concentraciones atmosféricas permisibles en las cuales el bienestar y la salud pública están protegidas e incluye un margen razonable de seguridad para proteger a los individuos más sensibles dentro de la población, tales como las personas mayores y los niños. Como las acciones alternativas propuestas no excederían ninguna norma de la calidad del aire ambiental, la salud pública estaría protegida de los efectos de las acciones alternativas propuestas. Las emisiones de los contaminantes toxicós del aire (TAC) causadas por el dragado propuesto y por las acciones de deshecho en NASNI, producirían un impacto insignificante en la salud pública.

DEVELOPING HOME PORT FACILITIES FOR
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DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT

DRAFT EIS COMMENTS

Name: IRV HOSENPAUL (USNR)

Address: 1016 Cypress Way
SAN DIEGO 92103

COMMENTS:

I ASKED A FRIEND LAST NIGHT 10/27/98
IF HE HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO MOVE TO
NORTHERN PORTION OF S.D. COUNTY - NEAR SAN ONOFRE
NUCLEAR ENERGY STATION - WHERE WOULD HE MOVE?
THE ANSWER - AS FAR AS AWAY AS POSSIBLE
25 - 30 MILES.

I.20.1

WITH ONS & HAVING (2) NUC. REACTORS ON
BOARD - ALL OF METRO SANDIEGO INCLUDING
MY HOME ARE WITHIN 4 MILES OR THERE COUNS.
I AM WORRIED!

I AM CONCERNED!

I FEEL PROBLEMS MIGHT ARISE!
LITTLE INFO HAS BEEN MADE AVAILABLE RE
HEALTH - OF INDIVIDUALS NEAR NUC. FACILITIES
WHAT ABOUT HEALTH - OF PEOPLE?

IRV HOPPAUL

Signature

Irvin Hosenpaul

10-27-98

Date

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VOLUME 7 CVN HOMEPORING EIS — NASNI RESPONSE TO COMMENTS

Comment Number	Response
Irv Hosenpud	
I.20.1	<p>There is considerable information contained in the EIS on issues pertaining to the risks associated with radiation exposure and human health. Appendix E provides a summary of a number of studies that evaluated the risks of radiation exposure near Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program facilities. The results of these studies and those contained in Appendix F of this EIS indicate there is no significant radiological risks to the health and safety of the general public as a result of NNPP operations or the proposed action.</p>

DEVELOPING HOME PORT FACILITIES FOR
THREE NIMITZ-CLASS AIRCRAFT CARRIERS
IN SUPPORT OF THE U.S. PACIFIC FLEET

DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT

DRAFT EIS COMMENTS

Name:

Nita L. Hunter, CNM, AER

Address:

1016 Cypress Way, San Diego, CA 92103

COMMENTS:

My greatest concern is in the storage
of plutonium & radioactive materials —
As a Nuclear Medicine Technologist I am fully
aware of the dangers of plutonium materials
Storage — dealing with half-lives as long as
those present in Nuclear Weapons — presents
major challenges in an earthquake prone area.

I.21.1

San Diego is a community that is still living
with the Toxic Cleanup of Point Loma, that
will take many more years to clean up —

I.21.2

Epidemiology Reports of the Point Loma area —
Regarding the incidence of Breast & Ovarian
Cancer is from the side of Physicians —
Have you done your homework in this regard!

I.21.3

Signature

Nita L. Hunter, CNM

Date

10-28-98

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VOLUME 7 CVN HOMEPORING EIS — NASNI RESPONSE TO COMMENTS

Comment Number	Response
Anita L. Hunter	
I.21.1	Radioactive waste disposal issues are addressed in sections 3.15.2 and 7.4.3 of the EIS. In addition, a wide range of hypothetical accidents was considered in the development of the analysis presented in the EIS. The hypothetical accidents analyzed indicate risks that are unlikely to be exceeded by other accidents (e.g., airplane crash, earthquake, tsunamis, or terrorism). The results of all the analyses indicate that there would be no significant radiological impacts from homeporting and maintaining NIMITZ-class aircraft carriers or operating NIMITZ-class aircraft carrier maintenance facilities.
I.21.2	As explained in section 3.2.1, contaminated locations on North Island are in the Navy Installation Restoration Program. The contaminated locations are being addressed in accordance with the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA), the National Oil and Hazardous Substance Pollution Contingency Plan, and/or Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) Subtitle I.
I.21.3	The Navy knows of no epidemiological reports in the Point Loma area concerning higher incidents of breast or thyroid cancer than normal. However, Appendix E provides a summary of a number of studies that evaluated the risks of radiation exposure near Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program facilities. The results of these studies indicate there is no significant risk to the health and safety of the general public as a result of NNPP operations.

DEVELOPING HOME PORT FACILITIES FOR
THREE NIMITZ-CLASS AIRCRAFT CARRIERS
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DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT

DRAFT EIS COMMENTS

Name: Harry C. Mangelson

Address: 403 Langley St., Apt. A San Diego, CA 92102

COMMENTS:

My primary concern regarding the stationing of nuclear-powered vessels in San Diego is the establishing of the very highest standards of operational safety. Given the lifetime containment difficulties of spent fuel and the potential for operational accidents the safest way to ensure a non-radioactive San Diego environment is to not bring them here and decommission them.

I.22.1

A secondary consideration is cost. I believe it is likely that the nuclear Navy has few advantages over conventionally fueled one as far as the ability to provide fuel during foreseeable operations as well.

I.22.2

The dredging operations themselves would also stress the bay environment, as the Navy, as well as civilian companies, has contaminated the bay sediments already.

I.22.3

Harry C. Mangelson
Signature

10/28/98
Date

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VOLUME 7 CVN HOMEPORING EIS — NASNI RESPONSE TO COMMENTS

Comment Number	Response
Larry C. Mangelsen	
I.22.1	Our publicly-elected U.S. Congress and President of the United States make programmatic decisions regarding Naval ships (e.g. application of nuclear power), and thus comments regarding these decisions are beyond the scope of this EIS. The results of all the analyses of both normal operations and hypothetical accidents indicate that there would be no significant radiological impacts from homeporting and maintaining NIMITZ-class aircraft carriers or operating NIMITZ-class aircraft carrier maintenance facilities.
I.22.2	See response to comment O.12.55.
I.22.3	The EIS addresses the potential environmental impacts to present conditions associated with homeporting three CVNs. The impact analysis for San Diego Bay indicated that homeporting is not expected to result in significant adverse impacts to water or sediment quality.

DEVELOPING HOME PORT FACILITIES FOR
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DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT

DRAFT EIS COMMENTS

Name: Leonor Miramontes

Address: 1749 Logan Ave S.D.C.A. 92113

COMMENTS:

M. comentario es que me opongo a que traigan plantas nucleares porque es muy riesgoso y peligroso para nuestra comunitad donde hay niños y nos atien en mal porque contaminarian el aire y nuestros hijos se enferman por eso me opondre para que eso no le pase a suceder en la comunitad porque donde quieran poner eso nos opondremos por nuestros hijos que son niños inocentes y no saben del peligro pero uno de adalfo ha aver pol ellos y por nosotros por eso se lo pedimos que por favor no traigan esas armas gracias

I.23.1

Leonor Miramontes
Signature

10-28-98
Date

Note: This form is supplied for your convenience. You are not required to use this form. Comments of any length may be submitted to the address on the reverse side of this form. Your comments should be postmarked on or before November 12, 1998.

CERTIFIED TRANSLATION OF A DRAFT EIS COMMENT

Name: LEONOR MIRAMONTES
Address: 1749 Logan Avenue San Diego CA, 92113

COMMENTS:

MY COMMENT IS THAT I AM AGAINST YOU BRINGING NUCLEAR PLANTS BECAUSE IT IS VERY RISKY AND DANGEROUS FOR OUR COMMUNITY WHERE THERE ARE CHILDREN AND YOU WOULD BE DOING A BAD EVIL BECAUSE YOU WOULD CONTAMINATE THE AIR AND OUR CHILDREN WOULD GET SICK AND THAT IS WHY I WILL OPPOSE SO THAT IT WILL NOT HAPPEN IN THE COMMUNITY, AND WHEREVER YOU WANT TO PUT THAT, WE WILL OPPOSE IT FOR OUR CHILDREN WHO ARE INNOCENT CHILDREN AND DO NOT KNOW OF THE DANGER AND US, AS ADULTS, WILL OVERSEE IT FOR THEM AND FOR OURSELVES, THAT IS WHY WE ASK YOU TO PLEASE NOT BRING THOSE WEAPONS, THANK YOU

LEONOR MIRAMONTE

10/28/98

VOLUME 7 CVN HOMEPORING EIS — NASNI RESPONSE TO COMMENTS

Comment Number	Response
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Leonor Miramontes

- I.23.1 A wide range of hypothetical accidents was considered in the development of the analysis presented in the EIS. The hypothetical accidents analyzed indicate risks that are unlikely to be exceeded by other accidents (e.g., airplane crash, earthquake, tsunamis, or terrorism). The results of all the analyses of both normal operations and hypothetical accidents indicate that there would be no significant radiological impacts from homeporting and maintaining NIMITZ-class aircraft carriers or operating NIMITZ-class aircraft carrier maintenance facilities.

En el desarrollo de los análisis presentados en el EIS (Estudio de Impacto al Medio Ambiente) se consideró una amplia diversidad de accidentes hipotéticos. Los accidentes hipotéticos analizados indican riesgos que probablemente no sean excedidos por otros accidentes (ejemplo: el choque de un avión, terremotos, maremotos o el terrorismo). Los resultados de todos los análisis, tanto de las operaciones normales como de los accidentes hipotéticos, indican que no existirán impactos radiológicos significativos del puerto base y del mantenimiento de los portaaviones de clase NIMITZ o de operar las instalaciones de mantenimiento para los portaaviones clase NIMITZ.

DEVELOPING HOME PORT FACILITIES FOR
THREE NIMITZ-CLASS AIRCRAFT CARRIERS
IN SUPPORT OF THE U.S. PACIFIC FLEET

DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT

DRAFT EIS COMMENTS

Name: José M. Jimontos

Address: 1751 Logan AV San Diego, CA.

COMMENTS:

Mi Comentario es que me opongo a que no a carrier más armas nucleares ó toxicos nucleares pues es peligroso en dearme nuclear para las ciudades y colonias de el area. porque podria enviar el aire y asi morir miles de personas o quedar millones entre adultos niños mujeres y hombres. Y con el tiempo nos traeria enfermedades a nuestros hijos al medio ambiente y a nuestra propia salud. Y por el bienestar de nuestra comunitad nos opondremos rotundamente que ~~no~~ se planten armas ~~o~~ nucleares. por el bienestar de cada familia o hogar de nuestra comunitad.

I24.1

José M. Jimontos
Signature

10-19-98
Date

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CERTIFIED TRANSLATION OF A DRAFT EIS COMMENT

Name: JOSE MIRAMONTES
Address: 1751 Logan Avenue San Diego CA,

COMMENTS:

MY COMMENT IS THAT I AM AGAINST YOU BRINGING ANY MORE NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND NUCLEAR TOXICS, BECAUSE IT IS DANGEROUS WITH A NUCLEAR SPILL, FOR THE CITIES AND COLONIES OF THE AREA., BECAUSE IT COULD POISON THE AIR AND THOUSAND OF PEOPLE COULD DIE OR MAYBE MILLONS, AMONG ADULTS, CHILDREN, WOMEN AND MEN, AND WITH TIME IT WOULD BRING ILLNESSES TO OUR CHILDREN AND TO THE ENVIRONMENT AND TO OUR OWN HEALTH. AND FOR THE WELFARE OF OUR COMMUNITY WE WILL TOTALLY OPPOSE TO HAVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS, FOR THE WELFARE OF EACH FAMILY OR HOME IN OUR COMMUNITY.

I.24.1

JOSE MIRAMONTE

10/28/98

VOLUME 7 CVN HOMEPORING EIS — NASNI RESPONSE TO COMMENTS

Comment Number	Response
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Jose Miramontes

- I.24.1 It is the Department of Defense policy to neither confirm nor deny the presence of nuclear weapons at any site.

A wide range of hypothetical accidents was considered in the development of the analysis presented in the EIS. The hypothetical accidents analyzed indicate risks that are unlikely to be exceeded by other accidents (e.g., airplane crash, earthquake, tsunamis, or terrorism). The results of all the analyses of both normal operations and hypothetical accidents indicate that there would be no significant radiological impacts from homeporting and maintaining NIMITZ-class aircraft carriers or operating NIMITZ-class aircraft carrier maintenance facilities.

La política del Departamento de Defensa es de ni confirmar, ni de negar la presencia de armas nucleares en ninguna ubicación.

En el desarrollo de los análisis presentados en el EIS (Estudio de Impacto al Medio Ambiente) se consideró una amplia diversidad de accidentes hipotéticos. Los accidentes hipotéticos analizados indican riesgos que probablemente no sean excedidos por otros accidentes (ejemplo: el choque de un avión, terremotos, maremotos o el terrorismo). Los resultados de todos los análisis, tanto de las operaciones normales como de los accidentes hipotéticos, indican que no existirán impactos radiológicos significativos del puerto base y del mantenimiento de los portaaviones de clase NIMITZ o de operar las instalaciones de mantenimiento para los portaaviones clase NIMITZ.

DEVELOPING HOME PORT FACILITIES FOR
THREE NIMITZ-CLASS AIRCRAFT CARRIERS
IN SUPPORT OF THE U.S. PACIFIC FLEET

DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT

DRAFT EIS COMMENTS

Name: James Ricker

Address: 4682 Campus Ave SD 92116

COMMENTS:

The Draft EIS for this project
is an insult to the intelligence and
authority, to the jurisdiction of
the people in this matter.

I.25.1

As a citizen, taxpayer (your employer)
I demand that a new Draft be
composed, with full public disclosure
of accident statistics and probabilities.

I.25.2

- There is no evacuation plan
- There is no believable risk assessment
- The democratic process must be
included in making your decision.

I.25.3

You are our SERVANTS;
ACT like it.

James P. Ricker
Signature

10/28/98
Date

Note: This form is supplied for your convenience. You are not required to use this form. Comments of any length may be submitted to the address on the reverse side of this form. Your comments should be postmarked on or before November 12, 1998.

VOLUME 7 CVN HOMEPORING EIS — NASNI RESPONSE TO COMMENTS

Comment Number	Response
James Ricker	
I.25.1	Your comments are noted and are included in the Final EIS.
I.25.2	Please see responses to comments L.4.100, O.10.31, and O.10.34.
I.25.3	This EIS was prepared pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act, passed by Congress in 1969. The Act requires public disclosure via a scoping notice, a scoping hearing, and a Draft EIS that is made available to the public. The public is then provided the opportunity to comment upon and question the description of the proposed action and the environmental effects. The Navy, as Lead Agency, is responsible for addressing the public's questions and comments in the Final EIS. The public will have 30 days to review the Final EIS before a decision is made. This is the democratic process established by Congress and the Council on Environmental Quality. The Navy believes it has followed all applicable laws and regulations in preparing this EIS.

DEVELOPING HOME PORT FACILITIES FOR
THREE NIMITZ-CLASS AIRCRAFT CARRIERS
IN SUPPORT OF THE U.S. PACIFIC FLEET

DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT

DRAFT EIS COMMENTS

Name: Moctezuma Rodriguez

Address: 1911 HARRISON AVE SAN DIEGO CA.

COMMENTS:

Todo lo que estamos viendo es causa del Riesgo
Al cual en un mañana nos destruirá.

I.26.1

Vemos Niños mutilados y Deformes

Personas mayores cancerosas

Gracias al uso de la Energía Atómica

No debemos de permitir esto

Aunque muchas cosas es para el bien mismo
de la ciencia

Estamos esperando a la contaminación del
aire y del agua.

No mas plantas atómicas móviles como

Son los Barcos Radioactivos

Gracias por la oportunidad que me dan de
describir Gracias.

Moctezuma Rodriguez

Signature

10/28/98

Date

Note: This form is supplied for your convenience. You are not required to use this form. Comments of any length may be submitted to the address on the reverse side of this form. Your comments should be postmarked on or before November 12, 1998.

CERTIFIED TRANSLATION OF A DRAFT EIS COMMENT

Name: MOCTEZUMA RODRIGUEZ
Address: 1911 Harrison Avenue, San Diego CA

COMMENTS:

ALL WE ARE SEEING IS THE CAUSE OF THE RISK THAT ONE MORNING
WILL DESTROY US. WE SEE CHILDREN MUTILATED AND DEFORMED,
CANCEROUS OLD PEOPLE, THANKS TO THE USE OF ATOMIC ENERGY.
WE SHALL NOT PERMIT THIS, ALTHOUGH MANY THING ARE FOR THE
GOOD OF SCIENCE. WE ARE AGAINST AIR AND WATER CONTAMINATION.
NO MORE MOVING NUCLEAR PLANTS LIKE RADIOACTIVE SHIPS ARE.
THANK YOU FOR THE GIVING ME THE OPPORTUNITY OF SAYING IT.

I.26.1

MOCTEZUMA RODRIGUEZ

10/28/98

VOLUME 7 CVN HOMEPORING EIS — NASNI RESPONSE TO COMMENTS

Comment Number	Response
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Moctezuma Rodriguez

- I.26.1 A wide range of hypothetical accidents was considered in the development of the analysis presented in the EIS. The hypothetical accidents analyzed indicate risks that are unlikely to be exceeded by other accidents (e.g., airplane crash, earthquake, tsunamis, or terrorism). The results of all the analyses of both normal operations and hypothetical accidents indicate that there would be no significant radiological impacts from homeporting and maintaining NIMITZ-class aircraft carriers or operating NIMITZ-class aircraft carrier maintenance facilities.

En el desarrollo de los análisis presentados en el EIS (Estudio de Impacto al Medio Ambiente) se consideró una amplia diversidad de accidentes hipotéticos. Los accidentes hipotéticos analizados indican riesgos que probablemente no sean excedidos por otros accidentes (ejemplo: el choque de un avión, terremotos, maremotos o el terrorismo). Los resultados de todos los análisis, tanto de las operaciones normales como de los accidentes hipotéticos, indican que no existirán impactos radiológicos significativos del puerto base y del mantenimiento de los portaaviones de clase NIMITZ o de operar las instalaciones de mantenimiento para los portaaviones clase NIMITZ.

DEVELOPING HOME PORT FACILITIES FOR
THREE NIMITZ-CLASS AIRCRAFT CARRIERS
IN SUPPORT OF THE U.S. PACIFIC FLEET

DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT

DRAFT EIS COMMENTS

Name:

Sandra Rodriguez


Address: 2058 main st 157 San Diego Ca . 92113

COMMENTS:

Impacto seria Castas tropica para
miles de personas latiendo seria
infertil no que daria nadie de
nosotros personas y animales
no sobrevivir los niños no tendrían
un futuro el que lo grava salvarse
sería mejor morir como el resto
sería Con causa defensa seria como
en Japón sería una mala decisión
por la decisión de algunos personas
por que no piensan en algo mejor
para la humanidad lo nuclear cuando
es cosas de paz es bien en planteo pero
para lo que quieren ustedes es muy malo

I.27.1

Sandra R.



Signature

11.28.98
Date

Gracias Por desear es lo

Note: This form is supplied for your convenience. You are not required to use this form.
Comments of any length may be submitted to the address on the reverse side of this form. Your
comments should be postmarked on or before November 12, 1998.

para mi y mi familia

I.27

CERTIFIED TRANSLATION OF A DRAFT EIS COMMENT

Name: SANDRA RODRIGUEZ
Address: 2058 Main St. 157, San Diego CA 92113

COMMENTS:

THE IMPACT WOULD BE CATASTROPHIC FOR THOUSANDS OF LATIN PEOPLE, THEY WOULD BE INFERTILE, NOTHING WOULD BE LEFT OF US, PEOPLE NOR ANIMALS, THE CHILDREN WOULD HAVE NO FUTURE, THE ONE THAT WOULD SURVIVE, IT WOULD BE BETTER TO BE DEAD, LIKE THE OTHERS, WITH THEIR DEFORMED FACES, LIKE IN JAPAN, IT WOULD BE A CURSE FOR (ILLEGIBLE) OF SOME PEOPLE THAT DO NOT THINK OF SOMETHING BETTER FOR HUMANITY, NUCLEAR FOR PEACE TIME IT IS WELL USED, BUT FOR WHAT YOU WANT IT, IT IS VERY BAD.

SANDRA RODRIGUEZ

10/28/98

THANK YOU FOR SAYING THIS FOR MYSELF AND FOR MY FAMILY.

VOLUME 7 CVN HOMEPORING EIS — NASNI RESPONSE TO COMMENTS

Comment Number	Response
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Sandra Rodriguez

- I.27.1 A wide range of hypothetical accidents was considered in the development of the analysis presented in the EIS. The hypothetical accidents analyzed indicate risks that are unlikely to be exceeded by other accidents (e.g., airplane crash, earthquake, tsunamis, or terrorism). The results of all the analyses of both normal operations and hypothetical accidents indicate that there would be no significant radiological impacts from homeporting and maintaining NIMITZ-class aircraft carriers or operating NIMITZ-class aircraft carrier maintenance facilities.

En el desarrollo de los análisis presentados en el EIS (Estudio de Impacto al Medio Ambiente) se consideró una amplia diversidad de accidentes hipotéticos. Los accidentes hipotéticos analizados indican riesgos que probablemente no sean excedidos por otros accidentes (ejemplo: el choque de un avión, terremotos, maremotos o el terrorismo). Los resultados de todos los análisis tanto de las operaciones normales como de los accidentes hipotéticos, indican que no existirán impactos radiológicos significativos del puerto base y del mantenimiento de los portaaviones de clase NIMITZ o de operar las instalaciones de mantenimiento para los portaaviones clase NIMITZ.

DEVELOPING HOME PORT FACILITIES FOR
THREE NIMITZ-CLASS AIRCRAFT CARRIERS
IN SUPPORT OF THE U.S. PACIFIC FLEET

DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT

DRAFT EIS COMMENTS

Name: Suzanne Rosen

Address: 5872 Kantor St.
San Diego, CA 92122

COMMENTS:

I wish to respectfully submit my request that the Navy postpone its decision to bring more nuclear carriers into San Diego until the matter can be reviewed by the public.

If indeed it is to the benefit of the people both here in San Diego and the nation, then the facts that support this should be clearly presented. Without the support of those involved, there can only be frustration and inefficiency.

Again, please postpone this decision so that further research can be documented and widely distributed.

Thank you

I.28.1

I.28.2

Signature

Suzanne Rosen

10-28-98

Date

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VOLUME 7 CVN HOMEPORING EIS — NASNI RESPONSE TO COMMENTS

Comment Number	Response
Suzanne Rosen	
I.28.1	The Draft EIS was published on 28 August 1998 and made available to the public for review. The comment period was extended from 45 to 75 days.
I.28.2	Without a request for specific types of additional research and documentation to be conducted, this comment cannot be addressed.

DEVELOPING HOME PORT FACILITIES FOR
THREE NIMITZ-CLASS AIRCRAFT CARRIERS
IN SUPPORT OF THE U.S. PACIFIC FLEET

DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT

DRAFT EIS COMMENTS

Name: MEL SHAPIRO
Address: 1050 ESSEX ST San Diego 92103

1 COMMENTS:

SAV ONCE HAD AN EVACUATION
PLAN.

WHY DOESN'T THE NUCLEAR
NAVY BASE HAVE ONE?

THE EVACUATION PLAN SHOULD
BE PART OF THE EIS.

I.29.1

2 IS IT WISE TO CONCENTRATE ALL
CARRIERS IN 1 LOCATION? THIS
MAKES AN EASY TARGET FOR
AN ENEMY. DISPERSION IS BETTER
STRATEGY.

I.29.2

Signature

Melvin Shapiro

Date

10/28/98

Note: This form is supplied for your convenience. You are not required to use this form. Comments of any length may be submitted to the address on the reverse side of this form. Your comments should be postmarked on or before November 12, 1998.

VOLUME 7 CVN HOMEPORING EIS — NASNI RESPONSE TO COMMENTS

Comment Number	Response
Mel Shapiro	
I.29.1	Please see response to comment O.10.31.
I.29.2	The U.S. Pacific Fleet has dispersed its aircraft carrier assets at four different home ports: Puget Sound Naval Shipyard, Washington; Naval Station Everett, Washington; Yokosuka, Japan; and San Diego, California. This geographic dispersal, when combined with deployment commitments, results in few occasions over a period of a year when more than two carriers are co-located at any one port. For further detail on security issues of co-locating more than one carrier in a given location, please see the response to comment L.4.44.

DEVELOPING HOME PORT FACILITIES FOR
THREE NIMITZ-CLASS AIRCRAFT CARRIERS
IN SUPPORT OF THE U.S. PACIFIC FLEET

DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT

DRAFT EIS COMMENTS

Name: CRAIG SHERMAN
Address: 1901 First Ave # 335

COMMENTS:

Draft EIS is deficient in analyzing visual impacts. Essentially all views of Coronado will be lost as viewed from downtown San Diego. What mitigation is being offered to mitigate visual impacts? What economic and tourist interest losses might be realized from decreased views and aesthetics from downtown San Diego? What will happen if a national newspaper picks up on San Diego's "military view" complex? Will tourism and the City's image be lost? What are the cumulative impacts, if any, when an aircraft carrier is ~~moored~~ moored as a museum at the Broadway Pier?

I.30.1

I.30.2

I.30.3

St.

Signature



10-29-98

Date

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VOLUME 7 CVN HOMEPORING EIS — NASNI RESPONSE TO COMMENTS

Comment Number	Response
Craig Sherman	
I.30.1	Depending on the alternative selected, views of Coronado may be altered, although impacts would remain below the thresholds of significance identified in section 3.12.2. As stated in section 3.12 under the discussion of operational impacts for each alternative, aircraft carriers have been accepted as part of the NASNI view for decades. It is common for multiple aircraft carriers or other ships to be moored at NASNI (DON 1995a). Therefore, providing capacity to homeport up to two additional CVNs, in conjunction with the decommissioning of two CVs, would not substantially change the existing views of Coronado.
I.30.2	It is difficult to assess the impacts to tourism and visitor spending in the San Diego region due to insignificant changes to the views from downtown San Diego. The presence of Navy facilities, especially vessels have, in themselves, tourist value. The San Diego region has a wide range of tourist attractions (including its proximity to Mexico) and it is unlikely that potential changes in the visual environment at one specific location will measurably impact the level of tourism in the San Diego region.
I.30.3	The creation of a museum for the USS MIDWAY at the Broadway Street Pier has been added to the list of reasonably foreseeable projects in section 3.18. The combination of this project, along with the proposed action and other reasonably foreseeable projects, is addressed in section 3.18.

DEVELOPING HOME PORT FACILITIES FOR
THREE NIMITZ-CLASS AIRCRAFT CARRIERS
IN SUPPORT OF THE U.S. PACIFIC FLEET

DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT

DRAFT EIS COMMENTS

Name: Norma Sullivan

Address: 5858 Scripps St. San Diego, Ca 92122

COMMENTS:

On the public hearing Wed. 10-28: a disgrace!
Over-flow facilities are routinely provided at
this building - 2 large rooms with audio
and television. Why not thought?

I.31.1

No air conditioning. The aisles are packed
with people, which violates the fire
Safety code.

If this is a measure of The Navy's
competence, God save us all -

Norma Sullivan

Signature

10-28-98

Date

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VOLUME 7 CVN HOMEPORING EIS — NASNI RESPONSE TO COMMENTS

Comment Number	Response
Norma Sullivan	
I.31.1	Notification of the meeting location was in compliance with NEPA requirements and the inclusion of a second meeting was in direct response to a request from the community. In addition, the location for the meeting was set in response to a specific request from a local organization. The meeting was conducted in accordance with NEPA requirements and all participants who wanted to speak were provided an opportunity to make comments. Had the Navy been expecting more people as compared to previous meetings involving CVN homeporting, a larger site would have been chosen.

DEVELOPING HOME PORT FACILITIES FOR
THREE NIMITZ-CLASS AIRCRAFT CARRIERS
IN SUPPORT OF THE U.S. PACIFIC FLEET

DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT

DRAFT EIS COMMENTS

Name: Rogelia Urino
Address: 333 20th SD Cal. 92102

COMMENTS:

I.32.1

Yo estoy muy preocupada acerca de lo que ustedes piensan hacer con sus Barcos de nucleares porque nuestras playas estan muy contaminadas y no se puede pescar porque la playa esta muy Sucia y tambien no se puede ni Bañar porque es una cosa espantosa que no se soporta porque es malo para nuestra Comunida pero el pueblo unido siempre estara y espero que todos los Comentarios los escuchen y mediten antes de tomar las Iniciativas y piensen en lo peligroso que es  

Rogelia Urino
Signature

10/28/98
Date

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CERTIFIED TRANSLATION OF A DRAFT EIS COMMENT

Name: ROGELIA URCINO
Address: 333 20TH , San Diego CA 92102

COMMENTS:

I AM VERY WORRIED ABOUT WHAT YOU THINK OF DOING WITH YOUR NUCLEAR SHIPS, BECAUSE OUR BEACHES ARE VERY CONTAMINATED AND ONE CAN NOT FISH BECAUSE THE BEACH IS VERY DIRTY AND ALSO ONE CAN NOT SWIM BECAUSE IT IS A HORRIBLE THING THAT CAN NOT BE PUT UP WITH, AND IT IS BAD FOR OUR COMMUNITY, BUT THE PEOPLE ALWAYS WILL BE UNITED AND I HOPE THAT YOU LISTEN TO ALL THE COMMENTS AND YOU THINK BEFORE TAKEN ANY INITIATIVE AND THINK HOW DANGEROUS IT IS.

I.32.1

ROGELIA URCINO

10/28/98

VOLUME 7 CVN HOMEPORING EIS — NASNI RESPONSE TO COMMENTS

Comment Number	Response
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Rogelia Urcino

- I.32.1 The EIS explains how the proposed action of providing capacity to homeport up to two additional CVNs at NASNI would not result in significant, unavoidable impacts on beaches and fishes.

Dredging of an estimated 582,000 cubic yards (cy) of bottom sediments from areas adjacent to and immediately offshore from the wharf would be required. Dredging would be conducted in accordance with permit specifications and other requirements of EPA, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and RWQCB Permit conditions that specify: specific dredging equipment, water quality monitoring, barge disposal monitoring, and a debris management plan. Dredging operations would not cause long-term changes in dissolved oxygen concentrations or in other water quality characteristics because sediments suspended during dredging would settle to the bottom, and natural mixing processes would reduce any other localized changes to water quality, within a period of several hours after dredging stops. Based on extensive tests and modeling completed by the Navy, sediment caused during dredging would not create significant releases of chemical contaminants, and would not kill marine animals including fish. Excavation for the new pier and dike would cause similar short-term impacts that would not significantly affect water quality of marine animals. Construction would cause shock waves from pier pile driving, causing fishes to temporarily leave the activity area. Most fish are very mobile and would be able to avoid the construction area. This effect would be short-term and less than significant. Floating barriers (booms) would be placed around the construction site to ensure that any accidental release of debris during construction would be contained so that it would not float onto local beaches.

When in port, the homeported carriers would be surrounded by a floating boom to contain any materials accidentally released. The booms would also help in clean up efforts. Emergency response and clean-up plans are required and would rehearsed to ensure that effects from any spills would be minimized.

Therefore, the proposed action to provide capacity to homeport additional CVNs would not pose a significant impact to area beaches and fish.

El EIS (Estudio de Impacto al Medio Ambiente) explica como la acción propuesta para proveer capacidad como puerto base para hasta dos más CVN's en el NASNI, no resultaría en inevitables y significativos impactos a las playas y a los peces.

Se requeriría el dragado de aproximadamente 582.000 yardas cúbicas (cy) de sedimentos de fondos de las áreas adyacentes y de las que están inmediatamente afuera de la costa cerca del muelle. El dragado sería llevado a cabo de acuerdo a las especificaciones de los permisos y de otros requisitos por parte de EPA, el cuerpo de ingenieros del Ejército de

VOLUME 7 CVN HOMEPORING EIS — NASNI RESPONSE TO COMMENTS

Comment Number	Response
	<p>Estados Unidos, y las condiciones del Permiso y RWQCB que especifica: el equipo específico de dragado, el control de la calidad de agua, el control del desecho por las dragas, y un plan de administración de residuos. Las operaciones de dragado no causarían cambios a largo plazo en las concentraciones de oxígeno disuelto ni en otras características de la calidad del agua, porque los sedimentos suspendidos durante el dragado se estabilizarían en el fondo y los procesos naturales de mezcla reducirían todo otro cambio localizado en la calidad del agua dentro de un período de varias horas después que se pare de dragar. Basándose en extensos análisis y modelos completados por la Marina, los sedimentos causados durante el dragado no crearían descargas significativas de contaminantes químicos, y no mataría los animales marinos, incluyendo los peces. La excavación para un nuevo muelle y dique causaría impactos similares de corto plazo que no afectarían significativamente ni la calidad del agua ni a animales marinos. La construcción causaría ondas de impacto al clavar las vigas del muelle, causando que los peces se alejaran temporalmente del área de actividad. La mayoría de los peces tienen mucha movilidad y podrían evitar el área de construcción. Este efecto sería de corto plazo y mucho menos que significativo. Las barreras flotantes (booms), serían puestas alrededor del lugar de la construcción para asegurar que toda descarga accidental de residuos durante la construcción quedaran contenidos para evitar que floten hacia las playas locales.</p>
	<p>Cuando estuvieran en el puerto, los portaaviones del puerto base estarían rodeados por barreras flotantes para contener todo material descargado accidentalmente. Estas barreras flotantes también ayudarían en los esfuerzos de limpieza. Las respuestas de emergencia y planes de limpieza son requeridos y serían practicados para asegurar que los efectos de todo derrame fueran minimizados.</p>
	<p>Por lo tanto, la propuesta acción de proveer capacidad para adicionales CVN en el puerto base no causaría un impacto significativo a las playas y a los peces del área.</p>

DEVELOPING HOME PORT FACILITIES FOR
THREE NIMITZ-CLASS AIRCRAFT CARRIERS
IN SUPPORT OF THE U.S. PACIFIC FLEET

DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT

DRAFT EIS COMMENTS

Name: L AURETTE VERBINSKI
Address: 8871 CLIFFRIDGE AVE
LA JOLLA, CA 92037

COMMENTS:

No, No, No -
SAN DIEGO IS TOO
BIG AN URBAN AREA.
FOR NUC. CARRIERS
TO BE SO CLOSE

Raurette Verbinski
Signature

10/26/98
Date

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VOLUME 7 CVN HOMEPORING EIS — NASNI RESPONSE TO COMMENTS

Comment Number	Response
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Laurette Verbinski

I.33.1 Your comments are noted and are included in the Final EIS.

DEVELOPING HOME PORT FACILITIES FOR
THREE NIMITZ-CLASS AIRCRAFT CARRIERS
IN SUPPORT OF THE U.S. PACIFIC FLEET

DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT

DRAFT EIS COMMENTS

Name:

Hector Yuriar


Address:


COMMENTS:

We should not have nuclear carriers

I.34.1

because no matter what they say
it's not safe. It better to not have
one dead than one dead, NO more
nuclear waste please we will fight.


Signature


Date

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VOLUME 7 CVN HOMEPORTING EIS — NASNI RESPONSE TO COMMENTS

Comment Number	Response
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Hector Yuriar

I.34.1 Please see response to comment I.22.1.

The Navy Is All Wet

I.35.1

The Navy is all wet

It hasn't happened yet.

Why do we all fret?

Imagine our sixth largest city.

It would be a pity.

If this lovely, temperate place

Became a barren space.

Contaminated by nuclear waste.

Please take heed post haste.

It would take one small mistake
To create a nuclear wake.

It fills my heart with fear.

Because, it could happen here.

The navy is all wet.

No, it hasn't happened yet.

Nuclear carriers must go

Before disaster strikes, you know.

Please do not forget.

Leave no room for regret.

Ruth Picarsky-Benjamin
San Diego, California 10.98

VOLUME 7 CVN HOMEPORING EIS — NASNI RESPONSE TO COMMENTS

Comment Number	Response
Ruth Pickarsky-Benjamin	
I.35.1	Please see response to comment I.4.1.

1780 Avenida del Mundo
#404
Coronado, CA 92118

Naval Facilities Engineering Command
(Code 05AL.JC)
1220 Pacific Highway
San Diego, CA 92132-5190

Gentlemen:

Please record the position of this Coronado family as being in favor of the proposal to make North Island the home port for three nuclear powered carriers.

We believe that this proposal is in the best interests of both the community and the nation.

Sincerely,



Ed and Genie Sack

VOLUME 7 CVN HOMEPORING EIS — NASNI RESPONSE TO COMMENTS

Comment Number	Response
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Ed and Genie Sack

I.36.1 Your comments are noted and are included in the Final EIS.

November 3, 1998

Southwest Division, Naval
Facilities Engineering Command
Code 05ALJC
1220 Pacific Highway
San Diego, CA 92132-5190

Mr. Jim Bell
P.O. Box 7453
San Diego, CA 92167

Subject: Message left on the CVN Draft EIS Information Line

Dear Mr. Bell:

We have received your comment you recorded on the Homeporting Draft EIS information line, and have summarized it as follows.

I'm voicing my total opposition to the Homeporting idea. I'm questioning the stationing of any nuclear vessels in and around the heart of San Diego. Beyond the potential for accidents, I feel that because of the danger of terrorism worldwide, this could create a target for terrorists. Sinking a large ship at the mouth of the Bay could prevent any carriers from leaving port. This is not good from either a military or civilian perspective to protect the civilians in this country and Mexico, and does not make any sense... "Please reconsider this. This is nuts."

I.37.1

We suggest that you submit your comments in writing for accuracy. Written comments must be received by November 12th, 1998. Please send them addressed to my attention at the address above. You may also fax your comments to (619) 532-4998. You may also submit your comments by email, to: CVN_HOMEPORTING@efdswest.navfac.navy.mil.

Thank you for your perspective.

Yours truly,

John Coon

VOLUME 7 CVN HOMEPORING EIS — NASNI RESPONSE TO COMMENTS

Comment Number	Response
Jim Bell	
I.37.1	<p>It is beyond the scope of this environmental document to hypothesize on a theoretical scenario involving terrorist activities in the San Diego area. In addition, the Navy does not perceive that having three CVNs at NASNI increases the threat from terrorists beyond the potential that has existed for the past several decades. The robustness of a naval vessel designed to withstand combat damage lessens the potential impact that such an act might incur. The very nature of a military asset diminishes its attractiveness as a target for terrorist. Not only is there a constant posture of security maintained through tightly controlled access and roving patrols, but the ability of the trained "targeted personnel" to react with deadly force increases the risk to the terrorist.</p>

The Navy, throughout its long history of homeporting dozens of ships in San Diego Bay, has evaluated the risk of having its ships, regardless of the ship's type of propulsion, "trapped" inside the Bay, and found that risk to be acceptable. This EIS analyzes the impact to the environment of the construction and operation of facilities to support homeporting three CVNs; the same number of aircraft carriers that have been homeported in Coronado for decades.

October 26, 1998

3930 Park Blvd.
San Diego, CA 92103
(619) 296-6713

John Coon, Project Manager
Southwest Division, Naval facilities, Engineering Command
Code 05AL-JC
1220 Pacific Highway
San Diego, CA 92132

Dear Mr. Coon:

I am extremely concerned about the Navy's plans for nuclear-powered aircraft carriers in San Diego. North Island Naval Air Station sits in the middle of a major metropolitan area. The homeporting of two more nuclear carriers in San Diego poses a serious public health and safety threat. It results in too many nuclear reactors too close to too many people.

I.38.1

Please measure the water quality in areas surrounding Naval Air Station North Island to ensure the safety of the public. This water will have to be measured regularly to ensure that the marine environment is kept free of pollutants from NASNI.

I.38.2

Also, I want assurance that hazardous waste storage facilities on NASNI will be used solely for the base generated wastes and not for wastes generated from off-base facilities.

I.38.3

In the event of an accidental release of radioactive material into the environment, I want assurance that the Navy will notify local and state agencies. I want assurance that contingency plans to ensure the safety of the population in affected areas have been developed.

I.38.4

With its decision to bring nuclear-powered aircraft carriers into San Diego, the Navy has assumed tremendous responsibilities. The Navy must take every step to ensure the safety of the millions of residents who live in San Diego.

I.38.5

Respectfully,

Jason A. Folkman
Jason A. Folkman

VOLUME 7 CVN HOMEPORING EIS — NASNI RESPONSE TO COMMENTS

Comment Number	Response
Jason A. Folkman	
I.38.1	Your comments are noted and are included in the Final EIS. Please see response to comment I.4.1.
I.38.2	Any requirements for, and the scope of, monitoring would be determined by the regulatory agencies through the permitting process. However, evaluations in the EIS concluded that no significant impacts would occur to water and sediment quality.
I.38.3	The State of California, Department of Toxic Substance Control (DTSC), permits the hazardous waste storage facilities at North Island for operation. That permit allows wastes generated at other Navy facilities to be stored at the North Island facility. The Mixed Waste Facility at NASNI will only be allowed to temporarily store small amounts of mixed waste from SUBASE San Diego pending shipment to permitted treatment, storage and disposal facilities. Issues concerning storage and shipment of Non-CVN generated hazardous wastes to and from NASNI are not part of the proposed action.
I.38.4	Please see responses to comments O.10.31, O.12.33, and O.12.81.
I.38.5	Your comments are noted and are included in the Final EIS.

October 28, 1998

Janet M. Hatch
816 Olive Avenue
Coronado, California 92118

Sir, as a 30 year resident and voter of the City Coronado, I wish to object to the addition of two nuclear aircraft carriers stationed at NAS North Island.

I.39.1

My reason is 3 carriers in this small town will severely impact an already impossible traffic problem with its attendant air pollution, noise, etc.

I.39.2

The added naval personnel adds very little to our city's economy. Why?

I.39.3

Simply stated, they cannot afford Coronado prices. I, a retiree, am hardly making it myself!

I.39.3

Our Naval sources state that a nuclear accident while a ship is in port is very remote. Perhaps, but statistics over the centuries show accidents do happen!

I.39.4

Please give this letter serious consideration to those of us who do not wish any nuclear carriers in our area.

I.39.5

Yours truly,

Janet Hatch

VOLUME 7 CVN HOMEPORTING EIS — NASNI RESPONSE TO COMMENTS

Comment Number	Response
Janet M. Hatch	
I.39.1	Your comments are noted and are included in the Final EIS.
I.39.2	Your comments are noted and are included in the Final EIS. For information on the transportation, air quality, and noise analysis please see response to comments L.2.2, O.12.141, and L.4.29, respectively.
I.39.3	Your comments are noted and are included in the Final EIS. The Navy concurs with the commentor's statement that the added Naval personnel would add very little to the City's economy. As stated in section 3.8.2.3, providing the capacity to homeport two additional CVNs would result in 3,319 additional military personnel to the region.
I.39.4	Your comments are noted and are included in the Final EIS. Please see response to comment I.22.1.
I.39.5	Your comments are noted and are included in the Final EIS.

DEVELOPING HOME PORT FACILITIES FOR
THREE NIMITZ-CLASS AIRCRAFT CARRIERS
IN SUPPORT OF THE U.S. PACIFIC FLEET

DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT

DRAFT EIS COMMENTS

Name: Tom Dawson
Address: 708 E Ave Coronado Ca 92118

COMMENTS:

I AM AGAINST THE USE OF NUCLEAR POWER. THE "CONS" OUT WEIGH THE "PROS". WHAT COST FOR POWER?; TO POISON THE ENVIRONMENT WITH SUBSTANCES SO LETHAL AS TO BE DEADLY FOR THOUSANDS OF YEARS?. NUCLEAR POWER, NUCLEAR WASTE AND LIFE ARE A DEADLY MIX WITH LIFE COMING OUT THE ~~loser~~ LOSER.

I.40.1

THE UNITED STATES WOULD SERVE THE WORLD AND IT SELF BETTER BY DEVELOPING ALTERNATIVE POWER SOURCES FROM RENEWABLE SUPPLIES.

I.40.2

PERSONALLY, WHERE NUCLEAR IS, IS WHERE I DON'T WANT TO BE. SO, BECAUSE OF THE NUCLEAR BUILD UP IN THIS AREA (SAN DIEGO) THIS WILL MEAN THE LOSS OF MY BUYING POWER AND TAX DOLLARS... IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

I.40.3

T. N. Dawson
Signature

11.03.98
Date

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VOLUME 7 CVN HOMEPORING EIS — NASNI RESPONSE TO COMMENTS

Comment Number	Response
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Tom Dawson

- I.40.1 Your comments are noted and are included in the Final EIS. Please see response to comment I.22.1.
- I.40.2 Your comments are noted and are included in the Final EIS. Please see response to comment I.22.1.
- I.40.3 Your comments are noted and are included in the Final EIS.

DEVELOPING HOME PORT FACILITIES FOR
THREE NIMITZ-CLASS AIRCRAFT CARRIERS
IN SUPPORT OF THE U.S. PACIFIC FLEET

DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT

DRAFT EIS COMMENTS

Name: Khatara Morgan

Address: 708 E Ave. Coronado, Ca. 92118

COMMENTS:

I am strongly opposed to your bringing more "Nuclear" anything to this densely populated area - San Diego - North Island.

We already have more than enough here of "Nuclear" submarines & aircraft carrier. This adds a burden of toxicity to our environment.

It all adds up! I don't believe in "Nuclear" power. The costs (long term radiation problems, monetary costs, extra care, wastes) just don't outweigh the benefits.

Is this the legacy we will leave our children & their children? The Native American Indians have a saying "How will this "affect" for Seven Generations. We must begin to think along these lines.

The people here are saying no to this. We are supposed to live in a democracy. You do have the power to "turn the ship around" & go back. We just don't have the time or options to play around with & make mistakes with Nuclear Radiation.

Signature

Khatara Morgan

Date Nov. 3, 1998

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VOLUME 7 CVN HOMEPORING EIS — NASNI RESPONSE TO COMMENTS

Comment Number	Response
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Khatara Morgan

I.41.1 Please see response I.22.1.

November 5, 1998

To: Mr. John Coon, Project Manager--Code 05AL-JC
Southwest Division, Naval Facilities Engineering
FAX (619) 532-4998

From: Ms. Sally Beynon, US citizen and 36 year resident of San Diego
FAX & phone (619) 223-8583

Re: Comment on the Draft Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS)
for two more nuclear aircraft carriers to be homeported in San
Diego Bay.

I have lived in San Diego most of my adult life. My family and friends are here. I, and almost everyone with whom I have discussed the matter, are horrified that the Navy is proposing to homeport two additional nuclear aircraft carriers here as well as to create new radioactive waste treatment and storage facilities on North Island and at the Point Loma Submarine base. I.42.1

Through the Peace Resource Center and the Environmental Health Coalition, I have received information describing recent naval nuclear accidents culled from Navy records. I have also seen the findings of the recent Government Accounting Office report that found that in spite of incredible costs, nuclear carrier provide no military advantage. I.42.2

The Navy's DEIS for the two additional carriers does not include much necessary information about its accident record or emergency response plans, nor did it respond to issues raised by our community including concerns relating to environmental justice in an already polluted environment or requests for baseline health studies and air monitoring. I.42.3

It seems that under the guise of protection (which would appear to be unnecessary and without military advantage) the Navy is endangering our health and our lives, not to mention wasting our tax dollars. I am totally opposed to this proposal and am committed to alerting all with whom I come in contact to the situation and the publically available information on the hazards we would face should the proposal become reality. I.42.4

VOLUME 7 CVN HOMEPORING EIS — NASNI RESPONSE TO COMMENTS

Comment Number	Response
Ms. Sally Benyon	
I.42.1	The scope of this EIS does not include creating new radioactive waste treatment and storage facilities at North Island. As described in response O.12.69, issues associated with constructing and operating the NASNI Depot Maintenance Facility were analyzed in reference DON 1995, and are beyond the scope of this EIS. In addition, issues associated with constructing and operating facilities at SUBASE San Diego were analyzed in reference DON 1998b, and are addressed in section 6.18, Cumulative Impacts.
I.42.2	Please see responses O.12.12 and O.12.33.
I.42.3	The purpose of the environmental justice analysis is to determine whether there would be a disproportionate effect on a minority or low-income population. The environmental justice section related to San Diego, section 3.17, discusses Coronado as the relevant sub-regional area, since this community is adjacent to, and closest to areas impacted by the proposed action. The community of Coronado is comprised of relatively few minorities and low income households (see Table 3.17-1 in Volume 1). Based on this analysis, there is no reason to conclude that minorities or low income communities would be affected disproportionately. Any impacts from air quality, traffic, security, construction, earthquakes, and personnel loading would primarily affect the residents of Coronado; these impacts would also be less than significant, as discussed in the relevant sections of the Draft EIS. Finally, as indicated in section 3.10, air quality impacts would be below thresholds of significance and would therefore not be expected to increase respiratory or other illnesses. In absence of significant environmental impact except for localized areas around NASNI, the EIS concluded that there would be no disproportionate effects on minority or low income populations." For further detail, please see responses to comments O.10.31, O.12.33, O.12.101, and L.4.36.
I.42.4	Your comments are noted and are included in the Final EIS.

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Mr. John Coon (Code 05AL.JC)
Southwest Division
Naval Facilities Engineering Command
1220 Pacific Highway
San Diego, California 92132

November 12, 1998

RE: Comments on the DEIS for Developing Home Port
Facilities for Three Nimitz-Class Nuclear Powered
Aircraft Carriers in Support of the U.S. Pacific
Fleet

Dear Mr Coon:

I have several comment on the above captioned DEIS ("DEIS"). I begin by pointing out that the purpose of a Draft Environmental Impact Statement as required by the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA") is to provide full and frank disclosure of the environmental impacts and risks of a proposed project so that citizens and politicians can make informed decisions about its acceptability. The DEIS, because of the problems noted in this letter, as well as the problems noted in the comment letters on the DEIS filed by The Environmental Health Coalition and the City of Coronado, fails to perform this fundamental purpose of disclosure. Accordingly, this letter must insist, in order to fulfill the purposes required by NEPA, that the questions and issues raised by this letter and the comment letters submitted by the City of Coronado and The Environmental Health Coalition be fully, frankly and comprehensively dealt with in a revised Draft Environmental Impact Statement circulated again for comment in accordance with the requirements applicable to Draft Environmental Impact Statements, including the required public hearings. Because of the fundamental nature of the disclosure inadequacies noted in this letter, it is only through this reanalysis, revision, reissuance and recirculation process that the public can be informed enough to make decisions about this project, including what mitigations, if any, might make this project acceptable.

Reissuance of a DEIS in draft form is not unknown and in fact is clearly required under CEQA when a draft environmental impact report (the State equivalent of a draft environmental impact statement) does not meet the disclosure standard required

by CEQA. Please see *Laurel Heights v. Regents of California*, 6 Cal. 4th 1112 (1993) in which the Supreme Court of the State of California held that a draft environmental impact report must be redone and recirculated if it is seriously deficient. CEQA is applicable in this situation because the DEIS is also serving to meet the requirements of CEQA. The DEIS is seriously deficient and does not meet the disclosure requirements of CEQA and NEPA for the reasons stated in this letter and in the comment letters filed on the DEIS by The Environmental Health Coalition and by the City of Coronado.

Moreover, the DEIS represents just one stage of a larger project: the reconfiguring and expansion of the Navy's presence in and around San Diego Bay. This reconfiguring and expansion commenced several years ago with the Draft Environmental Impact Statement for the Stennis and the associated support facilities, continued with the decommissioning of the McKee and the construction of a shore based facility for submarine maintenance and continues now with this DEIS. Contrary to the purposes and reconfiguring and expansion project into smaller segments which the requirements of NEPA, the Navy has divided this enormous process which is supposed to give the public a chance to evaluate the total impacts and risks of a proposed project in advance. The DEIS should now be revised to now perform this function by disclosing the impacts of the entire project against the pre-Stennis baseline. It is only in this way that the public can be informed and understand the total impacts and risks of this project.

My specific comments commence with comments on Appendices E and F. I start by noting that these Appendices are extremely difficult for a lay person to understand. I suspect there are few people in San Diego who have had the time or patience to struggle with it as I have and that most people do not understand it and instead rely on the reassuring probability statistics thrown out by the Navy at its public meetings. These statistics are highly misleading and greatly understate the risks for several reasons:

1. In all the risk probability analyses, except possibly one the risk has been calculated by multiplying the assumed risk by the Navy's own estimate of the probability of an accident. (See page F-1, line 14 et seq.). The Navy assumes this probability is an extremely tiny fraction (5×10^{-10} to the minus three power) (See page F-19, line 11 et seq.). (How the Navy arrives at this probability factor is not clear.) The effect of this is to greatly underestimate the risk if an accident occurred, i.e., if you multiply anything by a tiny fraction, the end result is a tiny number. But what citizens deserve to know is what the risk is to them if there is an accident. The numbers should be restated to back out this probability factor.

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2. The one set of tables (Table F-9 and Table F-11) that may back out the probability factor are incomprehensible to the average person, including the average person with an advanced degree who has spent time studying them. This means that they fail in their function of informing the public about an essential feature of the project, i.e., the degree to which they may have a higher cancer risk as a result of this project. In Table F-9, the risk to a maximally exposed off site individual at NASNI is stated to be 1.0×10^{-4} to the minus 4 power. This is meaningless to the average person. This analysis should be restated in language that people can understand.

3. The risk analyses present the cancer risks of radiation exposure in terms of the average ANNUAL risk. People need to know what their risk is of developing cancer during their lifetime, not the risk in any given year. The Navy method of calculation again greatly understates the cancer risk caused by this project. The new DEIS must recalculuate the data to show lifetime risk rather than average annual risk.

4. The risk analyses show the risk of FATAL cancers, not total cancers. Again, this understates the risks. The Navy must restate the analyses to include all cancers.

5. The risks of adverse health effects other than cancer should also be disclosed.

6. The cancer risk assumptions used in Appendix F and described in Appendix E do not reflect current scientific thought about the cancer and other adverse health consequences of ionizing radiation at much lower doses than previously thought. In September of this year I attended a scientific symposium on the health effects of low level radiation at the New York Academy of Medicine. Although this is a field in which some controversy exists, the findings of most of the papers presented were that cancer risks exist at much lower levels than previously thought. (See the comments of Dr. David Richardson submitted to the Environmental Health Coalition dated 10/20/98 enclosed herewith.) Whether or not the Navy agrees with this research, in a disclosure document of this nature, it is misleading not to at least acknowledge it and analyze the data on the basis of this more current research as well. Because the DEIS does not take the higher risk factors implied by current scientific thought into account, the Navy's risk calculations again may greatly underestimate the cancer risk. Appendices E and F should be redone using these more current and conservative risk assumptions.

7. The DEIS risk analyses model only two modest accidents, including only one accident involving an airborne release of radioactivity. There are many other possibilities for accidents, such as airborne radioactive steam from a carrier's reactor (such as happened in the Puget Sound accident); sabotage (such as happened in the Groton, Conn. submarine base where the wires to

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the fuel rods which control the reactor were almost severed); a spill of radioactive primary coolant on land while it is in the process of being transported from the carriers to the radioactive waste reprocessing plant; an earthquake on the faults that are right next to this operation that caused the radioactive waste storage facility and/or the radioactive waste reprocessing plant to collapse or the loosely compacted landfill on which part of this project is located to liquify; a reactor going critical (the Navy must explain if the carrier could be towed out to sea at low tide and how they would persuade the civilian operated tugboats to maneuver it out of the Bay). The DEIS must set forth all possible serious accident scenarios and they must be modeled using worst case assumptions.

I.43.6
I.43.11
8. The meteorology assumptions are not clear. The DEIS says it assumes 95% worst case meteorology. What does this mean? For Coronado, the worst case meteorology is the prevailing winds which blow from the base towards Coronado residences 87% of the time. Do the Navy analyses assume the worst case is winds blowing toward Coronado or winds blowing towards downtown San Diego (which might be considered worst case by the Navy because it would expose a larger population)? If the analyses assume the wind is blowing towards San Diego, does it underestimate the risk of the maximally exposed individual living in Coronado?

I.43.7
I.43.12
9. I note that Appendix F describes the Navy's Plans to evacuate NASNI within two hours in the event of a radiological accident, including practice drills, but there are no such plans for the residents of Coronado or San Diego. There is only a vague statement on page F-6, line 11 et. seq. about "emergency response" and communications with state and local authorities. This is obviously inadequate. I point out that the Navy has refused to release its emergency response plans for a San Diego Radiological Emergency in response to a FOIA request by the Environmental Health Coalition on the ground that it is classified. This is unacceptable. Emergency Plans which are not well known and well rehearsed are not effective. I further note that neither the Navy nor the cities surrounding the Bay currently have any means to even notify residents in the event of a radiological emergency, which unlike most other types of emergencies, would not necessarily be apparent to people. You may recall that it was several days before the residents surrounding Three Mile Island were notified of the radiation hazard and, because radiation is invisible and odorless, they were unaware of it until notified. Moreover, it would be simply impossible to evacuate the population of Coronado in any reasonable time frame in view of its limited means of egress, especially since the Navy would apparently be using these limited means of egress to evacuate North Island at the same time. And it may be impossible to evacuate anyone at all from Coronado if a radiological release occurred at the same time as, or was caused by, an earthquake which also rendered the bridge and/or the Strand road impassible. Moreover, it is virtually impossible to conceive of how the enormous metropolitan area of San Diego could be evacuated in the

event of an emergency in view of the fact that the existing roadways are barely able to handle the traffic of a normal rush hour and in view of the fact that Coronado and North Island would be evacuating at the same time. Moreover, there are no known evacuation plans and no means to communicate such in the event of an emergency.

10. All that most citizens know about the radiation risk to which they may be exposed in connection with the nuclear carrier homeporting is the reassuring "negligible risk" statistics presented at the Navy hearings, i.e., cancer risk of 1 in 2 billion. This number (Table F-1, page F-2) not only is dramatically understated by the factors described above, it is the AVERAGE annual risk of a fatal cancer of all people living in a 50 mile radius of the project. This number dilutes the risk by averaging in the enormous population of Tijuana to the South and the highly populated areas to the North and West of San Diego, and by assuming that the risk of upwind populations is the same as downwind populations, and assumes NORMAL operations, i.e., NO ACCIDENT. Even the companion maximally exposed individual risk factor of 1 in 19 million assumes NORMAL operations. Appendices E and F must be redone to make it clear to citizens and the cities surrounding San Diego Bay what the true risks are.

11. It is not clear what distance assumption has been used to calculate the risk to the MOI, i.e., the most exposed off base person. The assumed distance from the closest element of exact distance of the Base boundary from the project, which I believe is the carriers, be used. I suspect that inappropriate distance assumptions were used because the non-worker on-Base population is shown to have a higher risk than the closest Coronado resident, but in fact, residents of Coronado are closer to the carriers than most on-Base residents and workers. If the assumed distance has been estimated from the reprocessing plant rather than the carriers (the carriers could be the locus of an accidental release of radiation just as happened in Puget Sound where a Navy nuclear vessel in port with the reactors turned off released a cloud of radioactive steam) or the distance to residences turned overstate, this would again operate to understate the risk to residents. Instead of considering the MOI figures as the relevant statistics, Coronado residents may be exposed to the risk of the on-Base population, or greater, since Coronado residents are actually closer to the carriers than the on-Base population. (Again, I note that the on-Base population has evacuation plans and Coronado residents do not, possibly based on these assumptions which would not seem to be correct.)

12. I am enclosing with this letter a list of questions submitted to Richard C. Guida of the Navy's nuclear propulsion program in connection with a meeting held in Coronado several years ago. These questions were not answered at that meeting or since. The new DEIS should address these questions. The answers to these questions are essential to permit citizens to evaluate

I43.12 their risk.

13. I am also enclosing a document relating to the overwork conditions that caused the Mystic accident several years ago when mercury was accidentally dumped into San Diego Bay, in front of the very turning basin where the carriers will park. This accident was caused by an overworked and fatigued crew. (This document was obtained through a Freedom of Information Act request by The environmental Health Coalition.) The Navy's recruiting and retention problems have been much in the news of late. The new DEIS should indicate how the personnel shortages caused by these problems may intensify the likelihood of accidents, explaining the extent to which the Nuclear Navy is currently experiencing personal shortages, how these shortages are likely to intensify and how the Navy compensates for those shortages, through overtime work, etc. The new DEIS should explain what safeguards the Navy has in place to avoid the conditions of fatigue that caused the Mystic accident. It should also explain why safety procedures failed in the Mystic accident. The Navy should release the "lessons learned report" from this accident.

14. The new DEIS should include a guarantee that the carriers will not be defueled or refueled in Coronado/ San Diego Bay at any time in the future or in the alternative, state that defueling and refueling may be done here and set out fully and frankly the risk that this extremely hazardous operation would pose to surrounding populations.

15. I have enclosed drafts of two letters addressed to The Environmental Health Coalition, one from Camille Sears dealing with Appendices E and F and other air toxics issues and the other from the Institute for Energy and Environmental Research dealing with Appendices E and F. The final versions of these comment letters are filed with the November 12, 1998 comment letter of The Environmental Health Coalition on the DEIS and are incorporated herein by reference. The issues and questions contained in these letters should be fully addressed in the new DEIS.

16. The new DEIS should include a description of the "collection tanks" referred to in Appendix F which might result in one of the accidents modeled in the DEIS and explain how the radioactive liquid will be transferred from the nuclear powered aircraft carrier to the collection tanks and what is then done with the radioactive liquid in the collection tanks, including how it is transported for reprocessing or storage. The DEIS should also describe what conditions could cause the tanks to rupture and what the safeguards are to prevent such an accident.

17. The new DEIS should also describe how radioactive liquids and solids will be transported to and from the vessels to the Controlled Industrial Facility and the radioactive waste storage facility and the conditions under which the transport process could result in an accidental release of radioactivity.

			I 143.27
143.20	18. The new DEIS should fully explain whether and under what circumstances radioactive solids or liquids or toxic chemicals will be brought into North Island from facilities located elsewhere, the names and locations of the sources of radioactive or chemical wastes that may be brought to North Island and what conditions could result in an accidental release of radiation or toxic chemicals during the transport or transfer process.	I 143.28 Therefore the surrounding communities are already living with the radiation, toxic chemical and explosion risks that are also inadequately described in this DEIS. At the minimum, the Navy should pay for the cost of a monitoring system, under the independent control of citizens, which is designed to monitor for radiation and toxic chemical releases. Moreover, the Navy must disclose, (and develop if it has not previously done so) emergency and evacuation plans which should be communicated to the public and rehearsed.	I 143.29
143.21	19. The DEIS should state definitively that there will never be a dry dock constructed at North Island. A statement of present intention is insufficient inasmuch as present intention could change the day after the DEIS became final.	I 143.28 Further, the Navy should make available Potassium iodide from Federal stockpiles, to be stored in communities possibly affected by an accidental release of radiation in a hazardous amount, especially in the schools of such communities, with instructions on the circumstances in which administration of the Potassium iodide would be advisable and the proper doses for different age groups. It may be necessary for the Navy to work through the State of California to do this inasmuch as the recent change in Federal regulations which makes Federal stockpiles of potassium iodide available contemplates a state request.	I 143.29
143.22	20. The DEIS should describe all expected and routine releases of radioactive steam or gases (including, but not limited to, xenon, krypton and tritium) into the air and the possible adverse health consequences which could be caused by exposure thereto.	I 143.28 Finally, The Navy should pay for a tunnel which would run from the San Diego Bay Bridge to inside the gates at North Island inasmuch as the tunnel would serve North Island exclusively and is made necessary by the enormous increase in traffic already coming into North Island as a result of the Navy's various expansion activities and which would be greatly worsened by the proposed project.	I 143.29
143.23	21. The Navy should state in the new DEIS that the Navy will immediately notify citizens in surrounding communities of any and all accidental releases of radiation and will permit independent testing to verify the amounts released. The DEIS should state that the Navy will notify citizens in advance of all planned and expected releases of radiation into the air.	I 143.28 Although I have commented on several possible mitigation measures that should be provided by the Navy based on the already existing conditions caused by the Stennis and other Navy expansion in San Diego Bay which were never properly addressed in an Environmental Impact Statement which covered the entire scope of the intended reconfiguration and expansion of the Navy presence in and around San Diego Bay, as well as the Additional nuclear aircraft carriers and related support facilities covered by the DEIS, I do not in any way intend to suggest that the homeporting of additional vessels and construction of related support facilities contemplated by the DEIS can be acceptably mitigated. While final thoughts on this matter must await the reanalyses, revision and republication of the DEIS as outlined above, based on what I now know about the scope of this project and the possible and expected impacts on Coronado and the San Diego region, I doubt that the risks and impacts can be adequately mitigated as to Coronado and the San Diego region. The actions proposed by the DEIS for Coronado and the San Diego	I 143.29
143.24	I also comment on munitions loading onto vessels at the carrier docks. The record of decision for the Stennis EIS indicated that the Navy was seeking a waiver from its own regulations which would otherwise have prohibited the loading of munitions this close to residences because of the danger of explosion. The new DEIS should explain the intention of loading munitions at the carrier docks, explain the risks that the Navy's regulations were designed to protect against and describe the explosion arcs that would result from a worst case accident and how this would impact nearby residents.	I 143.28 I endorse all the comments of The Environmental Health Coalition on the DEIS by their letter dated November 12, 1998, including the expert reports enclosed therewith and incorporate these comments and reports herein by reference. The comments and deficiencies discussed in therein should be fully addressed in the new DEIS.	I 143.29
143.25	I also incorporate by reference the reports and comments of the consultants and experts and law firm hired by the City of Coronado and filed with the comment letter of the City of Coronado on the DEIS dated November 12. The comments and deficiencies raised by these letters and reports should be fully addressed in the new DEIS.	I 143.28 While it is premature to consider whether and what mitigation might be made this project acceptable until all the	I 143.29

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region pose unacceptable risks and, therefore, must be withdrawn. | 1.43.30

Very truly yours,

Marilyn J. Field

Enclosures

Enclosures listed below were provided with this comment letter. These enclosures were also received from other commenting agencies or organizations, as indicated.

See attachments to comment O.13 by the Peace Resource Center of San Diego for the following:

- Draft letter from the Institute of Energy and Environmental Research

See expert comment letters attached to comment letter O.12 by Environmental Health Coalition for the following:

- Comments of Dr. David Richardson, Department of Epidemiology, School of Public Health, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, NC
- Letter by Camille Sears to Ms. Laura Hunter, Environmental Health Coalition, November 10, 1998.

See attachments to City of Coronado comment letter L.4 for the following:

- Memorandum from Lt E. N. Panlilio, MYSTIC AOIC to Reporting Senior RE: LT Mid-Term Counseling
- Questions from Marilyn G. Field, 1101 1st Street, to be raised by the Coronado City Council at April, 1996 meeting with Richard Guida and the city's independent nuclear consultant.
- Letter from Ivan A. Getting, Subject: Questions for meeting with Richard Guida. April 5, 1996
- Question for Mr. Richard Guida from Earle Callahan. April 5, 1996
- Letter from Environmental Health Coalition to Coronado Mayor and City Council. April 5, 1996.
- Questions for Mr. Guida from Stephanie Kaupp. April 5, 1996
- Questions for Mr. Guida, from Sandor Kaupp. April 5, 1996

VOLUME 7 CVN HOMEPORING EIS — NASNI RESPONSE TO COMMENTS

Comment Number	Response
Marilyn G. Field	
I.43.1	The Navy, as Lead Agency, has complied with all applicable regulations in the preparation of the Draft EIS; therefore, the Navy disagrees that the document is deficient in meeting NEPA requirements. Responses to public comments on the Draft EIS have been provided in this Final EIS. In response to some comments, additional information has been added to the text. The Navy considers that the Final EIS, incorporating revisions as a result of public comment, complies with NEPA requirements and no recirculation of the Draft EIS is required. Responses to your specific comments are provided below.
I.43.2	The closure of Naval Air Station (NAS) Alameda, California, and the relocation of two CVNs to fleet concentrations in San Diego and the Pacific Northwest were carried out in compliance with the 1993 Defense Base Realignment and Closure Commission (BRAC) recommendations. Consequently, the Department of the Navy constructed homeporting facilities for one CVN at NASNI (DON 1995a) and one at Puget Sound Naval Shipyard (PSNS), Bremerton, Washington (DON 1995b). New facilities were required at NASNI in order to support the homeporting of a CVN, since prior to 1998, there had been no CVNs homeported there. At the time the Navy proposed the construction of facilities at NASNI to support a homeported CVN, the Navy prepared an EIS to present the analysis of potential environmental effects associated with that action. A Final EIS for that project was completed in November 1995. The Navy knew at that time that, consistent with established policy, the two remaining CVs in the Pacific Fleet would eventually be replaced with CVNs. Further, the Navy knew at that time that homeporting those CVNs would require construction of additional facilities somewhere in the Pacific Fleet area of responsibility. Although a need had been identified, the Navy had not formulated an action to satisfy that need. Formulating an action to address that situation would require assessing the adequacy of existing facilities, determining the extent of new facility requirements, and identifying possible locations for home ports.

The environmental analysis in an EIS correlates to the level of planning for a particular project. If the planning has evolved such that the agency has formulated a project to meet a particular need, the EIS should reflect analysis of all aspects of that project, and the alternative methods of meeting the identified need should be addressed on a "co-equal" basis. In this case, the Navy had not, at the time of preparation of the 1995 EIS, formulated a proposal for how to meet the need of facilities for two more CVNs in the Pacific Fleet.

However, the Navy did anticipate that in the future, a proposal would be formulated, and that the alternatives could include facilities at NASNI. Therefore, a larger project was not segmented into two smaller projects for the purpose of avoiding more rigorous environmental analysis. Further, although a

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Comment Number	Response
	"proposal" had not been formulated such that it could be analyzed on a "co-equal" basis in the 1995 EIS, it was reasonably foreseeable that a future project could include additional facilities at NASNI. Since it was reasonably foreseeable, the potential effects were included in the analysis of cumulative effects in that document. The 1995 EIS states "This EIS, therefore, considers the potential cumulative impacts of CV replacement and homeporting a total of three CVNs in San Diego." See Volume 1, Chapter 6, DON 1995a.
	The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California approved the Navy's implementation of NEPA, and concluded that the Navy had not understated the potential effects of a larger project by preparation of two documents (segmentation). In an Order dated May 12, 1997, the Court stated , "Because the Court finds that no proposal to homeport three CVNs existed prior to the issuance of the Final EIS, the Final EIS's analysis of the possible cumulative impacts of potential additional home ports suffices under NEPA."
	The Navy, as Lead Agency, complied with all applicable regulations in the preparation of the Draft EIS; therefore, the Navy disagrees that the document is deficient in meeting NEPA requirements. The comment states that CEQA is the state equivalent to NEPA. In fact, there are several substantial differences between the two statutes. However, in the comment it is correctly stated that both statutes do have disclosure requirements. The Navy believes that the EIS satisfies both the spirit of and the specific requirements of NEPA and its implementing regulations in terms of analyzing and disclosing the environmental effects of the proposed action and alternatives. Please note that federal agencies are not subject to CEQA. Under recent amendments to CEQA, state agency actions of issuing permits to federal agencies are now subject to CEQA.
I.43.3	Please see the response to comment I.43.2 above.
I.43.4	The technical analyses contained in the appendices are to support conclusions contained in the EIS, consistent with 40 CFR 1502.18. Please see responses to comments L.4.34 and O.10.34.
I.43.5	Tables F-9 and F-11 have been revised to be consistent with Table F-7. Specifically, risk is stated in scientific notation (e.g., 5.0×10^{-7}) and statistical terms (e.g., 1 in 2 million). Converting between the two can be done by simply taking the inverse of the number or $1/2,000,000 = 5.0 \times 10^{-7}$.
I.43.6	Please see response to comment O.12.25.
I.43.7	Please see response to comment O.12.27.

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Comment Number	Response
I.43.8	Health effects other than cancer are discussed in Appendix E, as well as in response O.12.27.
I.43.9	Please see response to comment O.12.190.
I.43.10	Please see response to comment O.12.84 and O.13.27.
I.43.11	Appendix F, section 2.4, states that the 95 percent meteorological condition is the combination of weather stability class and wind speed that results in the highest calculated exposures. This means that at least 95 percent of the time, weather conditions are such that doses equal to or less than those calculated would result (combinations of faster wind speeds and/or more unstable atmospheric conditions). For the EIS accident analyses, Pasquill Stability Category F with a wind speed of 0.89 meters per second is used.
	Since the locations of members of the public are different for each of the 16 compass directions evaluated, doses are calculated for each of the 16 possible wind directions, each using the 95 percent meteorological condition. The analysis results reported in Table F-9 for the nearest public access individual, maximally-exposed off-site individual, and the public are the largest of the 16 exposures calculated, and represent conservative estimates of doses to receptors in any of the 16 compass directions. For this reason, and to minimize the complexity of the EIS, exposures and distances for all 16 directions are not reported.
I.43.12	Please see responses to comments L.4.47, L.4.48, and O.12.53.
I.43.13	Risks to members of the public from normal operations and accident scenarios are presented in two distinct ways: risk to a member of the general population within 50 miles in which dose to the entire population is averaged over the entire population, and risk to the maximally-exposed off-site individual in which the dose is directly received and not averaged. Risk to the maximally-exposed off-site individual is calculated by analyzing the dose to a specific member of the public, which results in a higher hypothetical risk to the maximally-exposed off-site individual which bounds the risk to a member of the general population. Thus, no change to the EIS is deemed necessary.
	In addition, contrary to the commentor's assertion, exposure to the Mexican population is calculated and reported separately in Appendix F, section 3.
I.43.14	As is explained in section 2.1 of Appendix F, the maximally-exposed offsite individual is defined as a theoretical individual living at the base boundary receiving the maximum exposure. Since that individual receives the maximum exposure, the exposure for the maximally-exposed off-site individual bounds the exposure for any member of the public in any of the 16 compass directions. The

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Comment Number	Response
	<p>same methodology is used to determine the exposures to the nearest public access individual. For this reason, and to minimize the complexity of the EIS, individual distances for the maximally-exposed off-site individual and nearest public access individual are not needed to be reported in the EIS. For information, the nearest public access individual is located 945 meters from the release point, and the maximally-exposed off-site individual is located 1,189 meters from the release point at North Island. Differences between the dose estimates to the nearest public access individual and maximally-exposed off-site individual are due to different modeling assumptions used for those individuals. Table F-5 of Appendix F identifies the different exposure times used in the analysis. Since calculations are based on assumptions appropriate to the individual being evaluated, assuming that a Coronado resident would receive the same exposure as non-involved worker at NASNI is not a technically correct assumption.</p>
I.43.15	<p>The comments provided in the letter attached by the commentor were developed for a meeting which was outside the scope of the present NEPA process, and were not generated as a result of direct review of the subject Environmental Impact Statement. However, since some of the comments address issues relating to those in the EIS, the Navy has the following responses:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Routine and accidental releases of radioactivity are addressed in responses O.12.33 and L.4.37.2. Please see response to comment O.10.38.3. Please see response to comment O.12.49.4. Please see responses to comments L.4.39 and L.4.40.5. Tables F-9 and F-11 of Appendix F provide the consequences of hypothetical releases of radioactivity to both on-site personnel and members of the public.6. Please see response to comment O.12.49.7. As described in section 7.1.4 of the EIS, features such as redundant systems enhance reactor safety as well as contribute to the ability of the ship to survive combat.8. Please see response to comment O.12.33.9. Please see response to comment O.12.33.10. Please see response to comment O.12.33.

Comment Number	Response
11.	The Navy has analyzed radiological risks from the proposed action, and has determined those risks to be not significant. The risk associated with more probable but less severe accidents are bounded by the accident analyses contained in the EIS. As discussed in the EIS, examining the kinds of events which could result in release of radioactive material to the environment or an increase in radiation levels shows that they can only occur if the event produces severe conditions. Some types of events, such as procedure violations, spills of small volumes of water containing radioactive particles, or most other types of common human error, may occur more frequently than the more severe accidents analyzed. However, they involve minute amounts of radioactive material and thus are insignificant relative to the accidents evaluated. Stated another way, the very low consequences associated with these events produce smaller risks than those for the accidents analyzed, even when combined with a higher probability of occurrence. Consequently, they have not been evaluated in greater detail in this Environmental Impact Statement.
12.	Please see response to comment O.12.33.
13.	The Navy's radiological environmental monitoring program focuses on nuclear-powered ship transit routes and areas near where nuclear-powered ships are berthed. The radioactive slag described by the commentor appears to have been used for beach erosion control in an area removed from such locations, and thus the NNPP's program did not detect any unusual radioactivity concentrations resulting from the slag. In addition, the type of elevated radioactivity in the slag, radium, was not related to NNPP operations. However, it is important to note that the Navy, pursuant to the CERCLA process and in coordination with CA-DTSC, is actively remediating those areas where radioactive slag was present. All radioactive slag has since been removed from locations below the high water mark, and remediation of the remaining slag is currently being pursued.
14.	Issues regarding the schedules for radioactive waste disposal facilities are beyond the scope of this EIS.
15.	Please see response to comment O.10.28.
16.	As described in response O.12.69, issues associated with constructing and operating the NASNI Depot Maintenance Facility, including the Mixed Waste Storage Facility and Controlled Industrial Facility, were analyzed in reference DON 1995, and are beyond the scope of this EIS. However, it is important to note mixed waste will be shipped to off-site treatment and disposal facilities in accordance with a Mixed Waste Treatment Plan,

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Comment Number	Response
	which outlines the Navy's planned treatment and disposal paths for each NASNI mixed waste stream stored in the MWSF. The Mixed Waste Treatment Plan is a means to ensure the Navy continues its present practice of aggressively pursuing treatment and disposal paths for its mixed waste. In addition, low-level radioactive waste is shipped to off-site disposal facilities as soon as practicable, with consideration given to minimizing the number of truck shipments. The Navy does not dispose of its low-level radioactive waste at its facilities. Rather, low-level radioactive waste is disposed of at licensed Department of Energy or commercial disposal facilities.
17.	As described in response O.12.84, section 7.4.3.4 of the EIS states that shipments of radioactive materials in the NNPP are made in accordance with applicable regulations of the U.S. Department of Transportation, U.S. Department of Energy, and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. In addition, the Navy has issued instructions to further control these shipments. These regulations and instructions ensure that shipments of radioactive materials are adequately controlled to protect the environment and the health and safety of the general public, regardless of the transportation route taken, and have proven to be effective. Shipments of radioactive materials associated with Naval nuclear propulsion plants have not resulted in any measurable release of radioactivity to the environment. Please also see response to comment O.12.132.
18.	Section 7.4.1 of the EIS describes the half-lives of radioactivity expected for low-level radioactive waste in the facility. Please also see response to comment O.12.132.
19.	As described in response O.12.84, section 7.4.3.4 of the EIS states that shipments of radioactive materials in the NNPP are made in accordance with applicable regulations of the U.S. Department of Transportation, U.S. Department of Energy, and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. As such, the Navy's definition of low-level radioactive material is consistent with those regulations.
20.	Releases of radioactivity are addressed in the EIS, most notably in sections 7.4.2.2 and 7.6. Please also see response to comment O.12.182.
21.	Issues associated with standards associated with siting of other nuclear facilities are beyond the scope of this EIS.

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Comment Number	Response
	22. Issues associated with constructing and operating the NASNI Depot Maintenance Facility were analyzed in reference DON 1995, and are beyond the scope of this EIS.
	23. Please see response to comment O.10.31.
	24. Appendix I of the EIS contains a detailed description of the activities conducted in the Controlled Industrial Facility.
	25. See section 7.4.3.2 of the EIS contains a discussion of low-level radioactive solid waste generated as a result of Naval ship and maintenance facility operations, which is the same types of material cited by the commentor.
I.43.16	Appendix I already states, "Refueling/defueling of nuclear reactors on NIMITZ-class aircraft carriers can only be done at a qualified shipyard during a defueling/refueling availability. No refueling/defueling availabilities are planned for any of the alternative sites qualified to perform defueling/refueling although PSNS has the facilities to be able to accomplish this work." Thus, no change to the EIS is deemed necessary. In addition, please see response to comment O.12.86.
I.43.17	Please see responses to comments O.12.174-178 and O.12.191-197.
I.43.18	As discussed in Appendix I, "Tanks would be located adjacent to the ship to receive various fluids discharged for processing (e.g., radioactive liquid drained from the nuclear propulsion plant, . . .)"
	The following will be added to clarify the radioactive liquid collection tanks in Appendix I:
	"Radioactive liquid collection tanks are constructed with heavy gauge corrosion resistant steel, and are very robust. These tanks are connected to the ship by temporary hoses that are tested and certified before use, and are radiologically controlled and operated by the strict control procedures discussed in Chapter 7 of this EIS. The tanks are then transferred to the Controlled Industrial Facility for processing."
	The probability of a tank rupture is assessed in Appendix F, section 3.2.2. This probability accounts for potential industrial accidents such as vehicular accidents, lifting and handling accidents, or others. The NNPP has never had a radioactive liquid collection tank rupture in the history of the Program.
I.43.19	Radiological control practices of the NNPP are discussed in section 7.4.3 of the EIS. Probability of accidents are discussed in Appendix F, section 3.2.1 and 3.2.2.

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Comment Number	Response
I.43.20	Shipment of radiological and/or hazardous substances associated with the proposed action at NASNI are discussed in section 3.15 of the EIS. Shipment of radiological and/or hazardous substances from activities not associated with the proposed action are beyond the scope of this EIS.
I.43.21	Please refer to the EIS, Volume 1, paragraph 2.3.2.1, which states that no dry-dock facilities exist at NASNI and none are planned.
I.43.22	The normal emissions of NNPP activities is summarized in Appendix F, section 3.1. The risk associated with these releases is calculated in Appendix F, Tables F-6 and F-7.
I.43.23	Please see responses to comments O.12.33 and O.12.81.
I.43.24	Please refer to response O.12.90 for a discussion on handling high explosives at both the BRAC CVN berth (Berth Kilo) and the Preferred Alternative-required berth (Berth Juliet). In summary, the Navy does not intend to load or off-load high explosives at these locations.
I.43.25	Please see the responses to comment letter O.12 by the Environmental Health Coalition. All comments on the Draft EIS have been responded to.
I.43.26	Please see the responses to comment letter L.4 by the City of Coronado. All comments on the Draft EIS have been responded to.
I.43.27	Actions associated with the Navy's 1995 Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Development of Facilities in San Diego/Coronado to Support the Homeporting of One NIMITZ Class Aircraft Carrier are complete (except for the MWSF at the time this response was written). The 1995 EIS was challenged in the Federal Court System, and was upheld as being adequate on all issues challenged. Please see responses to comments to L.4.36, O.12.53, and O.10.31.
I.43.28	Please see responses to comments O.12.78.
I.43.29	The traffic analysis presented in the Draft EIS indicated that the proposed action would not have a significant traffic impact because, for the maximum development scenario, it would simply be providing additional capacity to homeport two nuclear carriers (CVNs) as a replacement for two CVs. As the larger CVNs would have more personnel than the CVs, there would be a proportional traffic increase of approximately 27 vehicle trips during the peak hours and 150 trips per day. This level of additional traffic would not have a significant impact and would definitely not justify the construction of a tunnel between the Bay Bridge and the NASNI Main Gate. This tunnel project is being

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	studied by public agencies as a measure to reduce the effects of existing Navy-related traffic on the Coronado residential streets.
I.43.30	Regarding your comments on segmentation or piece-mealing, see response to your comment I.43.3 above. Your opinions are noted and are included in the Final EIS.

MARILYN G.FIELD
1101 FIRST STREET, APT. 208
CORONADO, CA 92118
TEL: (619)437-6553
FAX: (619)522-0522

November 12, 1998

Mr. John Coon (Code 05AL.JC)
Southwest Division
Naval Facilities Engineering Command
1220 Pacific Highway
San Diego, CA 92132

RE: Comments on the DEIS for Developing Home Port Facilities
for Three Nimitz-Class Nuclear Powered Aircraft Carriers
in Support of the U.S. Pacific Fleet

Dear Mr. Coon:

I sent a comment letter on the above captioned subject
earlier today but I have two additional comments:

1) The Navy should provide a baseline study of whether residents of the communities surrounding San Diego Bay already are experiencing elevated rates of cancer and other adverse health consequences compared to national averages. Residents of these communities may already be experiencing adverse health consequences as a result of past and ongoing Navy activities, including the nuclear submarine fleet and the maintenance thereof in Point Loma. If elevated rates of cancer and other adverse health consequences were found it may or may not be possible to determine whether the cause is attributable to Navy activities but would it would certainly suggest that no further activities be undertaken by the Navy which could increase health hazards to residents of the communities surrounding San Diego Bay. This analysis should be provided in the new Draft Environmental Impact Statement ("DEIS") as suggested in my earlier letter of even date.

I.44.1

2) The noise analysis in the new DEIS should include an analysis of the noise caused by the helicopter traffic along the Bay which can be extreme and disruptive (conversation and telephone conversation must cease until the helicopters - which often seem to travel in fleets - pass over). There has definitely been an increase in helicopter traffic along the Bay in the past several years.

I.44.2

Very truly yours,

Marilyn G. Field

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Comment Number	Response
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Marilyn G. Field

- I.44.1 Epidemiological studies concerning areas near NNPP facilities are summarized in Appendix E. The Navy believes these studies provide sufficient baseline to assess the impacts of NNPP activities in any of the homeport sites considered.
- I.44.2 As stated in sections 3.11.2.2, 3.11.2.3, and 3.11.2.4 of the Draft EIS, "CVN homeporting would not result in any increase in the aviation units based at NASNI or any increase in air traffic at NASNI. Therefore, no increased aircraft noise would result." This statement applies to helicopters as well as fixed-wing aircraft. For additional information on aircraft and air traffic at NASNI, please refer to section 2.3.2.1.

FAX 532-4998

11-12.98

To John Coon, Project manager
 Southwest Division Naval Facilities
 Engineering Command, Code 05AC-JC
 1220 Pacific Highway San Diego 92132

greetings - this last comment day —

a copy of my letter of complaint follows. Of course, people could move away from San Diego if the carriers move in — but let's face it, we are a nuclear-occupied country & fate is trumped minute by minute — (See nops)

L45.1

Sincerely & cynically yours

Leone Hayes

Tel/Fax 459-6162

5416 Candlerayt or


La Jolla 92037

There may be some ecological problems in San Diego by clustering the Island. No permits or license to residents - led by then-Governor that the Island could not be evicted. What applied to Long Island As for San Diego, it is not an segment of Southern California city boosters are busy planning the harbor with the expanded complex - face to face with the power performance. Three can radioactive waste, the storage

Filner's article poses several questions? The answer can be found in the autonomous Office of Naval Nuclear Navy seek to mislead the public about its nuclear accident and safety record. Filner having such a difficult question? And why is the Navy in the Navy? According to Robert H. this office's control over all issues has prevented a detailed review of the Navy's nuclear reactor taken.

Because it operates outside and also possesses separate Energy, its director has vast unscrutinized by layers of classification the Naval Nuclear Propulsion

DEADLY NUCLEAR RADIATION HAZARDS USA



Smaller States, Alaska, Hawaii, U.C. and Puerto Rico			
VI	41	1	1
NM	117	1	1
MA	666	2	14
CT	271	4	4
RI	89	1	1
NJ	576	4	23
ND	802	2	11
DE	65	1	1
DC	95	1	1
AK	59	1	14
HI	69	1	3
PR	38	1	1

The recently released **DEADLY RADIATION HAZARDS USA** report and new nuclear map, researched and designed by Louise Franklin-Ramirez and John Steinbach, demonstrates the horrific consequences of America's nuclear nightmare. One look at the map of nuclear America provides a chilling view of our country's future—which will be forever clouded with the legacy of 50 years of nuclear proliferation by the nuclear industry for the next 200 millenia.

The map and report serve as a blueprint for activists, students, and citizens who are concerned about nuclear issues. The map provides visual, concrete proof of the nuclear toxicity of our country. It is no longer possible for the nuclear industry and their cohorts in the government to claim that nuclear atoms are "friendly" as they try to sweep their lethal deadly garbage under the rug—or into unlined trenches as proposed for the pristine Ward Valley site near Needles, California. The industry's dirty little secret is out, and they must be held financially and morally accountable for the mountains of nuclear waste strewn across America.

TO ORDER:
To Order: MAP AND DATA BASE: \$20; MAP ALONE: \$7; DATA BASE ON COMPUTER DISC-MAC OR PC: \$15.
SEND CHECK/MONEY ORDER TO: VISUAL INFORMATION PROJECT, 7615 LAKE DR, MANASSAS, VA, 22111

Is: Space Harbor or rear harbor?

This letter by Leone Hayes was printed in The San Diego Union-Tribune on August 29 under the title "What applied to Long Island should apply to San Diego."

some economic benefit to the Navy and San Islering these carriers in our front waterway, but lid precedent upon which to base efforts to stop y dangerous project, namely: the Shoreham nuclear reactor was built on Long or license to operate was ever granted because the then-Governor Mario Cuomo - convinced NRC d not be evacuated in case of disaster.

Long Island should certainly apply to Coronado. It is not an island, but it is a highly populated California coastal topographical trap. And the isy planning greater concentrations of visitors at expanded convention center and baseball park ace with the equivalent of San Onofre in nuclear Three carriers means 6 reactors also generating the storage facility for which is either over or

close to the earthquake fault that runs through North Island, depend-
ing upon which Navy map is correct. North Island is a good part made land - not very stable and of concern, because the rad waste facility would be close to an elemen-
tary school - in case of a quake, etc. There has never been a live
evacuation drill in San Diego, because "people might panic." In Japan neighborhood drills are conducted. From news reports, it
seems that Secretary of Defense, William S. Cohen, has the final say
on homeporting. He needs our urgent requests to base the carriers in
different ports, rather than concentrating them - a la Pearl Harbor -

Contact Secretary Cohen at
The Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20301-1155

This letter by Richard Dittbrenner, Professor of LA, Southwestern College, was printed in The San Diego Union-Tribune on September 5 under the title "The Navy, the congressman and nuclear safety."

poses several implicit questions: Why does the seek to misstate and conceal the truth regarding accident and radiation release record? Why is a difficult time getting information from the the Navy investigating ordinary citizens who ask to be found in the attitude and values of the of Naval Nuclear Propulsion, which is headed by who is also a deputy undersecretary of energy military-civilian arrangement of this type in govern- Robert Holzer, a reporter for Defence News, over all information relating to naval nuclear d a detailed assessment of the health and safety clear reactor program from ever being under-
sites outside the channels of command in the Navy separate authority in the U.S. Department of r has vast unregulated authority. Shielded from, classification and little independent oversight, Propulsion Office has asserted its power into

virtually every area of submarine and aircraft carrier development and operation.

On a recent visit to San Diego, Richard Guida, associate director for regulatory affairs for the Nuclear Propulsion Office, said that the nuclear Navy would not disclose to civilians in nearby communities the amounts of radiation leaked from the submarine base at Point Loma or the radioactive storage site proposed for North Island. Why not? According to Guida, because "groups like Greenpeace would try to shut us down."

It follows that if the leadership of the nuclear Navy fears disclosure of safety information to community-based groups, safety questions posed by concerned citizens or members of Congress will fare no better. This may lead to erosion of public support for the nuclear Navy's presence in San Diego.

Contact Secretary Cohen at
The Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20301-1155

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Comment Number	Response
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Leone Hayes

I.45.1 Please see response to comment I.4.1.

OCT 23RD - 1998

TOM B. ARENA
P.O. BX # 70706
SAN DIEGO - CA
9 2 1 6 7

DEAR SIRS,
HONORED MEMBERS OF THE BOARD:

I WANT TO THANK YOU FOR THE OPPURTUNITY
TO ADDRESS THIS BOARD AND CONTRIBUTE COMMENTS WHICH I FEEL
I MUST, IN AS MUCH AS SAN DIEGO IS MY HOME ALSO, AND I
WANT TO FEEL JUST AS SAFE LIVING HERE, AS DO OTHER CITIZENS
LIVING HERE. IF I DID NOT FEEL SAFE WITH NUCLEAR SHIPS
BASED CLOSE TO ME, COMMON SENSE DICTATES THAT I SHOULD
AND MUST, MOVE TO A SAFER LOCATION.
HOWEVER, MY SAFETY, SHOULD NOT, AND MUST NOT, IMPAIR THE
ABILITY OF MY COUNTRY, MY NAVY, FROM DOING IT'S MAIN JOB,
PROTECTING AND DEFENDING OUR COUNTRY AND THE FREE WORLD.
ALL OF US MUST BE WILLING AND READY TO SHARE THE COST AND
BURDEN FOR THE PEACE AND FREEDOM WE HAVE ENJOYED FOR
OVER 100 PLUS YEARS. OUR NAVY HAS PLAYED A MAJOR ROLE IN
GIVING US THIS PEACE AND FREEDOM.

I.46

IN REGARDS TO THE BERTHING OF THE NUCLEAR CARRIERS AT
N A S N J, AND TO THOSE WHO HAVE BEEN PROTESTING THE
MOST AND LOUDEST, I AM REMINDED OF CHICKEN LITTLE WHO CRIED,
"THE SKY IS FALLING - THE SKY IS FALLING".
THERE ISN'T A NAVY OR COUNTRY IN THIS WORLD THAT HAS A BETTER
SAFETY RECORD, OR BETTER TRAINED MEN AND WOMEN THEN OUR
OWN MEN AND WOMEN SERVING ON THESE HIGH TECH FLEET OF
SHIPS. THE STANDARDS AND TRAINING ARE THE MOST RIGID
IMAGINABLE.

I.46.1
HAVING SERVED IN THE MARINES, AND HAVING BEEN A TEACHER,
SR.HIGH & JR.COLLEGE, I FEEL AMPLY QUALIFIED TO MAKE THESE
COMMENTS. FOR THE PAST 2 WEEKS, I HAVE BEEN SPENDING MY FREE
TIME, READING THIS ENTIRE REPORT, AND WHILE I AM NOT A
NUCLEAR ENGINEER, UNDERSTANDING THIS COMPREHENSIVE REPORT,
DOESN'T TAKE AN OXFORD RHODES SCHOLAR TO UNDERSTAND IT.

I.46.1
THE MEN AND WOMEN SERVING ON THESE SHIPS ARE NOT YOUNG
KIDS FRESH OUT OF HIGH SCHOOL. THEY ARE MEN AND WOMEN
WHO HAVE MANY YEARS IN THE NAVY, PEOPLE WHO HAVE BEEN GIVEN
TRAINING AND EDUCATION MOST COLLEGE GRADUATES WOULD ENVY.
WE ARE NOT ABOUT TO PUT ON ANY NUCLEAR SHIP, ANY PERSON
WHO HAS NOT BEEN TRAINED, EDUCATED, AND, MADE AWARE OF THE
RESPONSIBILITY AND DANGER OF SERVING ABOARD SUCH A CRAFT.

IN REGARDS TO THE SAFETY RECORD OF THESE NUCLEAR SHIPS,
I WANT TO REMIND EVERYONE THAT WE HAVE BEEN OPERATING A FLEET
OF NUCLEAR SUBMARINES FOR MANY YEARS WITH A SAFETY RECORD
THAT WOULD IMPRESS EVEN EINSTEIN HIMSELF.
OUR NAVY'S SAFETY RECORD SPEAK FOR ITSELF AND I CHALLENGE
ANYONE TO PROVE OTHERWISE. JUST UP THE COAST, WE HAVE A
NUCLEAR POWER GENERATING FACILITY AND SITTING ON A FAULT,
AND AS YET, THROUGH ALL THE MANY YEARS OF OPERATING, WE HAVE
NEVER EVER HAD SO MUCH AS A WARNING OF ACCIDENTS.
OUR NUCLEAR FLEET HAS JUST AS IMPRESSIVE A RECORD AND BETTER.

I.46.1

IN CONCLUSION, I WANT TO SAY THIS, THAT, IF WE THE PEOPLE
FEEL ANYTHING FOR THE MEN AND WOMEN WHO, DAILY PUT THEMSELVES
ON THE LINE TO HELP MAKE OUR COUNTRY AND WORLD A BETTER SAFER
PLACE TO LIVE, THEN I FEEL AND BELIEVE WE ONE THOSE BRAVE YOUNG
MEN, WHO NOW LAY ENTOMBED AT THE BOTTOM OF THE OCEAN
IN THE HULL OF THE U S S. ARIZONA, THE RIGHT TO CARRY ON THE
HIGHEST AND FINEST TRADITIONS OUR NAVY REPRESENTS.

WE OWE THE MEN AND WOMEN SERVING OUR NATION TODAY, THE VERY
BEST TRAINING AND EQUIPMENT AVAILABLE SO AS TO MAKE
DOING THEIR JOB, SERVING OUR COUNTRY, THE VERY BEST
WE EXPECT FROM THEM AND OUR NAVY. SAN DIEGO FOR 150 YEARS
HAS BEEN, NAVY TOWN U S A, I PRAY TO GOD IT WILL ALWAYS BE SO.

THANK YOU FOR ALLOWING ME THE OPPORTUNITY
TO SHARE WITH YOU AND MY FELLOW CITIZENS
MY OWN FEELINGS ON THIS MATTER.


Tom B. Odner

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Comment Number	Response
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Tom B. Arena

I.46.1 Your comments are noted and are included in the Final EIS.

4762 Jessie Avenue No. 5
La Mesa, CA. 91941
(619) 667-0339
November 5, 1998

Mr. John Coon, Project Manager
Southwest Division, Naval Facilities, Engineering Command
Code 05SAL-JC
1220 Pacific Highway
San Diego, CA 92132

Cordial Manager John Coon ,

I.47.1
Recent history has brought to light many discussions on every issue that could come into thought on the nuclear dilemma here in San Diego. It is time to act on this matter! The institution you work for need not abandon the people in this dire time. Rather, the immediate action that you lend could prevent a significant nuclear disaster. Public protection is the responsibility of the government; therefore, this entity should be on the side of the people that it was design to protect.

Apalled at the thought of having a nuclear port facility (i.e., nuclear subs & ships) in San Diego Harbor, I request your support. Empirical research conducted by educated fellow San Diego's residents and other leading world scientist have aided my conclusion, hazardous ramifications exist for the environment and the people's safety is at stake. Life as we understand it could cease. Because of the scientific evidence that currently supports community suspicion, the people of San Diego and I demand no less than a halt in nuclear porting. Public safety, environment, and cost are our basis for requesting your attention. The Navy should begin appeasing the public concern by implementing tactics to begin removal of all nuclear powered vessels home-ported here. Public concerns can not be denied or refuted.

I.47

calls for action, removal of this threat from our bay and away from our coastal cities is the only acceptable course of action.

Environmental test presented by the navy remain inconclusive because these tests are full of fallacies. Radioactive waste and radiation exposure do affect our ocean, our land, our animals and our air. Already, the dredging of our bay that began in September is posing a threat to downwind neighboring schools. I worry for the welfare of those children as well as the rest of the people in our community. Furthermore, the fish and wild life in our bay are already experiencing current damaging affects. Contaminants such as mercury and lead are on the floor of our bay. These toxic metals, and other contaminants are destroying basic marine life. The current levels of deterioration remove valuable resources from our coastal waters. There are 38 Navy bases authorized to transport hazardous waste through our streets. This increases the opportunities for a catastrophe. An accident in our streets is improbable, but not impossible; therefore, I am not willing to continue to take risk against my life. It is time that you begin protecting us from imminent risks, rather than protecting us from possible enemy threat. Besides the adverse effects our health and the environment suffer and the potential danger of mishap, this project is a money pit.

I.47.2
When calculated, the long term cost to the tax payer could mount to tens of billions of dollars. According to the Peace Resource Center, the cost of the construction and decommission of a nuclear powered aircraft carrier in 1995 averaged to 5 billion dollars. Moreover, the estimated cost of operating each nuclear powered aircraft carrier is 1 million dollars a day. The Navy plans to build two additional ships; I believe this is a waste of taxpayers' money. More ships bring additional troops, and this will further tax the over extended environment, that means cleanup-cost. The additional personnel to man and maintain ships will serve to complicate the lesser issues that also surround the ships planned port project. Issues that effect San Diego community are far reaching and range from such problems as increased traffic congestion, short falls in housing, even crime will increase. San Diego's residents and I do not want the nuclear ships and the facilities needed to maintain a deadly nuclear megaport.

I.47.3
Mounting bad evidence, of no concrete safety solutions, coupled with the Navy's unwillingness to involve the public in their decision making process is enough to fuel my disdain. I have read and heard more than I need to on the matter. Writing many people to voice my concern on these matters, is the only recourse I know, yet I remain unsatisfied. Safety of our city is in jeopardy, environment is being destroyed, and the cost is intolerable. I appeal to your humanitarianism, and I hope that you will act on this matter by standing up for the people of San Diego. I thank you for your prompt attention and await your response.

Sincerely

Luigi Angiello
Luigi Angiello

I.47.4
We will not allow the navy to ignore the evidence compiled by many great minds. Every issue we believe to be important is not been properly addressed or resolved. Simply put, the Navy's political posturing leads the community and I to demand no less than an active role in the decision making processes that effect our safety. The safety of our people is in serious jeopardy, because San Diego is unprepared for any eventual mishap. In a nuclear emergency, the area down wind to be evacuated is 12 miles; yet, no parameter warnings, no public warning sirens, no evacuation plans exist to protect San Diego inhabitants. If there is a Naval reactor accident, implementation of proper treatment to radiation exposures is impossible because there are no supplies of potassium iodide available for the population to protect themselves. Past mishaps are bad enough and additional ships will only add irreversible damage and imbalances to our environment. In addition, contrary to what the Navy told us, medical literature shows even smaller amounts of radiation, than previously believed can be "medically devastating" said the president of the Peace Resource Center (10/27/98). Any physical threat is intolerable and

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Comment Number	Response
Luigi Angilello	
I.47.1	Our publicly-elected U.S. Congress and President of the United States make programmatic decisions regarding Naval ships (e.g., application of nuclear power), and thus comments regarding these decisions are beyond the scope of this EIS. The results of all the analyses of both normal operations and hypothetical accidents indicate that there would be no significant radiological impacts from homeporting and maintaining NIMITZ-class aircraft carriers or operating NIMITZ-class aircraft carrier maintenance facilities.
I.47.2	Please see responses to comments L.4.36, O.10.31, O.12.78, and O.12.190.
I.47.3	The EIS addresses the potential environmental impacts to present conditions associated with homeporting three CVNs. The impact analysis for San Diego Bay indicated that homeporting is not expected to result in significant adverse impacts to water or sediment quality. Risks associated with operations of NNPP facilities are summarized in section 7.6 of the EIS. The results of these analyses indicate there is no significant radiological risks from NNPP operations.
I.47.4	Please see response to comment I.47.1.
I.47.5	Your comments are noted and are included in the Final EIS.

DEVELOPING HOME PORT FACILITIES FOR
THREE NIMITZ-CLASS AIRCRAFT CARRIERS
IN SUPPORT OF THE U.S. PACIFIC FLEET

DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT

DRAFT EIS COMMENTS

Name: Josette Marie Charmasson

Address: 623 Genter St., La Jolla CA 92037

COMMENTS:

I attended the Oct. 28th meeting in San Diego & was appalled by the Navy representatives' attitudes towards the civilians of San Diego County.

I.48.1

How dare they have a meeting "after the fact", now that a nuclear vessel is already in the harbor & now that they have already decided of the location of the 2 other ships

Who is their right mind would allow a nuclear "anything" in their "backyard"?

I.48.2

I am so shocked that I cannot even write properly - After 22 years of residency I thought I had a sayin in this matter-

I.48.3

Josette M. Charmasson
Signature

11/9/98
Date

Note: This form is supplied for your convenience. You are not required to use this form. Comments of any length may be submitted to the address on the reverse side of this form. Your comments should be postmarked on or before November 12, 1998.

VOLUME 7 CVN HOMEPORING EIS — NASNI RESPONSE TO COMMENTS

Comment Number	Response
Josette Marie Charmasson	
I.48.1	A previous EIS was prepared in 1995, the "Final EIS for the Development of Facilities in San Diego/Coronado to Support the Homeporting of One NIMITZ-Class Aircraft Carrier," and public hearings were held in Coronado for that project on August 17, 1993 and June 7, 1995. No decision regarding adding more CVNs to San Diego/Coronado has been made. This decision will be made no sooner than 30 days after the Final EIS is published.
I.48.2	Please see response to comment I.4.1.
I.48.3	You do have input into the process. The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 requires public participation to solicit concerns, issues, and opinions before a decision on a federal action that may have significant environmental effects are made. You have made comments on the Draft EIS and they are addressed in the Final EIS. The decision maker reviews the Final EIS including all comments and responses before making a decision whether or not to proceed with the proposed action or any of its alternatives.

November 10, 1998

Mr. John Coon (Code 05AL.JC)
Southwest Division
Naval Facilities Engineering Command
1220 Pacific Highway
San Diego, CA 92132

Dear Mr. Coon:

I have read with interest the Draft Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS) Developing Homeport Facilities for Three Nimitz-Class Aircraft Carriers. The DEIS is long on rhetoric and short on facts. The finding that two additional Nimitz-Class Aircraft Carriers at Naval Air Station North Island (NASNI) will have no impact on the environmental quality of life in Coronado is incredible. It is even more incredible that there is a finding that two additional Nimitz-Class Aircraft Carriers at NASNI will only add fifty five additional automobiles to the daily traffic in Coronado.

Was the DEIS prepared by the same government scientists that assured us that Agent Orange was a harmless defoliant?

Perhaps the government scientists who proclaimed that participants in the Gulf War who complained of illness (Gulf War Syndrome) were malingerers also collaborated in the preparation of the DEIS.

I wonder why government requires the owners of commercial nuclear reactors to provide:

1. Perimeter radiation leak detection systems;
2. Warning systems for surrounding residents, and
3. Evacuation plans for effected residents.

Did I overlook this discussion in the DEIS?

Sincerely,



Robert E. HAFEEY
273 Alameda Blvd.
Coronado, CA 92118-1133

cc: Mayor Thomas J. Smisek
The Honorable William S. Cohen
U.S. Senator Barbara Boxer
U.S. Senator Dianne Feinstein
Congressman Brian Bilbray

VOLUME 7 CVN HOMEPORING EIS — NASNI RESPONSE TO COMMENTS

Comment Number	Response
Robert E. Hafey	
I.49.1	The traffic analysis presented in the Draft EIS is based on the incremental increase in traffic that would occur as a result of the proposed action. Currently, NASNI has the capacity to support two conventional aircraft carriers (CVs) and one nuclear carrier (CVN) for a total of three homeported carriers, while Alternatives One, Two, and Three would have three CVNs. The proposed action would not result in two additional aircraft carriers, but would provide the capacity to homeport two CVNs as a replacement for two CVs. As the number of personnel on the CVNs is slightly greater than that on the CVs, the proposed action would generate approximately 27 additional vehicle trips during the peak hours and 150 trips throughout an average day, as outlined in the EIS. The analysis indicates that a traffic increase of this magnitude would not be significant. Refer to the response to comment L.4.5 for a more detailed discussion of the homeporting baseline at NASNI.
I.49.2	While your comments do not address the adequacy of the EIS, they are noted and are included in the Final EIS.
I.49.3	Please see response to comment O.12.80 and O.13.28.

November 10, 1998

Mr. John Coon, Southwest Division (Code 05AL.JC)
Naval Facilities Engineering Command
1220 Pacific Highway
San Diego, CA 92132-5190

Dear Mr. Coon:

On the eve of Veteran's Day, it seems appropriate to submit my comments to you regarding bringing more nuclear-powered aircraft carriers to San Diego. DON'T DO IT! I.50.1

I understand the need for military preparedness, even though I wish such a need did not exist. However, I see no need to proliferate a device that can have catastrophic effects on the very people it is supposed to protect. I am talking about nuclear power. I.50.2


Given the fact that nuclear accidents DO happen, and HAVE happened already, and the fact that there already exists a proven alternative, it seems outrageous to continue building and deploying nuclear powered carriers (or nuclear-powered anything, for that matter). I do not want my tax dollars used toward that needless and horribly frightening end. As we all know, there is no "correcting" a nuclear mistake and the consequences are with us nearly forever.

According to the GAO report of August 27, 1998, conventionally powered carriers are able to meet the requirements of our national military strategy at a significantly lower life-cycle cost and without the current and future dangers associated with nuclear power. Why is this objective information being ignored in favor of continued usage of nuclear power? I.50.3

I accept, reluctantly, the fact that San Diego is a military town, but I do not accept it being used to house such dangerous devices unnecessarily. The Stennis should be deactivated and no further nuclear powered craft of any kind should be brought here or anywhere else. I.50.4

Listen to your government and the people whom it represents!!!

Seriously,



Stephanie Strout
10502 Queen Ave.
La Mesa, CA 91941

VOLUME 7 CVN HOMEPORING EIS — NASNI RESPONSE TO COMMENTS

Comment Number	Response
Stephanie Strout	
I.50.1	Your comments are noted and are included in the Final EIS.
I.50.2	Please see response to comment I.47.1 and O.12.55.
I.50.3	Please see response to comment I.47.1 and O.12.55.
I.50.4	Please see response to comment I.47.1 and O.12.55.

Mr. John Coon
Southwest DIVISION (Code 05AL.JC)
Naval Facilities Engineering Command
1220 Pacific Coast Highway
San Diego CA 92132-5190

November 10, 1998

Sir,

I am an American citizen and have lived and worked in San Diego for eleven years. I have 43 years experience with the military, both on active duty as well as in civilian life. I too have concerns for the environment in which we live. I recently attended the public hearing on the home porting of nuclear aircraft carriers in San Diego. Most of what I heard was against the proposition, and in many cases the speakers not only disparaged the US Navy but were insulting to the naval service and its representatives present that night. Not only do I disagree with these 'citizens', but I was embarrassed for them.


I.51.1

My perception is that the Navy has in the past, and continues to err on the side of conservatism when it comes to environmental issues. Not only am I satisfied that the Navy in this instance of home porting taken every precaution to insure the safety of its crews and our citizens, but I know that the military takes enough risks during wartime without knowingly risking its personnel aboard ships at home, during peace time by exposing them to harm from nuclear spills(as they were accused of during the hearings).

A September 2nd letter by Congressman Bob Filner, and a more recent letter in the SD Union-Tribune written by a law professor questions the safety of nuclear ships. My answer is that the US Navy has been safely operating nuclear reactors since 1955. Our ships have sailed literally millions of miles on nuclear power since then without a reportable reactor accident. And while I'm not a physicist, nor can I run a reactor, I would venture to say that life aboard USS Stennis is safer than on a number of Bob Filner's city streets. The nuclear safety record of the Navy over the course of the last fifty-plus years is impeccable and is the envy of the rest of the world!

Finally, I am very comfortable knowing that our navy is here in San Diego doing everything in its power to protect our environment while protecting our country, enhancing the local economy and in general being a good, if not ideal neighbor.

Sincerely,


Charles L. Zangas

PO Box 27348
San Diego, Ca 92198

VOLUME 7 CVN HOMEPORING EIS — NASNI RESPONSE TO COMMENTS

Comment Number	Response
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Charles Zangas

I.51.1 Your comments are noted and are included in the Final EIS.

November 11, 1998

Mr. John Coon,

About six years ago, there was a nuclear "accident" near Springfield, Massachusetts. A truck carrying nuclear fuel rods was driving north on interstate 91. They were returning from being reprocessed in route to Vernon, Vermont. The driver had an accident and dumped his radioactive cargo all over the highway. There was never an emergency response team prepared to deal with this kind of disaster. To my knowledge, no one living in the area was ever notified of the accident. The officials said there was no danger from radiation...no need to worry. I found out about this whole situation from a friend who was living in southern California. She sent me a news paper article, assuming that I had already heard. At the time of the accident, I lived less than an hour away.

Accidents do happen and they are covered up. First of all, I don't believe that nuclear power is safe. Second, I don't trust that the Navy would ever notify me in the event of an accident. I read over parts of the environmental impact statement. I did not read anything about how I, as an individual or my school would be notified when there is an emergency. I heard you say at the public hearing in San Diego that the Navy and city officials would be notified within a few hours, in the event of an emergency, and told when to evacuate. I, also, did not hear or read anything about an evacuation plan. I don't have a clue as to what the Navy actually considers an accident worth mentioning. How many "incidents" just get brushed aside as all in a day's work?

I can not accept any of your proposals for more CVN's. Alternative 5 may look good to me for San Diego but I do not believe in dumping what I don't want on someone else. We do have one nuclear powered aircraft carrier and a number of nuclear submarines. I need to know that all of these nuclear reactors are being monitored on a twenty-four hour basis, by an organization other than the Navy. I want all information on releases and shipments of waste to be made public. I don't mean a book in the library. I want it announced on the radio and on the front page of the local papers. I am holding you accountable for this "nuclear megaport". You, the Navy, are responsible for the health and well-being of millions of people in southern California and northern Baja, Mexico. You are responsible for the health and well-being of all the plants and animals that inhabit San Diego Bay and nearby ocean areas.

I have been told by scientist friends that the next large earthquakes

are due to occur in the next five to ten years. There have been two

earthquakes larger than magnitude six in San Diego since 1800. One was

near the harbor. I didn't read anything about what you will do when there is an earthquake. What are your plans regarding your nuclear reactors when there is a large earthquake?

How will you transport your low level nuclear waste? You are currently producing nuclear waste. Do you know that there will be a place to store that waste permanently and safely in the future? What are you planning on doing when Hanford shuts down? How will you notify people in that area that there is radioactive material stored there and how will you keep people out of the contaminated area?

I never approve any proposal unless all of my questions have been answered to my satisfaction. I will not treat the Navy differently. I can not accept or approve of any of your proposals for homeporting CVNs in San Diego Bay.

Sincerely,

Bryn Anderson

Ms. Bryn Anderson
3364 Grim Ave.
San Diego, Ca. 92104

1.52.1 I didn't read anything about what you will do when there is an earthquake. What are your plans regarding your nuclear reactors when there is a large earthquake?

How will you transport your low level nuclear waste? You are currently producing nuclear waste. Do you know that there will be a place to store that waste permanently and safely in the future? What are you planning on doing when Hanford shuts down? How will you notify people in that area that there is radioactive material stored there and how will you keep people out of the contaminated area?

I never approve any proposal unless all of my questions have been answered to my satisfaction. I will not treat the Navy differently. I can not accept or approve of any of your proposals for homeporting CVNs in San Diego Bay.

1.52.2 I can not accept any of your proposals for more CVN's. Alternative 5 may look good to me for San Diego but I do not believe in dumping what I don't want on someone else. We do have one nuclear powered aircraft carrier and a number of nuclear submarines. I need to know that all of these nuclear reactors are being monitored on a twenty-four hour basis, by an organization other than the Navy. I want all information on releases and shipments of waste to be made public. I don't mean a book in the library. I want it announced on the radio and on the front page of the local papers. I am holding you accountable for this "nuclear megaport". You, the Navy, are responsible for the health and well-being of millions of people in southern California and northern Baja, Mexico. You are responsible for the health and well-being of all the plants and animals that inhabit San Diego Bay and nearby ocean areas.

1.52.3 I have been told by scientist friends that the next large earthquakes are due to occur in the next five to ten years. There have been two

earthquakes larger than magnitude six in San Diego since 1800. One was

VOLUME 7 CVN HOMEPORING EIS — NASNI RESPONSE TO COMMENTS

Comment Number	Response
Ms. Bryn Anderson	
I.52.1	Section 7.4.3.4 of the EIS, which describes the Navy's radioactive material transportation, states that there have never been any accidents involving release of radioactivity during shipment of NNPP radioactive waste. In particular, section 7.4.3.4 of the EIS states that shipments of radioactive material associated with the Naval nuclear propulsion plants have not resulted in any measurable release of radioactivity to the environment. For correctness, section 7.4.3.4 will be revised by inserting "a significant" between "involving" and "release."
	Please also see responses to comments O.10.31 and O.12.81.
I.52.2	Potential impacts to marine life have been evaluated carefully in the Final EIS, as detailed in Volume 1, section 3.5. Potential impacts are either less than significant or mitigated to less than significant by such means as construction of the mitigation site at Pier B. Further, as part of the dredged material disposal plan a habitat enhancement area would also be constructed at NAB that will provide about 6-8 acres of additional higher quality habitat for marine organisms in the bay. Please see responses O.10.23 and O.12.33.
I.52.3	The Navy addresses the effects of earthquakes, tsunamis, and seiches with respect to the proposed action in section 3.1.2.4.
I.52.4	Radioactive waste storage and transportation issues for NASNI are discussed in sections 3.15.2 and 7.4.3 of the EIS. Issues pertaining to the operations at Hanford are beyond the scope of this EIS.
I.52.5	Your comments are noted and are included in the Final EIS.

DEVELOPING HOME PORT FACILITIES FOR
THREE NIMITZ-CLASS AIRCRAFT CARRIERS
IN SUPPORT OF THE U.S. PACIFIC FLEET

DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT

DRAFT EIS COMMENTS

Name: Beth Bailey

Address: 8858 Millburn Ave. Spring Valley, CT 06787

(1)

COMMENTS:

It's the Navy's responsibility and purpose to prepare for and conduct war. The purpose of war is to protect the well-being of our citizens and the nation's "interests". Before we go to war and any military personnel are put in harm's way, the risks and importance of the interests at stake are weighed. But with the homeporting of nuclear aircraft carriers in S.D., the very preparations aimed at our protection are putting all our citizens in harm's way and jeopardizing our most basic interests. What is more important than air and water and food sources and ground to live on that do not contaminate our bodies with toxic + life-threatening substance?

I.53.1

Although I am sure there is a high level of concern and professionalism and discipline among naval nuclear technology personnel, human beings are fallible, - and we all know computers are. Just because an accident hasn't happened, doesn't mean it won't, especially after riving the odds with several new reactors (# witness the New Jersey battleship whose main gun blew up). And how can all possibilities of foul play be ruled out? There are times of rapid change, only to accelerate over the 50 yr. lifespan of the carriers. How can

Beth Bailey

Signature

11-11-98

Date

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DEVELOPING HOME PORT FACILITIES FOR
THREE NIMITZ-CLASS AIRCRAFT CARRIERS
IN SUPPORT OF THE U.S. PACIFIC FLEET

DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT

DRAFT EIS COMMENTS

Name: _____

Address: _____

(2)

COMMENTS:

such a big complex institution respond quickly enough to changing capabilities and conditions to rule out a fluke successful terrorist or sabotage act that would have consequences so unthinkable that a realistic response has not even been formulated, let alone communicated to those who would be responsible for implementing it? Furthermore, there is a conflict of interest in disseminating these ^{emergencies} plans because of the resistance the scenario may incite, as well as the attention they might draw from potential terrorists.

to the
aircraft
carriers'
presence

I.53.1

To say that in this rapidly changing, evermore, complex world, the Navy is capable of 5 decades of control complete and constant enough to assure 5 million plus people that the very most basic elements necessary for them to live will not be jeopardized by the presence of these billions of particles of "the most toxic substance known to man," (plutonium) is hubris - an arrogant tragic over-reach. Who will manage and control the added 1,000's of tons of low and high level nuclear waste generated for the hundreds or thousands of years it is dangerous? From what I know about transport and storage technology ~~of~~ ^{and thus} nuclear waste, you can't assure your grandchildren and great grandchildren that

I.53.2

Signature

Date

it will not reach their ground water.

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DEVELOPING HOME PORT FACILITIES FOR
THREE NIMITZ-CLASS AIRCRAFT CARRIERS
IN SUPPORT OF THE U.S. PACIFIC FLEET

DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT

DRAFT EIS COMMENTS

Name: _____

Address: _____

(3)

COMMENTS:

There has never been a battle with the kind of far-reaching, inestimable damage/consequences of the "worst case scenario" that must be considered with the home-porting of nuclear carriers in this highly populated prime target military port city.

I.53.3

The fact that the Navy's literature larks back to the PAST 50 years and its EIR offers woefully inadequate contingency plans for emergency evacuation or ongoing assessment and amelioration of conditions that negatively impact the health of the people living and working closest to the carriers and facilities is not reassuring.

I.53.4

We are only beginning to study and understand the long-term effects of even small exposures to radioactive elements.

What provisions will the Navy make for accurate objective monitoring of the impact of its nuclear presence on surrounding populations - human or otherwise? What arrangement for the open sharing of information pertinent to civilian and Naval personnel health concerns? What express responsibility will the Navy/govt take for protecting ~~health~~ the citizens of the region from any negative impact of its nuclear presence? some? none? What assurances can the Navy offer when in the case of "Agent Orange", where similarly, considerable numbers of people were negatively affected, one commander (despite written rules

I.53.5

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prohibiting interference in the study) was able to withhold for almost a decade crucial information and compensation and help from Navy personnel who had served and suffered in battle and their families. This commander, being involved / cov
on bac
paad

Continued from page ③

in the decision to use "Agent Orange," reportedly stated he wouldn't be able to live with himself if some of the study's implications proved to be true, so he suppressed them. In this tacit cost-analysis, the cost to his ego carried more weight than the suffering of those many families affected. Humans beings are fallible. And the Navy is run by humans beings who may be quite out of touch with the people their decisions affect.

I.53.5

What part of the cost of potential negative health effects is the Navy willing to take responsibility for?

I.53.6

Or are we, the citizens of the surrounding area expected to bear all the costs? At what point would the Navy consider the costs too high?

With studies taking so long (if they're lucky enough
(Return Address) to be funded), and then response on the part of the government taking just as long or longer, — Mr. John Coon — even good faith assurances are meaningless during the possible 10⁺ year period before a decision is taken.

Place
32-Cents
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Here

Southwest Division (Code 05AL.JC)
Naval Facilities Engineering Command
1220 Pacific Highway
San Diego, CA 92132-5190

Again, I appeal to your dedication to your basic duty to the ~~safety~~ of American citizens. May that sincere dedication

fold

guide you in carefully considering and responding to the issues herein.

Sincerely, Beth Bailey

P.S. In addition to the general issues above, I am also concerned about the ^{particular} metallurgical problems addressed by Dr. Siegel at the hearing. Please see that these are specifically investigated and reported on. Also, the Y2K issue.

I.53.7

VOLUME 7 CVN HOMEPORING EIS — NASNI RESPONSE TO COMMENTS

Comment Number	Response
Beth Baily	
I.53.1	Please see response to comment I.12.9, O.12.10, and I.47.1.
I.53.2	Radioactive waste storage and transportation issues for NASNI are discussed in sections 3.15.2 and 7.4.3 of the EIS. Issues pertaining to the management of spent nuclear fuel are beyond the scope of this EIS. Management of spent fuel associated with the NNPP is addressed comprehensively in an EIS published by the DOE and the Navy titled, Department of Energy Programmatic Spent Nuclear Fuel Management and Idaho National Engineering Laboratory Environmental Restoration and Waste Management Programs Final Environmental Impact Statement dated April 1995. That EIS concluded that U.S. Naval spent fuel can be safely managed with negligible environmental impacts pending its ultimate placement in a permanent geologic repository as prescribed in the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.
I.53.3	Please see responses to comments O.12.190, I.12.9, and I.47.1.
I.53.4	Please see responses to comments O.12.190, I.12.9, and I.47.1.
I.53.5	Please see response to comment L.4.36.
I.53.6	Please see response to comment I.12.9.
I.53.7	Please see responses to comments I.63 and O.12.57.

CONGER-CROSS CHOCOLATES

2850 Skyline Drive, Lemon Grove, CA 91945

11/12/98

Dear John Leon,

This is a letter to protest the Navy's plan
to place more nuclear-powered aircrafts in
San Diego. ^{than for} Conventionally powered carriers
would be less costly & much more environmentally
safe.

1.54.1

The GAC report of Aug 27, 1998, Navy Aircraft
Carriers: "Cost-Effectiveness of Conventionally and Nuclear
Powered Carriers" states: "Nuclear-powered carriers
cost more than conventionally powered carriers to acquire,
operate and support, and to deactivate...". These
cost do not take into account the cost of storing
the spent nuclear fuel ~~after~~ it has been refueled.

I have lived in San Diego County since
I was a baby some 40+ years. We need
the Navy but not nuclear powered carriers.

Sincerely

Paul Conger-Cross

(619) 461-5089 463-2618

VOLUME 7 CVN HOMEPORING EIS — NASNI RESPONSE TO COMMENTS

Comment Number	Response
---------------------------	-----------------

Carol Conger-Cross

I.54.1 Please see responses to comments I.47.1 and O.12.55.

11-12-98

Mr. Coon
Southwest Director
(Code 05A-LJC)

Naval Facilities Engineering Command
1220 Pacific Highway
San Diego, CA 92132-5790

re: Homeporting of CVNs in San Diego

I.55.1

I strongly oppose the homeporting of nuclear-powered aircraft carriers in San Diego. The health risks they pose to such a densely populated area are far & away too great to be justified by our "national security needs."

I.55.2

The Harris DEIS is inherently flawed as it fails to address the cumulative impacts of the two additional carriers. It also glosses over the highly relevant issue of cancer mortality & low-level radiation exposure.

I.55.3

Possibly the most egregious omission is the lack of a real emergency plan including distribution of potassium iodide to civilian.

I.55.4

Also, why make San Diego ~~to~~ a sitting duck target for any simple-minded terrorist? Did we learn nothing from Pearl Harbor?

I.55.5

Please heed the warnings of such informed activists as Carol Gehrke (PRC), Dr. Ben & J. Kipple (PRG), Laura Heiter (ETC) & other experts who have made their appeals.

In peace,
W. Douras

Dr. Jennifer W. Douras
(urgently care physician in San Diego since 1984,

VOLUME 7 CVN HOMEPORING EIS — NASNI RESPONSE TO COMMENTS

Comment Number	Response
Dr. Jennifer W. Doumas	
I.55.1	Your comments are noted and are included in the Final EIS.
I.55.2	Cumulative impacts related to the preferred alternative at NASNI are discussed in section 3.18. The text has been revised to clarify the spatial and temporal relationships of the proposed action and reasonably foreseeable projects, in evaluating their combined, cumulative effect. Please see response to comment O.12.158 and O.12.190.
I.55.3	Please see response to comment O.12.78 and O.10.31.
I.55.4	Please refer to responses L.4.44 and I.37.1 in the San Diego responses to comments on the subject of "sitting duck targets."
I.55.5	Your comments are noted and are included in the Final EIS.

Reproduction clarity limited by quality of comment letter received.

DEVELOPING HOME PORT FACILITIES FOR
THREE NIMITZ-CLASS AIRCRAFT CARRIERS
IN SUPPORT OF THE U.S. PACIFIC FLEET

DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT

Page 1

DRAFT EIS COMMENTS

Name: Susan J. Randerson

Address: 831 Golden Park, San Diego, CA 92106

COMMENTS:

I attended a hearing in San Diego on October 25, 1995 regarding the homeporting of 2 more nuclear aircraft carriers (CVNs) in San Diego Bay. I am deeply concerned about the harm this could do to the environment and the danger to the inhabitants of San Diego.

We were told there would be no "significant effects" on the environment. What does "significant" mean? I assume sea water will be pumped as a coolant for the reactors. How much radioactive material would be in the water returned to the bay? This perhaps "insignificant" amount of radioactivity would be absorbed by the plankton + other small organisms, to be eaten by larger animals & concentrated as it moved up the food chain, providing a significant danger over time to fish, birds, seals and people (who eat the fish) at the top of the food chain.

Recent studies have shown that much lower

Susan Randerson
Signature

11-12-98
Date

(continued)

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DEVELOPING HOME PORT FACILITIES FOR THREE NIMITZ-CLASS AIRCRAFT CARRIERS IN SUPPORT OF THE U.S. PACIFIC FLEET

DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT

Page (2)

DRAFT EIS COMMENTS

Name: Susan J. Rondeau

Address: 531 Golden Park, San Diego, CA 92106

COMMENTS:

levels of exposure to radioactivity over a long time period are much more harmful than previously believed. Tiny levels of radioactivity over a long period have produced increased rates of cancer, birth defects, etc.

I.56.2

What will be the impact of dredging the equivalent of 2 Qualcomm stadiums of bay sediment, much of it contaminated, on the water column, and the animals in the bay water - on the bottom? I understand the last "mitigation project" destroyed the intertidal habitat. The protection of the intertidal habitat was not addressed by the DEIS, although it is required to be addressed, according to law (the Clean Air Act).

I.56.3

Concentrating 18 nuclear reactors in one location is inviting terrorism or attack - making San Diego a vulnerable, undesirable ~~ideal~~ target. The rationale that these CVNs are needed for our defense loses its meaning when you risk ruining one of the most beautiful bays & regions in the U.S. and the destruction of the 6th largest city with nearly 2 million people.

I.56.4

Signature Susan Rondeau

Date 11-12-98 people

(continued)

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DEVELOPING HOME PORT FACILITIES FOR
THREE NIMITZ-CLASS AIRCRAFT CARRIERS
IN SUPPORT OF THE U.S. PACIFIC FLEET

DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT

page 3

DRAFT EIS COMMENTS

Name: Susan J. Randerson

Address: 831 Golden Park, San Diego, CA 92106

COMMENTS:

What is the advantage of CVNS, which cost \$ billion dollars
to build, over a million dollars a day to operate
and over \$50 million to decommission? A recent independent
GAO study found them not cost effective over conventional
carriers (CVS). There is no safe place for permanent storage
of nuclear wastes. Our nation's success & well being
as well as security would be much better served by spending
this money on education and health care. OUR PRIORITIES
ARE WRONG!

I.56.5

I have many more deep concerns, not the least of which
is the danger of a nuclear accident. This many other issues
were not adequately addressed in the DEIS. Also, much
of the data in the DEIS was outdated &/or inaccurate.
Please redo the DEIS, have more hearings where
San Diegans can have a say in their future safety &
quality of life - above all, please reconsider the
home porting of any more CVNS here. Thank you.

I.56.6

Susan Randerson
Signature

11-12-98
Date

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comments should be postmarked on or before November 12, 1998.

VOLUME 7 CVN HOMEPORING EIS — NASNI RESPONSE TO COMMENTS

Comment Number	Response
Susan J. Randerson	
I.56.1	While CVs and CVNs use different sources of fuel (oil vs. nuclear), both types of ships rely upon steam propulsion plants that require seawater cooling. As described in section 7.2, the primary system (which circulated through the reactor) is isolated from the secondary system (which circulates through the steam plant) to ensure radioactivity is kept within the primary system. In addition, the water used in the steam plant does not contact the seawater used for cooling. The seawater cooling requirements are similar and the thermal and marine life impacts from CVs and CVNs are comparable. In addition, please see response to comment O.12.33.
I.56.2	Please see response to comment O.12.190.
I.56.3	Potential impacts to water quality and aquatic organisms from dredging operations in San Diego Bay are discussed in sections 3.3 and 3.5, respectively, of the EIS.
	The USS STENNIS mitigation site was constructed in accordance with permit conditions set forth by the resource agencies. The new wharf mitigation site design would be based on one of two options, intertidal or intertidal/subtidal, to be determined by the agencies during permitting as mitigation for the 1.5 acres that would be impacted. Also please see additional details summarized in the responses to comments F.2.10 and F.2.11 and clarification provided in Volume 1, section 3.5.
I.56.4	Please refer to responses L.4.44 and I.37.1 in the San Diego responses to comments on the subject of terrorism and attacking aircraft carriers in San Diego. The No Action Alternative in the EIS does not propose any additional capacity to home port CVNs, or add additional vessels to the three-carrier historical baseline that has existed at NASNI for several decades.
I.56.5	Our publicly-elected U.S. Congress and President of the United States make programmatic decisions regarding Naval ships (e.g., application of nuclear power), and thus comments regarding these decisions are beyond the scope of this EIS. The results of all the analyses of both normal operations and hypothetical accidents indicate that there would be no significant radiological impacts from homeporting and maintaining NIMITZ-class aircraft carriers or operating NIMITZ-class aircraft carrier maintenance facilities. Please see also response III.O.12.55.
I.56.6	Please see the response to comment I.56.5, above.

Nov. 2, 1998

Jeff Coor Project Mayor,
S. West Division Naval
Facilities & E. Command:

Sir:

I object to nuclear-
Powered Aircraft carriers [3]
in San Diego bay. With
all the trouble in the
world today and especially
Iran. I don't feel that is
safe at all. What could
prevent some enemy
from acting such as
Japan did to Pearl Harbor
doing the same to us.

Dear God, This is
all I feel. I worry!
Of course my time is
getting short on this
earth but I do have

I.57.1

offspring. I would like
to see a safe happy
world for them & all others

I would like to know
where this idea originated
from and more about this.

A most unhappy mother
grand mother & great grandma

Mrs. Dignie A. Miller
3929 Kansas St.

#12 San Diego, Ca.

92104

B Say no! yet true!
I still can't believe it!

1.57.1

1.57.2

1.57.3

VOLUME 7 CVN HOMEPORING EIS — NASNI RESPONSE TO COMMENTS

Comment Number	Response
Virginia A. Miller	
I.57.1	Your opinions are noted and are included in the Final EIS.
I.57.2	<p>As stated in the Draft EIS under the section "Need for the Proposed Action," "The Navy has established a Pacific Fleet Force Structure consisting of six aircraft carriers. Five of these vessels are or will be assigned to ports (homeported) at Navy installations in the continental United States. Three of these are homeported in the San Diego area and two are homeported in the Pacific Northwest area. A sixth carrier is forward deployed in Japan. The closure of Naval Air Station (NAS) Alameda, California, and the relocation of two CVNs to fleet concentrations in San Diego and the Pacific Northwest were carried out in compliance with the 1993 Defense Base Realignment and Closure Commission (BRAC) recommendations. Consequently, the Department of the Navy constructed homeporting facilities for one CVN at NASNI (DON 1995a) and one at Puget Sound Naval Shipyard (PSNS), Bremerton, Washington (DON 1995b). The proposed action of this EIS does not involve a reexamination of homeporting actions directed by the 1993 BRAC process, and does not address the carrier forward deployed in Japan.</p> <p>"Of the six aircraft carriers homeported in the U.S. Pacific Fleet, three are currently NIMITZ-class CVNs. The CVN is a newer class of aircraft carrier requiring different homeporting shore infrastructure (e.g., electrical power and water depth). The three existing CVNs are assigned to home ports at PSNS; NAVSTA Everett; and NASNI. Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard, (PHNSY), a part of the Pearl Harbor Naval Complex in Hawaii, is within the U.S. Pacific Fleet area and is considered a potential CVN home port location (see Figures ES-1 through ES-3 in the Final EIS).</p> <p>"In 1994, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) announced Navy-wide homeporting plans, which included plans to replace two older CVs with two new CVNs in the U.S. Pacific Fleet. The Navy must select home ports and construct facilities as required for the two new CVNs to be added to the U.S. Pacific Fleet; the first by 2001, and the second by 2005. Therefore, the need for the proposed action is the lack of acceptable CVN home port facilities and infrastructure in the U.S. Fleet area of responsibility (AOR)."</p>
I.57.3	Your comments are noted and are included in the Final EIS.

DEVELOPING HOME PORT FACILITIES FOR
THREE NIMITZ-CLASS AIRCRAFT CARRIERS
IN SUPPORT OF THE U.S. PACIFIC FLEET

DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT

DRAFT EIS COMMENTS

Name: Cam Martinez
Address: 4587 39th St. #5, San Diego, CA 92116

COMMENTS:

I do not want a nuclear megaport
in San Diego. It is not safe
Contrary to your flawed EIS report.
The environment is already
suffering greatly and this will
only make it worse. All life
will sustain even more problems
than what already exists. This
country doesn't need anymore
nuclear anything. It is totally
unnecessary and a waste of
money. There is no proper
emergency plan and no
proper plan for disposal.
We don't need any more problems.
Stop this plan Now!
We don't want to be a target either!

Cam Martinez

I.58.1

Date

11/5/98

Signature

Note: This form is supplied for your convenience. You are not required to use this form. Comments of any length may be submitted to the address on the reverse side of this form. Your comments should be postmarked on or before November 12, 1998.

VOLUME 7 CVN HOMEPORING EIS — NASNI RESPONSE TO COMMENTS

Comment Number	Response
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Cam Martinez

- I.58.1 Please see response to comment O.10.31 and I.5.1.

November 6, 1998
McLane Downing
2416 Grandview St
San Diego, CA 92110-1146
(619) 276-8532

John Coon, Project Manager
Southwest Division, Naval Facilities, Engineering Command
Code 05AL-JC
1220 Pacific Highway
San Diego, CA 92132

Subject: Homeporting Two More Nuclear Carriers

Dear John Coon:

Homeporting two more nuclear carriers increases the health and safety risk. This is a densely settled area, and any incident would affect lots of people. | I.59.1

I would like to see the health risk of an incident explained in common english. The assessment should include the demographics of this area, including the population below the border.

Dredging should protect marine life, including all life in the bay. | I.59.2

I suggest that baseline data be obtained for radioactive levels in and around the bay. Then monitoring the levels, analyzing the data, and reporting information to the public should be assigned to an agency outside of the Defense Department. | I.59.3

Very truly yours

McLane Downing
McLane Downing

Comment Number	Response
McLane Downing	
I.59.1	To place the results of the analyses in perspective, Volume I, section 7 of the EIS states, "The radiation exposures to the general public due to normal operations would be so small at each of the home port locations that they would be indistinguishable from naturally occurring background radiation. For example, the highest exposure to a member of the public in any year due to normal operations would be less than one millirem (0.66 millirem at Everett). This value can be compared to the 300 millirem of radiation exposure the general public receives each year from naturally occurring background radiation. Also, the results show that the annual individual risk of a latent fatal cancer occurring in the general population within 50 miles of a NIMITZ-class aircraft carrier home port is very low at each of the home port locations evaluated, less than 1 chance in 2 billion." It further states in Volume II, Appendix F of the EIS, "the annual individual radiological risks to a member of the general population due to accidents associated with support facilities for homeporting of NIMITZ-class aircraft carriers are very low at all of the locations evaluated, less than 1 chance in 580 million." For perspective, the annual risk of dying in a motor vehicle accident is about 1 chance in 6,250. Similarly, the annual risk of dying in a fire for the average American is approximately 1 chance in 36,000; and the annual risk of dying from accidental poisoning is about 1 chance in 72,000.
	As discussed in Appendix F, section 2, population distribution and prevailing wind directions are factors that are accounted for in the risk analysis for the general population. Risks to the Mexican population are also assessed in this Appendix as well. Based on the above, no change to the EIS is deemed necessary.
I.59.2	Potential impacts to marine life has been evaluated carefully in the Final EIS, as detailed in Volume 1, section 3.5. Potential impacts are either less than significant or mitigated to less than significant by such means as construction of the mitigation site at Pier B. Further, as part of the dredged material disposal plan a habitat enhancement area would also be constructed at NAB that will provide about 10 acres of additional, higher quality habitat for marine organisms in the bay.
I.59.3	Please see response to comment O.12.33.

November 6, 1998

Dolores Thompson
4545 Georgia Street #101
San Diego, CA 92116-2675

Mr. John Coon (Code 05AL. JC)
Southwest Division
Naval Facilities Engineering Command
1220 Pacific Highway
San Diego, CA 92132

Dear Mr. Coon,

I would like to thank the U.S Navy for granting us a public hearing regarding the DEIS. However due to the seriuness of the situation I feel that the Secretary of Navy should come to San Diego and hear what the people and their children have to say concerning this matter. His visit is pertinent especially since the people of San Diego would be the target of a "Three Mile Island" accident.

I.60.1

Also, the U.S. Navy did not address the major questions ie: What is done with the nuclear waste material. How much radiation admission is there in the air. What measures is being taken that San Diego does not become another Three Mile Island accident.

I.60.2

Since the officials present could not address these questions perhaps the Secretary of the Navy can. I respectfully request that he come to San Diego if not for any reason then for the sake of the children.

I.60.3

Sincerely,

Dolores Thompson

VOLUME 7 CVN HOMEPORING-EIS — NASNI RESPONSE TO COMMENTS

Comment Number	Response
Dolores Thompson	
I.60.1	<p>Two public hearings on the Draft EIS have been held in the San Diego region and public testimony received, as required under NEPA. The Navy does not currently have plans to have a follow-on community workshop for an informal dialogue. Concerns generated during the public review of the EIS will be considered by Navy personnel responsible for making decisions regarding the proposed action. Navy representatives at the EIS public hearings are directly involved with this decision-making process, and provide recommendations to the Secretary of the Navy regarding the preferred alternative to be implemented.</p> <p>Furthermore, the Navy ensures that the EIS decisionmaker has a complete copy of the public hearing transcripts. The Navy believes that the objective sought by the comment is met by the fact that the transcript of the public hearing is prepared and reviewed as part of the NEPA process leading up to the Record of Decision.</p>
I.60.2	Please see responses to comments L.4.37, O.10.31, O.12.33, and I.53.2.
I.60.3	Please refer to response I.60.1

An Open Letter To The Residents Of The San Diego/Tijuana Region

I.61.1

I'm writing this letter because I'm frightened. I'm afraid for my community, for our children, and for future generations. Why?

Because the U.S. Navy is moving forward with "homeporting" 3 or more nuclear aircraft carriers, in San Diego Bay, one mile up wind of the heart of downtown San Diego and upwind of the almost 5 million people living in our region, depending on which way the wind is blowing. Three nuclear aircraft carriers have 6 nuclear reactors between them with a combined reactor capacity exceeding that of a Three Mile Island or Chernobyl reactor.

At this point I want to make one thing very clear. This is not a letter against the Navy. The Navy, along with all the other branches of the military have served the United States well, but the Navy, like any institution, is not infallible in its judgment.

According to the Navy's estimates, the chances of a significant "accidental" release of radioactive materials into the air from the carriers or their supporting storage and processing facilities is very small. But the chances of winning the lottery "jackpot" are also small, but people still win it on a regular basis.

But beyond long odds for an accident, the potential for terrorism and/or the act of a bitter, disgruntled, drunk, disturbed, and/or insane sailor means that all bets are off in the game of odds.

The whole reason we fund the Navy with our tax dollars is to protect our right to pursue "life, liberty," and "happiness." This given, I'm at a loss to find any rationale that would remotely indicate that homeporting these Nuclear Carriers in the heart of San Diego will make our region, and indeed the U.S. or Mexico more secure from either a civilian or military perspective. In fact the opposite is true. Basing the carriers here means that a small group or even an individual would have the power to render our region unsafe to inhabit for tens if not hundreds of years plus, cripple the Navy's ability to protect us militarily by taking out 3 or possibly more nuclear carriers and who knows how many Navy personnel and civilians.

How could this happen? Well for openers, terrorists could drop bombs from small planes and/or helicopters on the carriers or their storage and processing facilities. A suicide bomber could fly a plane or helicopter loaded with explosives into the carriers. The carriers can be attacked with underwater explosives. They could also be attacked by ramming them with boats filled with explosives. A mentally unstable and/or vengeful sailor could blow reactors with explosives or tamper with reactor computers and controls to cause radioactive meltdowns.

Let's face it, these carriers will be very attractive sitting ducks from a terrorist's perspective or the perspective of some clever nut out to get even for some real or imagined transgression.

Finally, blowing up reactors or causing their safety measures to fail is not comparable to other disasters we are more familiar with. For example, if the carriers the Navy wants to homeport here were oil powered, their destruction, whatever the cause, would certainly be a disaster, but shortly after the fire burned out workers could begin the salvage and cleanup operation.

This is not the case with nuclear powered vessels and their support facilities. Unlike the chemicals generated by simple combustion, the radioactive fallout from a nuclear associated fire will continue to hurt us, our children, future generations, and life in general on cellular, genetic, and atomic levels for tens, hundreds, and potentially thousands of years. Like I said, an incident involving the release of significant amounts of radioactive material is incomparable with the kind of disasters with which we are use to dealing.

After what I've just said, it seems almost trivial to mention it, but homeporting could have a negative affect on our tourist and real estate driven economy. If the release of even a moderate amount of radioactive material hit the news, the tourist and real estate industries in our region would suffer a devastating if not fatal blow. There have already been

international travel advisories published and broadcasted warning tourists about our polluted bays and ocean. Does it make sense to add the danger of radioactive contamination to such advisories?

What should be done? To begin with, the Navy or any other branch of the military should "homeport," "base," and/or "store" nuclear machines, devices, and their support facilities as far away from population centers as possible. And particularly from the Navy's perspective, ships should not be clustered. It seems we should have learned that lesson from Pearl Harbor.

If nuclear powered vessels are homeported separately and in remote locations they would be much easier to defend. Plus, if a reactor core is breached for whatever cause, the Navy only loses one ship and the danger of civilian populations being contaminated by radioactive materials would be lessened.

As I said in the beginning, I'm writing this letter because I'm afraid for the future of our region, its people, and the other forms of life that share it with us.

There are many other things we are doing, like building in floodplains and turning our best agricultural soils into shopping centers, that threaten our region's future well-being, but none of these acts even come close to being as devastating as the radioactive contamination of our region's people and land. Any other assault on our region's ecological health, short of the extinction of a species, can be undone. This is not the case when radioactive contamination is widespread, since undoing it is beyond human capability. If such contamination occurs, it will be a blow to life that only immense amounts of time will hopefully heal.

Why allow ourselves to be put in a situation that makes us potentially vulnerable to the release of more radioactive materials than was released at Chernobyl? When there's so much to lose, why take on such a risk when we don't have to? If enough of us let our elected representatives and the media know that homeporting nuclear powered vessels in the middle of San Diego Bay or any densely populated region is frightening, irrational, and unacceptable, homeporting here can be stopped.

I love our region. I enjoy sharing it with all the people who live here. I love our promise. I love our potential. I've always considered this region my home for life, but now, for the first time, I'm seriously considering moving away. Not so much because I want to save myself, I've already lived a pretty full life, but because I don't think I could stand to look in the faces of our children if homeporting happens, knowing that it represents the potential to completely ruin their lives on every level. Let's all work together to ensure that this does not happen.

I.61.1

Peace & love



Jim Bell was the second place finisher in the 1996 Mayor's race for the City of San Diego. He's also an internationally recognized expert on how to gracefully transform non-sustainable economies into economies that are completely ecologically sustainable. His radio show, "Jim Bell & Common Sense," airs weekly on KFMB, 760 on the AM radio dial, Sunday evenings from 10 to 11 PM. The show can also be heard live world wide, by logging into KFMB's web page via www.jimbell.com. Jim's book, Achieving Eco-nomic Security On Spaceship Earth, is available on his web site free of charge. Jim is also available for lectures, workshops, and design and consultation services. For more information about this letter or other projects, call (619) 272-2898.

VOLUME 7 CVN HOMEPORING EIS — NASNI RESPONSE TO COMMENTS

Comment Number	Response
Jim Bell	
I.61.1	Our publicly-elected U.S. Congress and President of the United States make programmatic decisions regarding Naval ships (e.g., application of nuclear power), and thus comments regarding these decisions are beyond the scope of this EIS. The results of all the analyses of both normal operations and hypothetical accidents indicate that there would be no significant radiological impacts from homeporting and maintaining NIMITZ-class aircraft carriers or operating NIMITZ-class aircraft carrier maintenance facilities.

DEVELOPING HOME PORT FACILITIES FOR THREE NIMITZ-CLASS AIRCRAFT CARRIERS IN SUPPORT OF THE U. S. PACIFIC FLEET.

DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT

RESPONSE FROM A U. S. CITIZEN AND SAN DIEGO COUNTY RESIDENT FOR INCLUSION WITH PREVIOUS ORAL AND WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS FROM THE UNDERSIGNED.

From: Russell D. Hoffman
P. O. Box 1936 Carlsbad CA 92018-1936 (760) 720-7261
November 10th, 1998

Additional Remarks:

My oral remarks concerned the clear and indisputable history by various branches of the United States Military, including the U.S. Navy, of misrepresenting the true dangers of low level radiation to the American public. These misrepresentations have resulted in the deaths already of at least 10s of thousands and probably hundreds of thousands of U. S. civilians (and perhaps even more soldiers) from nuclear weapons testing alone. Add to that, the damage to the ecosystem from the Scorpion, the Thresher, and a long list of smaller unclassified and undoubtedly many classified other nuclear accidents, and it is crystal clear that the real damage has only begun to occur, and many more lives will be wasted by our current and planned military nuclear policies.

However, it will be many more years (if ever) before the real effects are completely quantifiable with available statistical methodologies and analytical technologies, because of the widespread and insidious nature of the effect. Statistics itself, as a separate branch of science and mathematics, is only a few decades old! The science of health physics is even younger -- younger even than the harnessing of the "mighty atom" whose health effects health physics seeks to explain. Yet the trends are clear and just because an effect is hard to measure does not mean it does not exist and is not responsible for 10s of thousands, hundreds of thousands, and perhaps even millions of deaths globally and in the United States.

The nuclear option, whether used or unused, is a weapon of mass destruction. It is both a target for terrorists and a tool of fascists (because it concentrates so much power in the hands of so few).

Yet the Navy continues to support this option. Why?

History clearly shows from the government's own documents and from a wide variety of other sources, that the nuclear option was often supported in part because the evidence of the true hazards of low-level radiation to a closed ecosystem was not yet available (see sample, below). But in those cases, including in the case shown below (the "Manhattan" project), little real effort was made to actually obtain this vital information. And indeed, it is very hard evidence to obtain, requiring 10s of thousands or even 100s of thousands of test subjects, which introduces all sorts of statistical problems in itself, not to mention the logistic ones, or the cost. But slowly, the truth is showing itself and it continuously

points closer and closer in one direction -- that low level radiation is far more dangerous than originally suspected.

I.62.3

In other cases, where various truths were actually known but not presented properly to the public, it was often done under the name of National Security or some other misnomer. In fact any conceivable "National Security" issues are *obliterated* by the overriding concerns of human health, not to mention the wasted additional money the nuclear option costs over non-nuclear options, and the endangerment to the world's environment that an accident (including possible enemy action) could have. (The Russians are now reported to have a better cruise missile than the French Exocets I mentioned in my other remarks.) The DEIS covers only the health effects of a properly functioning reactor, which is uselessly incomplete considering all the fuel and ordinance kept so close to the reactors -- and considering also, the 1500+ mile range of typical cruise missiles. In today's paper are reports of three Navy air crewmen who were lost just this week, due to a collision of two planes *on board* a United States Aircraft Carrier deck. *Accidents do happen!*

I.62.4

The preposterous claim that no accident or enemy action can destroy these ships and cause a loss-of-coolant accident is implicit in the DEIS's failure to properly consider the hazards of full-scale meltdowns in our harbors. Further, the lack of concern over "the dilution solution to pollution" (that is, the effects worldwide of increased radiation levels over time) is bad science, plain and simple. Lastly, the inability of the Navy to understand its greater role as a part of a geopolitical/environmental situation is frightening, if only because the Navy should be thinking globally since it certainly acts globally. Numerous countries (besides America) do not want these things ported in their harbors! If some poll shows the American civilian has been fooled into favoring the Navy's nuclear options, it is only because decades of misrepresentations by the U. S. military, like the current DEIS and like the item below, that they (the public) have agreed to be part of the costly nuclear terror.

I.62.5

The following quote is from the same book my oral quotes from H. D. Smyth were taken from -- A GENERAL ACCOUNT OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF METHODS OF USING ATOMIC ENERGY FOR MILITARY PURPOSES UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT 1940-1945. The author, H. D. Smyth, was at the time Chairman of the Department of Physics of Princeton University and "Consultant to Manhattan District U. S. Corps of Engineers". The report was written at the request of Major General L. R. Groves' United States Army. Publication was authorized as of August 1945, with reproduction in whole or in part authorized and permitted. In short, this document was the official report to the American public about the atomic bomb at the time of its initial development and use. Regarding radiation from an atomic blast, it uses the phrase "dispersed harmlessly", which we now all know to be utterly devoid of fact, yet it is a statement hauntingly similar to the entire attitude of the United States Navy to the truth about radiation hazards. The quote is from page 154. **Bold has been added to highlight the misrepresentation.**

Bold has been added to highlight the misrepresentation.

I.62

↑ I.62.5
"On account of the height of the explosion practically all the radioactive products are carried upward in the ascending column of hot air and dispersed **harmlessly** over a wide area."

Harmlessly? That is easy to prove false -- look at the effects of Iodine 131 from barely 100 above-ground U. S. nuclear tests as recently reported (after a 14-year wait since the investigation was completed). The only question is are there 4 zeros, 5 zeros, or more in the total number of civilian U.S. deaths so far from U.S. nuclear weapons testing? The fact is it wasn't harmless and the statement, like so many others, was a complete misrepresentation to the American public. Low-level nuclear radiation kills in numbers the U.S. military apparently refuses to understand, whether that radiation comes from nuclear weapons testing, harbor meltdowns, or from sunken reactors over time. The Navy's claim to being able to handle these materials to the required level of perfection is both mathematically absurd and morally repugnant.

Clearly, it is time to face the truth of the nuclear menace to humanity, and it is time for the United States Navy and other branches of the military to realize that their service to America must include fair concern for delayed and dispersed responses (a.k.a., "health effects") to their actions.

I.62.6
It has been more than 50 years since the public was first misinformed about the incredible cost of these deadly toys, and it's been long enough. The Navy must face the truth, must present the truth, and must serve the public properly in all it does. The 50-year lie to the American people must come to an end, lest other countries, that are even more capable of hiding the truth from their citizens, also take up the nuclear lie. (India and Pakistan quickly come to mind, each with more than a 90% illiteracy rate.)

Lastly, I wish to state that the Navy policy of not simply distributing Environmental Impact Statements directly to any U. S. citizen who requests one is in complete opposition to the spirit of the laws under which the EIISs and DEIISs and so forth are produced in the first place. My own request for one has so far been turned down, which is the reason my statements do not address actual remarks inside the document. I have had some chance to look over it, and it clearly follows the trends described in this letter and in other government nuclear EIISs and DEIISs (not to mention SEIISs and DSEIISs) I have seen. They all ignore worst-case scenarios and low-level effects.

Sincerely,

Russell D. Hoffman
P. O. Box 1936 Carlbad CA 92018-1936
United States Citizen

Owner and Chief Programmer,
The Animated Software Company
(for affiliation purposes only)

VOLUME 7 CVN HOMEPORING EIS — NASNI RESPONSE TO COMMENTS

Comment Number	Response
Russell D. Hoffman	
I.62.1	<p>It is important to note that since the inception of the NNPP almost half a century ago, there has never been a reactor accident associated with the Program, nor has there ever been a release of radioactivity that has had a significant effect on the public or the environment. The Navy's historical record of safe and responsible operation of nuclear powered warships is discussed in Volume I, section 7 of the EIS.</p> <p>In section 7.1.4 of the EIS it is stated that "Two nuclear-powered submarines (USS THREШER and USS SCORPION) sank during operations at sea in the 1960s. Neither was lost due to a reactor accident . . . Radiological surveys of the debris sites have been performed on several occasions over the past three decades and confirm that, despite the catastrophic nature in which these ships were lost, no detectable radioactive fission products have been released to the environment."</p> <p>The EIS has evaluated a wide variety of accidents and has determined that the radiological risks are not significant. A summary of risks is contained in section 7.6 of the EIS.</p>
I.62.2	Please see response to comment O.12.190.
I.62.3	Please see responses to comments O.12.49 and I.4.1.
I.62.4	Please see responses to comments I.4.1 and O.12.49.
I.62.5	Please see response to comment O.12.10.
I.62.6	Copies of the Draft EIS were made available in several public libraries for public review as required under NEPA. 367 citizens were sent notices of the Draft EIS availability (NOA) and where they could be review the Draft EIS in libraries near their location. 331 copies of the Draft EIS were sent to agencies, organizations and individuals. Every individual who requested a copy of the Draft EIS was sent one. For further detail, please see response to comment O.12.190, I.4.1 and O.12.49.

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D. C. Miller 1/2
San Diego, Calif.
[Redacted]

first class

Mr. JOHN COOPER
Project Manager
Solid Waste Division
Solid Waste Management
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

SEARCHED INDEXED
SERIALIZED FILED

1330 Pacific
San Diego, Calif.
[Redacted]

LETTER TO THE EDITOR

"WOULD BE NUCLEAR ENGINEER WHO HAD TROUBLES WITH POTHOLE AND JURIES COURTS"

As one of the "pinko commie liberal chicom fellow traveler... swine" late (unlamented) Mayor Roger Hedgecock (or was it Hedgehog, as in Naval attack?) identified as "infiltrating among us, as we speak", I have been instructed by my Komissar Felix Dzherzinsky of K.G.B. Central, Moscow and Beijing, acting under the expressed orders of Kamerades Stalin and Mao Tze Tung, to issue an official

"pronunciamento" (i.e., contains many pronouns) to Roger (McCarthy?), Hedgecock's divertiissement from, to quote his would-be supporter, "Just the facts, Maam". i.e., Hedgecock, enough rhetoric already. Now, (as they say in the Courts as ex-officio Mayor Hedgecock should know all to well!), down to "cases":

- Village voice, p. 40, August 21, 1978 - about nuclear leaks, referring to...
- Journal of Magnetism and Magnetic Materials, 7, 312 (1978) - about INCO-182/S2 transition-weld "super" alloy accelerated overageing-embrittlement catastrophic failures (Hudson Generating Station gas-turbine, P. S. E. & G., Jersey City, New Jersey - early 1970's killing maiming some 100 workers (this was the forensic study for the court in a circa \$4 billion lawsuit, in which I predicted in abstract (last line) said consequences for the liquid-metal fast-breeder reactor (LMFBR) . . . fast-forward to Monju, Japan LMFBR "accident" (waiting to happen). The Japan Times, December 10, 1995 - front-page headlines (in English), and several hundred articles since - 304 stainless-steel & INCO-182 paper given at "Intl. Conf. on Magnetic Alloys & Oxides", The Technion, Israel (September, 1997 while employee of I. A. E. A.) - censored in U.S.

"Hear no evil, Speak no Evil. See no Evil" decidedly does NOT mean "DQ no Evil" simply because "super" alloys do not read rhetoric; they simply do what they will do, the laws of physics/metallurgy, and it is our job, Mr. ex-Mayor, to "read THEM". THEY are what nuclear safety (or rather LACK thereof!) is about!

- R. Pollnick, The European, week ending January 14, 1993 - about INCO-182 and INCONEL-600 steam-leaks in pressurized water-reactor (PWR vessel heads an control-rod tubing, necessitating replacement of ALL EC PWR pressure-vessel heads at a cost of some (56/France + 44/Germany + 30/E.C. = 130 @ cost of some \$130 billion to the E. C. because of radioactive-stream leaks of 1cub.meter/min unbeknownst nearly-instantaneous thermal overageing-embrittlement (Fig. 2/y-

I.63.1 in a 10^4 hour (= 1.5 years) in 10^2 hour = 4 days

of its intended life!! This work done right here at General Atomics while we were Mayor. I believe - what other secrets do the "Blues Brothers" have in their vaults?? One can only wonder... And they want to build a fusion-reactor out of these verysame "super" alloys...!!! Why?? Planned obsolescence causes more and more profits! (as anyone who has ever replaced a Mercedes headlight well knows!).

- J. R. Kattus, Code # 4112, U. S. D. O. D. aerospace structural materials Handbook, Battelle (1983) OFFICIAL-WARNING about THERMAL overageing-embrittlement of Hastelloys-X IN FABRICATION as well as IN SERVICE at ambient-temperature (in addition to any radiation-damage) - jet-engine "burn-cans"/combustion-chambers" are made of Hastelloys-X as are all ALL both PWR and BWR fuel bundle supports, "Internals"; the Zircalloy-2/4 fuel-cladding is probably O.K. - its these Hastelloys-X "super" alloys; GENERIC: ENDLESS, where the problem(s) lie not only the embrittlement, but "sensitization" accelerated-corrosion/stress-corrosion which the OMB, USN/SAIC reports all acknowledge "can" cause radioactive corrosion-products "sludge" contamination, and already in many HAVE!!!
- Eugene P. Wigner, Journal of Applied Physics, 17, S47 (1946) - dire prediction of same - Nobel Prize, Physics: Einstein's neighbor friend who took the (infamous "A-bomb letter" to Roosevelt; at Los Alamos under Groves/Oppenheimer (1943-1946) as vice director - a recently-deceased genius who should have won several more Nobel Prizes - one of the greatest physicists of all time, who and was NEVER WRONG ABOUT ANYTHING!!!
- U. S. S. Thresher & U. S. S. Stingray sinkings because of hydrogen-embrittlement of hull-welds - a very analogous metallurgical/mechanical problem!!
- R. Pollard, Union of concerned Scientists Report "US Nuclear Power Plants Shaking their AGE: Case Study: (BWR) (304 Stainless-Steel) Core-Shroud CRACKING" (September, 1995) & "NRC Report to Congress on "Abnormal" "Occurrences" for October-December, 1994" detailing SUDDEN core-"internals" 304 stainless-steel (like Monju LMFBR) SEVERE-EMBRITTLEMENT in some 25 BWR's - 1/3 of all in U.S and EXACTLY as I predicted for INCO-182/S2 transition-welds @ 17.5 years!! Boston Globe/A.P. p. 25 (March 31, 1994) about March 30, 1994 French Nuclear submarine Emerald: "Stream-Leak" kills Commander, Nine Crew..." - an INCO-182 transition-weld and probably 304 stainless-steel piping radioactive-stea

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I.63.1 in about 1 week, i.e. in about 1

Edward Siegel, 1111 Hornblende/Suite 2, San Diego, CA. 92109 / (619) 270-5111
 Ph.D./Metallurgy/M.S.U. (1970); M.S./Physics/U. of Michigan/1969); attended New York U. (1966-1968)/Physics; U. of Pennsylvania/1965-1966)/Materials Science/Metallurgy - both graduate school/ B.S./Physics/C.N.Y. (with Colin Powell (1995) / attended Colorado School of Mines (1960-1961)/Metallurgy & Geophysics/Mineralogy WHISTLEBLOWER: Westinghouse Bettis WAPD (designer & manufacturer of Pressurized Water Reactors (PWR's) for Naval Reactors Program (1974); Public Service Electric & Gas Co. (Mgr. Metallurgy & N.D.T./E.)-N.J. Nuclear Utility (1972); International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)/ Int'l. Nuclear Materials Consultant (1977); ABB D.E. Mgr. of N.D.T./E. (late 1970's....)

As detailed sequentially in accompanying "letter to the editor" and attachment(s), a succinct summary of my technical objections to any/all (not just the stenents!) home-porting of any/all nuclear-reactor powered ships in San Diego is:

- former mayor (and convicted felon) Hedgecock to impune the loyalty of any/all citizens opposed by "baiting the 'commies'..."
- Navy's use of "agent provocateurs" anti-Semitic rally during its arrival
- Navy s. with Jewish: most probably new Secretary Danzig, half-Jewish Defence Secretary Cohen, and national security advisor Berger, "accidental" scheduling of initial two hearings to coincide with holiest Jewish holiday, Yom Kippur (day of atonement), September 29 and 30, 1998 (this latter constitutes a clearly illegal anti-Semitic civil-rights violation with use of government funds by government employees, and is currently under investigation by F.B.I. for criminal civil rights (and other Federal laws) violation. The excuse that it was accident because of non-inclusion on U.S. Navy calendars is nonsense in view of the Navy and Executive branch/Cabinet preponderance of Jewish senior officials!!!

Technicallities: home porting of most especially Stennis CVN some 1,500 miles far south of Bremerton, Washington significantly lengthens steaming time to Asia or Russian coasts, whose minimal "angle of attack" times are only on great-circle routes (followed by commercial airlines and ICBM's). From San Diego, one could quickly deploy to defend only: central American and South American West Coasts, and Tahiti.

- **SECURITY:** proximity to: downtown San Diego, Point Loma area, and Coronado makes nuclear-ships prime terrorist targets for short-range anti-ship missiles. Terrorists can get too close from too many places too easily. More security is a must!
- **FRAUD:** as supported preliminarily by attached documents, WESTINGHOUSE (now CBS Entertainment) has for years PURPOSELY DEFRAUDED the U. S. Navy (as well as commercial customers) in conjunction with: General Electric, ABB/Combustion Engineering, Babcock & Wilcox, most architect-engineering firms, original contractors, International Nickel, Haynes International/Cabot Corp., coming from all key suppliers. Prudent Insurance/Horgan, Louis Githers & Am, along with one Aspinham (subsequent owners) by designing, fabricating, constructing, and installing PWR's, most especially "thermal leading to mechanical" (TLTM)-unstable, i.e., instability "Wigner-S-disease" overageing embrittling spinodal-decomposition catastrophic failure prone nickel-based and iron-based (rod) filler-alloys (welded so-called "super"alloys: INCO-182/82 transition-weld (rod) austenitic piping (304/304L, 312, 316...) "stainless" steels and nickel-based possibly Inconel-600...). This is/was always "planned obsolescence", to refit/supply more parts at greater profits, as except for Rolls Royce, which removed these garbage "super"alloys decades ago! military and commercial General Electric and/or Pratt & Whitney/United Technologies jet-engine combustion-chambers ("burn cans") which explode frequently due to their inherent intrinsic overageing-embrittlement (as Lai first published see attachments and Kartus officially warned about for the whole D.O.D. - see attachment(s). This is what planned obsolescence "super"alloys components to increase sales of component replacements retrofittings, and too early core decommissionings, and causes significantly ENHANCED INCREASED PROBABILITY OF NUCLEAR LEAKS. IF NOT OUT-RIGHT NUCLEUS- "ACCIDENTS" (WAITING TO HAPPEN!!!) due to "POOR" COMPONENT ALLOYS!

1st especially Westinghouse, but as well G.-E.'s, replacement parts and core equipment/decommissioning businesses!!! ENDMIC, "super" alloy Wigner's-disease Ostwald-ripening spinodal-decomposition "thermal-leading-to-mechanical" (TLTM)-Instability OVERAGING-EMBRITTLEMENT and their concomitant catastrophic-failures have a simple analogy.

They are like female senior citizen's OSTEOPOROSIS, a true (Wigner's-)DISEASE not to be denied, like a cancer, eating away at the (most especially Westinghouse) pressure-filled-water reactors (PWR's) (but, as well in G.-E./KAPL BWR's).

which, because of its (not so) "long" time chronic progression, can become acute in catastrophic-failures, as it has in so many "super" alloy applications already. And this progression, with/in time, can only accelerate. This is why it is technically called not just "aging", but OVERAGING!!!

In conclusion, let me offer the analogy to make the point:

- they simply drive the horse/ship, versus
- I am like the DOCTOR, the veterinarian specializing in horse bone diseases!
- the Navy can drive their horses/nuclear ships all they want, so bravely, with so much "bragadocio" and machismo, but, when the doctor diagnoses that the horses bones have osteoporosis/I diagnose "super" alloy TLTM-INSTABILITY, insist on continuing to "ride like the wind" risking the horses limb and life without a thorough diagnosis, and a consultation/hearing to discuss the ISSUE!!!
- Of course, the Navy is not quite like the owner; it won't go broke simply because the Navy can and will not foot the bill. They have an infinite "sugar daddy", the ripped off taxpayer citizens who have been PURPOSELY defrauded for some four to five decades, by WESTINGHOUSE (for PWR's) and G.-E. (for BWR's)!! So, the Navy, rather than admitting to the even possibility, muchless high probability of reactor "super"alloy component/systems GENERIC "now" ENMIC metallurgy problems, simply takes the infamous out of one who has an infinite source of taxpayer citizen funds to repair their foolish mistakes of many decades, to quote one (citizen) Alfred E. Newman, "what, no worry?? For the Navy to seriously consider, muchless air its dirty linen in public at SUBSTANTIVE hearings that it who, by definition can do "no, wrong!" (why? Because we are us!!!) is to bury one's head in the sand and hope the bad spirits pass them by. But these bad spirits simply will not let the Navy go. After all, these GENERIC "now" ENDMIC overageing-embrittling "super"alloys will not let the Navy go. After all, these GENERIC metallurgy embodied in their very own metallurgy. And they do not read media blitz, the Navy's public relations media hype spin doctoring marketing media blitz. They do not even read the metallurgy scientific literature. They will do what they will do when we want, and it is not up to them to read us. we have to read them and study and learn from them. This has been done since the early 1970's in the self-deluding Navy organization and Naval Reactors Office/Nuclear Navy;
- either won't tell (the "cover your --" at any costs option) (especially (a) either won't tell the taxpayers/citizens) or (b) its Navy macho technical incompetence cannot fathom such technical contractors: hoping to rely only upon these (verysame PURPOSELY defrauding) contractors: BWR's G.-E./KAPL and most SERIOUSLY PWR's/WAPD WESTINGHOUSE!!!
- **SURE:** if its after all, the motto over the Electric Chair is "you can be WESTINGHOUSE!!!". Here, in this context, what you/the Navy/the paying taxpayer/citizen CAN be **SURE**, of is: PREmature component failures/replacement: decommissionings/refirings... of nuclear cores, with continuing on-going (ad infinitum ad nauseum!!!) taxpayer/citizen ever mounting bills, even if there are never "leaks" nor catastrophic nuclear "accidents" (waiting to happen!!!). When will the Navy sue WESTINGHOUSE (& G.-E.) to recover these HUGE PURPOSEFUL FRAUD COSTS???

If the Navy wants, to echo Congressman Fisher's testimony, hold TWO-WAY NON-BIASED media hype blitz marketing HEARINGS rather than just one-way diatribes, wit

their Secretary Cohen, AND their a

their contractor's (G.-E./KAPL and WESTINGHOUSE/WAPD) metallurgy designer

technical experts (along with the expected DOE National Laboratory usual rabu

the only trustworthy metallurgists, working for the government, to air

issues of corruption N.I.S. ONLY THEN can substantive issues be aired

NOTiced/NOTiced/Ncorruptable N.I.S.

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O **CERAMIC SYNERGETICS RESEARCHER** - SAN FRANCISCO, CA. - FOUNDER & INVENTOR /

DEVELOPER OF STATIC SYNERGETICS, UNIVERSALITY-PRINCIPLE, RECESSION/EXPANSION THREE LAWS OF THERMODYNAMICS MAPPING PATTERN-RECOGNITION EQUIVALENCE TO SIGNAL PROCESSING TO EXPLAIN UNIVERSAL FUNCTIONS/J/F NOISE, 1/F SUSCEPTIBILITIES, CRITERION FOR ANDERSON LOCALIZATION & MULTI-LEVEL SYSTEM/APPLICATIONS: MATERIALS PROCESSING REAL-TIME Q.C./Q.A. TO OPTIMIZE YIELDS, CAM, CAD, CRYPTOGRAPHY, FRACTALS, HOW THEY WORK: WHY THEY WORK PROC-ELECTROCHIM. SOC. 83, 8, 497(1983); TEST & MEAS WORLD EXPO, SAN JOSE (1983); J. NONAL. SOL. 40, 453(1980); INTL CONF. LATT. DYNAM., PARIS(1977); J. PHYS. CHEM. LIQ. 1(1975)6(1976)-8 PAPERS/CONTEMP. PHYS. (1986?);

O **SILICON VALLEY CERAMIC LABS, CA. - MATERIALS SCIENCE/SOLID STATE PHYSICS/ CONSULTING (SEMICONDUCTORS, FIBER-OPTICS, MAGNETIC MEMORY...)**

O **NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL-SAO PAULO, BRAZIL - VISITING RESEARCH PHYSICIST DEVELOPMENT OF STATIC SYNERGETICS FOR DISORDERED SYSTEMS: GLASSES, LIQUIDS, PLASMAS (INHOMOGENEOUS/STRIATED), MAGNETS, POWDERS, SLUSHES (FERROFLUIDS). COMPOSITES, POLYMERS, REF-APS PLASMA DIV. MTG., L (1983); IEEE Conf. on PLASMA SCI., S.D.(1983); J. MAG. MAG. MATLS.-SERIES PAPERS(1977), (1978)... BRILLIQUIN/LANDAU SYMMETRY-BREAKING DOMINANCE**

O **QUEEN MARY COLLEGE, UNIVERSITY OF LONDON, U.K.-VISITING RESEARCH PHYSICIST DEVELOPMENT OF STATIC SYNERGETICS FOR DISORDERED SYSTEMS: POWDERS (ERSTERLAR GRAINS, COMPOSITES), MAGNETS(SPIN GLASSES, METALLIC GLASS): I.R., U.V. & VISIBLE OPTICAL PROPERTY FUNCTIONS COMPUTATIONS: MICROWAVE & MILLIMETER WAVE & R.F. TRANSMISSION, REFLECTION, REFRACTION, EXTINCTIVE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, INDONESIA, VIENNA, AUSTRIA & ICIP TRIE: RADIATION DAMAGE DISORDERS/DEFECTS IN CERAMICS, METALS, ALLOYS, POLYMER, N.D.T. (I.R. IMAGING, ACOUSTIC EMISSION, ULTRASONIC SCATTERING,...) ON**

O **MOLECULAR ENERGY RESEARCH CO., WESTWOOD, N.J. - ELECTROCHEMISTRY/PHYSICAL C. PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC & GAS CO., NEWARK, N.J. - MANAGER/MATERIALS SCIENCE, SURFACE PHYSICS/CHEMISTRY/CATALYSIS(HHOO/HETERO), CHEMICAL REACTION OSCILLATIONS, CATALYST MAGNETISM, AND(Ultrasonic) LAE, SCATTERING, L:**

O **ENERGY THEORY/HYDROGEN ECONOMY/REF. INTL. CONF. ALT. ENRG. SOUR., BAL HARBOR, RADIATION DAMAGE, ND(T. MECHANICAL PLASTICITY, SOLITONS, DISLOC. THE.**

O **WESTINGHOUSE ATOMIC POWER DIV., PITTSBURGH, PA. - SENIOR MATERIALS SCIENTIST: GENERAL MOTORS, TECHNICAL CENTER, FORD MOTOR CO. SCIENTIFIC LAB., MI - SR. LIQUIDS, POLYMERS, CERAMICS, MATERIALS, METALS, OPTICAL PROP. EXP. EXP.**

DR. EDWARD SIEGEL

LIST OF PUBLICATIONS & VIDEOS

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~ 30" b 1993

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"Now" Coming - This will - Venetian in
G.C... French Command (12/16 / 56) is

Now!

Church

STARBUCK THURSDAY 3/31

Over-aging Alib Metallurgy Failure
the US Nuclear (TRW) Inspection Report
100% Carbon with tribal INVITABLE
it is not a fireproof one under any

service since September 1983, at one time based at Toulon, the Fougueux is powered by a nuclearized steam-powered nuclear reactor, which heats water to produce steam to drive two turbine generators. The generators produce electricity that powers the ship's propeller and runs its internal systems.

'The accident was the second involving a nuclear-powered submarine from Toulon in eight months. The attack sub Rubis hit an oil tanker while surfacing during anti-collision maneuvers off Toulon last July 19. No one was injured, but the submarine sustained serious damage to its bow, which houses sensitive nuclear equipment.

Toulon is 400 miles south west of Paris on the Mediterranean.

A map of the Pyrenees mountain range, showing the border between France and Spain. The map includes labels for France, Spain, Andorra, Monaco, and San Marino. A scale bar indicates 100 km. The border is shown as a dashed line with arrows pointing from France to Spain. The Pyrenees range is depicted as a dark grey area.

leaked inside the turbine room of a sunken French nuclear submarine yesterday, killing the commandant and nine other sailors during a maneuver. The Kirov-grade surface ship sank in the Mediterranean.


"There was no immediate word on what caused the leak on the 6-year-old submarine," May said.

Taranto is 400 miles southward of
Villas on the Mediterranean.

—4101—


has a fleet of 600, was
other French navy ve-
the island of Corse a

said other compartments, including the one housing the sub's nuclear reactor, were not affected.



VILLAGE VOICE, AUGUST 21, 1978 A 40

Voice August 21, 1978



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GEIGER COUNTER

By Anna Mayo

II Leaks Could Kill

At Seabrook, Indiana, however, a small nuclear reactor contains hundreds of miles of corrugated piping, much of it stuck together with INCO 122 and INCO 123, two varieties of American know-how brought back by Huntarga Alloy Products, a division of International Nickel. A plant's laboratory investigates early after an accident or an emergency assuming uranium fuel rods, but in simulating the severe heat the resultant water itself becomes dangerously radioactive. Leaking is one half. So it is that INCO 122 and INCO 123 are two of the world's most crucial alloys.

The Public Service Electric & Gas Company is a New Jersey utility with four nuclear reactors either operating or under construction. Its safety program has been plagued from the outset by labor-dispenser environmental protest delays in permits, and federally mandated design changes. In September of 1976, P.S.E. & G. was among the utilities singled out as a poor investment site by the respected, Cambridge, New York brokerage firm of Jeffer, Lamson, P.S.E. & G. becomes one of the best-rated energy research laboratories in the country. In the late spring of 1973, Dr. Edward Siegel, then the 45-year-old metallurgist, says that he was assigned and funded to carry out an investigation of possible blistering and cracking in INCO 122/123 joints. Siegel and a team of technicians, over time, tried the play with every aspect, perhaps techniques (the basic metallurgy, chemical analysis, Kirschbaum microscopy (Kischell is a scale indicator), scanning electron microscopy, X-ray diffraction, Microstruc-ture, electron probe, tensile tests—just name it.)

By the winter of 1976, Siegel's research had led him to report that INCO 122/123 might not stand the heat in nuclear plants. As was natural, he discussed his doubts with his supervisors from other utilities whom he met at industry gatherings (as a result he remembers getting a lot of calls asking for more information. Suddenly), he says, the energy lab supervisor called him in and ordered to stop talking about this work. The supervisor attempted to silence Siegel. Utilities, he says, are not competitive and normally share technical information. So why, the supervisor? A P.S.E. & G. higher-up assured him that there had been a misunderstanding; that he was free, as before, to exchange ideas, just as long as he kept a record of communications with persons outside the company. "Just a routine exercise of cold-starting information."

In September of 1976, he recalls, the lab supervisor accused him of falsifying his expense account. Siegel, outraged, says that he challenged the possibility to bring criminal charges against him so that the matter could be settled in court, but, he says, he was fired without formal charges. He went round to pick up his books, papers, and personal effects, but found his office padlocked. Anthony Lava, a engineer who has since left P.S.E. & G. to run his own company, reports that he saw company personnel ransack Siegel's belongings before returning them. Siegel claims further that a lab technician told him that the company had removed all INCO samples and other experimental materials from the lab, announced that the project was terminated, and pledged him not to discuss it.


In 1976, Siegel says he was only faintly aware of the controversy raging over the use of nuclear energy. He had had no contact with the citizens who were protesting against P.S.E. & G.'s nuclear commitment. Siegel had loud the circumstances of his dismissal from his job, but had put it down to anti-Semitism. (The company had refused to give him Rosh Hashanah off or to let him sit Shiva following his mother's funeral.) Then, he says, "I started to follow Geiger's Captain's Chronicle of Persecuted Scientists and began to suspect that I might be a victim of the same society." Eventually he asked The Voice to raise the question of why P.S.E. & G. had got rid of him. Was it his being part of an INCO coverup?

Industry scientists shortly concluded that there is nothing to cover up, since INCO never breaks and cracks until it reaches temperatures of 1000 degrees Fahrenheit. Cracking is a problem in fossil-fuel plants that operate at that heat; they say, but not in nuclear reactors, where the water temperature hovers between 500 and 600 degrees.

Siegel, however, claims that this is the crux of his argument—that water is subject to thermal transients—sudden jumps to 1000 degrees. He says he has reason to suspect that transients lasting one to three hours have a cumulative weakening effect on INCO.

Such temperature leaps are impossible, says industry, according to Jim Sutaria, public information officer of the Chicago office of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, a nuclear reactor pipe, temperature depends on water pressure. When the rushing water reaches 1240 pounds pressure per square inch, relief valves open, automatically reducing the pressure and the heat.

Craig Carlson consulted with Greg Miller and in 1976 quit his job as a structural engineer of the General Electric Company to work with the environmental movement. Miller



Metalsurgist Edward Siegel, Ph.D., with sketch of graph illustrating properties of INCO 122 from Siegel's paper now always published this year in the Journal of Magnetism and Magnetic Materials. (You can look it up.)

said that thermal transients can occur if the steam that results from water boiling when pressure is reduced heats up as it passes through the fuel core. P.S.E. & G., nobly pretending that it had to protect Siegel's privacy—a lover Siegel has asked for—refused any comment on his association with the company or the reasons for his departure.

Siegel, however, had given me the names of two scientists whom he respected, and who, he said, had encouraged his line of research. He thought of them as friends. Some friends. The first, a senior researcher at another institution, who wished to remain anonymous, accused The Voice of trying to make trouble. "That man is a disgruntled employee," he shouted. "Took a trip around the world and returned in an extremely unproductive manner! His report was very poorly based, ridiculous."

Siegel's other "friend," a P.S.E. & G. engineer who also declined to be identified, gave a different account. "You know what he is? He's one of those people who believe in science," he snarled. "Think you can find out something in a laboratory. Well, we know the proof of the pudding is in the eating. We have no INCO problems in the actual operating plants. No problems at all."

No Problems

In late June, out in Palo, Iowa, the Iowa Electric Company had to shut down and remove the fuel from its Duane Arnold nuclear power plant in order to make emergency repairs. It must have been bad in Palo, Iowa Electric would not remove fuel tightly, for environmentally (and economically) speaking, removal is no picnic. After a reactor has been operating for awhile, the fuel decays to the point where a portion of it is plutonium, and it can be handled only by remote-control cranes which, like their human masters, can slip and drop their dangerous loads. And there is the risk of scratching fuel in Iowa's storage pool while repairs are going on. Like storage space at other reactors, Iowa Electric's fuel pool is already filled beyond original design specifications, there being no natural radioactive waste disposal facility to receive spent fuel. The problem with crowding a fuel pool is that, if fuel elements get too close to one another, you get a chain reaction that can result in a disaster-movie release of radioactivity.

Fuel removal is astronomically expensive. The staff of the Iowa State Commerce Commission, which regulates Iowa Electric, states, has made a tentative estimate of \$20 million for fuel removal. "Since they don't know what's wrong, we can't even begin to estimate what the triple costs are going to be," said Arthur Zahler, a staff engineer of the commission. But \$20 million is a lot of money. In Iowa, Zahler added firmly that the contamination will be bidding hearings August 31 to determine whether the plant breakdown is "the result of an error or an imprecident act."

Like relying on defective materials.

The Duane Arnold fuel had to be removed when helium in the plant reached a alarming level of four billion cubic feet per minute. The leakage has been determined to have been caused by at-yet-unexplained failures in located 600 fittings. The NTC asserts that the problems with located 600 (rooster, nickel alloy) are facilitated when unlocated INCO 122/123 cracking may be affecting the adjacent 600 material. (Inert metals like Nickel confirm that 600 is always welded with 122 and 123.) When I asked Siegel about the Duane Arnold shutdown, he remembered that in September of 1975, one of those once-friendly reactors had cracked at a predictable moment, thus his work might have helped to cause failures in other older alloys, including located 600 as well. Can Siegel have found the nuclear industry's Achilles heel? You can't make trouble very often when you can make love. They both have to be there to begin with.

Predicted (1974-1976)

- ① the Metallurgy Ichillah - Dard
- ② the Magnetic N.D.T. Q-T.A. (continued)
- ③ the Alm Rejuvenation Heat Treatment Q.-C. { outcome? }
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JOURNAL OF MAGNETIC AND METALLURGIC MATERIALS 7 (1978) 312-316
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PARAMAGNETIC-FERROMAGNETIC TRANSITION IN AGEING PRECIPITATION HARDENED NICKEL-IRON SOLID SOLUTION ALLOYS

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Westinghouse Atomics Power Division, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, U.S.A.

I.A.S.A., Vienna, Austria

Initially paramagnetic FCC Ni based alloys are known to transform to ferromagnetic FCC alloys via aging. This magnetic transformation is accompanied by NBC, TiC and minor NBC precipitation at temperatures between 400°C and 600°C. These regular carbide precipitates are the cause of the Curie temperature of the resulting Ni alloy which increases from room temperature. These alloys cause severe changes in the mechanical properties of the Ni alloy via hardness and fracture toughness. This is of major interest since these alloys, identified as INCO 182 and INCO 183, form the structural materials used in nuclear reactors and found fuel rods constructed since 1960, most refractory to the LMFBR; the former having shown increased brittleness due failure in low temperatures.

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means to prevent such catastrophic age hardening or to possible recrystallization by *in situ* solution treatment on welds or increasing ambient temperatures artificially to bring the alloy above the age hardening thermal range, i.e. to dissolve the precipitates as fast as they form or to prevent their formation entirely.

1. Introduction

Initially paramagnetic FCC Ni based alloys, identified in welding practices as INCO 182 and INCO 82, transform to a ferrimagnetic FCC alloy phase in their as cast form upon aging. This magnetic transformation is accompanied by drastic change in their mechanical properties: hardness, fracture toughness, tensile strength (ultimate), and yield stress (at 0.2% plastic strain yield point).

Such alloys are experimentally important because they are the major transition weld metal between ferritic BCC or BCT (martensite) steels and FCC stainless steels used for aerospace, nuclear reactor generating stations, as well as in petrochemical refineries, synthetic natural gas and coal gasification, and liquefaction plants, and other chemical processing plants. The magnetic induction of these mechanical engineering-age-hardening (hardening in service) is an extremely valuable tool for non-destructive testing of steel structures, welds in surveying, and for studying experimentally, the age hardening (precipitation hardening) processes and kinetics (kinetics) with an eye to possible alloy stabilization via addition of alloying ele-

2. Alloy aging experiments

The INCO 182 alloy, of usual (and final) composition (in wt%):

Ni = 65.23; Cr = 0.165; Co = 0.04
Fe = 8.62; Nb = 1.93; Ti = 0.81
Cr = 14.03; Ti = 0.81
Mn = 7.55; Si = 1.93
The subjects

was age hardened at temperatures of 700°F to 1400°F (with additional between-temperature anneals of 2000°F down to 1400°F for times ranging from 2 hrs to 15 min) for times ranging from 1 hr to several months in order to simulate an entire lifetime, nominally 1025°F for periods up to 105,000 hr (10 years) by accelerated aging; in addition, the as cast alloy was furnace aged for 17 years at about 1100°F continuously, with no thermal cycling after initial ambient service and with no applied stress as opposed to aged alloy in service in piping-welds. This latter fur-

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lines from the still low density of aligned precipitates, but via an observed clear increase in the d-spacings of the aged alloy.

Mössbauer spectroscopy [5] is currently underway to further study the magnetic structure of the unaged paramagnetic and aged ferromagnetic alloy. So far, it only confirms the ferromagnetic state formation via splitting of the single paramagnetic Mössbauer line in the unaged alloy into the characteristic six-fold Mössbauer peak structure in the ferromagnetic aged alloy.

Hot tensile testing [6] showed that the in service and furnace aging increased the ultimate tensile strength from 63,200 Psi in the unaged (as cast) alloy to over 84,100 Psi in the aged alloy, agreeing with the large increase in hardness, and presumable yield point, seen upon aging. An analysis indicated that this hardening, with concomitant loss of ductility, was responsible for the loss in fracture toughness and related catastrophic cracking of this alloy in service, and the equally severe embrittlement seen in the furnace aged alloy (unstressed an uncycled). This equality seems to rule out fatigue fracture as opposed to embrittlement fracture, but this is merely a tentative conclusion.

5. Theoretical considerations

The theoretical work of Hoscilitz [7], Chickazumi [8], Dykstra [9] on magnetic properties of age hardened alloys with a ferromagnetic matrix and paramagnetic precipitates (the case here), and of Hasen [10], Martin [11] and McLaughlin [12] on the mechanisms of age hardening precipitate formation, as well as the Liebowitz-Kalos [13] statistical mechanics theory of ageing (Orward ripening) are being applied to this alloy currently. The magnetic theory is difficult (for paramagnetic precipitates in a ferromagnetic matrix), but the major thrust is to predict aligned precipitate time dependence of the alignment kinetics with the concomitant increase in magnetization with time. This is important for calibration of any magnetic NDT technique and for estimating the in service lifetime of alloys welds before solution treatment or replacement.

The possibility of spinodal decomposition [13], at McLaughlin reported in NiTi FCC alloys [12],

a simple model of INCO 82 and 182, would produce




Fig. 6. Relative magnetization and hardness of age hardened INCO 182 alloy.

conditionally) around 1200°F of amplitude 30 mOe/cm; this peak is presumably due to (Nb, Ti) C, NbC and TiC aligned precipitate structure formation and growth and concomitant removal of Nb, Ti and C solute atoms from the FCC (Figs. 3 and 4). Ni based alloy matrix. This removal is also responsible for the concomitant large increase in relative magnetization; the paramagnetic-ferromagnetic transition via magnetic moment formation. This is because the Curie temperature of Ni FCC alloys is depressed by the addition of solute alloying elements (especially Nb and Ti) [2]. Removal of Nb and Ti from the Ni FCC solid solution matrix, will allow the Curie temperature in principle to rise through room temperature, where all of our measurements were performed, after a quench from ageing temperature into iced brine (at large velocity to prevent bubble formation and vapor lock, thermal barrier formation and to optimize quench rate) (figs. 5a and 6a).

X-ray diffraction [4] confirmed that precipitation during ageing (occurrence of γ - γ -carbide diffusion




Fig. 4. Electrical resistivity of age hardened INCO 182 alloy.






Fig. 5. Relative magnetization and hardness of age hardened INCO 182 alloy.





In the International Vacuum Congress and the Third International Congress on Solid Surfaces held in Vienna, Austria in September, 1977 one notices discussed was your experiences with Inconel 182 welds. One of 41 182 welds which stress corrosion cracking had been observed in 18 welds between stainless and carbon steel. Could you please provide me a copy of your report on this subject? If not detailed in your report, you please provide as much information as you can on:

- 1) Materials joined
- 2) Product forms
- 3) Fabrication histories (forming, heat treatment)
- 4) Operating histories (time to failure, temperature, environment, applied stress/strain)
- 5) Crack locations and appearances

You in advance for any information that you may be able to provide on subject.

Sincerely,

E. Siegel
E. Siegel
Component Behavior Analysis

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a non-linear alignment function and therefore a non-linear embrittlement and magnetization in time; this calibration is a necessity and can only experimentally be performed by another 10-20 year experiment. Solution treatment maps have recently been experimentally derived [14] for reverting the aligned microstructure, embrittlement, hardness increase and magnetization for a series of time-temperature combinations, some as low as 15 minutes and as cool as 1400°F. Whether this can be applied to post operation weld solution treatment on welds *in situ*, or increased ambient temperature to prevent the aging on welds *in situ*, remains to be experimentally determined [14].

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MIXED VALENCIES OF Eu IN INTERMETALLIC COMPOUNDS WITH THE Cu₃Cu₂ STRUCTURE *

E.R. BAUNINGER, I. FELNER and S. OFER

Racah Institute of Physics, The Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel

The Mössbauer spectra of EuNi_{2-x}Zn_{2-x} and EuNi₂Cu_{2-x} compounds are composed of three subspectra, one corresponding to Eu²⁺ and one to Eu³⁺ due to Eu in a mixed valence state. The mixed valency is interpreted in terms of fast fluctuations between 4% and 47% coexisting valencies. The energy necessary to make an interconfiguration excitation depends on the number of Ni neighbours of Eu, on z and on the temperature. Spectroscopic measurements are consistent with the analysis of the Mossbauer experiments. The dependence of the magnetic hyperfine field, the Curie temperatures and the inner shifts on z, is discussed.

1. Introduction

In most compounds rare earth ions appear in well defined valence states. In recent years a number of "mixed valence" compounds have been found which exhibit properties indicating that the rare earth ions in these compounds are in an intermediate or mixed valence state.

The mixed valence compounds can roughly be divided into four groups: (i) Compounds in which the rare earth ions with different valency occupy inequivalent lattice sites, as in Eu₂O₃ [1]. In this case the valence distribution is static and no fluctuations take place. (ii) Compounds in which all rare earth ions occupy equivalent lattice sites, but the ratio R between the number of ions in each valence state is dictated by the stoichiometry of the compounds, as in Sm₂S₃ [2,3]. In this case the ratio R will be independent of temperature but hopping of an electron between the ions might occur. The "hopping" frequency will usually be temperature dependent. (iii) Compounds in which all rare earth ions occupy equivalent lattice sites, R is not determined by stoichiometry and is temperature independent. In these compounds only the ionic ground state is occupied, but its wave function is a linear combination of atomic orbital wave functions. (iv) Compounds in which R is temperature dependent. In this case two different valence states are energetically very close and populated at temperatures at which measurements are

performed. The temperature dependence of R is a result of the change of the relative population of the two states with temperature [4,5]. Fluctuations between the two states usually take place and the fluctuation frequencies might or might not be temperature dependent. These compounds are referred to as fluctuating valence compounds [6]. The most direct evidence for such interconfiguration fluctuations (ICF) is provided by Mössbauer isomer shift data of ICF systems containing Eu ions [4].

Different techniques have been employed to study mixed valence compounds. Among them, only X-ray photoelectron spectroscopy (XPS) and the Mössbauer effect are of microscopic nature. The time resolution of the Mössbauer effect is determined by the lifetime of the nuclear level involved in the Mössbauer transition and is about 10⁻⁹ s. The ICF rates observed so far are faster than 10¹¹ s⁻¹, resulting in well defined spectra with parameters intermediate between those corresponding to the fluctuating states [4].

From all rare earth ions which may exhibit mixed valence properties (Ce, Sm, Eu, Tb, Tm and Yb) Eu isotopes are the most sensitive for studies of mixed valence phenomena by the Mössbauer effect. The isomer shift in a Mössbauer spectrum is a straightforward measure of the electronic configuration of the ion. Isomer shifts, S, measured with the 21.6 keV gamma ray of ¹⁵¹Eu between compounds in which Eu is divalent and trivalent are about 14 mm/s, whereas the natural line width, 2Γ, of the resonant absorption line of the 21.6 keV gamma ray of ¹⁵¹Eu is 1.3 mm/s. The ratio S/2Γ is therefore ~10 for ¹⁵¹Eu. This ratio

* This research was supported by a grant from the United States-Israel Binational Science Foundation (BSF), Jerusalem, Israel.

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Dr. E Siegh
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'Leaks' alert over nuclear power plants

NEXT week Britain's Nuclear Decommissioning Authority will issue its first ever warning to the public that it is likely to be met by consumers higher electricity charges.

The warning may have originated in the giant steam generators of the Esbjerg water reactor - the most common type of nuclear power plant - which have been leaking water from the outer boundary of the system. The alarm sounded after a finding of a leak in a reactor near Lyon.

It had been known that the reactors were leaking because the steam-cooled tubes had been found to have small holes.

In Switzerland, where no less than 12 reactors have been discovered at the Mühleberg reactor, Germany has found cracks in five of its 14 PWRs.

It also found one in Spain, and Belgium, which earn half its export trade, there are three and in the Netherlands there are one.

Other bridges could be a nuclear snow-

case, as the nuclear power stations of which France's EDF released this week disclosed that

most of the 120 reactors are leaking

because the steam-cooled tubes had been found to have small holes.

The Swiss, however, will not tolerate high pressure and even so experience, but it is now known to be necessary to reconstruct and fit a far sturdier core than originally projected.

French government scientists claim that some power stations may now be forced to stop operating at full output.

France's best days of no

danger of a Chernobyl-like

disaster, however, seem to

be numbered.

It is not clear whether the

French, who continue to

claim that they are

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EXCLUSIVE

Roman Rollinetz

Fusion reactors, and the gov-

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Both the boron carbide/steel melt formed and the melt constituents react eutectically with the coolant channel wall made of Zircaloy. Giving rise to Zircaloy liquefaction around 1250 °C. In this way, the Zircaloy cladding material is already liquefied well below its melting point of 1760 °C. The result of this lowering of the melting point is the beginning of UO₂ dissolution at "low" temperatures. In the upper bundle zone the Zircaloy cooling channel wall is destroyed so that the melt can spread radially and relocate downward. As a result, coolant channel blockages develop in the bottom part of the bundle.

Influence of Quenching

Quenching of the hot bundles by water caused further fragmentation and an enhanced Zr/H₂O reaction resulting in a temperature rise at the top of the bundle, although the electric power supply was shut off, and in additional hydrogen generation. Some further meltdown of material in the upper bundle regions was observed due to the additional exothermic Zr/H₂O reaction and the resulting high temperatures.

The water entering the bundle and the developing steam cause a thermal shock on the embrittled materials, generating new surfaces. The steam reacts with the metallic components of the newly formed surfaces, and, as a result of the exothermal Zr/H₂O reaction, local temperature excursions take place again. The additional hydrogen formed at this point in time is quite considerable, i.e., up to about 80% of the total hydrogen. In the LOFT experiment FP-2 the percentage of hydrogen generated during the reflood was approx. 80%.

Hydrogen Generation

The results from the CORA tests support the conclusion that hydrogen generation during severe accidents will continue, assuming a sufficient steam supply, up to complete consumption of the available Zircaloy and stainless steel. One of the mechanisms for fracturing hydrogen generation is the removal of heat materials from the high temperature oxidation zone into a cooler zone. During the tests, because little material relocated from the high temperature region to the steam cooled region, hydrogen generation continued until either termination of the test or complete consumption of the available Zircaloy and stainless steel. Re-flood of the hot bundle (quenching) resulted in an additional strong hydrogen generation as described in section 5.10 [Influence of Quenching].

Influence of Bundle Size

The larger fuel rod bundles (CORA-7 and CORA-10) with 57 and 59 fuel rods, respectively, compared with 25 fuel rods in the smaller bundles, did not show any different material behavior. In general, similar physical and chemical phenomena were observed in the smaller bundles. Temperature excitation started at about 1200 °C and continued

damage progression within the bundles. After the tests, the upper parts of the bundles were free of any absorber material. This material has relocated to the lower (i.e., cooler) part of the bundle.

Influence of Heat-up Rate

The only CORA experiment performed so far with lower heat-up rates of 0.2 K/s and 0.3 K/s, respectively, (CORA-30 and -31) compared to 1 K/s demonstrated clearly that no temperature excursion due to the exothermal Zircaloy/steam interactions takes place. The chemical interaction energy formed caused only an increased heatup rate between 1200 and 1800 °C of about 1 K/s. The oxide layer which has formed on the cladding outer surface during heatup delays the chemical interactions between Zircaloy and steam since the diffusion of oxygen through the ZrO₂ layer is the rate-determining step. The Zircaloy will be almost completely oxidized, or at least converted into a-ZrO₂, before reaching the melting point of oxygen poor (as-received) Zircaloy at about 1760 °C. As a result, large UO₂ fuel liquefaction by molten Zircaloy will not take place; this means smaller fission product release rates and it requires much higher temperature 1850 °C before UO₂ melting and relocation occurs.

AGING AND COMPONENTS

One area with a major impact on the safety and reliability of the current generation of nuclear plants, and one in which a great deal of research is being performed, is plant aging. Aging is a major concern because, as the components and structures age, safety may be affected if degradation occurs and goes unnoticed. Understanding the aging process becomes even more important in the context of plant lifetime extensions because the level of safety must not degrade during the life extension. In the two sessions on this topic, researchers addressed aging-related issues of Class I E power systems, reactor pressure pipe, piping systems, cables, motor-operated valves, gate valves,

control rod drive systems, safety-related pumps, pressure transmitters, and snubbers.

R. Lofaro's paper entitled "Detecting and Mitigating Aging in Component Cooling Water Systems," emphasizes the importance of the aging research. On the basis of operating experience, Lofaro showed that the Component Cooling Water system components are susceptible to gradual degradation and that this degradation leads to an increase in the failure rate of the components [2]. Of the failures reviewed [72%] were related to aging [16% to not aging, and 12% were of unknown cause]. The dominant failure mechanism was "wear" (31%), followed by calibration drift (12%), contamination (9%), corrosion

Not surprisingly, valves were the components that failed most commonly (47%), followed by pumps (19%), instrumentation (12%), and heat exchangers (11%). The data were not normalized to account for population effects.

Therefore valves are the dominant components failing in cause of their large population. However, these findings do show which components require the most resources in terms of monitoring and maintenance. More importantly, however, Lofaro showed, on the basis of a probabilistic risk assessment, that, because of the availability of the components, the component failure rates increase linearly with age, the unavailability of the system can increase exponentially.

The next question is: What can be done to control aging? First, Phase II of Lofaro's research addressed this question (Controlling aging). Lofaro presented a four-step process involving detection and mitigation. It is important to be able to detect aging/degradation. He found it results in failure. And it is equally important to mitigate the effects of aging. Regulators can detect aging. Lofaro investigated the various methods of managing aging: inspection, surveillance, monitoring, and maintenance (USNRC). From the study results it is seen that the currently used IS&M practices fall into two categories: basic practices, which are typically required by codes or plant technical specifications, and supplemental practices, which are selected based on particular plant operating characteristics and environment. The basic practices alone are not comprehensive enough to control all types of aging degradation. An effective IS&M program requires a combination of basic and supplemental practices to ensure that at least one method is in place to detect and mitigate each of the common aging mechanisms that may lead to component failure.

Second, mechanisms that may lead to component failure. This shows that proper detection and mitigation of aging degradation should be an important part of daily plant operation.

A paper by M. Jacobus, Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), reported on a long term project to assess aging in Class I E electric cables. The objective is to determine suitability of such cables for beyond 40-yr lifetimes and to assess various condition monitoring (CM) techniques used to predict remaining cable life. Typical qualification programs simulate aging by applying radiation again typically 100 to 1000 brad/s (1 to 10 kGy/h) and thermal aging separately. The experimental program used by Jacobus employs considerably less accelerated, simultaneous thermal and radiation aging conditions (100 °C, 10 krad/h (10 kGy/h)) followed by a simulated accident

Reproduction clarity limited by quality of comment letter received.

E Siegel

JET-ENGINE & COMBUSTION-CHAMBERS

An Investigation of the Thermal Stability of a Commercial Ni-Cr-Fe-Mo Alloy (Hastelloy Alloy X)

See Fig 2 (most likely paper!) & pray!

The changes in hardness and room temperature impact toughness of Hastelloy X Alloy X

After aging at 1000, 1200, 1400 and 1600°F (538, 649, 760 and 871°C) for times up to 10,000 h were investigated. The alloy exhibits age-hardening at 1200 and 1400°F (649 and 760°C). A slight hardness increase was observed at 1600°F (871°C) followed by overaging after 4000 h. No age-hardening was observed at 1000°F (538°C) up to 10,000 h. Aging at all temperatures resulted in room temperature impact toughness. The microstructure after aging was characterized by optical metallurgy and X-ray diffraction. Vane fracture mode was characterized by scanning electron microscopy. The results suggest that the toughness degradation is primarily associated with carbide precipitation. M₂C₆ type carbides are believed to be the major phase precipitated during aging at all temperatures, although e and m phases were also detected after 10,000 h at 1400 and 1600°F (760 and 871°C), respectively.

1. INTRODUCTION

THE high temperature gas-cooled reactor (HTGR) designed by General Atomics is a uranium-thorium-fueled, graphite moderator reactor system in which the fission heat generated in the reactor core is transferred, by high-pressure helium coolant gas, to steam generators wherein superheated steam is generated for power generation. The primary coolant outlet temperature in the HTGR typically lies within the range 1200 to 1500°F (649 to 815°C). This reactor system contains many metallic components that must operate for very long times (up to 40 years) under these elevated temperature conditions. Since it is known that the microstructure and mechanical properties of high temperature alloys can change during such exposure, due to thermal aging, it is necessary to quantify such changes in the materials used in component design. Thus, as a part of the program in support of the development and design of HTGRs, a systematic investigation of the thermal stability of several high temperature alloys is underway at General Atomics. This paper presents the results of an investigation into the aging kinetics and the changes in microstructure and room temperature impact toughness of Hastelloy Alloy X as a result of aging for times up to 10,000 h.

2. EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES

Material in plate form (1.27 cm thick) was purchased in the solution annealed condition to Specification AMS 3338. The chemical analysis (in wt pct.) as supplied by the vendor, was as follows: 0.11 C, 0.39 Mn, 0.022 P, 0.006 S, 0.32 Si, 21.41 Cr, 19.28 Fe, 8.64 Mo, 2.16 Co, 0.52 Ni, <0.002 B, and balance Ni. The grain size was ASTM No. 5.

The sample blanks (1.27 x 12.7 x 17.78 cm) were aged in air furnaces. Aging was conducted at 1000,

1200, 1400 and 1600°F (538, 649, 760 and 871°C) for times up to 10,000 h. Samples for hardness, microstructural examination and impact toughness testing were obtained from aged blanks after removal of the oxide scale and the surface layers affected by surface oxidation.

All impact tests were conducted on standard Charpy V-notch specimens in accordance with the requirements of ASTM E23-72. The notch of the Charpy specimen was aligned parallel to the rolling direction and perpendicular to the surfaces of the plate. The fracture surface was examined in a Hitachi scanning electron microscope operating at 25 kV. Hardness was measured in a Rockwell hardness tester.

Microstructure was characterized by optical metallurgy and X-ray diffraction. Metallurgical specimens were etched electrolytically in oxalic acid. The residue samples for X-ray diffraction analysis were obtained by electrolytically extracting the aged samples using an electrolyte containing 10 wt HCl in methanol. A Guinier De Wolff camera was used in conjunction with CuK_α radiation.




Fig. 1—Hardness changes over the 10,000 h aging period

G. Y. Lai is Staff Engineer, General Atomics Company, San Diego, CA 92138.

Manuscript received April 18, 1977.

~~FRAUD~~

BY: W.D.U. LUKE / HAYWARD - UNI-L
PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE & BROWN

Toughness in the samples aged up to 10,000 h. Hardness ^{LAT'S} remained essentially unchanged. Extensive grain boundary precipitates were observed after 1000 and 10,000 h.

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(McKee Bank)

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U.S. - D.O.D. Aerospace Standard 1M-Hast 1-102

DECEMBER 1963

NONFERROUS ALLOYS

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory

GENERAL

Material is a nickel base superalloy with good oxidation resistance at temperatures up to 2200 F and moderate strength properties at temperatures up to 1600 F. It is essentially a single phase austenitic alloy, which is solid solution strengthened by addition of chromium, mostly chromium and tungsten. Wrought products are normally used in the solution-treated condition and cast products in the as-cast condition. The alloy has excellent bending and drawing characteristics, and it can be hot and cold formed successfully if proper procedures and care are exercised. Aerospace applications for Hastelloy X include jet engine tail pipes, bolts, afterburner components, cabin heaters, and structural parts in the burner and turbine sections. It is also used in many industrial furnace applications because of its resistance to oxidizing, reducing, carburizing, and halogen atmospheres. In the chemical and petrochemical industries, it is used for many components, such as retorts, supports, baffles, rating, and diffusers, because of its excellent combination of corrosion resistance and heat resistance. In addition, a low-cobalt (0.50 percent maximum) version of the alloy, designated Hastelloy A-350, is used for structural parts in nuclear reactors. The difference in cobalt content has minimal effect on mechanical properties (1-7).

Commercial Designation

Hastelloy X.

Alternate Designations

Hastelloy Aloy X (Cabot Corp.), UNS N06002, AISI 630 (castings), Pyromet 680 (Carpenter Technology), Unitemp HX (Cyclops Corp.), and Sunalloy HX (Siemens Steel).

Specifications

Specifications, Table 1.03.

Composition

Composition, Table 1.04.

Heat Treatment

Wrought products are normally supplied by the mills in the solution-treated condition, which provides the optimum combination of mechanical properties and corrosion resistance for pressure vessel applications. This treatment consists of exposure to 2150 F followed by rapid cooling. The hold time at 2150 F varies with the section size of the product, size of load, and furnace characteristics. Here a rule of thumb that provides acceptable results for the products being treated is to hold for 1 hr per inch of thickness. The cooling rate from 2150 to 1600 F or below should be rapid enough to prevent carbide precipitation, which decreases corrosion resistance and toughness. For these products, rapid air cooling is adequate, oil or water quenching is frequently necessary for heavier sections. If uniform oxidation can be tolerated, the solution treatment can be carried out in air at 2150 F.

U.A

S.F.O.

The normal mixture of air and combustion products in gas-fired furnaces. Oxidation can be minimized by the use of an exothermic furnace atmosphere, or it can be almost entirely prevented by dry hydrogen, dry nitrogen, or vacuum atmospheres (1,7,17).

Following air hot-forming and most cold-forming operations, solution treatment (1-7) can restore certain properties. An exception would be, for example, the use of acid-cooled dies to take advantage of its improved room-temperature strength (7).

Solution treatment is recommended after welding of wrought products to restore optimum corrosion resistance in the weld areas (7).

Intermediate softening during most cold-forming operations should be accomplished with the full solution treatment because it provides optimum ductility and formability (7).

Stress relief at intermediate temperatures is not applicable because it tends to cause coarse precipitation and associated decreases in corrosion resistance, ductility, and toughness (7).

Hardness

Effects of exposures at various elevated temperatures on hardness of sheet and plate at room temperature. Figure 1.061.

Effect of cold work on hardness. Figure 1.062.

Forms and Conditions Available

Wrought products are available in the form of sheet, strip, plate, bar, tubing, wire, welding electrodes, and bullet stock.

Cast products are available in the form of ingots, investment castings, and centrifugal castings.

Melting and Casting Processes

Hastelloy A can be produced by any of the electric-arc or induction melting processes either in air or vacuum. The use of vacuum, of course, tends to improve toughness and fatigue properties. Most wrought products are produced by electric furnaces or vacuum induction melting followed by successive remelting (1-8).

Special Considerations

A pronounced reduction in ductility occurs in the temperature range 1000 to 1500 F, which is characteristic of most nickel-base superalloys. (See Figure 3.0313.)

Exposures in the temperature range 1000 to 2000 F cause carbide precipitation and age hardening following by overaging. During the initial stages of carbide precipitation, room-temperature ductility and strength increase, but during overaging they decrease to ultimate levels considerably below those of the solution-treated alloy. The time period for the hardening phase, and the point of overaging, varies from several thousands of hours at 1200 F and below, to practically zero at temperatures of 1700 F and above. Age-temperature ductility and impact energy, on the other hand,

decrease continuously from the start of carbide precipitation.

Alloy X

710 S.S.

Ni	Cr	Fe	Mo	Co	Cu
22	Cr	Fe	Mo	Co	Cu
18	Fe	Mo	Co	Cr	Fe
g	Mo	Co	Cr	Fe	Mo
1.5	Co	Cr	Fe	Mo	Co
0.5	W	Cr	Fe	Mo	W

Code 411

Page 1

OFFICIAL DOD WIRING (1983)

*1/2/87
F.A.A.
(3987)*

~~TEAT-N'-SAVE SOLUTION LTD.~~
~~163 - 14TH AVENUE~~
~~SAN FRANCISCO, CA. 94118~~
~~TEL (415) 221 - 1576~~

OFFICE OF THE REGIONAL CONSUL
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION
NEW ENGLAND DIVISION
12 NEW ENGLAND EXECUTIVE PARK
BURLINGTON, MA. 01803

RE: PROPOSED RULE FOR JT8D-SERIES TURBOFAN ENGINE SLEEVE SPACERS:
GENTLEMEN:

I WOULD LIKE TO GO ON RECORD AS TOTALLY SUPPORTING THIS PROPOSED RULE FOR JT8D-SERIES TURBOFAN ENGINE SLEEVE SPACERS SPECIFICALLY. HOWEVER, I WOULD LIKE TO SPECIFICALLY OBJECT TO:

- (A) THE VERY LIMITED, OBTENSIALLY CONSERVATIVE, BUT IN VIEW OF THE CONTINUING SEQUENCE OF DIRECTLY ENGINE FAILURE CAUSED CATASTROPHIC IN-SERVICE CRASHES, FURTHER ERODING PASSENGER CUSTOMER-BASE BELIEF IN THE COMPETENCE OF AIR CARRIERS UNIVERSALLY TO PROVIDE SAFE AIR TRAVEL SERVICE AS ADVERTISED, AND IN THE F.A.A. TO SUCCESSFULLY MONITOR SAME AND PROVIDE TOTALLY EFFECTIVE Q.A., VERY RADICAL, RISKY, AND EXTREMELY FOOLHARDY! MANY MORE... ALL COMPONENTS SHOULD BE SUBJECTED TO VERY THOROUGH N.D.T. (ULTRASONIC, EDDY CURRENT, ACOUSTIC EMISSION, MAGNEFLUX, RADIOGRAPHIC,...) IN FULL ENGINE OFF-WING STRIPOWN (REF: AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY, P. 31, SEPTEMBER 2, 1985)
- (B) THE CONTINUED LACK OF APPRECIATION OF THE "SUPER" ALLOY COMPONENT: UNIVERSAL GENERIC THERMAL-LEADING-TO-MECHANICAL EMBRITTLEMENT INSTABILITY CAUSING SEVERE IN-SERVICE DEPRESSION OF (ESPECIALLY IN HASTELLOY-X, BUT ALSO NIMONICS, UDIMETS AND ALL OTHER "SUPER" ALLOYS) RESISTANCE TO INTERNAL SHOCK, MECHANICAL SHOCK, BRITTLE, FATIGUE, STRESS CORROSION,... CRACK NUCLEATION, PROPAGATION, FRACTURE AND FAILURE FOR ALL COMPONENTS OF ALL ENGINES.

FIRST POINTED OUT BE ME FOR NUCLEAR, FOSSIL-FUEL, PETROCHEMICAL... PLANT TRANSITION-MED ALLOY INCO-192/82, NEARLY IDENTICAL METALLURGICALLY (REF: E. SIEGEL, JOURNAL OF MAGNETISM AND MAGNETIC MATERIALS, 7, 312 (1978); A. MAYO, VILLAGE VOICE, P. 40, AUGUST 21, 1978; INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON MAGNETIC ALLOYS & OXIDES, THE TECHNIKON, HAIFA (1977)) TO HASTELLOY-X (AND OTHER ENGINE "SUPER" ALLOYS) AS CLEARLY WARNTED ABOUT REPEATEDLY YET PUNCTUALLY IGNORED BY F.A.A., N.I.S.S. AND AIRLINE INDUSTRY (ESPECIALLY ENGINE MANUFACTURERS, AIR CARRIERS AND INSURANCE UNDERWRITERS) QUITE NEGLECTIVELY:

REFS:

- U.S.DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE Fracture Strength Materials Survey,
CODE#4112, BY J.H.KATTUS,BATTELLE MEMORIAL INSTITUTE(DEC., 1981)
- G.SABOL AND R.H.STICKLER,Physical Status Survey, 35, 11(1969)
- G.Y.LAI,Mechanical Transactions, 1, 1, M.E., 3A, 827(1978)
- G.C.LI, W.R.JOHNSON AND L.D.THOMPSON,General Atomic Report 504-15016,
U.S.DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY(1979)
- G.Y.LAI,General Atomic Rep. 504-15016, U.S.DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY(1979)
- CUSTOMER PRODUCT BULLETINS-HAYNES-STELLITE,CABOT,SIMMONDS,CYCLOPS,
CARPENTER,...-MAJOR HASTELLOY-X SUPPLIERS TO ENGINE MANUFACTURERS
- H.RICHARDS,SUPPRESSED WARNING MEMOS,PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC & GAS
ENERGY LABORATORY(1950's & 1960's)
- U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Requirements For Heat-Treatment
of Suppression Pressure Vessel, Piping, Ductile Castings and
Transition-Walls(1982...)

IT IS ABSUNDANTLY CLEAR THAT THIS IS A GENERIC EMBRITTLEMENT PROBLEM,
SEVERELY DETRIMENTALLY ALTERING AS-DESIGNED PERFORMANCE CHARACTERIS-
TICS OF ALL COMPONENTS,ESPECIALLY HASTELLOY-X COMBUSTION CHAMBERS.
WILL PROVIDE A CONTINUING AND INCREASING THREAT TO AIR CARRIER SAFETY
(AS WELL AS CUSTOMER BASE AND PROFITS) THAT IS ON-GOING AND WILL NOT
GO AWAY DESPITE ENGINE MANUFACTURER,ALLOY SUPPLIER,AIR CARRIER,INSURANCE
UNDERWRITER,F.A.A.,N.T.S.B.,PENTAGON,...DENIALS OR SHEER IGNORANCE !

SOME CONCURRING REFERENCES ARE:

- PROF. J.B.Prieston,UNIVERSITY OF WATERLOO(CANADA)-DEAN OF CARSIDE CHEMISTRY
- PROF. W.WILLIAMS,UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS-DEAN OF CARSIDE MECHANICAL ENGR.
- DR. E.STORM,LOS ALAMOS NATIONAL LABORATORY-CARSIDE CHEMISTRY EXPERT
- DR. C.TATRO,...,LAWRENCE LIVERMORE NATIONAL LABORATORY-DEAN OF N.D.T.
- DR. L.FENNET,NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS,DIRECTOR,ALLOY DATA BASE SECT.
- PROF. J.H.SABOL,SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY(CANADA)-ALLOY MAGNETICS EXPERT
- DRs. R.GOVILLA & F.BEARDMORE,Ford Motor Co.Scientific LABORATORY-EXPERTS
IN CARSIDE FRACTURE AND SUPERALLOY METALLURGY.
- DR. R.WEEKS,MATERIALS SCIENCE DIVISION,ARGONNE NATIONAL LABORATORY
- MR. G.LAI,PRESIDENT,HEAT-IT-SAVE INC.DEETHTHIVE,TESTING CORP,HAUNVILLE,N.J.,FAA CERTIFIED
OUR HEAT-IT-SAVE PROPRIETARY HEAT-TREATMENT FOR REINFORCEMENT OF UN-
CRACKED JET ENGINE COMPONENTS,AT MINIMAL COST,RESULTING IN DECREASED
N.D.T.,Q.A.,MAINTAINANCE,LABOR AND SPARE COMPONENT REPLACEMENT COSTS
AND,MOST IMPORTANT,THE REQUIRED AIR SAFETY MANDATED,STANDS READY TO
PROVIDE THIS CRUCIAL SERVICE,MILITATED BY SERIOUS QUESTIONS OF ENGINE
END-TO-END TRAVEL SAFETY !

Most Respectfully & Urgently,
Dr. G.Y.LAI, Metallurgist

Abstract


As more nuclear power plants approach middle age, it is becoming increasingly clear that a wide variety of degradation mechanisms pose significant economic and safety risks. Since the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) confirmed that age-related degradation in boiling water reactors (BWRs) will damage or destroy vital internal components well before the standard 40-year BWR license expires, federal regulators must now seriously address the future safety and engineering implications of multiple component failures in BWRs. State regulators must also take a long-range view and reexamine the cost-effectiveness of their current response to the aging-reactor crisis—a response that favors a piecemeal, fix-or-replace-at-any-cost strategy. And they must put in place the necessary financial incentives to minimize future costs to their customers without compromising nuclear plant operating safety standards.

This paper focuses on just one age-related problem confronting the nuclear power industry: degradation of the internal components in BWR pressure vessels. This study found that the nuclear industry—the regulated and the regulators alike—is not prepared to deal with the grave age-related problems that lie ahead. Prudent officials at all levels of government need to adopt a broad-gauged management plan to meet current and future engineering and economic challenges. A piecemeal, one-component-at-a-time approach may have been appropriate in the past, but it is simply no longer in the public interest, nor in the interest of the nuclear industry, to continue in this manner.

US Nuclear Power Plants—

Showing Their Age

Case Study: Core Shroud Cracking



By Robert Pollard

Union of Concerned Scientists

September 1995

9/95

By placing top priority on the more immediate safety implications associated with cracks in the core shroud—a legitimate concern given the NRC's charter—industry and NRC officials have implicitly elected to follow a piecemeal strategy for dealing with a broad range of age-related BWR issues. The industry and its regulators appear to be deliberately avoiding a comprehensive, systemwide, long-range approach.

On two counts, this is a dangerous precedent. First, once removed from its larger context, the true significance of the failure of any one component will be greatly underestimated, as will the synergistic effects that are likely when two or more components simultaneously experience a failure.

Second, a piecemeal approach can only treat the symptoms of a problem, not the problem itself. The root problem facing the BWR industry is not cracks in the core shroud or degradation in any of the other two dozen internal components of the reactor vessel known to be susceptible to stress corrosion cracking, creep, fatigue, embrittlement, and erosion; nor is it any one of the multiple valves, motors, pipes, seals, supports, and electrical wires that are experiencing age-related degradation. The real—and thus far neglected—problem facing federal and state-level regulators is that they don't have a detailed picture of the long-term cost-effectiveness and reliability implications of the nation's aging BWR plants. Only when regulators have such a picture can they make sense of what cracks in the core shroud and other aging problems really mean to utilities and their customers—and only then can they make enlightened decisions in the public interest.

Technical Background

The Core Shroud

As shown in figure 1, the core shroud is a 360-degree stainless steel cylinder surrounding the BWR core. Typically, a core shroud will measure 20 feet in height, 4 to 17 feet in diameter, and 1/5 to 2 1/2 inches thick. The core shroud performs three primary functions. First, it directs the incoming feedwater down and along the reactor vessel's wall, and then up through the reactor's core. Second, in addition to supporting the reactor's top guide and core plate, the core shroud also maintains the reactor's core geometry under normal operations. Finally, the shroud provides a refloodable space that could help protect the core from damage during an accident.¹

Core-Shroud Cracking

Table 1 is a compilation of core shroud inspection data received by the NRC from BWR operators. The primary locations for intergranular stress corrosion cracking in the core shroud are along the inner circumferential weld lines shown in figure 2. Figure 3 demonstrates that cracks in the core shroud are directly related to the aging process. In BWRs in commercial operation for fewer than 20 years, core shroud cracking is rare. After 20 years, moderate to extensive cracking is the rule rather than the exception.

¹ For further details on the role of the core shroud and other BWR internal components, see Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Boron-Fluoride Reactor Internal Aging Degradation Study, NUREG/CR-5754, September 1993.

Introduction

Since 1978 new nuclear reactors have been ordered in the United States, and plant orders placed between 1973 and 1978 have been canceled. Today, the US nuclear power industry is trying to survive by finding ways to extend the useful life of existing nuclear power plants another 20 years beyond their initial 40-year license period. This is an outdated strategy, and one that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's own nuclear plant aging research program severely discredits.

Research has shown that a multitude of both large and small nuclear plant components are susceptible to staggering varieties of aging mechanisms. Reactor vessels, steam generators, piping, valves, heat exchangers, pumps, various instrumentation, electrical cables, seals, and supports are all degraded by erosion, fatigue, corrosion, radiation, and thermal embrittlement, and vibration.

Studies have also demonstrated that some types of degradation cannot be detected using the established methods of periodic testing and inspection. Furthermore, in some cases no known methods exist for detecting the degradation. In-service failures in BWRs are thus inevitable.

To date, the single most significant finding resulting from the NRC's research program is that the essential conditions that produce stress corrosion cracking—including corrosion-susceptible materials, a corrosive environment, and tensile stresses—are all present in BWRs. So far, most of the documented cracking has been found in one component, the core shroud. But 18 other BWR internal components are also known to be susceptible to stress corrosion cracking. In all 21 major BWR internal components are susceptible to corrosion, fatigue, creep, embrittlement and erosion, often to a combination of these degradative mechanisms.

Other worrisome NRC findings include the following:

- Most BWRs experience core shroud cracking after only 20 years of operation—not 40 or 60.
- The synergistic effects of multiple degraded components is still a largely unexplored but critical aspect of the BWR aging cycle.

The Genesis of the Problem

In a January 4, 1994, internal memorandum (cited on page 1 of the attachment to SECY-94-276, dated Nov. 10, 1994), the NRC declared core shroud cracking in BWRs to be "an emerging technical issue." Since that date, the NRC has focused on core shroud cracking as a safety issue, and industry officials have busied themselves looking for reliable ways to find the cracks and then develop a technical fix for the problem. This approach, however, is not so much wrong as it is seriously incomplete.

Figure 1

BWR INTERNAL COMPONENTS




Table 1

SUMMARY OF NRC DATA ON CORE SHROUD CRACKING

Plant	Type	Commercial Operation	Last Inspection	Summary
Brunswick 1	MK 1 BWR-4	3/18/77	10/93	Inspection found extensive cracking. Repairs have been implemented.
Brunswick 2	MK 1 BWR-4	11/3/75	5/94	Inspection found extensive cracking. Repairs have been implemented.
Peach Bottom 2	MK 1 BWR-4	7/5/74	9/94	Kidder cracking found without significant degradation of shroud structural integrity. Minor circumferential and axial cracking found.
Peach Bottom 3	MK 1 BWR-4	12/23/74	11/93	Inspection found no cracking.
Nine Mile Pt 2	MK 2 BWR-5	3/11/88	11/93	Inspection found no cracking.
Vermont Yankee	MK 1 BWR-4	11/30/72	10/93	Inspection found no cracking.
Millstone 1	MK 1 BWR-3	3/01/71	1/94	Minor circumferential cracking found.
Hatch 2	MK 1 BWR-4	12/31/75	4/94	Inspection found moderate cracking.
Oyster Creek	MK 1 BWR-2	12/1/69	10/94	Inspection found extensive cracking. Repairs have been implemented.
Dresden 3	MK 1 BWR-3	11/18/71	4/94	Inspection found extensive cracking. A safety evaluation justified continued operation for 15 months without repair.
Quad Cities 1	MK 1 BWR-3	2/18/73	4/94	Inspection results similar to Dresden 3.
Fermi 2	MK 1 BWR-4	1/23/88	6/94	The Dresden 3 safety evaluation covered Quad Cities continued operation for 15 months.
Monica 10	MK 1 BWR-4	6/30/71	10/94	Inspection found circumferential crack.
Duane Arnold	MK 1 BWR-4	2/01/75	9/93	Inspection found no axial crack.
Hope Creek	MK 1 BWR-4	12/20/86	3/94	Limited inspection found no cracking.
LaSalle 1	MK 2 BWR-5	1/01/84	5/94	Inspection found no cracking.
Perry 1	MK 3 BWR-6	11/18/87	5/94	Inspection found no cracking.
Susquehanna 1	MK 2 BWR-4	2/12/85	12/93	Inspection found no cracking.
WPN 2	MK 2 BWR-5	12/13/84	6/94	Limited inspection found no cracking.

Source: NRC Report to Congress on Abnormal Occurrences for October–December 1994, March 1995


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M-1 N.R.C. Rep't: NUREG / CR-5754 (Sept. 1993)
② N.R.C. Rep't. to Congress: "Final Account for 10-12/94 (Mar.)
10-12/95 (Mar.)"

Figure 3

CORE SHROUD WELD LOCATIONS



ISBN: NRC 9700001-0000084-03-4/HN 25.1994




Figure 2

Table 2 (on page 8) puts the core shroud into a far more meaningful context. The core shroud is our internal component among many that will affect the passage of time, this table underscores the dangers associated with aging.

The Gara shroud in context

The Core Shroud In Context
In its March 15, 1995, Report to Congress, the NRC called BWR December 1994, the NRC called BWR concern related to potential failure of the core shroud have been cracks in the core shroud have been found in recent years, it is crucial to keep a system-wide problem but known as a very serious problem, indeed a widespread future crises. As the BWR become more and more commonplace.

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Table 2

BWR INTERNAL COMPONENTS AND POTENTIAL AGING-RELATED DEGRADATION MECHANISMS

Component	SCC*	Creep*	Fatigue*	Embrittlement*	Erosion*
Steam dryer	●				
Steam separator	●				
Shroud head	●				
Shroud head bolts	●				
Steam separator support ring	●				
Top guide	●				
Access hole cover	●				
Core shroud	●				
OFS piece	●				
Core plate	●				
Core spray line internal piping	●				
Core spray sparger	●				
Feedwater sparger	●				
Jet pump	●				
In-core neutron flux monitor	●				
housings	●				
In-core neutron flux monitor	●				
guide tubes	●				
In-core neutron flux monitor	●				
dry tubes	●				
CRD housing	●				
Neutron source holder	●				
Jet pump sensing line	●				
Control blade	●				

Source: Boiling-Water Reactor Internals Aging Degradation Study, NUREG/CR-5754, September 1993

*Stress Corrosion Cracking. SCC refers to the weakening of a BWR internal structural component because of deterioration caused by electrochemical reactions with the surrounding material.

*Creep. The progressive deformation of a structure under constant stress is known as creep. Internal components.

*Fatigue. As a structure vibrates in response to dynamic loads, cracks develop in certain BWR internal components.

*Embrittlement. Exposure of internal components to high temperatures (thermal embrittlement) and prolonged exposure to fast neutron fluxes (radiation embrittlement) makes a material more brittle and vulnerable to cracking.

*Erosion. The abrasive effects of bubbles and droplets in a liquid flow can weaken BWR internal components.

shroud apart from its larger BWR context. The core shroud may be the first internal failure to come to the attention of state, NRC, and industry officials, but it will surely not be the last.

As shown in table 2, 19 of the 21 BWR internal components listed are susceptible to stress corrosion cracking—including irradiation-assisted intergranular stress corrosion cracking. In addition, eight components are vulnerable to fatigue failures. Embrittlement is a potential aging-related degradation mechanism for four components, and erosion causes degradation in two components. Finally, five internal components are susceptible to the effects of creep.

Synergistic Effects

Significantly, in addition to the core shroud, 10 other internal components listed in table 2 are susceptible to two or more aging-related degradation mechanisms. In the past two years, NRC and industry officials have worked long and hard to accumulate a spattering of data concerning how and why the core shroud is cracking, and what to do about it. But to date, little is known for sure about the synergistic effects of the degradation and failure of one internal component as it interacts with others. Rather conservative speculation, however, would raise the following domino-like tasks:

- The force of escaping water from a ruptured pipe could cause a nearby, previously cracked component—such as a top guide—to fail and thereby prevent the insertion of control rods, which in turn would stop the reactor's shutdown
- The failure of any component listed in table 2 could very well block the flow of water within the core, resulting in localized melting of the reactor's fuel

Even under ideal conditions, detecting damaged internal components is an uncertain task. Access to the components is limited, and inspection techniques, visual and ultrasonic alike, are not 100 percent accurate. What is certain, however, is that with the passage of time the five degradation mechanisms and the 21 internal components listed in table 2 will interact with one another in surprising and unpredictable ways.

Reactor Repairs: The State of the Art

The Core Shroud

What does it take to repair a cracked core shroud in terms of cost, plant down time, and technology availability? According to the February 6, 1995, issue of Inside NRC, MPR Associates, based in Alexandria, Virginia, has developed a recently patented core shroud repair method, which consists of a series of 10 vertically mounted tie-rods applying axial compression to a cracked shroud. MPR charges between \$500,000 and \$1 million to inspect a core shroud, and \$3 million to \$4 million to install the tie-rods. The repair reportedly takes about 10 days.

Looking Toward the Future

lie ahead is unclear. A rough measure of the nuclear industry's level of readiness to manage the full range of problems associated with aging BWRs is found in a June 1994 report of the Boiling Water Reactor Owners Group. As indicated in table 3, more than half of the internal components in a BWR are classified as readily repairable. But, for 12 of 29 components (bolded below), repair methodologies were still in the conceptual phase of development.

Faced with long-term economic and technological uncertainty, the BWR community—owners, suppliers, and regulators at all levels of government—can no longer afford a myopic, short-term view of the future. Indeed, Ivan Selin, then-departing chairman of the NRC, warned in a May 9, 1995, address that reactor aging will require a major, continuous effort by industry officials to anticipate emerging aging-related problems and to resolve them before they become a crisis.

Table 3

OTHER REACTOR INTERNALS REPAIR OPTIONS

Component	Repair Capability
Shroud support	N
Jet pump	C
Controlled drive	R
Control rod guide tube	R
Control rod drive housing/ring tube	Y
In-core housing	Y
Head cooling spray nozzle	R
Core debris pressure and liquid control line	G
LPCI coupling	N
Core spray line	Y
Jet pump riser brace	Y
Oriented fuel support	R
Access hole cover	Y
Top blade	C
Keeper	C
Bolt	C
-Wedge	C
-Aligner	C
Core plate	C
Bolt	C
Shroud	Y
Core spray sparger	Y
Dry tube	R
Reactor Vessel Attachments	
Steam dryer hold down bracket	X
Steam dryer support bracket	X
Guide rod bracket	X
Feedback sparger	X
Surveillance capsule holder bracket	X
Core spray line bracket	N

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Source: NACB/WRC meeting materials, June 20, 1994.

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10/1995
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11 Jul 1995, May 14, 1995 7312/1978 In English! PREMIER
Consumption
not included

Monju may have leaked 3 tons of liquid sodium

Reproduction clarity limited by quality of comment letter received.

FUKUI (Kyodo) Officials operating the prototype fast-breeder nuclear reactor Monju that was shut down Friday said Saturday that between 2 and 3 tons of liquid sodium leaked from a cooling system, but the source of the leak has not yet been found.

Antinuclear activists said the leak exposes the main weakness in the nation's fast-breeder program.

Officials with the semipublic Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corp. said technicians had to wait for smoke caused by a reaction between sodium and moisture in the air to dissipate before they could enter the room where the leak is suspected to have occurred.

Workers shut down the plant at 9:20 p.m. Friday after an alarm went off at 7:47 p.m. indicating of a temperature abnormality in a sodium pipe in the secondary cooling system.


PNC reacted immediately and set up an emergency task force with Yasutami Omori, director of the nuclear plant, as its chief, the officials said.

Workers drained off about 80 tons of liquid sodium into a tank to prevent any spread of the effects of the accident.

According to PNC's investigation, an alarm in the central control room indicated a leak of sodium one minute after fire alarms went off in a piping room.

Several workers wearing oxygen tanks went to check the piping room and found spills of oxidized sodium on the stainless-steel floor below the pipes carrying the coolant, but were unable to locate the precise spot from where the liquid was leaking. PNC said.

Although it is not clear



MONJU. Japan's first fast-breeder nuclear reactor, is seen Saturday morning after it was shut down following a leak of liquid sodium the night before. KYODO PHOTO

where the leak occurred because the piping is covered with insulation and paneling. piping near where leaked sodium was found to have solidified was repaired in 1986, the officials said.

The repair might have compromised the overall evenness in the strength of the piping and lead to the leak, they said.

Antinuclear activists said Friday's accident proves the theory that sodium leaks are

the weakest point in fast-breeder reactors, and it appears likely that there will be more calls questioning the safety of Monju.

Jinzahiro Takagi, representative of the Citizen's Nuclear Information Center, said, "It is a fatal defect that the reactor must use sodium as its coolant."

About 20 representatives from Takagi's organization and other citizens' groups visited PNC's headquarters in

Tokyo on Saturday to hand out a statement urgently requesting that the Monju project be halted.

Kazuharu Kawase, mayor of Tsuruga in the coastal prefecture of Fukui, where the 280,000-kw Monju is located, visited the plant Saturday morning to hear an explanation of what had gone wrong from officials in the plant's central control room.

The Fukui Prefectural Government later summoned Tadayoshi Suda, PNC's vice director general, and issued a formal protest stating, "It was a grave accident that questions the assurances of Monju's safety."

Prefectural officials requested that PNC thoroughly investigate the incident and reconsider its schedule for tests before the plant begins full-scale operations, slated for as early as June.

The officials said it took about one hour for PNC to file the first report on the accident with the prefectural government, criticizing the corporation for the delay.

PNC representatives expressed their apologies to local residents.

A nearby resident who operates an inn said he felt uneasy knowing the plant had failed to inform residents about the accident.

"I can't say anything until the results of the checks are known," he said. "I can't stay here if I can't trust it."

Although a sodium leak is considered a technically serious problem for the fast breeder reactor, the corporation insisted Friday that there had been no radioactive damage to the environment as result of the accident.

Monju started producing electricity in August and slated to begin operating full-capacity next June. It was operating at 40 percent capacity at the time of the

CONTINUED ON PAGE 2

y to indict former President Chun

Choi said prosecutors were investigating allegations that heads of major corporations had given Chun money during his term in office.

Choi won't talk

SEOUL (Reuters) Former

South Korean President Choi Kyu Hah refused on Saturday to answer a prosecution request to appear for questioning over a 1979 coup and later massacre of civilians at Kwangju, the domestic Yonhap news agency said.

"As a former presi

Mr. Choi feels he should not have to be summoned." Lee Ki Chang, Choi's lawyer, was quoted by Yonhap as saying. "He has previously unanswered written questions about this matter so he doesn't feel obliged to go to prosecutors' office."

Strike closes train service via Chunnel

PARIS (Reuters) A strike by French rail workers close down all Eurostar high speed trains through the Channel Tunnel between Paris, London and Brussels on Saturday.

The Japan Times

(BOS)

Thursday, March 13, 1997

35 people were exposed to 'small' radiation leak

Hashimoto angered by tardy PNC reports

At least 35 people were exposed to an "extremely small dosage" of radioactivity Tuesday in Japan's worst radiation leakage accident, officials said Wednesday.

The exposure occurred after an explosion followed a fire at a nuclear fuel reprocessing plant in Tokai, Ibaraki Prefecture.

The blast occurred at 8:14 p.m. at a spent nuclear fuel reprocessing facility run by the Japan Nuclear Fuel Co., a subsidiary of the PNC.

It destroyed windshields and two steel shutters of the four-story building, the officials said.

While smoke billowed from the building, a small fire broke out in a building where low-level liquid nuclear waste and high-tempera-

alarm in the facility rang immediately after the explosion, they said.

One radioactive monitoring post near the building showed an increase in radioactivity of 20 percent at 8:50 p.m. but normal readings after 9 p.m., indicating that a small amount of radioactive doses had leaked outside, they said.

There was no radioactive pollution threat to residents near the facility, they claimed.

There were no workers in the building when the explosion occurred, and 42 people who were working in a building next to the facility were safe, the officials said.

Ten hours earlier, a small fire broke out in a building where low-level liquid nuclear waste and high-tempera-

later Ryutaro Hashimoto parked into drums. The fire was extinguished 14 minutes later, they said.

However, no one confirmed the temperature inside the building after the fire was extinguished, sources involved in the investigation said.

Further, the PNC neglected to sound the alarm publicly, even though the plant was aware that radiation warning signs were activated after the fire, they said.

The 35 workers present at the time of the fire inside the facility were found to have been exposed to an extremely tiny dosage of radioactivity.

The PNC officials claimed they said the maximum bodily irradiation suffered was 2,700 becquerels, less than two thousandths of the admissible maximum annual intake.

Prime Minister

PNC President Toshiyuki Kondo offered an apology over the accident during a visit to the agency.

"This is my intuition at this moment, but we were lax at making precise decisions (in handling the accident)," Kondo told a news conference.

Chief Cabinet Secretary Sei-iroku Kajiyama also apologized for the accident, saying it must have raised concern among the public over the safety of nuclear reactors.

"It is truly regrettable that the accident raised concerns among local residents (in Ibaraki Prefecture) as well as the people in the nation," the top government spokesman said at a news conference.

If the government will


make every effort to find out

the cause of the accident and prevent a recurrence,

Kajiyama said. The PNC could have been prevented, he said.

The PNC should inform the public of an incident — even if the cause of the fire

continues on page 2



5th EDITION ¥160

Reproduction clarity limited by quality of comment letter received.

Criminal charges sought against PNC, officials

The Science and Technology Agency filed a complaint Wednesday against the Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corp. (PNC) and three of its officials, urging police to investigate the falsification of a report in connection with the country's worst-ever nuclear accident, agency officials said.

It is the first time for the agency to lodge an accusation under a law that makes it an offense to falsify reports on nuclear plant accidents.

If convicted, the PNC officials could face fines of up to ¥300,000.

"I am sorry that the accident caused concern and anxiety among the general public, and it's regrettable to arrive at a situation such as this," agency chief Riichiro Chikaoka said at a news conference prior to filing the complaint with Ibaraki Prefectural Police.

The accident occurred last month at the nation's only reprocessing plant for spent nuclear fuel. It is located at Tokai, Ibaraki Prefecture.

"This is an issue related to Japan's nuclear and energy policies as a whole, so I believe that we must uncover and convey the real facts of the matter to the general public first," he said, adding that "we have taken a resolute attitude, which is what the government agency with jurisdiction must do with regard to the case."

PNC President Toshiyuki Kondo again apologized for the falsified accident report and pledged to cooperate with Ibaraki police in their investigation.

Chikaoka's announcement



RIICHIRO CHIKAOKA, director general of the Science and Technology Agency, faces report at his agency Wednesday to announce that police have been asked to act against Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corp. over false reports about accidents at the firm's nuclear facilities and attempts to cover up the falsified information.

came one day after agency officials wrapped up a two-day inspection of the Tokai nuclear fuel reprocessing plant in connection with the alleged falsification of a report on a fire there on March 11. The fire was followed later in the day by an explosion.

About 20 plant workers and managers were questioned about the false report on the accident, which left 37 workers exposed to radiation. Fifteen PNC officials, including five employees of a PNC subcontractor, were aware of the false report, according to the PNC.

The Tokai case was followed Tuesday by revelations of another scandal, with the PNC this time failing to

promptly report a radioactive leak that occurred at the Fugen advanced thermal converter reactor in Tsuruga, Fukui Prefecture.

The Fugen case is the third accident involving a PNC facility in less than 18 months, adding fuel to the debate over how to reform PNC.

Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto reiterated support for reforming the PNC.

"The nature of the problem at the PNC must be scrutinized thoroughly regardless of the question of whether it should be privatized," Hashimoto told reporters.

Chief Cabinet Secretary Seiyo Kajiyama expressed regret that the Fugen report was delayed and joined Hashimoto in stressing the need to review the PNC.

"I feel the deepest regret in the characteristics and organization of the PNC, which repeatedly acts in this fashion off limits, and with disregard to the public interest to dissolve the PNC," Kajiyama said at a news conference.

The power industry concerned that the nation's clear power program will suffer a setback following legal action taken against PNC.

Kazunao Tomon, vice president of the Federal Electric Power Corp., commented Wednesday that it is regrettable that Japan has been beset by a series of accidents and that it is appropriate to make appropriate changes.

An industry source said that, unlike prototype reactors, reactors used by companies are so safe that incidents will have little effect on Japan's power program.

The source added that PNC's operation transferred to the Tsuruga plant at a time when there was a electricity shortage.

11 exposed to radiation in Fugen leak

FUKUJI Kyodo: Eleven workers at the Fugen prototype advanced nuclear reactor in Tsuruga, Fukui Prefecture, were exposed to small amounts of radiation when it developed a tritium leakage Monday, officials said Wednesday.

The Fukui prefectural labor standards bureau and the Tsuruga labor standards inspection office said they received reports on the minor

radiation exposures Tuesday evening from the operator of the reactor, the state-run Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corp. (PNC).

The reports said the amount of radiation the workers were exposed to was within permissible limits.

On Wednesday, Science and Technology Agency sources said Fugen may have to be

decommissioned following last month's fire and explosion at Tokai, Ibaraki Prefecture, which led to the shutdown of a spent nuclear fuel reprocessing plant.

The Fugen plant has no further capacity to store spent nuclear fuel and an indefinite halt of operations is inevitable. The Science and Technology Agency has already issued an order for the facility

CONTINUED ON PAGE 2

Tokyo halts high-level dialogue with Iran

Japan will suspend high-level dialogue with Iran "for the time being" but has no immediate plan to recall its ambassador to Tehran, Foreign Minister Yukihiko Ikeda said Tuesday.

Ikeda said the decision is in response to a German court ruling last week that top Iranian leaders were behind the 1992 murder of four Kurdish dissidents in Berlin.

Iran has repeatedly denied any role in the killings, blaming them on infighting between opposition groups.

Ikeda made the remarks at a regular morning news conference after the day's Cabinet meeting.

Tokyo holds annual meetings of high-level officials with Tehran, and the next such talks were scheduled to take place in May.

The foreign minister said Japan will not immediately follow moves by European Union members, except Greece, to recall their envoys to Iran for consultations, saying Tokyo will keep its normal dialogue channels open with Tehran.

Later in the day, Seiichiro Noboru, director general of the Middle Eastern and African Affairs Bureau, explained Japan's decision to Iranian ambassador Manouchehr Mottaki at the Foreign Ministry.

Noboru told Mottaki that the relationship between Japan and Iran is important and that Japan believes it is wrong to isolate Iran, Foreign Ministry officials said.

Noboru said Japan is not considering cutting all channels for dialogue but that it will suspend high-level dialogue such as vice ministerial-level talks, the officials said.

Mottaki did not respond directly to Japan's decision, saying he will relay the decision to the Tehran government, according to the officials.

Mottaki told Ikeda that the German court's ruling is unacceptable because it is politically motivated, the officials said.

The German court ruling has led to swift reaction from the international community, with Canada, Australia and New Zealand as well as most EU member states either recalling or planning to recall their envoys to Iran.

Tokyo may come under

PNC slow to report latest nuclear leak

Tritium escapes from Fugen reactor

FUKUI (Kyodo) The Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corp. failed to report to prefectoral authorities on a leakage of radioactive substances Monday at the Fugen advanced thermal converter reactor in Tsuruga, Fukui Prefecture, until 30 hours after the accident, it was learned Tuesday.

The Science and Technology Agency ordered the PNC to shut down operations at Fugen, investigate the case and thoroughly review the system of information flow in the event of an emergency.

Officials at Fugen said the reactor automatically stopped around 10:30 p.m. Tuesday, before the agency told them to shut down. The officials said they are investigating why the reactor halted automatically.

The agency, meanwhile, has decided to file a complaint against several PNC officials today over a falsified report on Japan's worst nuclear accident last month at the nuclear fuel reprocessing plant in Tokai, Ibaraki Prefecture, agency sources said.

The sources said the agency will file the complaint with Ibaraki Prefectural Police over the PNC officials' alleged violation of the nuclear reactor regulations law.

Science and Technology Agency chief Riichiro Chikaoaka summoned PNC President Toshiyuki Kondo to the agency on Tuesday and ordered the institution to improve its crisis management system.

Chikaoaka also complained to Kondo about the slow handling of the accident at Fugen.

The latest blunder at Fugen is sure to pose more problems for the PNC, which is already being criticized for falsifying information on a fire and explosion on March 11 at the Tokai plant, analysts said.

"Our report was delayed because of our misjudgment. I am sorry for causing trouble," said Norio Takeshita, head of the Fugen nuclear power station, during a news conference Tuesday.

Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto expressed anger at the PNC's latest flap.



TOSHIYUKI KONDO, president of the Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corp., leaves the Science Agency Tuesday after reporting a tritium leak Monday at the nuclear reactor in Tsuruga, Fukui Prefecture. KYODO

"Give me a break," he said.

According to Fukui Prefectural Government officials, an alarm sounded at about 3:30 a.m. Monday when a high level of the radioactive material tritium was detected in a vent of a facility at the Fugen reactor, which refines heavy water used to decelerate the speed of neutrons.

The density of tritium also increased within the facility, they said.

The PNC suspended operations at the facility and prevented ventilation until it confirmed the density of tritium had declined to normal levels again, around 9 p.m. Monday, they said.

The PNC found that about 100 cu. cm of heavy water had leaked from a pipe in the facility, but the deputy head of the Fugen reactor decided not to report the case to the agency — which oversees the nation's nuclear policy — and the prefectural government.

because the concentration of tritium had decreased at the site of the leakage has been identified.

However, the head of the reactor, who was on a trip Monday, ordered a report on the accident to be submitted to the prefectural government Tuesday.

The PNC finally issued a report at noon, about 12 hours after the tritium leak was discovered, the officials said.

Because the volume of tritium leaked is estimated to have been one 3 millionths of the annual level in normal operation, the officials said it would cause no significant environmental impact.

According to the PNC, the Fugen reactor began commercial operation in 1979, providing power as well as a source of electricity to the utility companies.

HARKEI EXPLANATION

BUSINESS
INSTITUTE

SUBSTANTIALLY EXPANDED OR INITIAL BUSINESS

**COMMERCIAL
AIR CARRIERS**

SAN FRANCISCO
INTERNATIONAL
AIRPORT

W A S T E L O Y - X C O M P U S I O N H A N D B E R S

**THE ENGINEERS
LICHEN COMMUNION
CHAMBERS DAY**

- 10 -

三才圖會

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BARRELS & SCREWS-HASTELLOY-X

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THE BOSTONIAN, OR, THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LITERATURE AND SCIENCE.

INCO-102 WELDS, INCOMPL. STAINLESS

STEEL PIPING, COMBINES

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graph TD
    TRY((TRY)) --> AIRPORTS[• AIRPORTS]
    TRY --> DOMESTIC[• DOMESTIC]
    TRY --> MILITARY[• MILITARY]
    TRY --> LICENSING[• LICENSING]
    TRY --> FRANCHISING[• FRANCHISING]
    TRY --> INDUSTRIES[• INDUSTRIES]
    TRY --> TURBINEBLADES[• TURBINE BLADES (ROTORS, STATORs)...]
    TRY --> BOLTS[• BOLTS, AIR FILTERS, FLAME CUTTERS...]
    TRY --> STEEL[• MANY MORE ENGINEERS PER DAY]
    TRY --> PLASTICS[• PLASTICS (INJECTION MOULDING & EXTRUSION)]
    TRY --> OTHERINDUSTRIES[• OTHER INDUSTRIES]
    TRY --> POWERPLANTS[• Fossil fuel power plants]
    TRY --> METALS[• PEIROCHEMICAL (RETOIRS & REACTOR LINERS) METALS]
    TRY --> STAINLESS[• INCO-182 WELDS, INCONEL, STAINLESS STEEL PIPING, TURBINES]
    TRY --> AIRLINES[• INCO-182 WELDS, INCONEL, STAINLESS STEEL PIPING, TURBINES]
  
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The diagram illustrates the distribution of various industries from a central point labeled "TRY". Arrows point from "TRY" to several categories, which then branch into more specific sub-industries.

- AIRPORTS**
- DOMESTIC**
- MILITARY**
- LICENSING**
- FRANCHISING**
- INDUSTRIES**
- TURBINEBLADES** (Rotors, Stators, ...)
- BOLTS** (Air filters, Flame cutters, ...)
- STEEL** (Many more engineers per day)
- PLASTICS** (Injection moulding & extrusion)
- OTHER INDUSTRIES**
- POWERPLANTS** (Fossil fuel power plants)
- METALS** (PEIROCHEMICAL (retoirs & reactor liners) metals)
- STAINLESS** (Inco-182 welds, Inconel, stainless steel piping, turbines)
- AIRLINES** (Inco-182 welds, Inconel, stainless steel piping, turbines)

VOLUME 7 CVN HOMEPORING EIS — NASNI RESPONSE TO COMMENTS

Comment Number	Response
Dr. E. Seigel	
I.63.1	As is stated in section 7.1.3 of the EIS, all features of Naval reactor design, operation, construction, maintenance, and personnel selection, training, and qualification have been oriented toward minimizing environmental effects and ensuring the health and safety of workers, ships' crew, and the general public. Conservative reactor safety design has, from the beginning, been a hallmark of the NNPP. Selection and use of the appropriate materials and components is inherent in the design of Naval reactors. Evidence of the success of the NNPP lies in its safety record: there has never been a reactor accident, or release of radioactivity having a significant effect on the environment, in the 50-year history of the Program. It is important to note that although some of the materials mentioned in the comment are used by the NNPP, the NNPP has not experienced the problems the commentor cites. This is due to different design and operation of Naval Reactors compared with commercial reactors.
I.63.2	Please see response to comment I.63.1 above.
I.63.3	Your comments are noted and are included in the Final EIS.
I.63.4	Your comments are noted and are included in the Final EIS.
I.63.5	The public hearing dates were to accommodate the extended public review period, and thus avoided the Jewish Holiday of Yom Kippur. There was no intent upon the part of the Navy to offend those of the Jewish faith. Your comments are noted and are included in the Final EIS.
I.63.6	Your comments are noted and are included in the Final EIS.
I.63.7	Our publicly-elected U.S. Congress and President of the United States make programmatic decisions regarding Naval ships (e.g. application of nuclear power), and thus comments regarding these decisions are beyond the scope of this EIS. The results of all the analyses of both normal operations and hypothetical accidents indicate that there would be no significant radiological impacts from homeporting and maintaining NIMITZ-class aircraft carriers or operating NIMITZ-class aircraft carrier maintenance facilities.
I.63.8	Please see response to comment I.63.1, and response H.1.1-5 for responses to Congressman Filner's testimony.

Mr. Grant Kimball
P.O. Box 23091
San Diego, CA 92123

November 11, 1998

Certified Mail
P 413 693 762

Mr. John Coon
Southwest Division (Code 05AL JC)
Naval Facilities Engineering Command
1220 Pacific Highway
San Diego, CA 92132-5190

RE: Comments on Navy E.I.S. for Nuclear Aircraft Carriers

Dear Mr. Coon:

I am writing to register my dissatisfaction with the Navy's Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for homeporting at least three (3) nuclear-powered aircraft carriers in San Diego. The Navy's EIS is inadequate and misleading, because it discounts the risk which is associated with locating several large nuclear reactors within two (2) miles of downtown San Diego.

The Navy is using a misleading and self-serving definition of "reactor accident" to dupe the public into believing that the Navy has never experienced a "reactor accident." I have never seen an official definition of the term "reactor accident" in any Navy record or document. Despite the lack of an official Navy definition, an Associate Director of the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Directorate, Mr. Richard Guida, defined the term "reactor accident" in transcribed testimony before the Coronado City Council on April 9, 1996. Mr. Guida was the Associate Director for Regulatory Affairs, and testified about reactor accidents as follows:

"We have a long history of safe operation and I want to explain, because there has indeed been some misunderstanding of what we mean when we say safe operation. We have 4,600 reactor years without a reactor accident. We have never claimed not to have accidents or incidents. What we have claimed is never to have had a reactor accident. What a reactor accident is, is a term of art in the nuclear industry; it means damage to nuclear fuel and release of what are called fission products. . . . Again, damage to the fuel, release of fission products. We claim we have had none over the history of the program, and that's 4,600 years." (See Enclosure 1, a copy of Mr. Guida's testimony.)

According to Mr. Guida's definition, what the Navy defines as a "reactor accident" is known to the rest of the world as a "nuclear core meltdown". What the Navy is really saying is that they claim not to have had any nuclear meltdowns. The Navy persists in this claim despite the fact that an active duty Navy enlisted man, and two Army enlisted men, were killed in 1960 when they caused the SL-1 reactor to explode by accidentally inducing a prompt critical condition, which led to a steam explosion, massive damage to the nuclear fuel, and radioactive

contamination over a wide area. This accident was classified "secret" at the time it occurred, and is still largely unknown by the general public.

According to the Navy's definition, the Navy will not classify as a "reactor accident" any event that involves the accidental release of radioactive water into the harbor, or radioactive steam or gases into the atmosphere, as long as the nuclear fuel remains intact.

In contrast to the Navy, the Department of Defense (DOD) does have a written definition of a "reactor accident". The DOD definition differs considerably from that used by the Navy. The DOD definition is contained in DOD Policy Document 5230.16, dated December 20, 1993, available on the Internet at: <http://web7.whs.osd.mil/text/d523016p.txt>. The DOD definition of a reactor accident is as follows:

22. Nuclear Reactor Accident. An uncontrolled reactor criticality resulting in damage to the core or an event such as the loss of coolant that results in significant release of fission products from the reactor core. (Emphasis added. See Enclosure 2, a copy of the DOD definition.)

The significant difference in the DOD definition is that events such as spilling radioactive water can be classified as "reactor accidents." According to the Navy definition, spilling radioactive water will never be classified as a "reactor accident", regardless of how much radioactivity is released into the environment.

Since the Navy is a subordinate organization within the Department of Defense, it raises the issue of why the Navy doesn't abide by the DOD definition of reactor accident. The Navy's self-serving definitions are part of the Navy's continuing efforts to mislead the public about the risks associated with locating nuclear reactors within a major metropolitan area.

Another example of the Navy's deliberate deception of the public occurred during another of Mr. Guida's presentations, this time at Village Hall in Coronado on May 28, 1997. Mr. Guida was asked about the Navy's policies for reporting accidental releases of radioactivity. Mr. Guida stated that the Navy would comply with the same reporting procedures required by other federally licensed nuclear facilities. When Mr. Guida was asked what amount of radioactivity would trigger the reporting requirement, he stated that any accidental release over ten (10) curies would be reported. Mr. Guida's statement was grossly in error, as the federal reporting requirements are specific to the various radioactive isotopes within an accidental release. The isotope Iodine-131 is of particular concern, because it causes thyroid cancer in children. The official federal limit for accidental release of Iodine-131 is one one-hundredth (0.01) of a curie. The ten (10) curie limit stated by Mr. Guida is one thousand (1000) times the federal limit for Iodine-131 releases. Since Mr. Guida has a master's degree in nuclear engineering from M.I.T., it can be assumed that his error was not made out of ignorance of the subject matter. Mr. Guida's presentation was videotaped and transcribed by the Navy, so there should be a record of his false statements on the subject of reportable limits. (Federal reportable limits for accidental releases of radioactivity, by isotope, are contained in the Code of Federal Regulations 40 CFR 302.5, "Determination of reportable quantities". See Enclosure 3)

I.64.3

Finally, I note that the last of the Navy's nuclear-powered cruisers will be taken out of service next year, and no replacements are planned. Given the Navy's thirty (30) year experiment with nuclear cruisers and destroyers, and the Navy's preference for non-nuclear propulsion systems for those types of surface ships, I can see no logical reason why the nuclear carriers would have any advantage that the cruisers and destroyers didn't also have. Nuclear-powered surface combatants either do, or do not, have advantages over their non-nuclear counterparts. If nuclear cruisers and destroyers were ultimately a failed experiment, then I think the same will eventually be said of the nuclear carriers.

Sincerely,

Grant Kimball

Grant Kimball

Enclosures

TRANSCRIPT OF THE
CITY OF CORONADO
CITY COUNCIL MEETING

CORONADO, CALIFORNIA
APRIL 9, 1996

I.64

REPORTED BY: KAREN L. BRODIE
CSR NO. 5694

Enclosure 1

- 1 WE HAVE A LONG HISTORY OF SAFE OPERATION AND I
2 WANT TO EXPLAIN, BECAUSE THERE HAS INDEED BEEN SOME
3 MISUNDERSTANDING OF WHAT WE MEAN WHEN WE SAY SAFE
4 OPERATION. WE HAVE 4,600 REACTOR YEARS WITHOUT A REACTOR
5 ACCIDENT. WE HAVE NEVER CLAIMED NOT TO HAVE ACCIDENTS OR
6 INCIDENTS. WHAT WE HAVE CLAIMED IS NEVER TO HAVE HAD A
7 REACTOR ACCIDENT. WHAT A REACTOR ACCIDENT IS IS A TERM OF
8 ART IN THE NUCLEAR INDUSTRY; IT MEANS DAMAGE TO NUCLEAR
9 FUEL AND RELEASE OF WHAT ARE CALLED FISSION PRODUCTS.
10 THESE ARE THE HIGHLY RADIOACTIVE ELEMENTS CREATED AS A
11 CONSEQUENCE OF THE FISSION PROCESS WITHIN THE REACTOR.
12 IF YOU THINK, HAVE THERE BEEN REACTOR ACCIDENTS
13 IN THE WORLD OVER THE YEARS? MOST ASSUREDLY THERE HAVE
14 BEEN. THERE WAS THE S.O. 1 REACTOR, WHICH WAS AN ARMY
15 REACTOR, IN 1963 WHICH HAD A SERIOUS ACCIDENT, A FISSION
16 PRODUCT RELEASE, A REACTOR ACCIDENT. THREE MILE ISLAND IS ¹⁹⁶⁴
17 THE MOST FAMOUS ONE IN THE UNITED STATES, IN 1979, WHEN
18 ABOUT A THIRD OF THE REACTOR MELTED AS A CONSEQUENCE OF A
19 LOSS OF COOLING WATER, AND THEN, OF COURSE, THE NOST
20 SERIOUS REACTOR ACCIDENT IN THE HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAS ¹⁹⁸⁶ *Chernobyl*
21 CHERNOBYL IN 1986.
22 THOSE ARE REACTOR ACCIDENTS. AGAIN, DAMAGE TO ¹⁹⁸⁶ *Chernobyl*
23 THE FUEL, RELEASE OF FISSION PRODUCTS. WE CLAIM WE HAVE
24 HAD NONE OVER THE HISTORY OF THE PROGRAM, AND THAT'S 4,600 ¹⁹⁸⁶ *No.*
25 YEARS. OUR SHIPS HAVE STEAMED 106 MILLION MILES AT THIS
26 POINT AND WE'RE ACCUMULATING AT THE RATE OF A COUPLE
27 MILLION MILES A YEAR, AND IN THE PROCESS OF REACHING THAT
28 RECORD -- WE REACHED THAT RECORD, 100 MILLION MILES, IN

*** Text of the Regulation ***
Refs: (a) DoD Directive 5230.16, subject as above, February 7, 1983
(thereby canceled)
(b) Federal Preparedness Circular 8, "Public Affairs in Emergencies," June
22, 1969 NOTE: Available from the Federal Emergency Management Agency, 500
C Street, SW, Washington, D.C. 20429 END NOTE:
(c) DoD Directive 5100.52, "DoD Response to an Accident or Significant
Incident Involving Radioactive Materials," December 21, 1989
(d) Executive Order 12356, "National Security Information," April 2, 1982
(e) through (h) see enclosure 1

A. REISSUANCE AND PURPOSE

This Directive:

1. Reissues reference (a) to update DoD policy, responsibilities, and procedures for the prompt release of information to the public in the event of interest of public safety, and to prevent public alarm in the event of accidents or significant incidents involving nuclear weapons or nuclear components, radioactive material, nuclear weapon launch or transport vehicles (when a nuclear weapon is aboard), or nuclear reactors under DoD control.
2. Updates DoD Policy, responsibilities, and procedures during an improvised nuclear device (IND) incident.

B. APPLICABILITY

This Directive applies to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Military Departments, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Unified Commands, the Defense Agencies, and the DoD Field Activities (hereafter referred to collectively as "the DoD Components"). The term "Military Departments," as used herein, refers to the Army, the Air Force, and the Marine Corps.

C. DEFINITIONS

Terms used in this Directive are defined in enclosure 2.

D. POLICY

It is DoD policy:

1. To establish efficient and effective procedures for the release of information to the public in the event of nuclear accidents. These procedures include exceptions to the policy of neither confirming nor denying the presence or absence of nuclear weapons at any specified location.

Enclosure 2

[Previous section] [Next section] [error messages]

and/or material. Establishment of an NDA temporarily places such non-Federal lands under the effective control of the Department of Defense, and results only from an emergency event. The OSC or DSR at the scene shall define the boundary, mark it with a physical barrier, and post warning signs. The landowner's consent and cooperation shall be obtained whenever possible; however, military necessity will dictate the final decision regarding location, shape, and size of the NDA.

21. National Security Area (NSA). An area established on non-Federal lands located within the United States, its possessions or territories, for safeguarding classified information and/or restricted data, equipment, or material belonging to the DoE. Establishment of a national security area temporarily places such non-Federal lands under the effective control of the DoE and results only from an emergency event. The senior DoE representative having custody of the material at the scene shall define the boundary, mark it with a physical barrier, and post warning signs. The landowner's consent and cooperation shall be obtained whenever possible; however, operational necessity shall dictate the final decision regarding location, shape, and size of the national security area.

22. Nuclear Reactor Accident. An uncontrolled reactor criticality resulting in damage to the reactor core of an event such as loss of coolant that results in significant release of fission products from the reactor core.)

23. Nuclear Weapon Accident. An unexpected event involving nuclear weapons or nuclear components that results in any of the following:

- a. Accidental or unauthorized launching, firing, or use by U.S. forces or U.S. supported Allied forces of a nuclear-capable weapons system.
- b. An accidental, unauthorized, or unexplained nuclear detonation.
- c. Non-nuclear detonation or burning of a nuclear weapon or nuclear component.
- d. Radioactive contamination.
- e. Jettisoning of a nuclear weapon or nuclear component.
- f. Public hazard, actual or perceived.

24. Nuclear Weapon Significant Incident. An unexpected event involving nuclear weapons, nuclear components, or a nuclear weapon transport or launch vehicle when a nuclear weapon is mated, loaded, or on board that does not fall into the nuclear weapon accident category but that:

- a. Results in evident damage to a nuclear weapon or nuclear component to the extent that major rework, complete replacement, or examination or recertification by the DoE is required.
- b. Requires immediate action in the interest of safety or nuclear weapons

-TEXT-

(a) Listed hazardous substances. The quantity listed in the column 'Final RQ' for each substance in Table 302.4, or in appendix

B to Table 302.4, is the reportable quantity (RQ) for that substance. The RQs in Table 302.4 are in units of pounds based on chemical toxicity, while the RQs in appendix B to Table 302.4 are in units of curies based on radiation hazard. Whenever the RQs in Table 302.4 and appendix B to the table are in conflict, the lowest RQ shall apply.

(b) Unlisted hazardous substances. Unlisted hazardous substances designated by 40 CFR 302.4(b) have the reportable quantity of 100 pounds, except for those unlisted hazardous wastes which exhibit extraction procedure (EP) toxicity identified in 40 CFR 261.24. Unlisted hazardous wastes which exhibit EP toxicity have the reportable quantities listed in Table 302.4 for the contaminant on which the characteristic of EP toxicity is based. The reportable quantity applies to the waste itself, not merely to the toxic contaminant. If an unlisted hazardous waste exhibits EP toxicity on the basis of more than one contaminant, the reportable quantity for that waste shall be the lowest of the reportable quantities listed in Table 302.4 for those contaminants. If an unlisted

Enclosure 3

Holmium-159	67	1000 (3.7E 13)
Holmium-161	67	1000 (3.7E 13)
Holmium-162m	67	1000 (3.7E 13)
Holmium-162	67	1000 (3.7E 13)
Holmium-163	67	1000 (3.7E 13)
Holmium-164	67	1000 (3.7E 13)
Holmium-165m	67	1000 (3.7E 13)
Holmium-166	67	100 (3.7E 12)
Holmium-167	67	100 (3.7E 12)
Hydrogen-3	1	100 (3.7E 12)
Iodium-109	49	100 (3.7E 12)
Iodium-110 (69.1 min)	49	100 (3.7E 12)
Iodium-110 (4.9 hr)	49	10 (3.7E 11)
Iodium-111	49	100 (3.7E 12)
Iodium-112	49	1000 (3.7E 13)
Iodium-117m	49	1000 (3.7E 13)
Iodium-117	49	1000 (3.7E 13)
Iodium-118m	49	10 (3.7E 11)
Iodium-118m	49	100 (3.7E 12)
Iodium-115m	49	0.1 (3.7E 9)
Iodium-115	53	10 (3.7E 12)
Iodium-116m	49	100 (3.7E 12)
Iodium-117m	49	100 (3.7E 12)
Iodium-117	49	1000 (3.7E 13)
Iodium-118m	49	1000 (3.7E 13)
Iodium-120m	53	10 (3.7E 12)
Iodine-120	53	100 (3.7E 12)
Iodine-121	53	10 (3.7E 11)
Iodine-123	53	0.1 (3.7E 9)
Iodine-124	53	0.01 (3.7E 8)
Iodine-125	53	0.01 (3.7E 8)
Iodine-126	53	0.01 (3.7E 8)
Iodine-128	53	1000 (3.7E 13)
Iodine-129	53	0.001 (3.7E 7)
Iodine-130	53	1 (3.7E 10)
Iodine-131	53	0.01 (3.7E 8)
Iodine-132m	53	10 (3.7E 11)
Iodine-132	53	10 (3.7E 11)
Iodine-133	53	0.1 (3.7E 9)
Iodine-134	53	100 (3.7E 12)
Iodine-135	53	10 (3.7E 11)
Iridium-182	77	1000 (3.7E 13)
Iridium-184	77	100 (3.7E 12)
Iridium-185	77	100 (3.7E 12)
Iridium-186	77	10 (3.7E 11)
Iridium-187	77	100 (3.7E 12)
Iridium-188	77	10 (3.7E 11)
Iridium-189	77	100 (3.7E 12)
Iridium-190m	77	1000 (3.7E 13)
Iridium-190	77	10 (3.7E 11)
Iridium-195	77	1000 (3.7E 13)
Iridium-197	77	100 (3.7E 12)
Iridium-192m	26	100 (3.7E 12)
Iridium-192	26	100 (3.7E 12)
Iridium-194m	26	10 (3.7E 11)
Iridium-194	26	0.1 (3.7E 9)
Krypton-74	36	10 (3.7E 11)
Krypton-76	36	10 (3.7E 11)
Krypton-52	26	10 (3.7E 11)
Iron-55	26	100 (3.7E 12)
Iron-59	26	10 (3.7E 11)
Iron-60	26	0.1 (3.7E 9)
Krypton-77	36	10 (3.7E 11)
Krypton-79	36	10 (3.7E 12)
Krypton-81	36	1000 (3.7E 13)
Krypton-83m	36	1000 (3.7E 13)
Krypton-85m	36	1000 (3.7E 13)
Krypton-85	36	1000 (3.7E 13)
Krypton-87	36	10 (3.7E 11)
	36	10 (3.7E 11)
Krypton-88	57	1000 (3.7E 13)
Lanthanum-131	57	1000 (3.7E 12)
Lanthanum-132	57	1000 (3.7E 13)
Lanthanum-135	57	10 (3.7E 11)
Lanthanum-137	57	1 (3.7E 10)
Lanthanum-138	57	10 (3.7E 11)
Lanthanum-140	57	1000 (3.7E 13)
Lanthanum-141	57	100 (3.7E 12)
Lanthanum-142	57	1000 (3.7E 13)
Lanthanum-143	57	1000 (3.7E 12)
Lanthanum-145	82	100 (3.7E 12)
Lanthanum-149	82	100 (3.7E 12)
Lanthanum-150	82	100 (3.7E 12)
Lanthanum-151	82	100 (3.7E 12)
Lanthanum-152	82	100 (3.7E 12)
Lanthanum-153	82	100 (3.7E 12)
Lanthanum-154	82	100 (3.7E 12)
Lanthanum-155	82	100 (3.7E 12)
Lanthanum-156	82	100 (3.7E 12)
Lanthanum-157	82	100 (3.7E 12)
Lanthanum-158	82	100 (3.7E 12)
Lanthanum-159	82	100 (3.7E 12)
Lanthanum-160	82	100 (3.7E 12)
Lanthanum-161	82	100 (3.7E 12)
Lanthanum-162	82	100 (3.7E 12)
Lanthanum-163	82	100 (3.7E 12)
Lanthanum-164	82	100 (3.7E 12)
Lanthanum-165	82	100 (3.7E 12)
Lanthanum-166	82	100 (3.7E 12)
Lanthanum-167	82	100 (3.7E 12)
Lanthanum-168	82	100 (3.7E 12)
Lanthanum-169	71	10 (3.7E 11)
Lanthanum-170	71	10 (3.7E 11)
Lanthanum-171	71	10 (3.7E 11)
Lanthanum-172	71	10 (3.7E 11)
Lanthanum-173	71	100 (3.7E 12)
Lanthanum-174	71	10 (3.7E 11)
Lanthanum-175m	71	1000 (3.7E 13)
Lanthanum-176	71	1 (3.7E 10)
Lanthanum-177m	71	10 (3.7E 11)
Lanthanum-177	71	100 (3.7E 12)
Lanthanum-178m	71	1000 (3.7E 13)
Lanthanum-178	71	1000 (3.7E 13)
Lanthanum-179	71	1000 (3.7E 13)
Lanthanum-177m	71	10 (3.7E 11)
Magnesium-28	12	10 (3.7E 11)
Manganese-51	25	1000 (3.7E 13)
Manganese-52m	25	1000 (3.7E 13)
Manganese-52	25	10 (3.7E 11)
Manganese-53	25	1000 (3.7E 13)
Manganese-54	25	10 (3.7E 11)
Manganese-36	25	100 (3.7E 12)
Manganese-51	25	1000 (3.7E 13)
Manganese-52m	25	10 (3.7E 11)
Manganese-52	25	1000 (3.7E 13)
Manganese-53	25	1000 (3.7E 13)
Manganese-34	25	10 (3.7E 11)
Manganese-36	25	100 (3.7E 12)
Mendelevium-257	101	1 (3.7E 10)
Mendelevium-258	101	1000 (3.7E 13)
Mercury-193m	80	10 (3.7E 11)
Mercury-193	80	1000 (3.7E 13)
Mercury-194	30	0.1 (3.7E 9)
Mercury-192m	80	100 (3.7E 12)
Mercury-195	80	100 (3.7E 12)
Mercury-197m	80	1000 (3.7E 13)
Mercury-197	80	1000 (3.7E 13)
Mercury-199m	80	1000 (3.7E 13)
Mercury-203	80	10 (3.7E 11)
Molybdeum-90	42	100 (3.7E 12)
Molybdeum-93m	42	10 (3.7E 11)
Molybdeum-93	42	100 (3.7E 12)
Molybdeum-99	42	100 (3.7E 12)
Molybdeum-101	42	1000 (3.7E 13)
Neodymium-136	60	1000 (3.7E 13)
Neodymium-138	60	1000 (3.7E 13)
Neodymium-139m	60	1000 (3.7E 12)
Neodymium-139	60	1000 (3.7E 13)
Neodymium-141	60	1000 (3.7E 13)
Neodymium-147	60	10 (3.7E 11)

VOLUME 7 CVN HOMEPORING EIS — NASNI RESPONSE TO COMMENTS

Comment Number	Response
Grant Kimball	
I.64.1	<p>Please see responses to comments O.12.83 and O.12.33. Also, with regard to the SL-1 reactor, the Navy had no involvement, technical or otherwise, in that project. The reactor was not designed for combat, and was not designed to Navy standards for shipboard operation: it is not possible to remove control rods manually from an operating U.S. Naval reactor as happened at SL-1. In addition, none of the three personnel killed in the SL-1 accident, which occurred in 1961, was involved with the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program. One Navy enlisted person, from the Navy's civil engineering community, was among the fatalities, but that person was neither trained by nor had any connection to the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program. Thus, that accident does not reflect on Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program safety.</p>
I.64.2	<p>The 10 curie limit applies to Cobalt 60 as Mr. Guida discussed in the 28 May 97 meeting on the Mixed Waste Storage Facility RCRA Permit Meeting. Mr. Guida used Cobalt 60 as an example because it is the primary radionuclide of concern for NNPP operations. The exact quote from the transcription of Mr. Guida testimony on this issue is:</p> <p>"Under EPA regulations that pertain to releases of hazardous materials to the environment, that is under what's called their Super Fund (sic) Regulations. In the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, the EPA has set certain standards where if you release more than a certain amount of a hazardous material, you have to report to the EPA that you've had this incident, an accident. And they've got certain levels for oil spills, for ethylene glycol, which is an antifreeze. They have levels for thousands and thousands of substances.</p> <p>One particular substance they've got a level for is Cobalt-60, which is the principle radioactive radionuclide that we're talking about. For Cobalt-60, the release threshold is 10 curies. That means if you released more than 10 curies of Cobalt-60, you would have to report that to the Environmental Protection Agency."</p> <p>As stated by the commentor, the reportable quantity for iodine-131 is 0.01 curie. The source terms for the radiological accident analyses in Appendix F list the radionuclides that result in at least 99 percent of the possible exposure. Iodine-131 is not on this list since it is not present in sufficient quantities to contribute substantially to radiation exposure from an accident. The Navy has determined that the radiological risks from the proposed action would not be significant.</p> <p>Please also see response to comment O.12.81.</p>

VOLUME 7 CVN HOMEPORING EIS — NASNI RESPONSE TO COMMENTS

Comment Number	Response
I.64.3	Please see response to comment I.56.5.

PHONE NO. :

: ENDTRD/GENTLE

Oct 29, 1998

Secretary of the Navy
Mr. Richard Danzig,

I oppose the Navy's plans to turn San Diego into a nuclear megaport and nuclear Dump. San Diegans don't want or need more nuclear-powered Aircraft carriers. Nuclear power plants are being closed because of hazards. Why would the Navy who protects our Country want to stay in the nuclear business? Accidents happen.

I.65.1

VOLUME 7 CVN HOMEPORING EIS — NASNI RESPONSE TO COMMENTS

Comment Number	Response
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Anonymous

- I.65.1 Your comments are noted and are included in the Final EIS.

Reproduction clarity limited by quality of comment letter received.

FROM : Robert A. & Kelly Alexander

PHONE NO. : 619 456 5217

Oct. 29 1998 07:49AM PT

ROBERT & KELLY ALEXANDER
 PO BOX 2166
 LA JOLLA CA 92038-2166
 619 456 5217-FAX

FAX FAX FAX

Mr. Richard Danzig
Secretary of the Navy

Dear Mr. Danzig,

We are writing to you to express our deep anger, fear, and sadness that San Diego has become/will become a Navy Nuclear Megaport.

I.66.1

This puts both naval personnel and civilians at risk.

Please, please, please, for God's and all our sakes, please with all of your power and might and influence of your good office, with all of your heart and soul, please oppose this, please.

In this country of ours, with its government of elected representatives, elected by the people to carry out the wishes and needs of the citizens, you are the person we turn to in time of trouble, of crisis. This is certainly a crisis. We turn to you. Help! Please stop San Diego from becoming a Navy Nuclear Megaport.

IT IS A CATASTROPHE IN THE MAKING!

Thank you.

Sincerely,

Robert & Kelly Alexander

Mr. and Mrs. Robert and Kelly Alexander
 PO Box 2166
 La Jolla CA 92038-2166

P.S. Please make good on your promise to "put people first" and come to hear from the people directly, seriously considering their concerns.

Please oppose this homeporting plan!!!!

Navy nuclear vessels are not without risk

The Navy assertion endorsed in your editorial (Aug. 24) that nuclear-powered aircraft carriers in San Diego Bay are without risk is factually incorrect.

Your newspaper has carried articles documenting many accidents aboard Navy nuclear vessels, including the deliberate falsification of nuclear reactor safety records aboard a nuclear submarine at Point Loma. Recently, the radiation control officer aboard the nuclear sub tender McKee at Point Loma admitted to knowledge of six or seven other instances of the deliberate falsification of nuclear materials handling aboard naval nuclear vessels.

Using the federal Freedom of Information Act, the Los Angeles Times and Greenpeace documented dozens of near-catastrophes involving Navy nuclear activities. Still, a U.S. Navy that has lost two nuclear submarines with all hands aboard says it has an accident-free record. The handling of radioactive materials associated with naval nuclear reactors or naval nuclear weapons in San Diego Bay is a matter of legitimate concern to those living or visiting here.

RICHARD DITTRENNER
Commander

VOLUME 7 CVN HOMEPORING EIS — NASNI RESPONSE TO COMMENTS

Comment Number	Response
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Robert and Kelly Alexander

I.66.1 Your comments are noted and are included in the Final EIS.

Nancy Tadd

Dr. Darrel Crain
 450 Summerhill Court
 Alpine, California 91901
 Telephone (619) 659-0176
 Fax (619) 445-1059
 Email: dcraindc@connectnet.com

October 29, 1998

Mr. Richard Danzig, Secretary of the Navy
 Fax (703) 614-3477
 Telephone (703) 695-3131

Mr. Danzig,

As a health care professional in our fair city, I implore you to carefully review your plans for our lovely town and the consequences to our hard-working people.

This letter is in response to the proposed stationing of nuclear-powered aircraft here in San Diego. The people of San Diego do not wish to have these carriers here for several reasons:

- 1) The presence of nuclear craft poses serious risks to public health and safety.
- 2) The result would be more radioactive and toxic waste travelling on public roads which are congested to begin with.
- 3) The location is right in the heart of metropolitan San Diego, an unsuitable location for decades of handling of nuclear materials and the inevitable spills and mishaps. You and I both know, accidents do happen.

As you may be aware, a report from the Government Accounting Office concludes that nuclear carriers are much more costly than conventionally-powered carriers, and yet they offer few advantages over conventional ones.

You are in a unique position to cancel these plans and provide for a safer future for our children and future generations, simply by scrapping the outmoded and wasteful nuclear reactors for motive power.

In any case, before you make your final decisions, please come to San Diego personally and hear how the people of San Diego feel about nuclear-powered carriers in the San Diego Bay.

In Health,

Dr. Darrel Crain

I.67.1

I.67.2

I.67.3

VOLUME 7 CVN HOMEPORING EIS — NASNI RESPONSE TO COMMENTS

Comment Number	Response
Darrel Crain	
I.67.1	Please see responses to comments O.12.49, and O.12.132, and I.4.1.
I.67.2	Please see response to comment O.12.55 and I.63.7.
I.67.3	Your comments are noted and are included in the Final EIS.

FROM : NJHARTLAND LIFETRACKS

PHONE NO. : 6192881978

Oct. 29 1998 12:24PM PT

Reproduction clarity limited by quality of comment letter received.

LifeTracks Adventure Safaris

The words on the Serengeti Plains are whispering your name...

October 30, 1998

Secretary of the Navy,

Mr. Richard Danzig

FAX 703-614-3477

In a democracy you represent me and my family as well as your own interests. I understand you will make the final decision to add more nuclear carriers to San Diego Bay. Would you please come to San Diego and hear from the people who live here. We do not want our beautiful city or bay turned into a nuclear dump or nuclear megaport!

I.68.1

I have always opposed nuclear power from the very beginnings of my awareness of its destructive power when directed as well as when humans make mistakes with it and misdirect it; i.e. Chernobyl, Three Mile Island and other tragedies. ACCIDENTS DO HAPPEN! There are no guarantees it won't happen again! Also consider the problems of the year 2000 and those government computers that may just STOP! Y2K is real!

I oppose any and all plans to bring more destructive power to my beloved San Diego Bay. The environment and the people are too precious to continue this insanity!

According to my sources, the US Government Accounting Office reports no strategic advantage of nuclear carriers over conventional carriers (although Nuclear costs * 8 Billion dollars more!)

Please cancel the nuclear carriers and redirect that money into more immediate and humanitarian needs. Perhaps even Y2K compliance!

Thank you,

Nancy J. Hartland
Happy San Diegan,
a Maine taxpayer

CC to Bill Cohen

VOLUME 7 CVN HOMEPORING EIS — NASNI RESPONSE TO COMMENTS

Comment Number	Response
Nancy Hartland	
I.68.1	<p>Two public hearings on the Draft EIS have been held in the San Diego region and public testimony received, as required under NEPA. The Navy does not currently have plans to have a follow-on community workshop for an informal dialogue. Concerns generated during the public review of the EIS will be considered by Navy personnel responsible for making decisions regarding the proposed action. Navy representatives at the EIS public hearings are directly involved with this decision-making process, and provide recommendations to the Secretary of the Navy regarding the preferred alternative to be implemented.</p> <p>Furthermore, the Navy ensures that the EIS decisionmaker has a complete copy of the public hearing transcripts. The Navy believes that the objective sought by the comment is met by the fact that the transcript of the public hearing is prepared and reviewed as part of the NEPA process leading up to the Record of Decision.</p>

Please also see response to comments O.12.57, I.63.7, I.4.1, O.12.55, and O.12.49.

October 29, 1998

To: Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Richard Danzig

Dear Mr. Danzig:

I am writing to voice my opposition to the Navy's plan to home-port nuclear carriers in San Diego. You no doubt think that protesters to this plan just "don't know the facts"; people like you do not think there is danger in nuclear technology. You do not think that nuclear waste poses a tremendously dangerous threat, not only to us now living, but to our children and grandchildren and great-grandchildren. You think that the advantages far outweigh the risks.

I.69.1

The military mind thinks that it's okay if some people get injured or killed, as long as it's not too many.

I want you to understand that under no circumstances do the people of San Diego want their beautiful city to become a nuclear dump for the Navy.

You are making our city a target for all kinds of enemy attacks.

And you are endangering millions of people, not only in San Diego, but also in Tijuana and Baja California. Please listen to what we are saying. Come to San Diego and listen and see for yourself. This is our home, not your Nuclear Megaport.

Thank you very much.

Sincerely,

Stephanie Mood
4538 Long Branch Ave.
San Diego, CA 92107

VOLUME 7 CVN HOMEPORING EIS — NASNI RESPONSE TO COMMENTS

Comment Number	Response
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Stephanie Mood

I.69.1 Your comments are noted and are included in the Final EIS.

Reproduction clarity limited by quality of comment letter received.

Attn: Mr. Richard Danzig

October 29, 1998

To: Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Richard Danzig

Dear Mr. Danzig,

I am writing to you today to voice my opposition to the proposed stationing of nuclear aircraft carriers in San Diego. I am not aligned with any group, but respectfully ask you to meet with the Environmental Health Coalition. I believe that their concern for the welfare and safety of San Diego's citizenry is legitimate.

I.70.1

I had previously planned on making San Diego my permanent home, but if it is to become a port for nuclear carriers then I would prefer to live somewhere where that practice will not be carried out. San Diego is nationally known for its beauty, its people, its friendliness, but most of all its cleanliness. When people find out that nuclear warships will be stationed in San Diego, I believe you will not only see a drop in tourism, but in the number of educated and skilled workers that San Diego can currently attract. This city will become less competitive and less likely to attract industries that will allow the city economic expansion. And all this will be due to the fear that people will have for themselves, their families, but most importantly for their children in living in proximity to a nuclear port and repair facility.

I don't oppose the military and I believe that we need a strong military as we do not live in an ideal world. At the same time, though, I believe that the decisions which affect the military and this country's citizens should be made intelligently. The US Government's General Accounting Office reports that there is no strategic advantage of nuclear carriers over conventional ones. Besides the fact that the nuclear carriers cost \$ 8 billion more. I urge you to cancel the nuclear carriers and put the savings into other more urgent needs that the military has.

I.70.2

Thank you for your time and attention to this letter.

Sincerely,

Richard Moran

VOLUME 7 CVN HOMEPORING EIS — NASNI RESPONSE TO COMMENTS

Comment Number	Response
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Richard Moran

- I.70.1 Your comments are noted and are included in the Final EIS.
- I.70.2 Please see response to comment O.12.49, O.12.55, I.4.1, and I.63.7.

Nancy Teas

Nancy Teas
450 Summerhill Court
Alpine, California 91901
Telephone (619) 659-0176
Fax (619) 445-1059
Email: nancyt@connectnet.com

October 29, 1998

Mr. Richard Danzig, Secretary of the Navy
Fax (703) 614-3477
Telephone (703) 695-3131

Mr. Danzig,

This letter is in response to the proposed stationing of nuclear-powered aircraft here in San Diego. Please do not station these carrier here.

L71.1

These carriers:

- 1) poses serious risks to public health and safety of San Diego.
- 2) would result in more radioactive and toxic waste traveling on congested public roads.
- 3) would be located right in the heart of metropolitan San Diego, an unsuitable location for decades of handling of nuclear materials.

As you are undoubtedly aware, a report from the Government Accounting Office concludes that nuclear carriers are much more costly than conventionally-powered carriers, and yet they offer few advantages over conventional ones.

L71.2

Please get rid of the outmoded and wasteful nuclear reactors for motive power and keep them out of San Diego.

Sincerely,

Nancy Teas

VOLUME 7 CVN HOMEPORING EIS — NASNI RESPONSE TO COMMENTS

Comment Number	Response
Nancy Teas	
I.71.1	Your comments are noted and are included in the Final EIS.
I.71.2	Please see response to comment O.12.49, O.12.55, I.4.1, and I.63.7.

urgent

facsimile

To: SEC.OF NAVY, MR. RICHARD DANZIG

Company:

Fax Number: +1 (703) 614-3477

Business Phone:

From: Irv

Fax Number: +1 (619) 692-1642

Business Phone:

Home Phone:

Pages: 1

Date/Time: 10/30/98 2:36:34 PM

Subject: NUCLEAR MEGAPORT IN SAN DIEGO, CA

WE OPPOSE YOUR PLANS TO INSTALL ADDITIONAL NUCLEAR CARRIERS.
WE MUST SPEAK WITH YOU IN PERSON, AND WE WISH TO HAVE A PUBLIC TASK
FORCE SET UP TO STUDY THE SAFETY OF THE NAVY'S PLAN. THERE HAS BEEN
VERY LITTLE MEDIA AND NOTICE GIVEN TO THE SAN DIEGO PUBLIC

I.72.1

I SUPPORT MY CONGRESSMAN IN HIS REQUEST FOR MORE PUBLIC INPUT..

MR. IRVING B. HOSENPUD

VOLUME 7 CVN HOMEPORING EIS — NASNI RESPONSE TO COMMENTS

Comment Number	Response
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Irv Hosenpud

I.72.1 Your comments are noted and are included in the Final EIS.

1030 Calaveras Dr.
San Diego, CA 92107

Secretary of the Navy
Mr. Richard Danzig

Dear sir:

I oppose homeporting of nuclear carriers in the San Diego in the strongest possible way!

I.73.1

San Diego is the 6th largest city in the United States. The population density alone should prohibit a Nuclear Megaport in San Diego! There are seismic considerations that also make this move unwise.

San Diego doesn't need or want nuclear risk! Please listen to the people of San Diego and put the nukes somewhere else (or go conventional power).

Sincerely,

Jayne Cassedy

VOLUME 7 CVN HOMEPORING EIS — NASNI RESPONSE TO COMMENTS

Comment Number	Response
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Jayne Cassedy

I.73.1 Your comments are noted and are included in the Final EIS.

(619) 222-3761

10102550

0120100

0101

1030 Calaveras Dr.
San Diego, CA 92107

Secretary of the Navy
Mr. Richard Danzig

Dear Mr. Danzig:

I oppose homeporting of nuclear carriers in the
San Diego in the strongest possible way! 174.1

San Diego doesn't need or want nuclear risk!
Please listen to the people of San Diego and put the
nukes somewhere else (or go conventional power).

Very truly,

Paul Cassedy

P.S. Why didn't you come to the public hearings in
San Diego?

VOLUME 7 CVN HOMEPORING EIS — NASNI RESPONSE TO COMMENTS

Comment Number	Response
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Paul Cassedy

I.74.1 Your comments are noted and are included in the Final EIS.

Mitch C. Wallis
10360 Glenellen Way
San Diego, CA 92126

via fax: (703) 614-3477

October 29, 1998
Secretary of the Navy,
Mr. Richard Danzig
re: Proposed Nuclear Ships/San Diego Bay

DEAR SECRETARY DANZIG:

I am writing to protest the proposed installation of three nuclear-powered aircraft carriers in San Diego Bay. | 1.75.1

I vehemently oppose the plan to turn San Diego into a Nuclear Megaport and Nuclear Dump.

Please note especially that the U.S. General Accounting Office reports that no strategic advantage of nuclear carriers over conventional carriers will result AND nuclear carriers cost 8 billion dollars more! | 1.75.2

PLEASE CANCEL the nuclear carriers and use the savings for more pressing needs. | 1.75.3

Thank you.

Yours truly,

Mitch C. Wallis
MCw/me

VOLUME 7 CVN HOMEPORING EIS — NASNI RESPONSE TO COMMENTS

Comment Number	Response
Mitch Wallis	
I.75.1	Your comments are noted and are included in the Final EIS.
I.75.2	Please see response to comment O.12.49, O.12.55, I.4.1, and I.63.7.
I.75.3	Your comments are noted and are included in the Final EIS.

DEVELOPING HOME PORT FACILITIES FOR
THREE NIMITZ-CLASS AIRCRAFT CARRIERS
IN SUPPORT OF THE U.S. PACIFIC FLEET

DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT

DRAFT EIS COMMENTS

Name: KEN KJOLLER
Address: 310 D AVE, CORONADO, CA 92118

COMMENTS:

I ATTENDED THE MEETING AT THE VILLAGE ELEMENTARY SCHOOL ON OCT. 27. I WENT WITH A GENERALLY FAVORABLE FEELING ABOUT THE PLAN TO HOMEPORt THREE CVN's AT NORTH ISLAND.

HOWEVER, I LEFT WITH THE THOUGHT THAT THE NAVY IS MUCH LESS INTERESTED IN THE CONCERNs OF THE CITIZENS OF CORONADO THAN IS APPROPRIATE. THE TWO ISSUES THAT ARE MOST PROMINENT ARE : (1) A SYSTEM FOR PROVIDING EMERGENCY WARNING TO THE POPULATION OF CORONADO IN THE EVENT OF A NUCLEAR ACCIDENT AND (2) MITIGATION OF THE INCREASED TRAFFIC ON CITY STREETS DUE TO THE PRESENCE OF THESE SHIPS.

THESE CONCERNs NEED TO BE ADDRESSED WITH MUCH GREATER SENSITIVITY THAN HAS YET BEEN EVIDENT. IT IS TIME FOR OUR NAVY "TO STEP UP TO THE PLATE."

RESPECTFULLY,
Ken Jjoller
Signature

NOV 10, 1998
Date

Note: This form is supplied for your convenience. You are not required to use this form. Comments of any length may be submitted to the address on the reverse side of this form. Your comments should be postmarked on or before November 12, 1998.

VOLUME 7 CVN HOMEPORING EIS — NASNI RESPONSE TO COMMENTS

Comment Number	Response
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Ken Kjoller

- I.76.1 For the portion of the comment addressing an emergency warning system in the event of a nuclear accident, please see response to comment L.4.36.

The additional traffic that would be generated by the proposed action would increase the traffic volumes on the Coronado streets. The existing conditions reflecting traffic on the Coronado transportation network were derived from traffic counts taken when two carriers were in port, during the summer when the greatest amount of vehicles would be present, associated with tourist activity (August 1996). The traffic impact analysis is based on incremental changes in site-generated traffic when the proposed CVNs are in port. The impact analysis of two additional CVNs in section 3.9.1.2.3 evaluates conditions that would occur 96 percent of the time when two or fewer carriers would be in port at the same time. The impact created by this condition, 27 vehicle trips during the peak hour, would be less than significant. Also, intermittent, short-term impacts resulting on the 13 days (4 percent of the time) when all three carriers would be in port simultaneously are evaluated. Though substantial, the impacts on intersections and roadways during these days would be short-term and less than significant. Please see response to comment L.4.16 for detail on how the transportation analysis has been revised.

Although specific traffic-related mitigation measures are not needed of the proposed action, the Navy does have an ongoing series of strategies designed to reduce the level of traffic generated by NASNI, such as a ferry system, carpool/vanpool programs, installation of bicycle racks, a guaranteed ride home program (for rideshare users with a mid-day emergency), and an educational program to promote these strategies. In addition, the Navy is considering a redesign of the Main Gate so that the entrance would align with Third Street and thereby provide a more direct connection into and out of the base.

RECORDED REC'D

November 16, 1998

Samantha Ellis
3728 1/2 Ingraham St.
San Diego, CA 92109

Mr. John Coon
Southwest Division (Code 05AL.JC)
Naval Facilities Engineering Command
1220 Pacific Highway
San Diego, CA 92132-5190

Dear Mr. Coon:

I am writing to express my disapproval and protest of having nuclear carriers in our San Diego bay. In light of all the dangers involved with nuclear power, it is unsafe to port even one nuclear carrier so close to where so many families live.

I.77.1

I belong to the Peace Resource Center, which has been studying and following this dilemma for many years now. I have seen the findings of the GAO report, along with many other reports, that prove that nuclear power is not the right answer for this San Diego region. In fact, it would be blatantly endangering our lives, environment, and the other inhabitants of this area. The Navy's draft Environmental Impact Statement does not fully address all the consequences of a nuclear accident. Nothing does.

I urge you to consider the families and environment of this beautiful, vibrant region, and not put us in danger by housing nuclear carriers in our bay.

Sincerely,



Samantha Ellis

VOLUME 7 CVN HOMEPORING EIS — NASNI RESPONSE TO COMMENTS

Comment Number	Response
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Samantha Ellis

I.77.1 Please see response to comment O.12.49, O.12.55, I.4.1, and I.63.7.

November 12, 1998

Mr. John Coon
Southwest Division (Code 0SAL.JC)
Naval Facilities Engineering Command
1220 Pacific Highway
San Diego, CA 92132-5190

Re: Draft Environmental Impact Statement for Developing Home Port Facilities
for Three NIMITZ-Class Aircraft Carriers in Support of the Pacific Fleet

Dear Mr. Coon:

After reviewing the Navy's draft EIS (DEIS), additional relevant documents and memos,
and in support of the comments made orally and in writing by the following:

- City of Coronado,
- Environmental Health Coalition, San Diego,
- Peace Resource Center, San Diego,
- Marilyn Field, resident of Coronado,
- Joel I. Cohn, CHP, radiation expert hired by the City of Coronado,
- Robert Sergeant, traffic consultant hired by the City of Coronado,
- Charles Bull, noise consultant hired by the City of Coronado,
- Dr. David Richardson, epidemiologist hired by the Environmental Health Coalition
- Bernd Frake and Arjun Makhijani, radiological consultants hired by the
Environmental Health Coalition,
- Camille Sears, independent expert hired by the Environmental Health Coalition to
review the health and safety sections of the DEIS and
- Quinton & Petix, the legal firm retained by the City of Coronado

We conclude that the document is fatally flawed and does not comply with the
requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S. Code § 4331, et seq.
[NEPA] nor CEQA.

Further, in agreement with the findings of the above listed parties, we are forced to conclude that the Navy must make substantial corrections, additions to its assumptions, methodologies and factual conclusions. A new draft DEIS must be issued to ensure that the information is scientifically accurate and, a new public hearing must be held to allow for discussion and public disclosure.

Per the fundamental premise stated in the regulatory guidelines for implementation of NEPA, promulgated by the Federal Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), at 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1.

(b) NEPA procedures must insure that environmental information is available to public officials and citizens before decisions are made and before actions are taken. The information must be of *high quality*. *Accurate scientific analysis*, expert agency comments, and public scrutiny are *essential* to implementing NEPA. Most important, NEPA documents must concentrate on the issues that are truly significant to the action in question, rather than amassing needless detail. (Emphasis added).

Per Quinton & Petix, the legal council retained by the City of Coronado, "these principles have recently been reiterated by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in the case of Idaho Sporting Congress v Thomas, 137 F.3d 1146, at 1151 (9th Cir. 1998)

Another fundamental principle that the Navy should have followed in preparing the DEIS is set forth in 40 C.F.R. § 1502.24, entitled "Methodology and scientific accuracy".
"Agencies shall insure the professional integrity, including scientific integrity, of the discussion and analyses in environmental impact statements. They shall identify any methodologies used and shall make explicit references by footnote to the scientific and other sources relied upon for conclusions in the statement. An agency may place discussion of methodology in an appendix."

The City of Coronado's consultants as well as those hired by the Environmental Health Coalition have all identified numerous instances in the DEIS where the Navy has failed to comply with the above NEPA implementing regulations (see enclosed).

Per the Quinton & Petix"

"It appears that the Navy has failed to provide information of 'high quality' and in fact has totally omitted any supporting data with respect to key environmental issues..."

Further,

"While the Navy's DEIS appears to pay lip-service to the requirement of discussing the cumulative impact the current project will have on the environment of Coronado, ostensibly devoting an entire section to the DEIS to that topic, it arguably fails to include an adequate listing of past projects and overall traffic growth and therefore erroneously concludes that the current proposal's impact will not have a cumulative effect on the environment."

As the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has recently observed:

"The duty to discuss cumulative impacts in an Environmental Impact Statement is mandatory. See 40 C.F.R. § 1502.16. The controlling regulation defines "cumulative impact" as:

"the impact on the environment which results from the incremental impact of the action when to other past, present and reasonably foreseeable future actions, regardless of what agency (federal or non-federal) or person undertakes such other actions. Cumulative impacts can result from individually minor but collectively significant actions taking place over a period of time.

40 C.F.R. § 1508.7

City of Carmel-by-the-Sea v. U.S. Dept. of Transp., 123 F.3d 1142, at 1160 (9th Cir. 1997) (emphasis added)"

As stated in the City of Coronado's comment letter to the Navy on the DEIS:

"NASNI has incrementally expanded its functions and complement of personnel, slowly increasing the scope and intensity of the negative impacts of its operation on Coronado." Further, "The City is concerned that this draft EIS does not adequately address the impact on Coronado of basing two or three CVN's on NASNI, or fulfill the requirements of NEPA."

"The National Environmental Policy Act and its requisite EIS analysis requires full unbiased disclosure of the likely effects of Federal projects. The City believes that separating the impact of the homeporting of three CVN's between two EIS analyses, and then failing to consider the cumulative impacts of these decisions in the most recent EIS, effectively circumvents the fundamental objective of NEPA of guarding the environment 'through discussion and disclosure'."

Per Quinton & Petix:

"The Navy has not fulfilled its duties under NEPA in conducting its inquiry into the environmental consequences of the preferred home porting alternative. The fundamental purpose of NEPA, as stated by the federal Council on Environmental Quality, in its regulations implementing NEPA:

40 C.F.R. Sec. 1500.1 Purpose.

(a) The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) is our basic national charter for protection of the environment. It establishes policy, sets goals (section 101), and provides means (section 102) for carrying out the policy. Section 102(2) contains "action-forcing" provisions to make sure that federal agencies act according to the letter and spirit of the Act. (Quotation marks in original).

Preparation of accurate and informative environmental documents is an essential part of the Navy's obligations under NEPA, since this is an integral part of the "action-forcing" procedure that leads decisionmakers to take a "hard look" at environmental consequences, and hopefully, as a result, make decisions that are wise for the public good. *Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council*, 490 U.S. 332, 109 S. Ct. 1835, at 1846 (1989). To that end, the federal CEQ has further declared its policy, in part, as follows:

40 C.F.R. S 1500.2 Policy.

Federal agencies shall to the fullest extent possible:

(b) Implement procedures to make the NEPA process more useful to decisionmakers and the public, to reduce paperwork and the accumulation of extraneous background data, and to emphasize real environmental issues and alternatives. Environmental impact statements shall be concise, clear and to the point, and shall be supported by evidence that agencies have made the necessary environmental analyzes.

(c) Use the NEPA process to identify and access the reasonable alternatives to proposed actions that will avoid or minimize adverse effects of these actions upon the quality of the human environment.

(d) Use all practicable means, consistent with the requirements of the Act and other essential considerations of national policy, to restore and enhance the quality of the human environment and avoid or minimize any possible adverse effects of their actions upon the quality of the human environment.

It is certainly arguable that the DEIS under scrutiny fails to measure up to the standards set forth above in section 1500.2 (b), and would be subject to legal challenge, if the Navy were to ignore these defects when they are brought to its attention.

In conclusion, in accordance with NEPA procedures which must insure that environmental information is made available to public officials and citizens before decisions are made and before actions are taken, we insist that the Navy's DEIS must be revised and resubmitted for public scrutiny. Further, new public hearings must be held in order to allow for new presentation of data and public comment.

Respectfully yours,

Stephanie S. Kaupp
1133 First Street, Unit 418
Coronado, CA 92118
(619) 435-5703

Stephanie S. Kaupp

Elizabeth Gill
411 First Street
Coronado, CA 92118
(619) 437-1966

Elizabeth Gill

Enclosures and References:

- Letter to the City of Coronado from Quinton & Petix
- Letter to the Environmental Health Coalition from Camille Sears, MS
- Letter to the Environmental Health Coalition from Bernd Frank and Dr. Arjun Makhijani
- Letter to the Environmental Health Coalition from Dr. David Richardson
- Letter to the Mayor and City Council from E. Miles Harvey, the Landing Homeowners Association
- Letter from Marilyn Field, to the City of Coronado, November 6, 1998
- Memorandums of October 14 and November 5, 1998 from Joel I. Cehn, CHP, to the City of Coronado
- Reference additional and final comments by Joel I. Cehn to the City of Coronado
- Reference "Generations at Risk", released by Physicians for Social Responsibility and CALPIRG, November 11, 1998 (see references made on Military/Navy Toxics)

The attachments to this letter, listed here, can be identified as referenced below:

I.78.4

The following letters were submitted by the City of Coronado as part of their attachment and numbered by the City with pages listed in parenthesis:

- Letter from Quinton & Petix, October 14, 1998 (pp. 4 - 9).
- Letter from The Landing Homeowners Association, dated September 24, 1998 (pp. 153-155).
- Letter from Marilyn G. Field to Mayor Tom Smisek, Members of City Council, and Homer Bludau, City Manager, November 6, 1998 (pp. 74 - 80).
- Memo from Joel I. Cehn, CHP, Radiation Safety Consultant to Homer Bludau, City of Coronado RE: Interim report on Radiation Monitoring Study, October 14, 1998. (pp. 16 - 22).

The following letters were previously received and have been identified as attachments to comment letter O.12 from Environmental Health Coalition:

- Letter from Camille Sears to the Environmental Health Coalition, November 10, 1998.
- Letter from Bernd Franke for Institute for Energy and Environmental Research to Laura Hunter, Environmental Health Coalition, November 11, 1998.
- Comments of Dr. David Richardson, Department of Epidemiology, School of Public Health, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, NC.

VOLUME 7 CVN HOMEPORING EIS — NASNI RESPONSE TO COMMENTS

Comment Number	Response
Stephanie S. Kaupp and Elizabeth Gill	
I.78.1	Please see responses to comments to the 10 letters of comment on the Draft EIS that you have referenced. Specifically see responses to comments O.12.5, O.12.8, O.12.9, O.12.15, O.13.5, and O.13.9. The Navy does not agree with your comments.
I.78.2	This comment addresses the adequacy of the past, present, and reasonably foreseeable projects evaluated in the NASNI cumulative impact assessment. The list of reasonably foreseeable projects included in the cumulative analysis has been increased as requested by the City of Coronado. The revised cumulative analysis in section 3.18 incorporates these projects. Please see response to comment L.2.1.
I.78.3	This comment addresses the adequacy of the NASNI cumulative impact assessment. This EIS does identify the cumulative impacts resulting from the reasonably foreseeable actions of homeporting the BRAC CVN along with up to two additional CVNs at NASNI. The cumulative analysis in section 3.18 evaluates that alternative (in the case of NASNI, <i>Facilities for Two Additional CVNs: Capacity for Total of Three CVNs</i>) which would result in potentially the most adverse of environmental impacts for each CVN homeporting location. Please see response to comment L.4.11 for a discussion of the analysis of the BRAC CVN in the cumulative impacts assessment.
I.78.4	These comments are the same and in fact referenced to a consultant's letter attached to the City of Coronado's comments. See responses to comments L.4.56 through L.4.60 above.

November 25, 1998

Mr. John Coon, Project Manager
Southwest Division, Naval Facilities Engineering Command
Code 05AL-JC
1220 Pacific Highway
San Diego, CA 92132

Dear Mr. Coon,

These comments are submitted in regards to the DEIS for the Developing Home Port Facilities for 3 Nimitz Class Carriers in Support of the U.S. Pacific Fleet in Coronado, CA.....and request they be placed in the official record. I just returned from an east coast sojourn, and I respectfully request that these comments be included in responses.

L79.1

The installation of monitoring systems for radiation and chemical releases are required along the boundary with Coronado and within Coronado. These should be monitored by Coronado officials or civilian resident volunteers from Coronado. A continual print out should be placed in the Coronado public library on current results.

When certain thresholds are reached that would be detrimental to the health of residents, a siren should sound with a number code to convey to residents the action that they should take, i.e.: close all windows and do not expose self to outside air or evacuate the area, etc. There is NO OTHER WAY to notify residents immediately of a health hazard. Notifying public officials in past accidents has not worked and will not work now.

There are normal radiation releases as a normal routine, and there may be higher than normal releases, each of which must be registered. With a 600% increase in chemical and hazardous waste storage at NAS North Island for a 10 year duration and even longer, if a disposal area is not established, there is a potential for air releases. There are air releases today of chemicals and heavy metals from processes currently taking place at NAS. These and any accidental releases have to be detected along with radiation releases, since both affect the health of residents.

Because of the U.S. Government and military cover-ups of the effects of the atom bomb tests, Agent Orange, the Desert Storm Health Syndrome and even putting a known military person in the unknown tomb, these agencies have no credibility in notifying the public should there be an accident or incident affecting public health. This includes the Navy! Therefore, it is imperative that the residents have their own monitoring stations or the Navy will soon feel the wrath of those they ignore. It is human nature.

Conclusion: Navy provide monitoring stations with Coronado observers, with a central current display in the Coronado library, installation of sirens for immediate notification of accidents/incidents of radiation or chemical releases at any level, coded for necessary public response, all within the Coronado City area.

Sincerely,

Earle Callahan
CDR USN (Ret)

860 Cabrillo Ave.
Coronado, CA 92118

VOLUME 7 CVN HOMEPORING EIS — NASNI RESPONSE TO COMMENTS

Comment Number	Response
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Earle Callahan

I.79.1 Please see response to comment L.4.36 and O.12.81.



MARY LYONS
619.503.1221
FAX: 619.503.1223
3914 Murphy Canyon Rd
Suite A2106
San Diego, CA 92123

GaiaLINK.com
lyons@gaialink.com

October 29, 1998

I'm Marv Lyons, Founder of an organization called GaiaLINK. My mission is to link all people with each other and the living earth/system which sustains our lives.

I do not speak for myself or for the people of Coronado; they are doing an excellent job of speaking for themselves...

I speak for all the people in the San Diego/ Tijuana Region

I speak for all of the children...for many generations to come...

I speak for Gaia, the living earth, which provides us with our entire life support system...

You must be aware that you and your warships are a target... and make the entire region a most attractive target

- Think of terrorists from a fanatic sect... we saw them in NY

- Think of Oklahoma City and an angry American dissident
- Think of Chernobyl and the long term damage of nuclear fallout.

- Think of the devastation of Hiroshima...

We are here in discussion because these warships are not powered by common polluting internal combustion engines

You/we are messing with the power of the sun... over which we have limited control; notwithstanding the high degree of commitment and training of the people operating the systems.

With the best people responsible, there is a possibility of an accident.

Nuclear ships make great profits for the builders.

Nuclear warships may be the greatest macho power toys our clever species has yet invented. But the long term risks and problems in this game are too high.

I am not prone to paranoia or seeing enemies lurking in every shadowed doorway. But Terrorism is much in vogue these days, as you know, because it doesn't take billions of dollars to do billions of dollars worth of damage.

A terrorist attack could turn the San Diego/ Tijuana region into a nuclear wasteland for generations to come — it would even mess with the tourist trade.

I.80.1

Alternatively, the residue of nuclear waste is one more example of our shortsighted technological cleverness — poisoning not only ourselves, but our entire life support system: the birds, the fish... the frogs.

We, the citizens, have entrusted you and empowered you, with you proud blue uniforms, to defend us and create national security...

I believe it is time to re-examine the whole notion of national security... in the light of terrorism and the half-life of nuclear waste. We need a larger vision, a longer term, to frame our concept of national security. We are running out of other people's back yards... to dump waste in and the stuff doesn't stay put. It leaches out and contaminates water supplies and the soils we depend on for our very existence.

I respect you, your commitment to your job, and the past services of the U.S. Navy. Be aware that your proud blue coat and hard earned golden braid will not armor you against nuclear contamination and fallout or radiation sickness.

Are we willing to trade the short term image of national security for one group of humans — north americans — for serious, long term regional insecurity?

I implore you and all decision makers to re-consider your commitment to nuclear warships, particularly those in this area.

Most Sincerely,

Marv Lyons

I.80

I.80.2

You ships make great profits for the builders.

I.80.2

VOLUME 7 CVN HOMEPORING EIS — NASNI RESPONSE TO COMMENTS

Comment Number	Response
Marv Lyons	
I.80.1	Please refer to responses L.4.44 and I.37.1 on the subject of terrorists and attacks on aircraft carriers in San Diego.
I.80.2	Our publicly-elected U.S. Congress and President of the United States make programmatic decisions regarding Naval ships (e.g., application of nuclear power), and thus comments regarding these decisions are beyond the scope of this EIS. The results of all the analyses of both normal operations and hypothetical accidents indicate that there would be no significant radiological impacts from homeporting and maintaining NIMITZ-class aircraft carriers or operating NIMITZ-class aircraft carrier maintenance facilities.
I.80.3	Please refer to responses L.4.44 and I.37.1 on the subject of terrorists and terrorist attacks on aircraft carriers in San Diego.
I.80.4	Please see response to comment I.80.2

I N D E X

PUBLIC HEARING
DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT
FOR
DEVELOPING HOME PORT FACILITIES FOR
THREE NIMITZ-CLASS AIRCRAFT CARRIERS
IN SUPPORT OF THE U.S. PACIFIC FLEET

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CORONADO, CALIFORNIA
TUESDAY, OCTOBER 27, 1998

REPORTED BY MARILIEE P. JEFFRIES, CSR NO. 7142

H.1

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Certified Shorthand Reporters, Inc.
701 B Street Suite 760
San Diego, California 92101

ORIGINAL

1 CORONADO, CALIFORNIA, TUESDAY, OCTOBER 27, 1998

2 CAPTAIN DAVE O'BRIEN: Good evening, ladies and
3 gentlemen. My name is Captain Dave O'Brien, Commanding
4 Officer of the Naval Air Station at North Island. I'd
5 like to welcome you to this formal hearing of the
6 Department of the Navy's Draft Environmental Impact
7 Statement for developing home port facilities for three
8 NIMITZ-Class aircraft carriers to support the U.S. Pacific
9 Fleet.

10 The purpose of this Environmental Impact
11 Statement, or EIS, is to analyze the potential impact
12 associated with construction and operation of the
13 facilities and infrastructure needed to support home ports
14 for three nuclear-powered aircraft carriers at four naval
15 facility concentrations: San Diego, California;
16 Bremerton, Washington; Everett, Washington; and Pearl
17 Harbor, Hawaii.

18 With me this evening are key members of the
19 team who participated in preparation of the Draft EIS.
20 They represent some of the specialized Navy activities
21 involved in the project. Speaking tonight will be Captain
22 Rockland Deal, to my right, Commander Naval Air Force, U.S.
23 Pacific Fleet. They operate the aircraft carriers. And
24 to his right Mr. John Beckett from the Navy Nuclear
25 Propulsion Program. They manage the nuclear propulsion
26 program.

27 Tonight's meeting is being held as part of

1 the process prescribed under the National Environmental
2 Policy Act, or NEPA. NEPA is our basic charter for
3 evaluating potential environmental effects of federal
4 actions. Under NEPA, federal agencies, in this case the
5 Navy, must prepare an EIS for any major action that may
6 significantly affect the quality of human environment.
7 NEPA procedures are designed to make environmental
8 information available to public officials and citizens and
9 to receive input from officials and citizens before
10 decisions are made or actions are taken.

11 The NEPA process for this project was
12 initiated in December 1996, and in February 1997 four
13 public scoping meetings were held in Bremerton and
14 Everett, Washington; Pearl City, Hawaii; Coronado,
15 California. Since then we have been busy preparing the
16 Draft EIS.

17 On August 28th of this year, the Draft EIS
18 was issued for public review. The availability of the
19 Draft EIS was announced in local newspapers. Copies were
20 distributed to agencies, organizations, individuals, and
21 local libraries for public review. The 75-day public
22 review period will run through November 12th, 1998.
23 The purpose of this public hearing is to
24 describe the proposed actions and alternatives, to present
25 the results of the environmental analyses contained in the
26 Draft EIS, and to hear your comments about the Draft EIS.
27 A total of five hearings just like this one are being held
28 in Everett, Bremerton, Washington; Honolulu, Hawaii; and

1 San Diego and Coronado, California.

2 All oral and written comments on the Draft
3 EIS received tonight and throughout the public review
4 period will be considered and responded to by the Navy.
5 The Draft EIS will then be revised as necessary to produce
6 a complete and thorough discussion of the potential
7 environmental consequences. The revised document which
8 will include responses to all comments received during the
9 comment period will become part of the final EIS.

10 Depending on comments received and the effort
11 needed to address them, the final EIS will be completed in
12 early 1999. When completed, the final EIS will be
13 submitted to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy
14 for Installations and Facilities as input to the decision
15 making process. The document will then be subject to a
16 public review period as required under NEPA. After this
17 review period the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy
18 will consider any comments received and will sign a Record
19 of Decision which will document the final decisions and
20 will complete the NEPA process. This action is expected
21 in the spring of 1999.

22 Now, let me explain the procedures for making
23 tonight's meeting productive and smooth. I hope that each
24 of you have picked up one of the blue handouts that are
25 available on the table near the door. It has the agenda
26 for tonight's meeting on one side and a summary of the
27 proposed actions and the environmental analysis on the
28 other side. If you do not have one you may get one at the

1 break, or if you would like one now, please raise your
2 hand and we will pass one to you.

3 Also, please put your name and address on the
4 white sign-in sheet on the table near the door if you wish
5 to be included on the project mailing list. If you are on
6 the mailing list you will be able to receive information
7 about the project.

8 If you wish to speak during the public
9 comment portion of tonight's meeting, I hope you have
10 filled out a gray speaker request card, also available on
11 the table near the door.

12 Also available on the table are a green
13 handout which is a fact sheet summarizing the Navy Nuclear
14 Propulsion Program, and copies of the Naval Nuclear 50th
15 Anniversary brochure. Please help yourself to a copy of
16 each of these if you wish.

17 Finally, if you wish to submit written
18 comments and would like to have a handy form on which to
19 write your comments, please pick up one of the yellow
20 comment sheets. You may turn in your written comments
21 tonight by placing them in the comment box near the door,
22 or you may mail your comments to the address indicated on
23 the back of the comment sheet before November 12. I
24 assure you that written comments will get the same
25 attention as oral comments.

26 The public comment portion of tonight's
27 hearing is an opportunity for you to present your comments
28 on the Draft EIS. We are not going to take up your time

1 to respond to each comment tonight. Responses to your
2 comments will be in the final EIS. To ensure that we have
3 reported all your comments, a transcript of this meeting
4 will be prepared by our court reporter.

5 Now, let's get started. First we will
6 describe NIMITZ-class aircraft carriers and the need for
7 them to have home ports. Then we will explain what the
8 proposed actions are and why they are being considered.
9 Next we will explain the alternatives that are considered
10 in the Draft EIS. Then we will briefly summarize the
11 results of the environmental analyses. That will be
12 followed by a discussion of the nuclear propulsion aspects
13 of NIMITZ-class aircraft carriers. Following the
14 presentation, which will take about 40 minutes, we will
15 take a ten-minute break and then reconvene to receive your
16 comments.

17 Now, to talk about NIMITZ-class aircraft
18 carriers, homeporting, and the proposed actions, I would
19 like to introduce Captain Rockland Deal from the staff of
20 Commander Naval Air Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

21 CAPTAIN ROCKLAND DEAL: I chose this photograph of
22 one of our carriers at sea with part of our air wing
23 overhead to point out that this is what the proposed
24 actions we are discussing tonight are really all about.
25 They are about the efficient application of military power
26 in support of the United States' national interests
27 established by the President and Congress.

1 It is my boss who is responsible for support
2 for all of the aircraft and aircraft carriers in the
3 Pacific Fleet. That adds up to 6 aircraft carriers, about
4 1600 airplanes, and more than 57,000 people who make it
5 all work. They are out there every single day carrying
6 out their mission somewhere in the world's largest ocean.

7 I represent the people who fly these
8 airplanes and sail these ships, and it's we who need the
9 home port facilities that we are talking about tonight.
10 In this part of our presentation I'll
11 describe NIMITZ-class aircraft carriers, the major Pacific
12 Fleet home ports, and some of the principal factors
13 creating the framework for the decision of where to
14 homeport aircraft carriers.

15 NIMITZ-class aircraft carriers are among the
16 largest of the warships in the world. They are 1,092 feet
17 long by 252 feet wide on the flight deck, and 134 feet
18 wide at the water line. The flight deck encompasses 4.5
19 acres. They are also one of the deepest draft ships in
20 the Navy, requiring a home port berth with a depth of 50
21 feet measured at mean lower-low water. The full crew
22 complement while in home port is 3,217 personnel, which is
23 roughly half the full operational crew complement of
24 approximately 6,000 when the air wing is embarked at sea.
25 The aircraft and air wing personnel do not
26 remain on the carrier while it is in home port. The air
27 wing is typically based at several different Naval Air
28 Stations. When the carrier goes to sea, the wing support

1 personnel and material are loaded at pierside, and the
2 aircraft fly out to meet the carrier at sea.

The Pacific Fleet has facilities in many
locations, but they are concentrated mainly in four
geographic areas: Washington's Puget Sound in the Pacific
Northwest; the San Diego area in Southern California;
Pearl Harbor, Hawaii; and Yokosuka Japan. The naval
facilities in these areas provide home ports for nearly
all of the ships in the Pacific Fleet.

What is a home port? Each ship in the U.S.

Navy has home port where it is based when not deployed.
The crews' families generally live there; maintenance and
material support are located there; facilities and quality
of life infrastructure are provided there.

H1 The nuclear-powered aircraft carrier operates
on about a 24-month cycle: They deploy overseas for six
months; they undergo maintenance in the home port area for
about six months; and they spend the remaining 12 months
training for the next deployment. About four months of
that training is spent at sea, so you can see that the
crews get precious little time in home port with their
families.

As indicated on this slide, the Navy
designation for nuclear-powered aircraft carrier is CVN.
A conventionally-powered aircraft carrier is called a CV.
So when I use the term "CVN" in this presentation, I'm
referring to a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier.

The Navy's proposed actions, which are the

subject of this EIS, are to construct and operate the
facilities and infrastructure needed to support home ports
for three CVNs.

Two of these CVNs will be joining the Pacific
in 2002 and 2005 to replace two older
conventionally-powered aircraft carriers, CVs. Let me
emphasize that these two CVNs will replace two CVs and
will not increase the number of ships in the Pacific
Fleet. One of the CVs was decommissioned in September of
this year, and a second CV is scheduled to be
decommissioned in 2003.

The third CVN is the one homeported at Naval
Station Everett. The Everett home port location is being
reevaluated in order to assess the potential to increase
efficiency of support infrastructure and maintenance
capabilities and to enhance quality of life for the crew.

The decisions on CVN home ports could also
result in the need to relocate up to four Fast Combat
Support Ships, or AOEs, currently homeported at Puget
Sound Naval Shipyard if an additional CVN is homeported
there.

Decisions on facilities development need to
be made soon. This is important in order to program
budgets in time to accommodate planned arrival dates of
the two CVNs that will replace the aging CVs.

Currently designated CVN home ports are
located at three Pacific Fleet naval facilities. Two of
the home ports are in the Pacific Northwest area: Puget

1 Sound Naval Shipyard at Bremerton, Washington, and Naval
2 Station Everett, Washington.
3 The third designated CVN homeport is in the
4 San Diego area at Naval Air Station North Island in
5 Coronado, California. North Island was only recently
6 designated a CVN home port and just received a
7 nuclear-powered aircraft carrier in August of 1998.
8 All three of the currently designated CVN
9 home ports are considered in this EIS. In addition,
10 because Pearl Harbor is a vital fleet concentration, it is
11 also evaluated in this EIS as a potential CVN home port
12 location.

The Navy determined specific locations for
13 homeporting by examining the four existing ports just
14 mentioned to determine how well they were capable of
15 satisfying the following CVN home port objectives and
16 requirements:

17 Operations and training;
18 Support Facilities; and
19 Maintenance Facilities; and
20 Quality of life for Navy crew and families.

As I have stated, three CVNs are presently
21 assigned to the Pacific Fleet. One is currently
22 homeported at Bremerton, one is at North Island, and one
23 is at Everett. Two additional CVNs will be joining the
24 Pacific Fleet in coming years, bringing the Pacific Fleet
25 total to five CVNs and one CV. The CV based in Yokosuka,
26 Japan. The CV based at Yokosuka, Japan is not a topic of
27
28

1 discussion tonight.

2 The EIS analysis assumes at least one CVN
3 will continue to be homeported at Bremerton to comply with
4 previous actions under the Base Realignment and Closure
5 process, referred to as BRAC; at least one CVN will
6 continue to be homeported at North Island to comply with
7 previous BRAC actions; and (3) the remaining three CVNs
8 will be homeported within the four alternative locations
9 under consideration: Bremerton, Everett, North Island,
10 and/or Pearl Harbor.
11 Because we were looking at four locations to
12 homeport three CVNs with a different range of possible CVN
13 berths at each location, a very large number of potential
14 combinations were considered. We decided on the five
15 combinations that presented a reasonable range of
16 alternatives. These five combinations along with the
17 alternative of no action became the six alternatives
18 analyzed in the Draft EIS. The no-action alternative
19 evaluates the impacts that would occur if no new
20 facilities were constructed.

If you will look at the rows on this chart,
21 you will see that North Island could have a total of one
22 to three CVNs (the currently homeported CVN shown here in
23 white, and possibly one or two additional CVNs shown in
24 blue). Puget Sound Naval Shipyard could have one or two
25 CVNs (the currently homeported CVN and possibly one
26 additional CVN). Everett could have zero or two CVNs (the
27 additional CVN). Everett could have zero or two CVNs (the
28 currently homeported CVN and possibly one additional CVN,

1 or possibly minus the currently homeported CVN). Pearl
2 Harbor could either remain without a CVN or add one CVN.
3 Columns one through five represent what we
4 call the action alternatives because they would involve
5 the action of facilities construction in order to
6 accommodate additional ships at those locations. In each
7 case the column for each alternative totals five CVNs.
8 Each alternative also has four AOEs. The
9 AOEs are currently homeported at Puget Sound Naval
10 Shipyard. Under alternative one, with two CVNs at Puget
11 Sound Naval Shipyard, the four AOEs would be moved to
12 Naval Station Everett. Under alternative five, also with
13 two CVNs at Puget Sound Naval Shipyard, two AOEs would
14 remain at Puget Sound Naval Shipyard and two would be
15 moved to Naval Station Everett.

16 The sixth column is the no-action
17 alternative. Note that even the no-action alternative has
18 five CVNs. This is because the proposed action is not to
19 decide how many aircraft carriers we should have in the
20 Pacific Fleet; the action is to decide whether to
21 construct the optimal facilities and infrastructure to
22 support them. Since NEPA requires that an EIS evaluate a
23 no-action alternative, we had to determine where to
24 homeport three CVNs if no new facilities were constructed.
25 Logic dictated that we would not move the CVNs currently
26 homeported in North Island, Puget Sound Naval Shipyard,
27 and Naval Station Everett. The rest of the solution was
28 to locate one additional CVN at the existing transient

1 berth at North Island; locate one additional CVN at Puget
2 Sound Naval Shipyard; and keep the AOEs at Puget Sound
3 Naval Shipyard.

The Navy's preferred alternative is
4 alternative two, which would home port two additional CVNs
5 at Naval Air Station North Island and maintain Naval
6 Station Everett as a CVN home port. The Navy's preference
7 for this home port combination is based on North Island's
8 accessibility to the sea and the training ranges; Pearl
9 Harbor Naval Shipyard's inaccessibility to the training
10 ranges and its lack of facilities to support a carrier air
11 wing; and the operational and quality of life advantages
12 of the existing CVN home port at Naval Station Everett and
13 the assumption that depot maintenance for the CVN can be
14 successfully completed without a significant adverse
15 impact on crew quality of life or maintenance schedules
16 and costs.

Now I will describe some of the construction
17 needed for maximum development at North Island to provide
18 home port facilities for a possible total of three CVNs.
19 To achieve the necessary water depth of 50 feet,
20 approximately 490,000 cubic yards of dredging would be
21 required. The dredging material would be disposed of at a
22 designated ocean disposal location approximately five
23 miles southwest of North Island or at another location in
24 accordance with permit conditions. The existing pier J/K
25 would be demolished and reconstructed to provide required
26 pier berthing. Reconstruction of pier J/K is required to
27
28

1 maintain berth L as the transient CVN berth to support air
2 wing training and battle group training for CVNs in the
3 U.S. Pacific Fleet area of responsibility.

4 Approximately 1.2 to 2.5 five acres of dike
5 area would be filled behind the pier. The fill material
6 would be covered with a concrete cap to provide a
7 transitional paved area to the other CVN berth facilities.
8 Filling in the dike area would require establishment of a
9 mitigation site to address the loss of shallow waters and
10 eelgrass habitat. The mitigation would include the
11 creation of new bay bottom and establishment of eelgrass
12 beds with new enhanced intertidal and subtidal habitat.
13 The mitigation site would be constructed adjacent to pier
14 B at the western end of North Island. Approximately
15 50,000 cubic yards of sediment would be dredged to
16 construct the mitigation site and would be in accordance
17 with permit specifications and agency requirements.

18 The concrete wharf would be supported by
19 concrete and steel piles, reinforced concrete pile
20 capbeams and the deck slab. The wharf would provide
21 steam, low-pressure compressed air, potable water, pure
22 water, salt water, sanitary sewer, oil wastes, jet fuel
23 and marine diesel fuel. Electrical utilities would
24 include a new 4,160-volt substation.

25 Additional improvements would include
26 relocation of the existing ferry/flag landing that
27 accommodates personnel transportation across San Diego
28 bay. Other improvements would include a CVN warehouse, a

1 fleet support building, equipment laydown building, and
2 lighting. Improvements to the security fence would also
3 be needed.

The Draft EIS analyzes the potential
4 environmental effects of the six alternatives. The
5 analysis specifically addresses construction and operation
6 of associated facilities and any dredging that may be
7 required. The study also addressed significant issues
8 identified during the public scoping process. The
9 environmental issues that are addressed in the Draft EIS
10 include the 17 issues listed on this slide. I will let
11 you read through these and also point out transportation
12 there includes traffic. Coronado expects your comments on
13 the analysis. But we have accumulated thus far in the
14 draft and for further study and analysis.

The EIS identifies potentially significant
15 environmental impacts at some or all of the home port
16 locations for the following issues: Marine biology,
17 ground transportation, and general services and utilities.
18 This chart summarizes the potentially significant impacts
19 at each CVN home port location.

At Naval Air Station North Island, dredging
20 and pier replacement, which would cause marine habitat and
21 eelgrass habitat removal, would have significant but
22 mitigable impacts on marine biology. These impacts would
23 be associated with alternatives one, two, three and four,
24 and would be mitigated by construction of a habitat
25 mitigation area.

1 At Puget Sound Naval Shipyard, significant
2 but mitigable impacts on marine biology could result from
3 dredging and marine construction during the salmon out
4 migration season and from construction of a confined
5 disposal facility if needed. These impacts would be
6 associated with all five of the action alternatives.

7 Impacts on salmon migration could be mitigated by avoiding
8 dredging and marine construction from mid-March through
9 mid-June. Impacts from construction of a confined
10 disposal facility if needed potentially could be
11 compensated by construction of a shallow water habitat.
12 Also significant unavoidable impacts on general services
13 and utilities would be associated with the no-action
14 alternative at Puget Sound Naval Shipyard.

15 At Naval Station Everett significant but
16 mitigable impacts on marine biology could result from
17 dredging and marine construction during the salmon
18 outmigration season and during the Dungeness crab molting
19 period. These impacts would be associated with
20 alternatives one, four, and five and could be mitigated by
21 avoiding dredging and marine construction from mid-March
22 through mid-June. Under alternative four with two CVNs at
23 Everett, increased local commuters would cause a
24 significant but mitigable ground transportation impact.
25 This impact could be mitigated by providing roadway
26 improvements and by implementation of a trip reduction
27 program.

28 At Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard, significant

1 but mitigable impacts on ground transportation would occur
2 with the homeporting of a CVN. This impact would be
3 associated with alternatives three and five and could be
4 mitigated by providing roadway improvements and by
5 implementation a trip reduction program.
6 Now I would like to introduce Mr. Tom Beckett
7 who will discuss the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program.

8 MR. TOM BECKETT: Thank you, Captain Deal.

9 Good evening. You have probably seen it on
10 CNN. Aircraft carriers give the president four-and-a-half
11 acres of sovereign territory he can count on any time he
12 needs it anywhere in the world. Fleet commanders agree
13 nuclear power enhances the capability of an aircraft
14 carrier. With high speeds, sustained endurance, tactical
15 flexibility and mobility aircraft carriers can respond to
16 crisis more quickly, arrive on station in higher state of
17 readiness, and stay on station longer with less logistic
18 support if they are nuclear powered.

19 Next slide, please.

20 Before I discuss the results of the
21 Environmental Impact Statement radiological analysis, I
22 would like to provide some background on the Navy's
23 nuclear propulsion program.
24 Earlier this year we celebrated our golden
25 anniversary. The brochures that Captain O'Brien referred
26 to on the side table include some of the many kind words
27 we received from the nation's leaders to mark this
28

1 occasion. If you haven't already done so, I hope you will
2 take one on your way out tonight.
3 In the past 50 years the Navy has logged
4 approximately 5,000 reactor years and 115 billion miles of
5 steam safely and Worldwide operations on nuclear power.
6 There has never been a reactor accident in that period nor
7 has there been any release of radioactivity that's had a
8 significant effect on the public or the environment.
9 Next slide.

H.1
10 The naval nuclear propulsion program
11 standards and records surpass those of any other national
12 or indeed international nuclear program. To validate
13 compliance with our strict radiobiological control
14 requirements we conduct environmental monitoring in
15 operational areas including San Diego. Monitoring
16 includes analyses of air, water, sediment and marine
17 samples for evidence of radioactivity. Reports on the
18 results of these environmental sampling programs have been
19 published openly and annually since the mid-1960s. You
20 may find this report in the Coronado Library. This is the
21 current year's report of our environmental monitoring
22 program.
23 There have been as many as 22 naval nuclear
24 propulsion plants associated with nuclear powered war
25 ships homeported in San Diego over the past 40 years.
26 Independent surveys conducted by the Environmental
27 Protection Agency and by other government agencies confirm
28 the conclusions of the Navy's own environmental monitoring

1 program. Operations over this period have had no
2 significant affect on the environment. This does not mean
3 that radioactivity is not released from naval nuclear
4 propulsion plants. What it does mean is that such
5 releases are infrequent and small and are well below the
6 limits established by federal law.

7 Next slide.

8 Naval reactors are different from and much
9 more robust than their civilian counterparts. This slide
10 shows the live fire shot tested that was conducted in 1987
11 on board U.S.S. THEODORE ROOSEVELT. You can see the plume
12 of water behind the ship. The Navy intentionally
13 detonated the equivalent of over 50,000 pounds of T.N.T.
14 close to the hull. The reactor plant passed with flying
15 colors. This should be no surprise because each reactor
16 plant must be designed to meet the rigors of combat if
17 they are to serve in war ships. In addition, naval
18 nuclear plants must be designed to fit within the
19 constrained volume of a war ship hull.
20 I'd like to point out that even on a ship as
21 large as a nuclear powered aircraft carrier, over 6,000
22 sailors must live and work every day while deployed within
23 600 feet of the operating reactors. The design
24 requirements that result from these operational
25 necessities result in reactor plants that are
26 exceptionally rugged and resilient. In addition, the
27 reactors are simple and small being less than one-fifth
28 the size of the typical commercial nuclear power plant.

1 Thus naval reactors' designs enhance peacetime protection
2 of the environment and the public under the benign
3 conditions existing in a near port when the reactors are
4 operated at low power or are shut down.

5 Next slide

6 I'd like to talk about emergency planning.
7 Emergency preparedness is a normal part of ongoing Navy
8 planning and training. The Navy plans cover a wide range
9 of emergencies from events such as fires to less likely
10 events such as severe weather to highly unlikely events
11 including radiological emergencies.

12 Radiological emergency preparedness starts
13 with continuous monitoring of radiological work by highly
14 motivated and trained individuals to detect any abnormal
15 condition. It includes detailed procedures thought out in
16 advance and tested to deal with the abnormality. Because
17 of the conservative design approach used in naval reactor
18 plants and their facilities, the impacts from radiological
19 emergencies would be localized and not severe.
20 Consequently, emergency plans are based on using Navy
21 resources to deal with the casualty. However -- and I
22 would like to emphasize this -- the plans do include
23 prompt notification of both state and local officials at
24 the time of the casualty. Existing state and local
25 government plans for ensuring protection of the public
26 during general emergencies such as severe weather are
27 sufficient for protection from the casualties resulting
28 from naval reactor plants.

1 Next slide, please.

2 With that background and experience, let's
3 discuss the Environmental Impact Statement's radiological
4 analysis.

5 We performed detailed analyses looking at
6 potential impacts to air, water, and sediment quality from
7 a range of both normal operations and potential casualty
8 situations. The analyses cover impacts to humans as well
9 as to plant and animal life. Further, the analyses are
10 conducted using internationally accepted methodology and
11 use risk factors derived from the international commission
12 on radiation protection. The methodology assumes that the
13 risk to a given member of the public is higher than that
14 to a facility worker or sailor. This accounts for more
15 sensitive populations among the public such as children
16 and the elderly.

17 Fatal cancers are reported, since fatal
18 cancer is the commonly accepted measure of impact from
19 radioactivity exposure. However, the analyses also cover
20 non-fatal cancers and other health effects including
21 genetic defects.

22 Next slide.

23 We use several conservative assumptions in
24 conducting the risk analyses from both normal operations
25 and hypothetical accidents. For example, we assume that
26 the weather conditions exist which would maximize exposure
27 to the public, and we assume that the radiological forced
28 term which is used is greatly -- is much larger than the

1 source term actually available in the plants and
2 facilities. If these conservatisms were removed from the
3 analyses, we would find that the risks are many times
4 lower than those that I am about to report.
5 For cumulative impacts we assume that all
6 nuclear powered ships in the area are concentrated in the
7 home port location. For North Island what this means is
8 that we assumed as many as 12 naval reactor plants
9 associated with the 10 submarines and 1 aircraft carrier
10 in the area as the baseline, and then we evaluate it the
11 impact of up to 16 reactor plants associated with 10
12 submarines and 2 CVNs, 3 CVNS for the cumulative total.

13 Next slide.

14 Let me digress a little bit at this point and
15 talk about the potential for shipboard accidents. The
16 evaluation of shipboard accidents reveals significant
17 details about military capability and war ship design.
18 Consequently it's discussed in a classified appendix to
19 the Environmental Impact Statement. This classified
20 appendix is not releasable to the public but has been
21 provided to Environmental Protection Agency headquarters
22 for review.

23 What we can state publicly about the analysis
24 in the classified appendix is that all inclusions and
25 environmental impacts are covered by the discussion of
26 facility accidents contained in the unclassified sections
27 of the Environmental Impact Statement. I would also like
28 to point out that in addition to these analyses we have

1 conducted extensive classified analyses of the design of
2 the NIMITZ-class reactor plant and had provided those to
3 the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and its advisory
4 committee on reactor safeguards for independent review.
5 They have both concluded that these plants are safe. Each
6 review, although not required by law, are part of the
7 Navy's longstanding practice of obtaining independent
8 consideration of important elements of nuclear propulsion
9 design.
10 Next slide.

11 Now finally, here are the results of the
12 radiological analyses of homeporting carriers at North
13 Island. The average additional annual risk to a single
14 member of the population within 50 miles of North Island
15 from the cumulative impact of normal operations is less
16 than one in one billion. And the cumulative risk from
17 accident situations, in this case, a facility fire is less
18 than one in seven hundred million.
19 Next slide, please.

20 I provide this slide to provide some
21 perspective on those risks. You'll note some other risks
22 associated with common everyday activities in this area.
23 This supports our conclusion that the combined impact of
24 operation of carriers in this area is much less than the
25 risk associated with everyday life.
26 Next slide.

27 Finally, I'd like to show that this slide
28 represents a Seal Team inspection, environmental

1 inspection of U.S.S. NEVADA in her home port in Maine. I
2 use this to illustrate our point that the conclusion from
3 the Environmental Impact Statement is that there is no
4 significant radiological impact from any of the
5 homeporting alternatives.

6 I would now like to turn the program back
7 over to Captain Deal.

8

9 CAPTAIN ROCKLAND DEAL: Before we begin the public
10 comment portion of this hearing, we will take a ten-minute
11 break. If you haven't done so already, this would be a
12 good time for you to fill out and turn in the speaker
13 request card or to pick up copies of handouts from the
14 table by the door. Let me remind you, we have three
15 handouts available. The handouts are color coded blue
16 information sheets, green nuclear propulsion fact sheets,
17 and yellow are written comment forms. In addition, there
18 is a Naval Nuclear 50th Anniversary brochure that you are
19 welcome to take. All of these handouts are available on
20 the table near the door. During the break we will leave
21 up on the projector of the slide to show you where to send
22 your written comments.

23 Please return back to your seats in ten
24 minutes, and we will begin the public comment portion of
25 the hearing.
26 (A recess was taken.)

27 CAPTAIN ROCKLAND DEAL: All right. At this time we
28 would like to hear your comments on the Draft EIS. You

1 need to know the things that we missed and areas for
2 further research for further analysis because we want to
3 make the right decision on homeporting these carriers.
4 Again, we won't be responding to questions tonight, as
5 frustrating as it may be for some of you and for some of
us here. In order to hear from everyone and to gather the
6 expertise to answer your questions completely and
7 thoroughly we will do that in writing. Every comment
8 whether oral or written will be answered to the best of
9 our ability.
10 Please remember no homeporting decision has
11 been or will be made until the NEPA process has been
12 completed. Your comments will be recorded by our court
13 reporter tonight to become part of the permanent record,
14 part of the public record on the Environmental Impact
15 Statement process.
16 Out of courtesy to elected officials and
17 Government agency representatives speaking on behalf of
18 our constituencies, we will take their comments first. We
19 would like to hear from Coronado residents next and other
20 individuals. If you wish to speak and have not yet turned
21 in a gray speaker request card, please do so now. If you
22 need a speaker request card, please hold up your hand and
23 someone will bring one to you. After we have gone through
24 all the cards provided to us, we will ask if anyone else
25 wishes to speak and allow them the opportunity to do so.
26 When your name is called please step to the
27 podium, state your name and spell your name for the court
28

1 reporter. I will also identify the next speaker in
2 advance so that he or she can move to the front of the
3 room and be ready to follow the current speaker. Have
4 courtesy to others that would like to speak. We request
5 that you limit your comments to three minutes. We will
6 use this red light on the table to signal when it is time
7 to close your comments. When you have 30 seconds
8 remaining, the red light will turn on. When your three
9 minutes has ended, the red light will turn off. That will
10 be your signal to close your comments so the next person
11 may speak. If your comments cannot be condensed to three
12 minutes, we encourage you to submit them in writing.
13 Again, I'm sure you have comments, and we have people
14 waiting to answer thoroughly.

H.1 In the event you have comments you wish to
15 enter after tonight's meeting you may submit that in
16 writing by mailing them to us. The address is put up
17 again, and it's on the yellow sheet, that information
18 sheet. You may use the yellow comment sheet we have
19 provided for that purpose or any other stationery that you
20 want to use. We can accept written comments through
21 November 12, 1998. And again, the address is on the
22 yellow and the green handouts.

Now we are ready to begin to hear your
24 comments on the Draft Environmental Impact Statement.
25 The first person to speak tonight will be
26 Congressman Bob Filner and Dr. Edward Siegel will be next.
27 Congressman Filner.

H.1.1 CONGRESSMAN BOB FILNER: Thank you. Good evening.
1 My name is Bob Filner, and I represent the 50th
2 Congressional District, San Diego County and appreciate
3 the meeting today.
I want to make comments on, one, the process
4 that is being handled here, and second, substance of the
5 Draft Environmental Impact Statement.
First, on the process, I did express to you
6 earlier today I think a very great frustration and
7 distress that this kind of meeting is not a dialogue; that
8 is, people want to have answers; they want to have
9 discussion. This is a most important issue for people's
10 futures. There ought to be some dialogue and not just
11 written answers four or five months later and nobody can
12 read them or discuss them. As I told you this afternoon,
13 Captain, I would offer my good services to have a
14 community meeting anywhere in the county where there can
15 be this give and take, and I will make that in writing and
16 hope that you can and other Navy officials be there for a
17 real discussion.

H.1.2 Second, in some degrees this whole process
18 that you are doing is somewhat of a charade. I think
19 people expect when there is an Environmental Impact
20 Statement done someone is going to review it and certify
21 it. That's what happens with private projects and most
22 government agencies. I hope -- I think people should
23 understand that with military matters the Environmental
24 Impact Statement is self-certified. As you said, no
25

1 decision is made. Nobody can overrule you either. There
2 is no higher body to review this impact statement than the
3 Navy itself. So this will be certified by you as being
4 consistent with whatever you said it was consistent with.
5 So I think people should understand that. Let me make --
6 and I'm going to be introducing legislation in the next
7 congress that says the military ought to be subject to the
8 same certification processes that as the civilians are for
9 their projects.

10 Let me make a couple of quick statements on
11 the substance. Number one, the Draft Environmental Impact
12 Statement from my reading does not contain full
13 information necessary for the public to make an informed
14 decision. There is denial of any accident record, for
15 example, or emergency response plans that we can see
16 there.

17 Several consultants that have been hired by
18 the city of Coronado and others have testified that the
19 information is in there where it's skimpy and does not
20 allow for an independent discussion or analysis of the
21 information.

22 Second, the DEIS did not respond to issues
23 raised by the community in the scoping process. I think
24 you understand that the scoping process where our concerns
25 could be fully expressed. The Navy rejected most of those
26 issues raised by the community including the environmental
27 justice concerns of some communities. Nor did the Navy
28 include any analysis of the real worst case accident that

is a breach of the reactor core.

1 H.1.2 2 Lastly the DEIS does not consider current or
3 new information, does not consider findings of recent
4 G.A.O. report that found that nuclear propulsion carriers
5 were far more costly and provided no military advantage.
6 I think the Navy needs to take a step back, reassess this
7 entire project in light of the new analysis of the G.A.O.
8 I appreciate the time tonight.
9

10 H.1.3 11 DR. EDWARD SIEGEL: Yes. I'm metallurgist. I'd
12 like to respond to Mr. Beckett's comments about resilient
13 number one, rugged number two, and three, simple. I'm a
14 graduate of (inaudible) whistle blower. (inaudible) After
15 that P.S.A. (inaudible). After that incident (inaudible)
16 agencies fired missile blower. After that (inaudible)
17 combustion before it was (inaudible). I worked on
18 (inaudible) weld alloy.
19 I want to say something up front. I
20 understand you gentlemen are not brave enough -- I'm not
21 trying to insult you -- to go down in nuclear submarine.
22 People who go down in nuclear submarines (inaudible) are
23 brave. But they are jockeys. I'm like the veterinarian.
24 I can't teach you metallurgy. I'll talk a little more
25 tomorrow night.
26 Embrittlement of alloys (inaudible).
27 (inaudible) is like osteoporosis. So getting back to Mr.
28 Beckett's comments, resilience to what? Not to shock.
29

H.1.4 1 H.1.5

1 Not to mechanical shock. Not to time and temperature.
2 Just quickly (inaudible).
3 Number two, rugged. Not to shock in any way.
4 Number three, simple, in no way.
5 To metallurgy of nuclear reactors alloys is
6 very, very, very complicated.
7 So to conclude what I would like to say,
8 there has been one major nuclear accident which I will
9 pass around, I would just like these back. I'm interested
10 in what the Navy's comment is about the EMERAUD. French
11 nuclear submarine captain and nine crew members killed
12 March 30th, '94. That's an INCO-182 explosion. I worked
13 on many of these.

H.1.6 To conclude at the same time, statement and
make it very briefly. Let's talk about over aging and
embrittlement (inaudible). (inaudible) This is an SAIC
fan that they gave out at the Miramar Air Show. Overaging
embrittlement (inaudible) are generic. See how the blue
is peeling away. That's the reason you and I don't look
as good as we did 30 years ago. Over aging means
accelerating.

H.1.7 Your cores are not lasting more than 20 to 25
years. They should have lasted 50. The reason is over
aging. It is generic and endemic. My worry isn't as much
as the STENNIS as it's with your whole submarines here.
Thank you for your time.

1 officials decided to convert San Diego into a megaport
2 concentrating West Coast naval activities in San Diego
3 County. North Island being a main component would
4 homeport three to four nuclear carriers plus be the site
5 of a multitude of hazardous waste storage and maintenance
facilities. As you stated, by law a change of that
magnitude requires an Environmental Impact Statement. To
prevent North Island's closest neighbor Coronado from
understanding the magnitude of the impact, the Navy
officials devised a strategy to understand the negative
impacts on Coronado. The Navy prepared two massive
Environmental Impact statements, in my opinion, the
purpose being to mask the impacts and to justify a
decision previously made. To avoid responsibility for the
diminished quality of life in Coronado, the two impact
reports concluded that North Island's major expansion
caused no significant change in Coronado's traffic, air
quality, noise, nor any increased risk to health.
Our City Council has finally hired
independent experts to review this second EIS. Our jammed
streets, particularly the northeast quadrant, our poor air
quality and increased noise levels considered
insignificant in your report do indeed have negative
impacts on our quality of life.

H.1.8 How are we going to give any credibility to
your health risk analysis when your traffic analysis was
so grossly incorrect?

H.1.9 Having observed the whole Navy disclosure and

1 public process since 1993, the entire process, the
2 Environmental Impact Statements, the comment periods, the
3 hearings. This must be my fifth one, the promises
4 to answer questions, I'm sorry gentlemen, they just appear
5 to me a joke and sham. The failure of honest disclosure
6 and the evasion of the facts during the past five years
7 have caused many Coronado citizens, certainly myself, to
8 disbelieve and distrust Navy statements and findings. It
9 is unworthy of a Navy and institution previously held in
10 high regard to pass the risk and the burden of its
11 activities on the citizens of surrounding communities.
12 Without even an acknowledgment of the negative impacts. I
13 am not blaming you, but somewhere along the chain of
14 command maybe high up nobody really looked at Coronado and
15 understood how this expansion would affect our community.
16 Thank you.

H1.19 1 66,000. Please note that this is 1993 data, and it's out
2 of date. This is the traffic flow map for the San Diego
3 Association of Governments, and we are interested in this
4 transportation corridor right here. You'll note that it
5 is the most impacted local street and road in all of San
6 Diego County. It carries over 75,000 vehicles a day. And
7 those vehicles ingress and egress onto Coronado
8 residential streets. You'll notice that the impact is
9 even greater than it is on Harbor Drive. Harbor Drive
10 only carries 70,000 vehicles a day, and that's not in
11 front of residences. This is an existing condition.
12 The data that's put forward in this EIS is
13 1993 data. It's approximately there. It's the average
14 seven-day a week number. Where the actual numbers that we
15 are dealing with in 1995 five day a week, and that's
16 workday, is up over 81,000 vehicle trips a day. The
17 impact on 3rd and 4th Street in Coronado during peak
18 periods is level of service E and F. You can see between
19 5 and 8 a.m. 3rd Street is the most impacted. And in the
20 afternoons it's 4th Street that's the most impacted.
21 With regard to the cumulative analysis the

H1.10 17 GAIL BRYDES: Thank you, Captain Deal, Captain
18 O'Brien and Mr. Beckett. I'll confine my comments
19 primarily to traffic, cumulative impacts and also a
20 proposed alternative.
21 In table 3.9-1 of this document, I want to
22 point out a couple of things about this chart. First of
23 all, the Coronado bridge is identified as a freeway, and
24 it is said that this is from the Coronado general plan.
25 This is not a fact. The Coronado general plan identifies
26 the Coronado bridge as a principal arterial. I'd also
27 like to point out the number of daily traffic volume
28

H1.11 22 project area is identified here at Naval Station -- Naval
23 Air Station North Island. The cumulative projects that
24 were identified are all around the bay, and I would think
25 that these projects might be appropriate to do a
26 cumulative analysis perhaps for NTC or for Point Loma, but
27 you'll notice the transportation corridor that serves this
28 project right here, there are no projects. There is

H.1.11

nothing cumulative in this transportation corridor. Not
one project. And off the top of my head, I could name at
least five of them. I'll put them on here so you can take
a look.

First of all, the impact study for removal of
the tolls on the Coronado bridge. We have got the
Glorietta Bay master plan. We have got the Hotel Del
master plan. You have got the coming of the convention
center expansion and possibly a ballpark. And at the
Naval Amphibious Base Coronado you have cumulative
projects that have occurred over the last five years and
will occur into the future. These are all past, present
and reasonable future projects that we can expect. None
of which have been identified under the cumulative impact
analysis in this document. And I think that's a failure.

Now, with regard to the alternatives that
were considered in the document, all of the alternatives
were compared to the no action alternative, which puts two
carriers at North Island, two at Puget Sound, one at
Everett and none at Pearl Harbor. But among the other
alternatives that were analyzed, there were no two carrier
alternatives that were viable for N.A.S. North Island, and
the reason the no-action alternative was flawed is because
of utilities and general services at Puget Sound.

However, if you combine the actions from six and five,
what you come up with is another alternative which
provides a viable two carrier alternative to NAS North
Island, and that would be to put two AOEs at Puget Sound

H.1.12

1 and two at Everett. This is an alternative that wasn't
2 considered, and there wasn't a two-carrier viable
3 alternative considered in this document.

With regard to cost, the proposed alternative
4 costs less than the Navy's preferred alternative, which is
5 this one, alternative two. So I would like to compare the
6 proposed alternative with the Navy's preferred
7 alternative. What you have is a cost savings of
8 approximately \$62 million which might be used to fund a
9 bridge approach improvement for the City of Coronado. The
10 proposed alternative meets the operational objectives, and
11 not only does it not increase the environmental impacts,
12 but actually would remove some of the environmental
13 impacts on this community.

In closing what I would like to say is, I
14 have heard that this is a rubber stamped decision on the
15 part of the Navy. And I would like to encourage, since
16 there has been probably a million dollars spent on this
17 EIS, and what we find is the data is out of date, it's not
18 factual, there is no cumulative analysis of the
19 transportation impacts, and there is a viable two-carrier
20 alternative that hasn't been explored. I would like to
21 encourage the Navy leadership as well as our congressional
22 representatives not to allow this document to be rubber
23 stamped. I urge a look, a serious look at a viable
24 two-carrier alternative for NAS North Island, and I would
25 encourage the cost savings that are realized to be
26 reinvested in this community as mitigation for the

1 cumulative impacts of traffic on this small residential
2 community.
3 It's time that the Federal Government steps
4 up to the plate and takes financial responsibility for the
5 impacts that it's brought.

6 Thank you for your time.

H.1

1 I wouldn't have brought my children here, my H.1.13 1
2 wife here if I didn't think that it was safe. The nuclear
3 submarines have been across the way for a long time. I'm
4 hearing the things that I heard in 1940, "Not in my
5 backyard; defend the country but do it from someplace
else"; and you can't do it. You have got to have a fleet
6 here in order to protect this area. I think that the Navy
7 is doing a fine job in the way it's handling nuclear
8 reactors, in handling the nuclear ships. We go there. We
9 go around there. I feel safe. And I think the rest of
10 the Coronadoans feel safe as well or we wouldn't be living
11 here.

12 Thank you.

13 H.1.14 1 LARRY BROWN: My name is Larry Brown, B-r-o-w-n.
14 Gentlemen, the City Council sent you -- sent
15 comments on scoping the EIS for homeporting CVNs in
16 Coronado. It was a comprehensive recitation of the
17 city's -- the community's legitimate concerns, and we had
18 hoped that Navy decision makers would take that into full
19 account in drafting the EIS. Sad to say that was a false
20 hope. This Draft EIS in many respects follows the
21 patterns of the previous EIS for homeporting the STENNIS.
22
23 Indeed it often quotes it verbatim, even though it's two
24 years old, and it's incomplete, careless and insensitive
25 mind set in important aspects of impact analysis,
26 especially in regard to traffic impact and disregard of
27 R-e-f-k-i-n. I'm a resident of Coronado and have been for
28 18 years.

37

1 H.1.15 1 IRVING REFKIN: My name is Irving Refkin,
2 R-e-f-k-i-n. I'm a resident of Coronado and have been for
3 18 years.

38

1 cumulative impacts particularly in incessantly ignoring
2 the involvement of multiple CVS and other naval air
3 station activities. This trivialization of community
4 concerns is disturbing. We deserve better.

5 I believe that I'm a member of the majority
6 of Coronado citizens that support the mission and the
7 presence of North Island and other Navy activities in
8 Coronado to include the acceptance of CVN homeporting
9 here. I understand the operational and logistic
10 considerations that make Coronado a preferred home port
11 for these ships. That same majority, however, believes
12 that Navy officials and the fleet command and that the
13 Navy department levels' concerns need to change the way
14 they think about recognizing the severely adverse
15 secondary effects of Navy activities in Coronado and
16 accepting Navy responsibility for reasonable mitigation.
17 You have a chance to do this in the EIS, in this EIS, but
18 the draft gives us scant confidence.

19 Thank you.

20 EARL CALLAHAN: Good evening. My name is Earl
21 Callahan. I live in Coronado about three blocks outside
22 of North Island fence.
23 The EIS indicates the Navy has not had any
24 radiation accidents and more or less assumes it will never
25 have any accidents. Nothing is perfect, and there are
26 reports the nuclear Navy has had Navy nuclear accidents,
27 radiation accidents. The Navy has told us at the previous

39

H.1.16 1 meetings here that the public will not be informed of all
2 radiation and chemical accidents here at North Island. We
3 therefore need in Coronado, outside the Navy fence
4 radiation and chemical monitors. We also need an alarm
5 system similar to the sirens at civilian nuclear plants.
6 We do not want to be dependent upon the Navy to inform us.
7 There is no way the residents could be informed
8 immediately without an alarm system or monitoring system
9 of their own. Immediate action may be necessary among the
10 public at some time to save lives. Perhaps the Navy
11 should provide these monitoring systems.
12 Thank you.

H.1.17 1 JOSEPH WEAVER: I am Joe Weaver. I live in
2 Coronado.
3 I do not think the homeporting of carriers to
4 the defense of this country should be decided by civilians
5 of a small group like this. This should be decided by
6 C.N.O. and the people there what is best for the defense
7 of our country. Not for the convenience of people here.
8 They talk about three homeported carriers.
9 I was here during World War II, and all
10 around North Island there were piers and the carriers.
11 There were much more people then, but of course we were
12 fighting a war. I preferred not to fight that war, have
13 our carriers dispersed and placed where they are best
14 strategically now and not for the convenience of the
15 people here.

40

H.1.18 1 We talk about the dangers. Everyone here
1 took a greater risk just driving to this place than you
2 have a risk from any nuclear radiation accident from these
3 carriers. It is practically nil. That is not a big
4 problem. There will be an impact, but we have had three
5 carriers based here all along. These carriers are not
6 that much more than we have always had. But we have
7 poured in more hotels and everything else, and we have put
8 up a bridge, and people can put two people in a car and
9 they crowd our town. Try to go from one side of the town
10 across Orange. Not Navy traffic coming to work at ten
11 o'clock in the morning. These are the tourists and people
12 from across the way. What should be done here is to let a
13 C.N.O. and his staff do what is best for our country. And
14 if you are so scared of your carriers, you have an option.
15 You can move.

We do not have an option about defending this
17 country. We have to do the best we can. We do not want
18 to go back to fossil fuels. They do not have the
19 endurance that a carrier has. Let's base the carrier
20 where the C.N.O. says is best.
21 Thank you.

NED FLOYD: Good evening, gentlemen. I am Ned
24 Floyd, F-l-o-y-d.
25 This citizen is in favor of letting the Navy
26 determine the best location for its nuclear carriers. If
27 its Coronado, I would be proud of that. There are two
28

H.1.18 1 reasons for my thinking. First the Preamble of the
1 constitution provides that Congress and the Government
2 shall provide a defense for the country and then to
3 promote the well-being of the people. They had their
4 priorities straight. The CVNs represent a marked
5 enhancement in capabilities to protect us. And they do
6 protect. As a quantum physicist, not a nuclear physicist,
7 I have full confidence in the ability of the Navy crews to
8 continue to operate nuclear plants without incidents. The
9 second point is that the crews on these ships are our
10 protectors.

I invite those that have views that differ
11 from mine to please support these crews in their
12 commitment and honor and aid them and welcome them to
13 Coronado.

Thank you.

H.1.19 1 MICHAEL DEDINA: I'm Michael Dedina, M-i-c-h-a-e-l,
2 D-e-d-i-n-a.
3 I have to agree with Congressman Filner that
4 it would be -- have been best if you had an interactive
5 session where we would have -- I don't know if you
6 gentlemen are engineers, but to answer the questions about
7 what's on our minds here, which is the nuclear power
8 plants on the carriers.

H.1.20 1 And I'm going to ask you some questions. I'm
2 H.1.21 1 not a nuclear physicist. Don't know too much about it.
3 But let me ask you a few things and hopefully some answers

H.1.21

1 will be forthcoming in future meetings which will be
2 interacted.

3 What emissions exist on an ongoing basis from
4 nuclear power plants on the carriers? I don't even know
5 if there are any.

6 Is there such a thing that every day, gee,
7 it's just a small level, if it's okay?

8 What levels of particulates -- and I assume I
9 am using the right word when I say particulates -- what
10 levels of particulates emissions are considered normal?

11 What levels of particulates are considered
12 sufficiently high to trigger an alert to the public?

13 What has been done to keep nuclear emissions
14 from spreading to the community in case of a, God forbid,
15 Pearl Harbor type emergency when our ships -- it happened
16 to us before, you know, and Lord hope it never happens
17 again; but if it does, the ships will be here. If they do
18 we have to consider the lives of the people who live where
19 I live in Imperial Beach, folks in National City, Chula
20 Vista, Tijuana, San Diego and so forth.

21 What will happen to the population if, God
22 forbid, that should happen?

23 And, you know, wars do happen. If there
24 weren't such a case, you fellows wouldn't have a job.
25 Thank you very much.

26

27 FRED LORENZEN: My name is Fred Lorenzen,
28 L-o-r-e-n-z-e-n. Coronado resident.

H.1.22

1 I have a number of questions first, which I
2 must represent concerns that I have.

3 I don't understand why the Navy when it first
4 proposed the first CVN nuclear carrier why at that time
5 didn't they indicate that they were going to request three
nuclear carriers all together?

6 And one question, when a carrier -- when a
CVN is in port at a berth, are the nuclear reactors
operating at the time?

7 Is water used for cooling the reactors taken
from the bay and discharged into the bay?

8 Of the four proposed CVN locations and the
proposed alternatives for each one, why is North Island
being singled out for three CVNs and potentially fewer
CVNs at other sites? It doesn't seem fair.

9 If three CVNs are approved for North Island,
H.1.25 what proportion of the CVN fleet would need to complete
the Navy fleet will be based at North Island; that is, how
many CVNs are there in existence?

10 It has been estimated that one -- that the
nuclear reactors of one CVN are equivalent to two nuclear
power plants. If we have three CVNs at North Island, that
could be the equivalent to six nuclear power plants. Then
add the six submarines across the bay, and each one is
equivalent to a nuclear power plant; we have the
equivalent of about 12 nuclear power plants in the bay
area.

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The sad commentary of this whole nuclear mess

1 is that San Diego, and especially Coronado, is the big
2 disappointment in the California Environmental Protection
3 Agency decision to grant a permit for the Navy to
4 construct and operate a toxic waste treatment plant. This
5 permit was just issued a couple of months ago by the
6 agency in California that's supposed to protect us and
7 protect the environment.

8 This elementary school where we are meeting
9 tonight is located within about one mile of the CVN berth
10 is, and more importantly, within about one mile of the
11 toxic waste treatment plant.
12 Remember that the law states for written
13 comments responding to today's proposal should be
14 postmarked November 12th.
15 Thank you.

H.1

1 One of the things you showed up here was that
2 we would be promptly notified of any accidents. I'd like
3 to know how prompt prompt notification is. There was a
4 release of radioactive steam up in Bremerton a month back
5 and the public wasn't notified for 15 hours after the
6 release. Too late to really do anything to detect
7 afterwards, so the damage is already done, and the public
8 was notified late.

9 Why is it that accidents on board ships have
10 been classified information. We have really nothing to go
11 on. We don't even know how many accidents there have ever
12 been on board a ship because that's classified
13 information. I want to know. I don't know why that
14 should be classified, especially if it is something that
15 is going to affect us.

16 I know you're experiencing a lot of my
17 frustration. I've been involved in this probably the last
18 three years in opposition to this, and as far as I'm
19 concerned, this process has just been fraught with
20 deception and lies on the part of the Navy.
21 The originally EIS was only scoped for one
22 carrier even though I'm convinced that the Navy knew all
23 along that they wanted to bring three here ultimately.
24 But we were -- the original impact reports, one lady
25 stated how it's based on information that is not even --
26 it doesn't even apply anymore.

27 I'm sorry. I was making notes while
28 everything was going on.

H.1.28

H.1.26

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H.1.29

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1 Also I -- some of those things were a little
2 hard for me to read, your transparencies, but you stated
3 that the only environmental impact would be on marine life
4 and marine biology in this area. Well, there is a lot of
5 human beings that live here too. It is not just the sea
6 lions in the bay. There is a lot of people who are going
7 to be dramatically affected by what you do.

8 The traffic in this town is outrageous. And
9 you can't tell me by bringing two more, three more maybe
10 carriers here that the traffic is not going to get worse.
11 And contrary to what some gentleman said about the
12 tourists, it is not the tourists. There is a traffic
13 problem in this town. It is the Navy. You are doing
14 nothing to help us alleviate this. There is an item on
15 our ballot in November that is a citizen's advisory vote
16 about a tunnel to be built. Now, as far as I'm concerned,
17 it is the Navy's traffic problem; the Navy should be
18 helping Coronado deal with it.

H.1 And that I'll talk more about the health
19 effects tomorrow, and because I own and operate a health
20 food store in this town, so I hear and know a lot of risks
21 and sicknesses and stuff. Let's see.

22 Also we were told originally, at least it was
23 my understanding, there would be no shipbuilding and
24 repair work to go in here. Well, apparently NASSCO has
25 just been sold to General Dynamics, and I understand
26 NASSCO has put in a bid to do shipbuilding repair.

27 We saw a plan that was in the administrative

H.1.32 1 record that showed a dry dock being built on North Island.
2 Is that happening or not? Is this true?
3 And I want to know if that is going to be
4 there because that means who knows what other carriers are
5 going to come from somewhere else to be built and repaired
6 here too. That is something that may be here in the
7 future, but is it going to affect us as well?

H.1.36
H.1.33 8 Also as far as the mixed waste storage
9 facility, about three years ago, very nice captain,
10 Captain Chamberlain was in charge of this project -- he is
11 retired now, maybe he couldn't stand the heat, I don't
12 know -- but anyway, he was giving us a little spiel about
13 everything was going to be stored and treated there, and
14 it was a huge facility; and I asked him at that time,
15 well, if it's such a big facility what are you exactly
16 going to do with it, and what his answer was to me was,
17 oh, it is just going to be booties, tools, some
18 contaminated equipment, not too big. And I said, well, if
19 that's true, why do you need such a big facility? What's
20 to stop other people or outlets from storing their waste
21 and radioactive waste? He told me at that time, these are
22 his exact words, "that will never happen." Well, if -- we
23 come to find out, no, there is possibly 38 other
24 facilities that are going to be storing their toxic
25 radioactive and hazardous waste on North Island. All that
26 is coming to our town by truck.

H.1.37
H.1.34 19 Is this true or not?
20 I guess the problem with me is I feel like we

H.1.37

1 have really been deceived through this whole process, that
2 You have not been straight forward from the beginning. It
3 would be in your best interest to tell us the truth, from
4 the beginning tell us the truth. You wouldn't have this
5 kind of problem. You wouldn't have citizens that are
6 frustrated and angry and upset because we feel like our
7 own government, oh, surprise, surprise, is lying to us.
8 Anyway, you're asking us to accept more
9 traffic, more pollution, more hazardous waste, more harm
10 to our future generations. This to me is unacceptable and
11 I'm opposed to the project to begin with, but you'll hear
12 from me tomorrow night.

13 Thank you very much.

H.1.38

BUD FOSTER: My name is Bud Foster. I'm a Coronado resident.

H.1.39

You can probably tell I'm a retired Navy captain. You may not know that I operated, supervised, repaired the Navy nuclear ships from 1959 to 1983, so I'm quite experienced. I also did training at Bettis, and I know that their job was not to whistle blow and make light of all the investments. That lab was very important to the Navy nuclear powers, and personally it hurts me to have someone who should have a striped shirt and be on a football field up here being proud of some other things. Because I do admire the enthusiasm of the people, but because of my experience I would like to express my disappointment that this has been going on

H.1.37

1 three years as the previous speaker said. There have been
2 open forums, the naval reactor's office, Rich Geeto
3 (phonetic) has been here, has spent hours answering
4 questions after giving a introduction. It has always hurt
5 me that my next door neighbor stood up and told him, well,
6 you can say anything you want to, but we are not going to
7 believe what you say. I think you just heard that from
8 the previous speaker.

H.1.39

I admire the fact that you naval officers and
representatives can be there and take all this baloney.
I also live on 1st street and three blocks
from the carrier pier. So I experience what has also been
talked about here as the traffic. From the list of things
that are in the Environmental Impact Statement, I do not
see that the effect on our community of the shipyard
workers being here. Now even though they are only here
for six months out of two years for one ship, I'm sure
there will be other things that will go on. When we get
the three ships here that means we may have as much as 5-
or 600 shipyard workers working on those ships. I know
that's a high side number, but that is a possibility. I
would like to make sure that the impact statement
addresses that. Mayor Golding Hearing addressed this by
getting a ferry over. We talked about the temporary
workers live over there at the ASK training center instead
of traveling through our city every day.

Thank you.

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H.1.40 1 SALLY FINCH: My name is Sally Finch. I'm a
2 resident of Coronado.
3 I'm speaking tonight not because I am opposed
4 to another nuclear carrier on Coronado. The Navy has been
5 a good neighbor, and they have an excellent safety record
6 for their nuclear carriers.

H.1.41 7 I am speaking tonight because the Navy has
8 completely and utterly failed to deal with the traffic
9 consequences of another carrier in Coronado. Coronado is
10 a city of only 25,000 people. It is a very small
11 community with only local roads. You are talking about a
12 carrier that has a home port crew of over 3,000 people.
13 And to say that 3,000 additional people living in Coronado
14 are not going to impact the traffic situation here, which
15 is already obscene, greatly impacted, is preposterous to
16 me. I don't know how the E.I.R. can describe the traffic
17 impacts of this proposal as insignificant.
18 If the Navy wants to move ahead with this
19 project, they need to come up with some mitigation
20 measures to deal with the traffic problems.
21 Thank you.

H.1.41 22 JIM PEUGH: My name is Jim Peugh, P-e-u-g-h. I
23 represent the San Diego Audubon Society.
24 We have a real concern with the biological
25 impacts of this project. The previous phase of the
26 hom-reporting project has a new mitigation site on the north
27 side of North Island. The eelgrass apparently is
28

H.1.40 1 mitigating the loss of eelgrass; however, it has its own
2 environmental impact that's caused a loss of about a half
3 a mile of intertidal habitat along the shoreline. About
4 30 feet wide by half a mile long. This habitat is
5 important for shore birds for fish at high tide. They
6 don't fly at the high tide, they swim up in the tides in
7 the useless habitat and forage the invertebrates that help
8 clean our water. I have actually gone and looked in
9 the -- I have paddled over there myself, and the bird
10 activity is significantly less than it is in the areas on
11 both sides of the mitigation habitat just as you would
12 expect from looking at it.
13 But only a few hundred yards of natural
14 shoreline in the north part of San Diego Bay, so even
15 though the shoreline along North Island doesn't look very
16 attractive, that's almost the best we have in the north
17 part of the bay; so it's really important when we lose it.
18 Unfortunately the next phase the EIS looks
19 like, you are just going to do the same. You are going to
20 degrade or eliminate more intertidal habitat or seagrass
21 habitat. This is a violation of the Clean Water Act. I
22 don't know how you got away with it the first time, and I
23 certainly hope you don't get away with it another time.
24 The EIS that you have acknowledges upland
25 habitat that says it isn't too good. It talks about the
26 aquatic habitat, but it ignores the intertidal habitat.
27 So I paddle over in my kayak to look, and sure enough,
28 there is a shoreline between the upland and marine habitat

1 contrary to what the Environmental Impact Report suggests.

H.1.41 And since the ships are already sailing

I -- we urge that you assess the cumulative
impacts of this project with respect to intertidal
habitat; in other words, look at what the impact you have
already knocked out, about half a mile of shoreline and
now you are going to knock out some more. But why don't
you look at the cumulative impact. We don't have much
shoreline.

H.1.42 short-handed as has been stated by the Navy, up to 4- to
500, that they do not have in their -- how are we going to
have that personnel to control the nuclear ship?
H.1.43 Will there be enough qualified personnel to
handle these?

H.1.44 As requires a great deal of knowledge about
nuclear waste, will these be -- personnel be trained?
H.1.45 Where will they be trained, and for how long?
How will there their backgrounds and their
ability be correctly checked, and by whom and what kind of
statistics are you going to use?
H.1.46 What will these individual checkups amount
to?

H.1.47 We have never been given and we would like to
obtain information about the reasons for fully closing the
Navy base at Long Beach and moving the facilities here.
H.1.48 And what criteria was used by BRAC when they
designated this?

H.1.49 It has never been told to us, so we do not
understand.

H.1.50 Who do we hold responsible for making this
decision to move these to Coronado and to close some of
the large bases that were fully adequate?

H.1.51 May we have the names and designations of the
individuals who decided this?
H.1.52 Or who is now making the decision?
H.1.53 And if we cannot have it, why not?

H.1.44

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2 500, that they do not have in their -- how are we going to
3 have that personnel to control the nuclear ship?
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5 handle these?

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10 ability be correctly checked, and by whom and what kind of
11 statistics are you going to use?
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13 to?

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15 obtain information about the reasons for fully closing the
16 Navy base at Long Beach and moving the facilities here.
17 And what criteria was used by BRAC when they
18 designated this?

19 It has never been told to us, so we do not
20 understand.

21 BEVERLY DYER: Good evening. I'm Beverly Dyer. I
22 live here in Coronado.

23 I have a number of questions I would like to
24 have answered.
25 Why do we need the nuclear carriers to
26 replace the ones we have when the officer we have states
27 that they do not have enough money to support the present
28 services nor to give them increases?

What did they personally gain serving on that committee?

And what is the position of these people?

What is the Navy to gain by moving so much of their power to Coronado against -- right against the civilian homes locked into a bay that could be easily landlocked by an enemy?

If Congress had responsibility of making decisions for our protection, why don't they have anything to say about this move just as our congressman had stated?

Since nuclear power plants are being reduced, why is the Navy increasing nuclear ships?

By concentrating power in Coronado, Puget Sound, Hawaii -- or Hawaii, you are setting ourselves up for foreign attack or internal attack. Think of Pearl Harbor. We are told terrorism today is one of our most greatest dangers that we have today.

What protection are we proposing -- are you proposing to our local area in case of emergencies?

Will you please give our local residents information of your proposed decisions and protection for their use.

Thank you very much.

HOWARD RUGGLES: My name is Howard Ruggles, R-u-g-g-l-e-s. I live in San Diego.

Just a couple of comments. The reason for concentration on two ports on West Coast for the Navy's

ships, not only carriers, but we have ignored all the destroyers and cruisers and submarines that are on the bay elsewhere is budget driven. There was only enough money left in the budget at the time the decision was made to have two home ports on the east coast, Norfolk and Jacksonville; and two home ports on the West Coast, Puget Sound and San Diego. That's why Long Beach was closed. That's why everything in San Francisco was closed. It was all budget driven and still is.

H.1.53
One comment that I will agree with almost everybody that has been up here, there is a hole in the chart that shows the five alternatives. It was kind of a greenish color. That one that said biology -- marine biology; in each of the alternatives, you should have listed transportation under the Coronado item because that is a major problem over here, has been, still is. Conventionally when we get all three carriers here together, it will be even worse. Luckily that won't happen still for a few years when CONSTELLATION -- right now we have two because we lost the KITTY HAWK to Japan. When CONSTELLATION goes away and gets decommissioned we will have our second nuclear carrier, so we will still be at the current level of activity; but finally when the third nuclear carrier arrives, you are going to have a step up of the number of people, number of cars, traffic and so on. So that's one thing you really need -- really does need to be looked at and hasn't been emphasized enough really.

H1.53 1
Thank you.

H1.55
differently designed than you would a commercial nuclear

2 reactor. A commercial nuclear reactor is designed to
3 start out at low power level and transition to 80 to 90 to
4 100 percent of its power, generate power for a long time
5 and shut itself down and refuel. Nuclear reactor for
6 ships are designed to go through various transitions to
7 operate at low power levels and high power levels and up
8 and down. When they come to port it is very low low
9 levels. The accidents are very, very low.
H1.56
The other thing I would like to talk about is
what is nuclear waste? Everybody is always saying this
term here in Coronado and with the facility. The nuclear
waste that we are talking about is the booties, the rags,
the wrenches, and everything else that goes on with the
general maintenance. How much waste is generated by an
aircraft carrier in a year? Take an eight by eight foot
cube, fill it up with the rags, the booties, the tools,
and other things and that's the amount of waste generated
by a nuclear carrier. I mean that puts it into
perspective.

H1.54 3
H1.57
You also talk about the Blue Book. How much
total radiation is emitted into the atmosphere in the year
by all the Navy's reactors. Does anybody know? If you
look in the Blue Book, if you take the water displaced by
a normal naval submarine, okay, envision an 8,000 ton,
9,000 ton submarine, take sea water, the natural recurring
radiation in that sea water is more than is actually
discharged by the Navy in its entire year; and that's
58

H1.55
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start out at low power level and transition to 80 to 90 to
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58

H1.57
1 reported in the Blue Book that was referred to earlier
2 this evening.
3 Thank you.

H1.58
1 are hosting the Navy here in Coronado and San Diego,
2 please change this process where you have written
3 questions and you have people that you need to respond to
4 them somehow in an orderly fashion -- I understand people
5 do become pretty heated -- but I have to tell you that
6 tonight I'm leaving unfortunately suspicious of the
7 process.

DANI GRADY: My name is Dani Grady. I'm 40 years
old. I was born and raised in Coronado.
I came here tonight, I have to be perfectly
honest with you -- I'm actually -- I am a cancer survivor
and I participate -- and I think it's very important that
we support research in this country. A lot of things, low
level radioactive nuclear waste, those are byproducts to
me of our living in society.

I have been very fortunate to live in

Coronado almost all of those 40 years. My father is a
Navy -- an ex-fighter pilot for the Navy. And I do have
to tell you that as I came here tonight to feel good about
my decision to not be someone that says, "Not in my
backyard"; and I have to tell you gentlemen that
unfortunately I'm very disappointed because I really came
here just to feel better about saying it's all right we
have these carriers, but I have to agree with
Representative Filner when he says that this process is
tremendously flawed. Because I -- one thing for you to
tell us -- to give us your lecture, but I came here to
hear my neighbors and the people that live here in San
Diego; and I wanted to hear what their comments were, and
I wanted to hear your response.

So out of respect for your neighbors here who

H1.57
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Diego; and I wanted to hear what their comments were, and
I wanted to hear your response.

So out of respect for your neighbors here who

H.1

H1.59
1 JACK SHAW: My name is Jack Shaw. I'm a resident
2 of Coronado. S-h-a-w.
I have not read the Environmental Impact
Statement. I certainly agree as I have talked to many of
my friends the biggest impact of three carriers of any
type homeported in Coronado is going to be traffic.

I would like to see a show of hands of people
who served on nuclear powered ships. So like anything,
the amount of real knowledge about things is very small.
Because people have not done it. I have done it. I have

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who served on nuclear powered ships. So like anything,
the amount of real knowledge about things is very small.
Because people have not done it. I have done it. I have

H.159 1 commanded nuclear powered ship. I have served nuclear
2 powered task groups. Nuclear powered ships are safe.
3 Steam accidents happen on all ships. We had a nice
4 gentleman here from -- a whistle blower he said -- that
5 said we have this terrible accident on this French nuclear
6 powered submarine. It was a steam leak. Up until gas
7 turbines, most of our ships were steam ships. And steam
8 is a dangerous thing afloat, ashore, or anywhere. The
9 gentleman who talked about top quality, and the fact, yes,
10 the Navy is suffering a recruiting shortfall.

11 But let me tell you, there is no lack of top
12 quality nuclear program. They get the best, they will,
13 always have; and they will continue to do that. Mr.
14 Callahan cited radiation accidents. I don't know what his
15 definition is of a radiation accident is. If he put it in
16 his paper, because he writes frequently in the paper, I
17 would be happy to see what he says. I think that the
18 emotionalism has taken over a lot of this argument. The
19 emotionalism about nuclear power, not the emotionalism
20 about the impact on the city of Coronado, the traffic, the
21 shipyard workers and whatever are very factual things that
22 need to be addressed by the Navy. At the same time
23 nuclear power is safe, has been safe and will continue to
24 be safe.

25 Thank You.

26

27 CAPTAIN ROCKLAND DEAL: Anyone else this evening?

28 All right. Thank you for your input. We

will you make the right decision. Again, the written
deadlines for submission is 12 November.

Thank you.

(The public hearing was concluded at 9:52 p.m.)

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VOLUME 7 CVN HOMEPORING EIS — NASNI RESPONSE TO COMMENTS

Comment Number	Response
Coronado Hearing	
H.1.1	<p>The Navy has participated in many public meetings with regards to its CVN homeporting activities in the San Diego area. Most notably, the Navy has participated in ongoing monthly meetings, with members of the Coronado City government and members of the public ("Coronado-Navy Complex" meetings). These meetings are a forum where Navy officials, local officials, and members of the public discuss issues of mutual interest. In many cases, issues related to CVN homeporting have been discussed.</p> <p>Regarding this NEPA process, the EIS contains detailed technical analyses of a large number of specialized resource areas. As such, the Navy relies on expertise within a wide range of technical disciplines to prepare the analyses, and to subsequently answer comments received during the review periods. These technical experts need sufficient time to develop responses to these comments for the administrative record, and thus it is essential for the Navy to first carefully listen and then take time to confer with those experts to respond accurately to the comments. This process for responding to public comments is consistent with the requirements of NEPA, and is also consistent with feedback the Navy has received in relation to past public hearings conducted under NEPA. It is important to note that all comments received on the Draft EIS are responded to in the Final EIS as required by NEPA, and the Final EIS is then recirculated for another review period.</p>
H.1.2	<p>Consistent with guidance from the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) in 40 CFR Part 1503, the Navy solicited comments from any federal agencies that have jurisdiction by law or special expertise with respect to any environmental impact associated with the Draft EIS. Also, the Navy requested comments from appropriate State and local agencies who are authorized to develop and enforce environmental standards, as well as any interested or affected person. (See section 10 of the EIS).</p> <p>NEPA was enacted to ensure federal agencies consider environmental impacts in their decision making. Decision discretion still resides with the individual federal agency based on consideration of all relevant factors, including mission requirements and cost. In this case the Navy, as the cognizant federal agency for the action, is responsible to make the final decision on the proposed action after input from other federal agencies and stakeholders has been obtained and considered.</p>
H.1.3	<p>The Navy's historical record of safe and responsible operation of nuclear powered warships is discussed in detail in Volume I, Chapter 7 of the EIS. This record shows a long and extensive history of the Program's activities having no significant effect on the environment. Since the inception of the NNPP almost</p>

VOLUME 7 CVN HOMEPORING EIS — NASNI RESPONSE TO COMMENTS

Comment Number	Response
	half a century ago, there has never been a reactor accident associated with the Program, nor has there been a release of radioactivity that has had a significant effect on the public or the environment. The Navy reports all releases of radioactivity associated with the NNPP in its annual report entitled Environmental Monitoring and Disposal of Radioactive Wastes from U.S. Naval Nuclear Powered Ships and their Support Facilities. This report is prepared annually, and is provided to Congress and made available to the public. Relevant information from the report has been included and referenced as appropriate in the EIS in accordance with the implementing regulations of NEPA (40 CFR 1502.21). Copies of this and other reports were placed in local public libraries to aid public review during the EIS process.
	As described in the annual report referenced in the EIS, twenty-six previous versions of that report, and the 1998 update of the report, the total long-lived gamma radioactivity in liquids released annually to all ports and harbors from all Naval nuclear-powered ships and supporting tenders, Naval bases and shipyards is less than 0.002 curies. This annual total includes any accidental releases of radioactivity that occurred during the year. For perspective, the total annual amount is less than the amount of naturally occurring radioactivity present in the seawater displaced by a single submarine, and is environmentally inconsequential. Since the total amount released was inconsequential, any individual release was also inconsequential, and was not subject to reporting, immediate or otherwise, by any regulatory requirements.
	In addition, the Navy's plans for emergency response is included in section 7.5 of the EIS. The EIS states that emergency planning and emergency response is included as an integral part of ongoing NNPP operations to ensure the Navy is prepared to handle accidental releases of radioactivity. In the highly unlikely event of an emergency, the Navy would promptly notify State and local officials, and would communicate with those officials. Any action needed to protect the public would be handled by State and local officials using existing plans for emergencies from natural events, such as earthquakes or hurricanes.
	Finally, it should be noted that the Navy has provided detailed responses to the analyses provided by consultants. Navy responses can be found in various locations throughout the EIS, including responses O.12.174-178, O.12.179-189, O.12.190, and O.12.191-197. After examining these responses to the comments provided, the Navy believes it has correctly assessed the radiological impacts associated with the proposed action, and thus no significant changes to the Draft EIS are deemed necessary.
H.1.4	Public concerns identified in the response to the Notice of Intent for this EIS and in scoping meetings are summarized in Volume 2, Appendix B, EIS Scoping Comment Issues. The Navy determined that some of the issues raised were not

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	<p>relevant to the EIS analysis and are identified in Section 1.6 of the Draft EIS. Executive Order 12898 states that federal agencies shall identify "disproportionately high and adverse human health or environmental effects of its programs." The environmental justice section related to San Diego, section 3.17, discusses Coronado as the relevant sub-regional area, since this community is adjacent to, and closest to areas impacted by the proposed action. The community of Coronado is comprised of relatively few minorities and low income households (see Table 3.17-1 in the Final EIS). The Navy also considered communities affected by operations of normal radiological support facility operations within a 50-mile radius of the proposed action (see Appendix F in Volume 2). Based on this analysis, there is no reason to conclude that minorities or low income communities would be affected <i>disproportionately</i>. Any impacts from air quality, traffic, security, construction, earthquakes, and personnel loading would primarily affect the residents of Coronado; these impacts would also be less than significant, as discussed in the relevant sections of the Draft EIS. Finally, as indicated in section 3.10, air quality impacts were assessed for the San Diego region beyond Coronado and they would be below thresholds of significance and would therefore not be expected to increase respiratory or other illnesses.</p>
	<p>Nuclear propulsion technology is among the most sensitive military technologies possessed by the United States and Congress has placed stringent limitations on foreign access to it under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (amended) and other federal statutes. As such, discussion of issues related to U.S. Naval reactor design and operation, including an analysis of postulated reactor accidents, is contained in a classified appendix. The classified appendix was provided to EPA headquarters for review. This approach is in accordance with the implementing regulations of NEPA (40 CFR 1507.3(c)) which specifically provide for the protection of classified information. EPA received the entire Draft EIS, including the classified appendix, conducted a review, and provided comments based on their review. The Navy has responded to those comments (see F.3 series). EPA had no comments on the classified appendix.</p>
	<p>Every effort has been made to ensure that environmental impacts associated with homeporting are evaluated and reported in an unclassified fashion in the EIS, and thus all potential environmental impacts or conclusions discussed in the classified appendix are covered in the unclassified sections of the EIS. In addition to the above, NIMITZ-class aircraft carrier nuclear propulsion plant design was independently reviewed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (at the time of review it was by the Directorate of Licensing Division of the Atomic Energy Commission) and by the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards. Both reviews concluded that consistent with the military necessity of these ships, NIMITZ-class aircraft carrier reactors could be safely operated.</p>

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H.1.5	<p>The GAO report referred to by the commentor pertains to the government's choice for the next generation of aircraft carrier propulsion plants. As described in the response to O.12.12, the scope of this EIS does not include decisions regarding Naval ships (e.g., application of nuclear power), and thus comments regarding these decisions are beyond the scope of this EIS.</p> <p>However, because of the numerous errors and inaccuracies contained in the GAO report, the Department of Defense objected to the report. Specifically:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• The GAO report substantially understated the operational effectiveness of nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, and overstated the life cycle cost premium. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the CNO, the Unified CINCs, the Fleet Commanders, and the operating fleet of our Navy are unanimous in their recognition of the added capability, mobility, sustainability, and flexibility nuclear power gives to the Navy's aircraft carriers. Nuclear power gives carriers unlimited range and endurance at high speed, increases capacity for weapons and aircraft fuel, and eliminates dependence upon the vulnerable logistics train for ship fuel. The result is operational flexibility, independence, and survivability the Navy needs in its carriers.• The GAO report inappropriately compared the cost of modern nuclear-powered NIMITZ class carriers, such as the newest, USS HARRY S. TRUMAN (CVN-75), to smaller, older, less capable, conventionally-powered carriers, such as USS JOHN F. KENNEDY (CV-67). KENNEDY, which was designed over 40 years ago, does not meet today's Navy standards for ship capability, survivability, or habitability.• The GAO report did not capture actual deployment practices for CVNs and CVs. In the last two years, 6 CVNs were called to make high speed, long distance (over 4000 nautical miles) transits to respond to national security crises. No conventional carriers made similar high speed, long-distance transits in this period.
H.1.6	<p>Issues pertaining to French submarines are beyond the scope of this EIS. Issues pertaining to metallurgical embrittlement are responded to in answers to the commentors letter, I.63.</p>
H.1.7	<p>The Navy has not made a decision regarding the proposed action in this EIS. The Navy identified a preferred alternative in the Draft EIS so the public could review and comment upon that preferred alternative. The public will also have at least 30 days to review the Final EIS before the Navy makes a decision.</p>

This EIS evaluates those environmental impacts resulting from the Navy's proposed action and alternatives. If the existing environmental quality of an

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	<p>area is already degraded, an EIS identifies what additional environmental effects would result if the proposed action were to proceed. The EIS evaluates only those environmental impacts resulting directly, indirectly, and cumulatively (in association with past, present, and reasonably foreseeable projects) from the proposed action.</p>
	<p>The previous CVN Final EIS published in 1995 was challenged in regard to cumulative impacts and segmentation. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California concurred with the Navy's implementation of NEPA, and concluded that the Navy had not understated the potential effects of a larger project by preparation of two documents (segmentation). In an Order dated May 12, 1997, the Court stated, "Because the Court finds that no proposal to homeport three CVNs existed prior to the issuance of the Final EIS, the Final EIS's analysis of the possible cumulative impacts of potential additional home ports suffices under NEPA." See response to comment L.4.5 for additional information.</p>
H.1.8	<p>Your comments are noted and included in the Final EIS. The Navy does not agree with your general statement that the traffic analysis is incorrect. For detailed responses to comments submitted by the City of Coronado's traffic consultants, please see the responses to comments L.4.55, L.4.67 through L.4.74, L.4.82 through L.4.89, and L.4.90 through L.4.98.</p>
H.1.9	<p>Your comments are noted and included in the Final EIS. The Navy is aware of the Coronado's concerns.</p>
H.1.10	<p>The traffic analysis was based on intersection counts that were taken in August 1996 and average daily traffic volume information that was assembled in 1996 and 1997. Table 3.9-1 in the EIS has been revised to show the highest traffic volumes cited for each roadway in the various source references. For example, on the Coronado Bay Bridge the table shows an annual average volume of 71,000 vehicles per day. These more recent traffic data that were not available to the EIS preparer when the DEIS was initially prepared. The August 1996 traffic counts that were used to represent the existing conditions scenario reflect traffic conditions during the peak summer tourist/recreational season when there were two aircraft carriers in port. Follow-up counts taken in the fall of 1998 resulted in traffic volumes that were lower than the August 1996 volumes. It was determined, therefore, that it would be appropriate to use the August 1996 data to reflect the existing traffic conditions. This conclusion is consistent with the findings of the October 1998 draft report prepared by SANDAG titled "San Diego-Coronado Bridge Toll Removal Impact Study," which also used the August 1996 data to represent existing conditions. Please see response to comment L.4.12 and L.4.15.</p>

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	<p>With regard to the existing traffic intersection data that were used, the traffic analysis was based on intersection counts that were taken in August 1996, which reflected current information when the EIS traffic study was initiated. The August 1996 traffic intersection counts that were used to represent the existing scenario reflect traffic conditions during the peak summer tourist/recreational season when there were two aircraft carriers in port. Follow-up intersection counts taken in the fall of 1998 resulted in traffic volumes that were lower than the August 1996 volumes. It was determined, therefore, that it would be appropriate to use the August 1996 data to represent the existing intersection traffic conditions. This conclusion is consistent with the findings of the October 1998 draft report prepared by SANDAG titled "San Diego-Coronado Bridge Toll Removal Impact Study," which also used the August 1996 data to represent existing conditions. Please see response to comments L.4.12 and L.4.15.</p>
	<p>In addition, a follow-up traffic impact analysis was conducted to determine the impacts of project-generated traffic by using the traffic conditions for the year 2015 as the projected conditions scenario. The year 2015 projected conditions traffic volumes and levels of service were taken from the draft SANDAG report titled "San Diego-Coronado Bridge Toll Removal Impact Study." The year 2015 traffic projections represent future traffic conditions taking into account projections of population and employment growth in Coronado and the San Diego region, assuming that the bridge tolls continue to be charged (Scenario 2 from the report). Although the traffic volumes for the year 2015 projected conditions scenario are higher than what would be expected for the year 2005 when a third CVN would be homeported at NASNI, this scenario has been addressed to ensure that the level of anticipated growth and the cumulative traffic increases in Coronado have been considered. The analysis of the study area roadways and intersections for this scenario is summarized in the response to comment L.4.12 and in the EIS. Based on the criteria for significant impacts, the proposed action's traffic impacts would not be significant.</p>
	<p>With regard to traffic impacts, the traffic analysis presented in the Draft EIS is based on the incremental increase in traffic that would occur as a result of the proposed action. The homeporting baseline has facilities at NASNI to accommodate two conventional aircraft carriers (CVs) and one nuclear carrier (CVN) for a total of three carriers, while Alternatives One, Two, and Three have three CVNs. The proposed action would not result in two additional aircraft carriers, but would simply create the capacity to homeport two additional CVNs at NASNI. As the number of personnel on the CVNs is greater than that on the CVs, the proposed action would generate approximately 27 additional vehicle trips during the peak hours and 150 trips throughout an average day, as outlined in the Draft EIS. The analysis indicates that a traffic increase of this magnitude would not be significant, even at locations that are currently operating at unacceptable levels of service E and F.</p>

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H.1.11	<p>The list of reasonably foreseeable projects included in the cumulative analysis has been increased to include the San Diego-Coronado Bridge, Seismic Retrofit Financial Plan, Glorietta Bay Master Plan, Hotel Del Coronado Master Plan, and Convention Center Expansion projects. Projects at Naval Amphibious Base have been reviewed by the Navy to identify those that are reasonably foreseeable and appropriate to this analysis. The revised cumulative analysis in section 3.18 incorporates these projects. No projects have been eliminated from consideration in order to allow for the most reasonable analysis possible.</p>
H.1.12	<p>The alternatives analysis considered a reasonable number of combinations of CVNs and relocated AOEs at the four home port locations. Not every mathematically possible alternative was evaluated, consistent with guidance the "Forty Most Asked Questions Concerning CEQ's National Environmental Policy Act Regulations," printed in <i>Federal Register</i> Vol. 46, No. 55, 18026-18038, 3/23/81. While not included under one scenario for all four home port locations, the EIS has evaluated the environmental impacts of a total of providing capacity to homeport two additional CVNs in Coronado (Alternative 4), two CVNs and two AOEs at PSNS (Alternative 5), and one CVN and two AOEs at NAVSTA Everett (Alternative 5). By combining these analyses, one can assess the environmental impact of the additional alternative proposed in the comment. The net difference in costs for all home port locations under this additional alternative as compared to the preferred alternative is approximately \$86.4M over 30 years, rather than the \$62M identified in the comment. Any savings resulting from selecting one home port alternative over another would represent a cost avoidance. The funds would not be tangible savings from an existing budget that could be used for funding other regional improvements, particularly those that are not needed to address significant environmental impacts resulting from the proposed action.</p>
	<p>The preferred alternative is not the least expensive alternative: it ranks third in costs.</p>
H.1.13	<p>The Navy respectfully disagrees with your conclusion that "this is a rubber stamped decision," [or that the EIS is] "not factual, there is no cumulative analysis of the transportation impacts, and there is a viable two-carrier alternative." The EIS presents analyses of a reasonable range of alternatives for providing capacity to homeport additional CVNs at the four potential homeporting locations. One of the alternatives (Alternative Four) would provide capacity for one additional CVN at NASNI. This combination of CVNs at NASNI (Facilities for One Additional CVN: Capacity for Total of Two CVNs) was evaluated in each of the environmental resource issue areas. Another combination of alternatives would provide for the capacity to homeport two additional CVNs at NASNI (Facilities for Two Additional CVNs: Capacity for Total of Three CVNs), reflected in Alternatives One, Two and Three. The EIS</p>

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	in section 2.3.3.1 clearly defines the differences in new construction needed to provide homeport facilities and capacity for these two different combinations of CVNs.
	The EIS transportation analysis used the most up-to-date (1996) available information. The Final EIS text of the transportation has been revised to clarify that the existing conditions used to characterize Coronado traffic were based on counts taken in the summer of 1996 that reflect worst-case conditions during the tourist season, and were not based on 1993 traffic conditions. Additional projects have been added to the cumulative analysis with no change resulting in the overall cumulative impact conclusions. See the revised Final EIS text in section 3.18.
H.1.14	Please see response to comment O.12.86.
H.1.15	Your comments are noted and are included in the Final EIS.
H.1.16	Public concerns identified in the response to the Notice of Intent for this EIS and in scoping meetings are summarized in Volume 2, Appendix B, EIS Scoping Comment Issues. The Navy determined that some of the issues raised were not relevant to the EIS analysis and are identified in Section 1.6 of the Draft EIS.
H.1.17	Please see response to comment L.4.36 and O.12.33.
H.1.18	Your comments are noted and are included in the Final EIS.
H.1.19	Your comments are noted and are included in the Final EIS.
H.1.20	Please see response to comment H.1.1.
H.1.21	The radiological impacts of the NNPP are discussed in detail in section 7.4 of the EIS. For example, section 7.4.1 discusses the source of NNPP radioactivity, and section 7.4.2.2 discussed airborne radioactivity. In addition, Appendix F, section 3.1 and Tables F-6 and F-7 summarize the risk to human health from normal NNPP operations.
	The EIS has evaluated a wide variety of accidents (including those addressed in the comment), including human health impacts within a 50 mile radius of North Island. Based on the analyses in the EIS, the Navy has determined that the radiological risks are not significant. A summary of radiological risks is contained in section 7.6 of the EIS.
H.1.22	Please see response to comment L.4.5.

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H.1.23	<p>Typically, shore power is connected to the ship while in port. Accordingly, if the ship is in port and not moving, the reactor plant is normally shut down or operated at a small fraction of the ship's rated power.</p> <p>While CVs and CVNs use different sources of fuel (oil vs. nuclear), both types of ships rely upon steam propulsion plants that require seawater cooling. As described in section 7.2 of the EIS, the primary system circulates water in an all welded, closed-loop system. The primary water is passed through steam generators, where it transfers its energy across a water-tight boundary to the water in the secondary system. The water in the secondary system also circulates in a closed loop, and in a manner similar to the way energy is transferred from the primary to the secondary system, transfers its energy to seawater.</p>
H.1.24	<p>The EIS has analyzed six alternatives coequally which included investigating no additional CVNs (Alternative Five), one additional CVN (Alternatives Four and Six), and two additional CVNs at NASNI (Alternatives One, Two, and Three). Any one of the six alternatives could be selected. The Navy identified a preferred alternative (Alternative Two) in the Draft EIS so that the public could comment on that preference before the Navy makes a decision. Appendix G of the EIS provides further information on this subject. Specifically, the Navy is trying to live within its infrastructure means. That means using existing Navy and facilities to the maximum extent practicable. NASNI has most of the infrastructure to handle three carriers, because that was NASNI's historical mission until USS RANGER was decommissioned in 1993. NASNI is not being singled out for three carriers, rather it is being looked at in terms of its existing capacity. The other locations cannot support more carriers than what is analyzed in the EIS because the overall capacity does not exist (housing, commissary, recreational facilities, etc.) and it would take a tremendous undertaking (like creating a new base) to support such an action.</p>
H.1.25	<p>There will be 12 carriers — six in the Pacific Fleet and six in the Atlantic Fleet. Therefore, if the preferred alternative is selected, 25 percent of all the carriers would be homeported at NASNI.</p>
H.1.26	<p>Contrary to the commentor's assertion, each NIMITZ class aircraft carrier reactor is less than one-fifth the size of a typical commercial power reactor. In addition, it is important to note that the results of all the radiological analyses in the EIS, which included cumulative effects, indicate that there would be no significant radiological impacts from homeporting and maintaining NIMITZ-class aircraft carriers or operating NIMITZ-class aircraft carrier maintenance facilities under the proposed action.</p>

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	DTSC's decisions to permit Navy activities at North Island are not within the scope of this EIS.
H.1.27	Please refer to response to comment O.12.55 above.
H.1.28	Please see response to comment O.12.81.
H.1.29	The Navy's historical record of safe and responsible operation of nuclear powered warships is discussed in Volume I, section 7 of the EIS, where it is stated that there has never been a reactor accident, nor a release of radioactivity having a significant effect on the environment, in the 50-year history of the NNPP. Please also see response to comment O.12.33 and O.12.49.
H.1.30	Your comments are noted and are included in the Final EIS. The Navy believes the EIS presents factual and objective information.
H.1.31	This comment addresses the potential NEPA segmentation claims related to homeporting CVNs within the Pacific Fleet. A chronology of events resulting in the potential replacements for aircraft carriers planned for decommissioning in the San Diego area is provided to help the reader understand how NASNI has customarily been home port for three aircraft carriers.
	In the 1980s, the Navy reduced the size of its active aircraft carriers from 15 to 12: six in the Atlantic Fleet and six in the Pacific Fleet. Before that time, NASNI had been the homeport for at least three aircraft carriers. In the early 1970s, this included USS TICONDEROGA, USS KITTY HAWK, and USS CONSTELLATION; in the mid-1970s, USS RANGER, KITTY HAWK, and CONSTELLATION; throughout the 1980s, RANGER, KITTY HAWK, and CONSTELLATION; and in the early 1990s, a combination of USS INDEPENDENCE, (while KITTY HAWK and/or CONSTELLATION were undergoing their Service Life Extension effort in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania), KITTY HAWK, CONSTELLATION, and RANGER. All ships listed above are or were conventionally powered carriers, or "CVs."
	In 1993, RANGER was decommissioned at the end of its service life and removed from NASNI, temporarily reducing the port-loading to two CVs. In 1993, a Base Realignment and Closure Commission (BRAC) action resulted in the closure of NAS Alameda, California. Because there were no CVN homeport-capable berths at NASNI, the Navy was allowed to shift both NAS Alameda CVNs to the Pacific Northwest, pending completion of construction of suitable homeport facilities at NASNI. Those facilities were the subject of an EIS entitled <i>Environmental Impact Statement for the Development of Facilities in San Diego to Support the Homeporting of One NIMITZ Class Aircraft Carrier</i> (DON 1995a). The actual vessel that fulfilled the BRAC mandate and assumed the role of RANGER was USS JOHN C. STENNIS (CVN-74). Arriving in August 1998, STENNIS took

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	over one CVs worth of facility support infrastructure at NASNI. NASNI has had the historical capacity to support three aircraft carriers.
	In 1998, INDEPENDENCE (at that time the Navy's "forward deployed" carrier) reached the end of its service life and was decommissioned. KITTY HAWK was designated as its replacement and left NASNI in July 1998, 20 months after the Notice of Intent for this EIS, and relocated to Yokosuka, Japan. This resulted in a reduction of the port loading at NASNI to two homeported aircraft carriers. The USS NIMITZ is currently undergoing an extended maintenance period on the East Coast and will require a homeport berth within the Pacific Fleet area. Long range plans indicate that the most likely arrival date on the West Coast for NIMITZ would be early 2002. <i>Were the Preferred Alternative selected</i> , this would bring NASNI back to its historical three carrier port-loading baseline.
	USS CONSTELLATION is expected to reach the end of its service life in approximately 2003. At that time, NASNI would once again experience a reduction in port loading to two homeported carriers <i>if the Preferred Alternative were selected by the Navy</i> . The same long range plans addressing NIMITZ also involve replacing CONSTELLATION with the USS RONALD REAGAN. It is anticipated this will happen in 2005. Once again, <i>if the Preferred Alternative were selected</i> , it would bring NASNI back to its historical three carrier port-loading baseline.
	The closure of Naval Air Station (NAS) Alameda, California, and the relocation of two CVNs to fleet concentrations in San Diego and the Pacific Northwest were carried out in compliance with the 1993 Defense Base Realignment and Closure Commission (BRAC) recommendations. Consequently, the Department of the Navy constructed homeporting facilities for one CVN at NASNI (DON 1995a) and one at Puget Sound Naval Shipyard (PSNS), Bremerton, Washington (DON 1995b). New facilities were needed at NASNI in order to support the homeporting of a CVN, since prior to 1998, there had been no CVNs homeported there. At the time the Navy proposed the construction of facilities at NASNI to support a homeported CVN, the Navy prepared an EIS to present the analysis of potential environmental effects associated with that action. A Final EIS for that project was completed in November 1995. In this Final EIS, the Navy stated, "The proposed action of this EIS does not affect facilities and activities required for the two conventionally powered carriers (CVs) that are currently homeported in the San Diego area. However, as the older CVs are decommissioned, they will be replaced with newer CVNs. Therefore, a decision to establish the capability to support one CVN in the San Diego area makes it reasonably foreseeable that future decisions on where to homeport additional CVNs (CV replacements) beyond the year 2000 could result in their being proposed for homeporting in the San Diego area. This EIS, therefore, considers the potential cumulative environmental impacts of CV replacement and homeporting a total of three

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	<p>CVNs in the San Diego area. The Navy is not, however, developing proposals addressing where to homeport new CVNs beyond the year 2000 at this time. When the Navy does develop such a proposal, it will prepare the appropriate NEPA documentation." This statement was intended to provide public disclosure of reasonably foreseeable future actions that were not ripe for decision at that time. This is in accordance with 40 CFR 1508.7. The 1995 EIS also states, "This EIS, therefore, considers the potential cumulative impacts of CV replacement and homeporting a total of three CVNs in San Diego." See the 1995 EIS, Volume 1, Chapter 6 (DON 1995a).</p>
	<p>The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California evaluated the Navy's 1995 EIS with regard to the segmentation issue raised by the City. The District Court was aware of the Notice of Intent (December 1996) for this EIS before rendering its decision on the 1995 EIS in May 1997. The District Court concurred with the Navy's implementation of NEPA, and concluded that the Navy had not understated the potential effects of a larger project by preparation of two documents (segmentation). In a Court order dated May 12, 1997, the Court stated, "Because the Court finds that no proposal to homeport three CVNs existed prior to the issuance of the Final EIS, the Final EIS's analysis of the possible cumulative impacts of potential additional home ports suffices under NEPA."</p>
H.1.32	<p>The EIS does identify the effects on people. The EIS analyzes effects on the following environmental resources in addition to marine water quality and marine biology: topography, geology, and soils; terrestrial hydrology and water quality; sediment quality; terrestrial biology; land use; socioeconomics; transportation; transportation; air quality; noise; aesthetics; cultural resources; general services/access; health and safety; utilities; and environmental justice.</p>
H.1.33	<p>The additional traffic that would be generated by the proposed action would increase the traffic volumes on the Coronado streets that provide access to the site. As the maximum development proposed action scenario (Alternatives One, Two, and Three) would provide capacity to homeport two additional nuclear carriers (CVNs), the increase in personnel associated with the larger ships would result in a net increase of 27 vehicle trips during the peak hours and 150 trips throughout an average day. This increase in traffic volumes would not be significant based on the significance criteria outlined in the Draft EIS.</p> <p>Although specific traffic-related mitigation measures are not needed to mitigate less than significant impacts of the proposed action, the Navy does have an ongoing series of strategies designed to reduce the level of traffic generated by NASNI, such as a ferry system, carpool/vanpool programs, installation of bicycle racks, a guaranteed ride home program (for rideshare users with a mid-day emergency), and an educational program to promote these strategies. In</p>

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	addition, the Navy is considering a redesign of the Main Gate so that the entrance would align with Third Street and thereby provide a more direct connection into and out of the base.
H.1.34	Your comments are noted and are included in the Final EIS.
H.1.35	Purchases of local shipbuilding companies by other defense contractors, and the fact that these defense contractors are pursuing bids on ship repair, are common business practice and are beyond the scope of this EIS.
	The EIS addresses the dry dock issue in section 2.3.2.1. No dry dock is planned for NASNI.
H.1.36	Please see response to comment O.10.28. The facility Captain Chamberlain was referring to was the CIF.
H.1.37	Your comments are noted and are included in the Final EIS. Please see responses to comments O.12.8, O.13.3, O.13.5, and I.43.3.
H.1.38	Your comments are noted and are included in the Final EIS.
H.1.39	An average of 450 maintenance workers would be needed to support DMF maintenance activities for six month CVN PIAs at NASNI. Each CVN homeported at NASNI would require two six-month PIAs every six years. Thus, if three CVNs were homeported at NASNI, six PIAs would be conducted every six years, averaging one PIA per year.
	In addition to PIAs, CVNs must undergo drydocking PIAs (DPIA) once every six years. These maintenance availabilities would be done outside of the San Diego area, and would last for approximately 11 months.
	The BRAC EIS (DON 1995a) evaluated the traffic impact of DMF workers based on a one PIA in one year concept. The EIS determined that there would be no impact because of overall decreases in base population at NASNI. For example, NASNI has already experienced a decrease of about 2,500 personnel since the BRAC EIS was prepared over 4 years ago (see Volume 3, Table 2-1). While the BRAC EIS analyzed a lesser frequency of PIAs (two every six years), it did analyze what the impact of one PIA in one year would be, thus bounding the condition of this EIS where an average of one PIA each year would be conducted. Thus, the conclusion of no impact stated the BRAC EIS is still valid for this EIS.
	Please also note that the 1995 BRAC EIS had several conservative aspects built into the analysis. (1) The 1995 BRAC EIS estimated the average DMF workforce at 750 personnel and assessed the impacts at this level. The Navy overestimated

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	<p>this workforce because there had been no actual experience in conducting a CVN PIA. Now that the Navy has conducted several PIAs, the average workforce number at NASNI has been lowered to 450 personnel. (2) The analysis in the 1995 BRAC EIS did not account for the fact that DMF workers average 2.5 persons per vehicle. The 1995 BRAC EIS assessed these workers as all single vehicle operators. Therefore the 1995 BRAC EIS conservatively assessed the number of DMF workers and bounded the impacts of one PIA per year in its analysis.</p> <p>It should also be pointed out that the PIA is a maintenance activity for the CVNs that would essentially replace for maintenance overhaul activities that are currently performed on the CVs. The CV maintenance activities are conducted periodically by the Navy and contract personnel that must commute to NASNI during the maintenance periods. The amount of work for CVs and CVNs are similar in size; therefore, it is not expected that CVN PIA activities at NASNI would vary greatly from past CV maintenance activities at NASNI or result in traffic increases in Coronado.</p> <p>Please note that the total amount of work between the old overhaul system and the new PIA maintenance system has not appreciably changed. While a PIA is 6 months in length, it is done once every 2 years. Under the old overhaul system it was not uncommon to perform multiple 3+ month SRAs during the same time period. The main advantage of the PIA system is that it affords the Navy a more even tempo of operations than the old overhaul system. Please also note that some recent NASNI CV SRAs have been nearly a year in duration as noted elsewhere in the City's comments. Because the total amount of work has not appreciably changed between the old overhaul system and the new PIA system, the Navy does not consider further analysis on this issue necessary.</p>
H.1.40	<p>The traffic analysis presented in the Draft EIS is based on the incremental increase in traffic that would occur as a result of the proposed action. The baseline condition has facilities at NASNI to support two conventional aircraft carriers (CVs) and one nuclear carrier (CVN) for a total of three carriers, while Alternatives One, Two, and Three have three CVNs. The proposed action would not result in two additional aircraft carriers, but would create the capacity to homeport two additional CVNs. As the number of personnel on the CVNs is greater than that on the CVs, the proposed action would generate approximately 27 additional vehicle trips during the peak hours and 150 trips throughout an average day, as outlined in the EIS. The analysis indicates that a traffic increase of this magnitude would not be significant.</p> <p>Although specific traffic-related mitigation measures are not needed to mitigate less than significant impacts of the proposed action, the Navy does have an ongoing series of strategies designed to reduce the level of traffic generated by</p>

VOLUME 7 CVN HOMEPORING EIS — NASNI RESPONSE TO COMMENTS

Comment Number	Response
	NASNI, such as a ferry system, carpool/vanpool programs, installation of bicycle racks, a guaranteed ride home program (for rideshare users with a mid-day emergency), and an educational program to promote these strategies. In addition, the Navy is seeking a redesign of the Main Gate so that the entrance would align with Third Street and thereby provide a more direct connection into and out of the base.
H.1.41	This comment represents the public hearing transcript for James Peugh (San Diego Audubon Society – SDAS) and is therefore a summary of the SDAS letter. Please see responses to comments to that letter (O.11).
H.1.42	This comment represents public hearing transcript for James Peugh (San Diego Audubon Society – SDAS) and is therefore a summary of the SDAS letter. Please see responses to comments to that letter (O.11).
H.1.43	It is not within the scope of this EIS to examine the correctness from any point of view of building nuclear powered aircraft carriers. Notwithstanding the GAO analysis, the Defense Acquisitions Board (DAB) decided in September 1998 that CVX would be nuclear powered. This decision was based on a careful analysis of all pertinent data including the Department of the Navy's evaluation of tactical flexibility, operational and technical risks, and funding requirements of the various alternatives. For further detail, please see the response to comment H.1.5.
H.1.44	Please see response to comment O.12.86.
H.1.45	The information requested regarding the BRAC process is beyond the scope of this EIS.
H.1.46	The proposed action would not increase the numbers of aircraft carriers. Instead capacity would be provided to homeport up to two additional CVNs for a total capacity of 3 CVNs. NASNI has the current capacity of 1 CVN and 2 CVs. For a discussion of national security concerns in San Diego, please see the response to comment L.4.44.
H.1.47	This EIS was prepared pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act, passed by Congress in 1969. The Department of the Navy is the lead agency authority to sign a Record of Decision for this EIS.
H.1.48	Your comment is not within the scope of this EIS.
H.1.49	Please refer to responses L.4.44 and I.37.1 on the subject of terrorists and terrorist attacks on aircraft carriers in San Diego.
H.1.50	Please see response to comment H.1.3.

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Comment Number	Response
H.1.51	The preferred alternative is defined in the Final EIS. Please see response to comment H.1.50. The final decision will occur not less than 30 days after the public has had an opportunity to review the Final EIS. There will be no decision until the ROD is published.
H.1.52	Your comments are noted and are included in the Final EIS.
H.1.53	The traffic analysis presented in the Draft EIS is based on the incremental increase in traffic that would occur as a result of the proposed action. The baseline condition has facilities at NASNI to support two conventional aircraft carriers (CVs) and one nuclear carrier (CVN) for a total of three carriers, while Alternatives One, Two, and Three have three CVNs. The proposed action would not result in two additional aircraft carriers, but would create the capacity to homeport two additional CVNs. As the number of personnel on the CVNs is greater than that on the CVs, the proposed action would generate approximately 27 additional vehicle trips during the peak hours and 150 trips throughout an average day, as outlined in the EIS. The analysis indicates that a traffic increase of this magnitude would not be significant. Please refer to response to comment L.4.12 and Table 3.9-4 in the Final EIS, Volume 1. Although specific traffic-related mitigation measures are not needed to mitigate less than significant impacts of the proposed action, the Navy does have an ongoing series of strategies designed to reduce the level of traffic generated by NASNI, such as a ferry system, carpool/vanpool programs, installation of bike racks, a guaranteed ride home program (for rideshare users with a mid-day emergency), and an educational program to promote these strategies. In addition, the Navy is considering a redesign of the Main Gate so that the entrance would align with Third Street and thereby provide a more direct connection into and out of the base.
H.1.54	Your comments are noted and are included in the Final EIS.
H.1.55	Although no specific issues were noted by the commentor, the Navy notes the commentor's general opinion regarding the proposed action.
H.1.56	Although no specific issues were noted by the commentor, the Navy notes the commentor's general opinion regarding the proposed action.
H.1.57	Although no specific issues were noted by the commentor, the Navy notes the commentor's general opinion regarding the proposed action.
H.1.58	Your comments are noted and are included in the Final EIS.

The Draft EIS public hearing procedures are prescribed by the Council on Environmental Quality Implementation of Procedural Provisions; Final

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Comment Number	Response
Regulations Guidelines under the National Environmental Policy Act passed by Congress in 1969. The public hearing process is a formal one in which comments are taken from the public. The public hearing process does not facilitate a dialogue. Comments provided during the public hearing and written comments provided within the public comment period are formally addressed in a Final EIS. Please see response to comment H.1.1 above.	
H.1.59	Your comments are noted and are included in the Final EIS.

PUBLIC HEARING
 DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT
 FOR
 DEVELOPING HOME PORT FACILITIES FOR
 THREE NIMITZ-CLASS AIRCRAFT CARRIERS
 IN SUPPORT OF THE U.S. PACIFIC FLEET

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SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA
 WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 28, 1998

REPORTED BY MARILEE P. JEFFRIES, CSR NO. 7142

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 Certified Shorthand Reporters, Inc.
 701 B Street Suite 760
 San Diego, California 92101

ORIGINAL

EXHIBITS	PAGE	
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1 SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA, WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 28, 1998

2
3 CAPTAIN DAVE O'BRIEN: It's seven o'clock, so we
4 are going to go ahead and get started.

5 Good evening, ladies and gentlemen. My name
6 is Captain Dave O'Brien. I am Commander of the Naval Air
7 Station at North Island. I'd like to welcome you to the
8 Department of the Navy's Draft Environmental Impact
9 Statement for determining home port facilities for three
10 NIMITZ-class aircraft carriers in support of the U.S.
11 Pacific fleet.

12 The purpose of this Environmental Impact
13 Statement, or EIS, is to analyze the potential impacts
14 associated with construction and operation of facilities
15 and infrastructure needed to support home ports for three
16 nuclear-powered aircraft carriers at four Naval facility
17 concentrations: San Diego, California; Bremerton,
18 Washington; Everett, Washington; and Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.

19 With me this evening are key members of the
20 team who have participated in preparation of the draft
21 EIS. They represent some of the specialized Navy
22 activities involved in the project. Speaking tonight will
23 be Captain Rockland Deal to my right. They operate the
24 aircraft carriers. And Mr. Tom Beckett to his right from
25 the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program. They manage nuclear
26 propulsion for the Navy.

27 Tonight's meeting is being held as part of
28 the process prescribed in the National Environmental

1 Policy Act, or NEPA. NEPA is our basic charter for
2 evaluating potential environmental effects of federal
3 actions. Under NEPA Federal agencies, in this case the
4 Navy, must prepare an EIS for any major action that may
5 significantly affect the quality of the human environment.
6 NEPA procedures are designed to make environmental
7 information available to public officials and citizens and
8 to receive input from officials and citizens before
9 decisions are made and actions are taken.

10 The NEPA process for this project was
11 initiated in December 1996, and in February 1997 four
12 scoping meetings were held in Bremerton and Everett,
13 Washington; Pearl City, Hawaii; Coronado, California.
14 Since then we have been busy preparing the draft EIS.
15 On August 28th of this year the draft EIS was
16 issued for public review. The availability of the Draft
17 EIS was announced in local newspapers. Copies were
18 distributed to agencies, organizations, individuals, and
19 local libraries for public review. The 75-day public
20 review period will run through November 12, 1998.

21 The purpose of this public hearing is to
22 describe the proposed actions and alternatives, to present
23 the results of the environmental analyses contained in the
24 Draft EIS, and to hear your comments about the Draft EIS.
25 A total of five hearings just like this one are being held
26 in Everett and Bremerton, Washington; Honolulu, Hawaii;
27 and San Diego and Coronado, California.

28 All oral and written comments on the Draft

1 EIS received tonight and throughout the public review
2 period will be considered and responded to by the Navy.
3 The Draft EIS will be revised as necessary to produce a
4 complete and thorough discussion of the potential
5 environmental consequences. The revised document, which
6 will include responses to all comments received during the
7 comment period will become the final EIS.

8 Depending on comments received and the effort
9 needed to address them, the final EIS may be completed in
10 early 1999. When completed, the final EIS will be
11 submitted to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy
12 For Installations And Facilities as input to the
13 decision-making process. The document will then be
14 subject to a public review period as required under NEPA.
15 After this review period, the Deputy Assistant Secretary
16 of the Navy will consider any comments received and will
17 sign a record of decision, which will document the final
18 decisions and will complete the NEPA process. This action
19 is expected in the spring of 1999.

20 Now, let me explain the procedures for making
21 tonight's meeting productive and smooth. I hope that each
22 of you have picked up one of the blue handouts that are
23 available near the door. It has the agenda for tonight's
24 meeting on one side and the summary of the proposed
25 actions and the environmental analysis on the other side.
26 If you do not have one, you may get one at the break, or
27 if you would like one now, please raise your hand and we
28 will pass one to you.

H.2

1 Also, please put your name and address on the
2 white sign-in sheet at the door if you wish to be included
3 on the project mailing list. If you are on the mailing
4 list, you will be able to receive information about the
5 project.

6 If you wish to speak during the public
7 comment period of tonight's meeting, I hope you filled out
8 a gray speaker request card, also available on the table
9 near the door.

10 Also available on the table are a green
11 handout which is a fact sheet summarizing the Navy Nuclear
12 Propulsion Program, and copies of the Navy's Nuclear 50th
13 Anniversary brochure. Please help yourself to a copy of
14 each of these if you wish.

15 Finally, if you wish to submit written
16 comments and would like to have a handy form on which to
17 write your comments, please pick up one of the yellow
18 comment sheets. You may turn in your written comments
19 tonight by placing them in the comment box on the table
20 near the door, or you may mail the comments to the address
21 indicated on the back of the comment sheet before November
22 12. I assure you that written comments will get the same
23 attention as oral comments tonight.

24 The public comment portion of tonight's
25 hearing is an opportunity for you to present your comments
26 on the Draft EIS. We are not going to take up your time
27 trying to respond to each comment tonight. Responses to
28 your comments will be in the final EIS. To ensure that we

1 have recorded all of your comments, a transcript of this
2 meeting will be prepared by our Court Reporter.
3 Now, let's get started. First we will
4 describe NIMITZ-class aircraft carriers and the need for
5 them to have home ports. Then we will explain what the
6 proposed actions are and why they are being considered.
7 Next we will explain the alternatives that are considered
8 in the Draft EIS. Then we will briefly summarize the
9 results of the environmental analyses. Then that will be
10 followed by a discussion of the nuclear propulsion aspects
11 of NIMITZ-class aircraft carriers. Following the
12 presentation, which will take approximately 40 minutes, we
13 will take a ten-minute break and reconvene to receive your
14 comments.

H.2 Now to talk about NIMITZ-class aircraft
carriers, homeporting, and the proposed actions, I would
like to introduce Captain Rockland Deal from the staff of
the Commander Naval Air Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet.
CAPTAIN ROCKLAND DEAL: I chose this photograph of
one of our carriers at sea with part of its air wing
overhead to point out that this is what the proposed
actions we are discussing are really all about. They are
about the efficient application of military power in
support of the United States national interests
established by the President and the Congress.
It is my boss who is responsible for support
for all of the aircraft and aircraft carriers in the

1 Pacific Fleet. That adds up to six aircraft carriers,
2 about 1600 airplanes, and more than 57,000 people who make
3 it all work. They are out there every single day carrying
4 out their mission somewhere in the world's largest ocean.

I represent the people who fly these

airplanes and sail these ships, and it's we who need the
home port facilities that we are talking about tonight.
In this part of our presentation I'll
describe NIMITZ-class aircraft carriers, the major Pacific
Fleet home ports, and some of the principal factors
creating the framework for the decision on where to
homeport aircraft carriers.

NIMITZ-class aircraft carriers are among the
largest warships in the world. They are a 1,092 feet long
by 252 feet wide on the flight deck and 134 feet wide at
the water line. The flight deck encompasses 4.5 acres.
They are also one of the deepest draft ships in the Navy
requiring a homeport berth and depth of 50 feet measured
at mean lower-low water. The full crew complement while
in home port is 3,217 personnel, which is roughly half the
full operational crew complement of approximately 6,000
when the air wing is embarked at sea. The aircraft and
air wing personnel do not remain on the carrier while it
is in home port. The air wing is typically based in
several different naval air stations. When the carrier
goes to sea, the wing support personnel and material are
loaded at pierside, and the aircraft fly out to meet the
carrier at sea.

The Pacific Fleet has facilities in many locations, but they are concentrated mainly in four geographic areas: Washington's Puget Sound in the Pacific Northwest; San Diego area in Southern California; Pearl Harbor, Hawaii; and Yokosuka, Japan. The naval facilities in these areas provide home ports for nearly all of the ships in the Pacific Fleet.

What is a home port? Each ship in the U.S. Navy has a home port where it is based when not deployed. The crew's families usually live there; maintenance and material support are located there; facilities and quality of life infrastructure are provided there.

The nuclear powered aircraft carriers operate on about a 24-month cycle: They deploy overseas for six months; they undergo maintenance in the home port area for about six months; and they spend the remaining 12 months training for the next deployment. About four months of that training is spent at sea, so you can see that the crew has precious little time in home port with their families.

As indicated on this slide, the Navy designation for a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier is CVN. A conventionally powered aircraft carrier is called a C.V. So when I use the term "CVN" in this presentation, I'm referring to a nuclear powered aircraft carrier. The Navy's proposed actions, which are the subject of this EIS, are to construct and operate the facilities and infrastructure needed to support home ports

for three CVNs.

Two of these CVNs will be joining the Pacific Fleet in 2002 and 2005 to replace two older conventionally powered aircraft carriers, CVs. Let me emphasize that these two CVNs will replace two CVs and will not increase the number of ships in the Pacific Fleet. One of the CVs was decommissioned in September of this year. The second C.V. is scheduled to be decommissioned in 2003.

The third CVN is the one homeported in Naval Station Everett. The Everett home port location is being reevaluated in order to assess the potential to increase efficiency of support infrastructure and maintenance capabilities and to enhance quality of life for the crew.

The decisions on CVN home ports could also result in the need to relocate up to four Fast Combat Support Ships or AOEs currently homeported at Puget Sound Naval Shipyard if an additional CVN is homeported there.

Decisions on facilities development need to be made soon. This is important in order to program budgets in time to accommodate planned arrival dates of the two CVNs that will replace the aging CVs.

Currently designated CVN home ports are located at three Pacific Naval Facilities. Two of the home ports are in the Pacific Northwest area; Puget Sound Naval Shipyard at Bremerton, Washington, and Naval Station Everett in Everett, Washington.

The third designated CVN home port is in the San Diego area at Naval Air Station North Island in

1 Coronado, California. North Island was recently
2 designated a CVN home port and just received the
3 nuclear-powered aircraft carrier in August of 1998.
4 All three of the currently designated CVN
5 home ports are considered in the EIS. In addition,
6 because Pearl Harbor is a vital fleet concentration, it is
7 also evaluated in this EIS as a potential CVN home port
8 location.

9 The Navy determined specific locations for
10 homeporting by examining the four existing ports just
11 mentioned, to determine how well they were capable of
12 satisfying the following CVN home port objectives and
13 requirements.

14 Operations and training;
15 Support facilities;
16 Maintenance facilities; and
17 Quality of life for Navy crew and families.

18 As I have stated, three CVNs are presently
19 assigned to the Pacific Fleet. One is currently
20 homeported in Bremerton, one is at North Island, and one
21 is at Everett. Two additional CVNs will be joining the
22 Pacific Fleet in coming years, bringing the Pacific Fleet
23 total to five CVNs and one CV; the CV being in Yokosuka,
24 Japan. The CV home port at Yokosuka is not affected by
25 any decisions in this Environmental Impact Statement.

26 The EIS analysis assumes: One, at least one
27 CVN will continue to be homeported at Bremerton to comply
28 with previous actions under the Base Realignment and

1 Closure process, referred to as BRAC; two, at least one
2 CVN will continue to be homeported at North Island to
3 comply with previous BRAC actions; and three, the
4 remaining three CVs will be homeported within the four
5 alternative locations under consideration; Bremerton,
6 Everett, North Island and/or Pearl Harbor.
7 Because we are looking at four locations to
8 homeport three CVNs with a different range of possible CVN
9 berths at each location, a very large number of potential
10 combinations were considered. We decided on the five
11 combinations that presented a reasonable range of
12 alternatives. These five combinations, along with the
13 alternative of no action, became the six alternatives
14 analyzed in the Draft EIS. The no-action alternative
15 evaluates the impacts that would occur if no new
16 facilities were constructed.

17 If you will look at the rows on this chart,
18 you will see that North Island could have a total of one
19 to three CVNs, the currently homeported CVN is shown here
20 in white and possibly one or two additional CVNs shown in
21 blue. Puget Sound Naval Shipyard could have one or two
22 CVNs, the currently homeported CVN and possibly one
23 additional CVN. Everett could have zero to two CVNs, the
24 currently homeported CVN and possibly one additional CVN,
25 or possibly minus the currently homeported CVN. Pearl
Harbor could either remain without a CVN or add one CVN.
Columns one through five represent what we
call the action alternatives because they would involve

the action facilities construction in order to accommodate additional ships at those locations. In each case the column for each alternative totals five CVNs. Each alternative also has four AOEs. The AOEs are currently homeported at Puget Sound Naval Shipyard. Under alternative one, with CVNs at Puget Sound Naval Shipyard, the four AOEs would be moved to Naval Station Everett. Under alternative five, also with two CVNs at Puget Sound Naval Shipyard, two AOEs would remain at Puget Sound Naval Shipyard and two would be moved to Naval Station Everett.

The sixth column is the no-action alternative. Note that even the no-action alternative has five CVNs. This is because the proposed action is not to decide how many aircraft carriers we should have in the Pacific Fleet; the action is to decide whether to construct the optimal facilities and infrastructure to support them. Since NEPA requires that an EIS evaluate a no-action alternative, we had to determine where to homeport three CVNs if no new facilities were constructed. Logic dictated that we would not move the CVNs currently homeported to North Island, Puget Sound Naval Shipyard and Naval Station Everett. The rest of the solution was to locate one additional CVN at the existing transient berth at North Island; locate one additional CVN at Puget Sound Naval Shipyard; and keep the AOEs at Puget Sound Naval Shipyard.

The Navy's preferred alternative is alternative two, which would homeport two additional CVNs

at Naval Air Station North Island and maintain Naval Station Everett as a CVN home port. The Navy's preference for this home port combination is based on North Island's accessibility to the sea and the training ranges; Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard's inaccessibility to the training ranges and its lack of facilities to support a carrier air wing; and the operational and quality of life advantages of the existing CVN home port at Naval Station Everett and the assumption that depot maintenance of that CVN can be successfully completed without a significant adverse impact on crew quality of life or maintenance schedules and costs.

Now I will describe some of the construction needed for maximum development at North Island to provide home port facilities for a total of three CVNs. To achieve the necessary water depth of 50 feet, approximately 490,000 cubic yards of dredging would be required. The dredged material would be disposed of at a designated ocean disposal location approximately five miles southwest of North Island or at another location in accordance with permit conditions.

The existing pier J/K would be demolished and reconstructed to provide required CVN berthing. The demolition and reconstruction of pier J/K is required to maintain Berth L as a transient CVN berth to support air wing training and battle group training for CVNs in the U.S. Pacific Fleet area of responsibility.

Approximately 1.2 to two-and-a-half acres of

dike area would be filled behind the pier. The fill material would be covered with a concrete cap to provide a transitional paved area to the other CVN berth facilities.

Filling in the acre dike area would require establishment of a mitigation site to address the loss of shallow waters and eelgrass habitat. The mitigation site would include the creation of new bay bottom and establishment of eelgrass beds with new enhanced intertidal and subtidal habitat. The mitigation site would be constructed adjacent to Pier B at the western end of North Island.

Approximately 50,000 cubic yards of sediment would be dredged to construct the mitigation site and would be in accordance with permit specifications and agency requirements.

The concrete wharf would be supported by concrete and steel piles, reinforced concrete, pile capbeams, and the deck slab. The wharf would provide steam, low-pressure compressed air, potable water, pure water, salt water, sanitary sewer, oily wastes, jet fuel, and marine diesel fuel. Electrical utilities would include a new 4,160 volt substation.

Additional improvements would include relocation of the existing ferry/flag landing that accommodates personal transportation across San Diego Bay. Other improvements would include a CVN warehouse, a fleet support building, equipment laydown building, and lighting. Improvements to the security fence and a security fence would also be needed.

The Draft EIS analyzes the potential environmental effects of the six alternatives. The analysis specifically addresses construction and operation of associated facilities and any dredging that may be required. The study also covers significant issues identified during the public scoping process. The environmental issues that are addressed in the draft EIS include the 17 issues on this slide. I'll let you read through them now and just point out the transportation area includes traffic.

The EIS identifies potentially significant environmental impacts at some or all the home port locations for the following issues: Marine biology, ground transportation, general services, and utilities. The chart summarizes the potentially significant impacts at each CVN home port location.

At Naval Air Station North Island, dredging and pier replacement, which would cause marine habitat and eelgrass habitat removal, would have significant but mitigable impacts on marine biology. These impacts would be associated with alternatives one, two, three and four and would be mitigated by construction of a habitat mitigation area.

At Puget Sound Naval Shipyard significant but mitigable impacts on marine biology could result from dredging and marine construction during the salmon outmigration season and from construction of a confined disposal facility, if needed. These impacts would be

associated with all five of the action alternatives.
1 Impacts on salmon migration could be mitigated by avoiding
2 dredging and marine construction from mid-March to
3 mid-June. Impacts from construction of a confined
4 disposal facility, if needed, potentially could be
5 compensated by construction of a shallow-water habitat.
6 Also, significant unavoidable impacts on general services
7 and utilities would be associated with the no action
8 alternative at Puget Sound Naval Shipyard.
9 At Naval Station Everett significant but
10 mitigable impacts on marine biology could result from
11 dredging and marine construction during the salmon
12 outmigration season and during the Dungeness crab molting
13 period. These impacts would be associated with
14 alternatives one, four and five and could be mitigated by
15 avoiding dredging and reconstruction from mid-March
16 through mid-June. Under alternative four with CVNS at
17 Everett, increased local commuters would cause a
18 significant but mitigable ground transportation impact.
19 The impact could be mitigated by providing roadway
20 improvements and by implementation of a trip reduction
21 program.
22 At Pearl Harbor Shipyard significant but
23 mitigable impacts on ground transportation would occur
24 with the homeporting of a CVN. This impact would be
25 associated with alternatives three and five and could be
26 mitigated by providing roadway improvements and by
27 implementation of a trip reduction program.

Now I'd like to introduce Mr. Tom Beckett who
1 will discuss the Navy Nuclear Propulsion Program.
2
3 MR. TOM BECKETT: Thank you, Captain.
4 Wow, good turnout tonight. Certainly
5 validated the request for a separate meeting in downtown
6 San Diego. If you don't tell the Fire Marshal I won't.
7 You have probably seen it on CNN. Aircraft
8 carriers give the president four-and-a-half acres of
9 sovereign territory he can count on, any time he needs it
10 anywhere in the world. Fleet commanders agree, nuclear
11 power enhances the capability of an aircraft carrier.
12 With tactical flexibility, high speed endurance, and
13 mobility the nuclear powered aircraft carriers can respond
14 to crisis more quickly, arrive on station and higher state
15 of readiness and remain on station longer with less
16 logistic support than their civilian -- excuse me -- than
17 their fossil fueled counterparts.
18 Before discussing the results of the
19 radiological analyses contained in the Environmental
20 Impact Statement, I'd like to provide some background on
21 the Navy's nuclear propulsion program. Earlier this year
22 we celebrated our golden anniversary. You may have seen
23 on the table outside copies of the brochure documenting
24 some of the many kind words we received to mark this
25 occasion from the nation's leaders. If you haven't done
26 so please take one at the break time.
27
28 In the past 50 years the Navy has logged over

1 5,000 reactor years and 115 billion miles steamed on
2 nuclear power worldwide safely. There has never been a
3 reactor accident nor any release of radioactivity
4 associated with our program that has had a significant
5 effect on the public or the environment.

6 The Navy nuclear propulsion standards and
7 record surpass those of any other national or
8 international nuclear program. To validate compliance
9 with our strict radiobiological control requirements we
10 conduct extensive monitoring of the environment in areas
11 where we operate, including San Diego. Monitoring
12 includes analysis of water, sediment, air, and marine
13 samples for evidence of radioactivity. Reports on the
14 results of this monitoring are published openly and
15 annually and have been done so since the mid-1960s.

16 We refer to the Blue Book obviously because
17 of the color of its cover. The Blue Book is available in
18 the Coronado library for those of you who are interested.

19 There have been as many as 22 reactor plants
20 associated with nuclear powered war ships which have been
21 homeported in the San Diego area over the past 40 years.
22 Independent surveys which have been conducted by the

23 Environmental Protection Agency and by other government
24 agencies confirm the results of the Navy's own annual
25 environmental monitoring program. Operations in San Diego
26 over that period of time have had no significant affect on
27 the environment.

28 Now, that doesn't mean that we don't

1 occasionally release radioactivity, but what it does mean
2 is that reactor plant operations which release
3 radioactivity are infrequent and result in small releases
4 which have no significant affect on the environment.

5 Naval reactors are different from and much
6 more robust than their civilian counterparts. The
7 background on this slide shows U.S.S. THEODORE ROOSEVELT
8 undergoing live fire shock testing in 1987. The plume of
9 water behind the ship represents the detonation of the
10 equivalent of over 50,000 pounds of T.N.T. close to the
11 hull. Don't try this in the home reactor pad.

12 The propulsion plant passed with flying
13 colors allowing the ship to continue operating. This is
14 no surprise. Unlike civilian plants, naval reactor plants
15 must be designed to meet the rigors of combat. In
16 addition, naval reactor plants must be designed to fit
17 within the constrained volume of a war ship hull. Even on
18 a ship as large as a nuclear powered aircraft carrier, as
19 many as 6,000 sailors work and live every day while
20 deployed within 600 feet of two operating reactor plants.

21 These design requirements result in reactor
22 plants which are exceptionally resilient and rugged. In
23 addition, the reactors are simple and small. Typically
24 less than one-fifth the size of a civilian nuclear power
25 plant. The naval reactor designs have features which
26 enhance peacetime protection of the public in the
27 environment under the benign conditions existing in any
28 near port when the reactors are being operated at very low

power or shut down.

Emergency preparedness is a normal part of ongoing Navy planning and training. Emergency preparedness covers a wide range of situations from events such as fires, to less frequent situations. Navy plants cover a wide range of situations from common events such as fires to less frequent events such as severe weather, highly unlikely events such as radiological emergencies. Radiological emergency preparedness starts with continuous monitoring of radiological work by trained crews who are highly motivated to detect any abnormal condition. It includes detailed procedures which are thought out in advance and tested to deal with the abnormal situation. Because of the conservative design approach used in naval reactive plants and their facilities, the impacts from radiological emergencies would be localized.

Consequently, emergency plans are based on using Navy resources to combat the problem. The plans do include prompt notification of state and local officials. Let me reiterate that. Plans do include prompt notification of state and local officials. Existing state and local government plans for ensuring public safety during general emergencies such as severe weather are sufficient to deal with the situation if necessary.

H.2

With that background and experience let's discuss the Environmental Impact Statement radiological analysis. We performed detailed analyses which looked at potential impacts to air, water, and sediment quality from normal operations and a range of potential accidents. We performed the detailed radiological analyses which looked at the potential impacts to air, water, and sediment quality. Analyses cover impacts to humans as well as to plant and animal life. The analyses were conducted using internationally accepted methodology and use International Commission on Radiation Protection risk factors. These risk factors assume that a given radiation exposure to a member of the public results in higher risk than it would to a facility worker or sailor. This accounts for more sensitive populations among the public such as children in and the elderly. Fatal cancers are reported since fatal cancer is the commonly accepted measure of impact from radiation exposure. However, the analyses also cover non-fatal cancers and other health effects including genetic effects.

We used several conservative assumptions to determine risks from both normal operations and from hypothetical accidents. For example, we assumed that weather conditions exist which would maximize exposure to the public from the radioactivity released. We also used radiological source terms which greatly overestimate the amount of radioactivity released. If these conservatism were removed from the analyses, the risks would be many times lower than those reported, which I'm about to summarize.

For cumulative impact we assumed that all nuclear powered ships in the area are concentrated at the

1 home port location. For North Island this means that as
2 many as 12 reactor plants representing the ten submarines
3 and one CVN currently in the area were evaluated for the
4 baseline, and then up to 16 reactor plants representing
5 the same 10 submarines and up to 3 aircraft carriers were
6 evaluated for cumulative impacts.

7 Let me digress a little bit at this point and
8 talk about potential shipboard accidents. The evaluation
9 of shipboard accidents does reveal significant details
10 about military capability and war ship design.
11 Consequently they are contained in a classified appendix

12 consistent with the requirements of NEPA. The classified
13 appendix is not releasable to the public but has been
14 provided to E.P.A. headquarters for review. What we can
15 state publicly about the classified analysis is that all
16 environmental impacts and conclusions from this classified
17 appendix are covered by the discussion of facility
18 accidents in the unclassified sections of the EIS.

19 In addition to the analyses in the
20 Environmental Impact Statement we provided a comprehensive
21 classified analysis of the design of the NIMITZ-class
22 reactor plant to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and its
23 advisory committee on reactor safeguards. They conducted
24 their own detailed analyses and agreed with our
25 conclusions: These plants are safe. These reviews,
26 although not required by law, are part of the Navy's
27 longstanding commitment to obtain an independent
28 consideration of important elements of reactor plant

design.

1 Here are the results of the radiological
2 evaluations for homeporting nuclear powered aircraft
3 carriers at North Island. They show the average
4 additional annual risk of latent cancer fatality to any
5 single member of the public within 50 miles of North
6 Island are one in one billion from the cumulative impact
7 of normal operations. For the most severe facility

8 accident, the additional annual risk is one in seven
9 hundred million. This slide is provided to show some
10 perspective on the previous risk numbers. Notice I didn't
11 say there is no risk associated with these operations, but
12 our conclusion is that the risks are less, much less than
13 the risks associated with everyday life.

14 Finally, this slide shows what I like to call
15 a Seal Team environmental inspection of U.S.S. NEVADA in
16 her home port. I use this slide to punctuate our
17 conclusion that there are no significant radiological
18 impacts from any of the homeporting alternatives.
19 I will now turn the program back over to
20 Captain Deal.

21 CAPTAIN ROCKLAND DEAL: Now, normally at this point
22 we take a ten-minute break, but I think due to constraints
23 of the facilities we have here tonight we will probably
24 best, unless I hear something different, and we will go to
25 launch into the speaker part of it. If I can get some of
26 the contact folks to bring the cards out that we have so
27 28

1 far. We want to hear from you. We want to hear from as
2 many people as we can. Hopefully everybody will get a
3 chance to speak tonight. When you -- I'll announce -- I
4 think because of the difficulty of getting down to the
5 front of the room here, I will probably introduce three
6 people or have three people ready to speak; and when you
7 step up to the mic, please state your name for the Court
8 Reporter here so we make sure we get comments back to you
9 when we record your comments for writing. Also point out
10 that oral or written comments, they will both get complete
11 and thorough, as we can make it, reply in writing. So if
12 you can't get everything said orally here, please put it
13 in writing and we will answer that part. All right.
14 Okay. First to speak will be Victor Castillo
15 followed by Ruth Heife followed by Laura Hunter.

16 VICTOR CASTILLO: Good evening. Thank you for
17 letting me speak here briefly tonight. (inaudible)
18 regrets his inability to be here tonight, yet he attended
19 last night's hearing and asked me to attend tonight. He
20 submits for the record an article he wrote for the "San
21 Diego Union Tribune," from September 2nd of this year, and
22 the article is entitled "Public Needs Information About
23 The Nuclear Carriers." We ask that it be respectfully
24 submitted for the record.
25 (Attached as Exhibit 1.)
26 Thank you.
27
28

25

1 LAURA HUNTER: Good evening. My name is Laura
2 Hunter from the Environmental Health Coalition. I would
3 like to take a moment to ask everybody in the audience
4 tonight who is opposed to nuclear homeporting in San Diego
5 Bay to please stand.

6 We are asking the Navy -- I would like to ask
7 you to remain standing just for two minutes while I make
8 comments, then I'll ask you to sit down.

9 We are asking the Navy to take note, there is
10 significant public concern and opposition to the nuclear
11 megaport in San Diego Bay, and we demand that you take our
12 concerns into account before you bury us with more nuclear
13 reactors and even more risk to our health and our safety.

14 One point we want to make very, very clearly,
15 telling us what you are going to do is not the same as an
16 inclusive decision-making process that we deserve and
17 count on in a participatory democracy. We are here
18 tonight to demand a real voice in this process.

19 Thank you.

20 The speakers that follow me will raise issues
21 that have been of concern in the past and are still of
22 concern in this DEIS. Nothing has changed, nothing except
23 we are going to have more reactors, more waste, more
24 traffic, and more risk. The concerns we have raised in
25 our previous extensive comments on this project, the
26 health risks are still unanswered, and they have been
27 ignored. The health risk assessments are still improperly
28

26

H.2

1 manipulated. The Navy accident record is still hidden.
2 Our safety is still unprotected. No meaningful actions
3 have been taken in response to the considered,
4 intelligent, thoughtful public input that has been
5 provided to you today. These are not the actions of
6 participatory democracy, and it makes a charade out of
7 this process.

8 Many of us have been involved in this project since 1994. We have attended seven public hearings on
9 five separate environmental documents on one project; the
10 nuclear megaproject. By splitting the impacts into
11 five separate studies, the total impact of this project
12 was hidden and obfuscated. This is piecemealing, and it's
13 not allowed under the law. Of these five reviews none has
14 been signed by a person who cared enough about us to come
15 out here and hear from us first hands about our concerns,
16 about how this project will affect our lives.
17 Frankly, I have a lot of sympathy for you
18 gentlemen sitting there; you don't make the decision.
19 Where are the guys that are going to make the decisions
20 about our lives?

H.2 This is not the action of a government that
22 exists for and cares about the good of the people.
23 Democracy is also undermined when the Navy completely
24 self-certifies and self-regulates the most dangerous
25 aspects of this project, and that's the nuclear propulsion
26 part. It violates the all important checks and balances
27 of power integral to our society.

H.2.4 1 Bottom line, fifth piece of this puzzle
ignores public input, and most important to communities.
It's most objectionable that this person who was
ultimately responsible for this, specifically Secretary of
the Navy, Richard Dansig is not here.

I urge everybody in attendance to call Dansig
and say where were you. We want to talk to you. Call and
dial for Democracy tomorrow. Anything less is
unacceptable.

H.2.5 9 Thank you.

MARILYN FIELD: Good evening. I'm Marilyn Field,
and I live in Coronado, but I didn't go to the meeting in
Coronado last night. I'm here tonight because this is the
first meeting you have had in San Diego, and this is not
just a Coronado issue. This project affects San Diego and
surrounding communities equally with Coronado, and tonight
you are going to hear the names of many people from many
communities around San Diego who oppose this project.
And why are we all concerned?

H.2.6 15 Homeporting three nuclear aircraft carriers
with the support facilities, the nuclear waste processing
plant, and the nuclear waste dump within less than a mile
of the center of a major population center makes no sense.
Especially when it's right between two earthquake faults
on loosely compacted landfill.

H.2.7 22 Why are we concerned? Put very simply,
accidents happen. They happen to everyone. They happen

even in the nuclear Navy.

For five years now you have been telling us the Navy makes no mistakes; there are no accidents; never had a reactor accident in the history of naval nuclear propulsion, but that's because you define reactor accidents very narrowly. You have many things which you call incidents which general population would call accidents. I have a list of 11 of them, and six others that are near accidents.

And I will give this to the Court Reporter and she can put it in the record.

(Attached as Exhibit 2.)

Accidents are especially likely to happen when you have short-handed personnel and personnel are worked around the clock to compensate for vacancy. This has been much in the news lately. The Navy has told us how they are going to have to do something, either lower their recruiting standards by to the lowest categories or taking other actions, but right now you are not fully able to man your personnel slots, and that creates the risk of accidents and people get tired and overworked just as it did when you spilled mercury in the San Diego bay two years ago which cost about \$2 million to clean up.

I first became very seriously concerned about this project when I read the EIS for the STENNIS because one of the things that concerned me was that I read about the Navy's accident plans, and that there is a warning system and Navy based personnel will be inside within five

minutes and evacuated from the base within two hours. But

there are no emergency evacuation plans or warning sirens or perimeter monitoring to let civilians know what is happening in the event of an accident.

For years now -- several years now -- we have been asking for at least perimeter monitoring, emergency warning, and emergency plans including evacuation plans. Civil plans for an earthquake are not sufficient.

Emergency plans are not effective unless civilians know what they are and what they are supposed to do if they are warned. Right now we don't even have a warning system so we could tell people in the event of an accident.

Perimeter monitoring is available; it is not that expensive; it is used in other -- around other nuclear facilities around the country, and there is even federal money available and it's encouraged. Citizen monitoring is encouraged by -- the Navy has tried to oppose this and has so far refused to provide this to us.

So I say it is time for the public to say no, and I think we are saying no tonight.

No more nuclear propulsion. And it's time for the Navy to say yes. Yes to answering our questions, and yes to our reasonable requests for citizens' safety measures in connection with the carrier we already have here.

One more comment. I have spent a lot of time in the last few weeks trying to understand this document, and particularly the appendix dealing with radiation

H.2.13

H.2.11

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2 there are no emergency evacuation plans or warning sirens
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4 happening in the event of an accident.

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6 been asking for at least perimeter monitoring, emergency
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27 in the last few weeks trying to understand this document,
28 and particularly the appendix dealing with radiation

29

30

1 risks, and this document is a disgrace. You talk about it
2 being conservatively calculated. It isn't. It is a
3 highly biased NAVY P.R. piece which does not take into
4 event the latest scholarship and research done on low
5 level radiation. Moreover, in your risk you multiply
6 your -- whatever you decided is your risk of an accident,
7 which I guess you think is pretty close to zero. That
8 greatly underestimates the risk. Also risk is stated as
9 average annual risk. Nobody cares if they are going to
10 get cancer this year or next, they want to know if this is
11 going to cause me cancer in my lifetime.

12 What we need -- I have been to many meetings.
13 I speak my peace. I have written letters. My comments
14 are ignored. My questions aren't answered. I have been
15 at this for three years now. We really deserve answers
16 and we need a dialogue. We don't just need you to listen
17 and hear us and ignore us.

18 Thank you.

19 LUZ PALOMINO: (In Spanish. Not reported by the
20 Court Reporter.)

H.2
21 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I'm going to translate.
22 The additional impact of aircraft carriers,
23 nuclear aircraft carriers and a waste plants here next to
24 our streets. I don't understand why the documentation of
25 this project wasn't in Spanish, nor do I understand why
26 this is the first time you had a meeting in San Diego.
27 We are already victims of a lot of

H.2.16 1 contamination in my neighborhood and emissions from a lot
2 of industries that put out toxic waste. The fish in the
3 bay already are contaminated, and they are not good enough
4 to eat.

H.2.20
5 One of the aspects of this document that
6 wasn't analyzed recently also that we found out was that
7 you have now contracted with three local ship builders to
8 do your defense contracts. And the contracts guarantee
9 that the nuclear ships will be repaired next to this site.
10 That will bring even more contamination to my
11 neighborhood. And that is a direct and indirect impact of
H.2.17 12 these nuclear aircraft carriers that was never ever
13 contemplated in your EIS or even talked to in the
14 community.

H.2.21
15 I live downwind from the project, from your
16 project. And if there is an accident, my family, all of
17 our families and all of San Diego are in jeopardy by these
18 nuclear aircraft carriers.

H.2.18 19 ERNIE McCRAE: And if you happen to have accidents
20 that you say you haven't, all I can reply to that is thank
21 goodness. You see, I have had personal experience with
22 accidents that had happen. I was part of many families in
23 San Diego that hosted kids from Belerusse that had a
24 tremendous nuclear accident, or nuclear incident, and
25 their lives have been changed forever. The reason they
26 came here was to replenish their immune systems. The
27 fruit in their country has been changed. The structure of
H.2.19 28

1 their very nature has been changed.

2 Let's say we don't have an accident anywhere
3 near our lives. Some day it is going to happen. And then
4 how is that explained to children. I'm here representing
5 children because that's what my work -- life's work is all
6 about. I happen to be Principal of Cabrillo Elementary in
7 Point Loma, and we don't have a clue as to what to do if
8 something happened to release nuclear waste, and we are
9 very close to where you are; and we are upwind, downwind,
10 sidewind. Every afternoon in Point Loma the winds are
11 just all over the place, anybody who lives in that area.

I think we owe it to future generations -- I
1 H.2.23
12 happen to have nine grandchildren who live in this
13 community, and we owe it to them and their descendants to
14 think of other ways to carry on our national security. I
15 think that it's become like a game and someone had
16 mentioned that there is no consideration of people who
17 oppose, and the Secretary of the Navy should be here.
18 This is extremely important, and I think it's a lack of
19 respect for our community that they put you in this
20 situation to take this on.
21 Thank you.

22
23 DEE CHRISTIAN: Good evening. I'm Dee Christian.
24 I'm a retired physician from U.C.S.D. and the president of
25 the board of the Peace Resource Center in San Diego.
26 As a physician at the same time as every
27 month I get literature showing that tinier and tinier and
28 H.2.24

tinier amounts of radiation are now proving to be
medically devastating. The Navy is busily bringing in
ship after ship, and submarine after submarine, nuclear
repair facility after nuclear repair facility making San
Diego already one of the sixth most largest cities in the
United States, one of the most radioactively at risk
cities in the United States.

To a physician this is starting to seem
absolutely insane. We know that if one of these floating
nuclear power plants goes wrong with no containment
vessel, we are supposed to evacuate a ten-mile radius
within five hours and get potassium-iodine and shelter to
everyone 74 miles downwind way into Mexico, and we also
know that no such thing will happen; and we are doomed.
Even without accidents we are in trouble.

All these nuclear processes involve routine
allowable legal exposures in this state of radionuclides.
These small amounts are more health threatening than we
have realized, and more health threatening than your risk
assessment assumptions are making. We thought Chernobyl
would hurt people 12 miles away. We now have 150 percent
increase in breast cancers 25 miles away from Chernobyl.
We have a thyroid cancer epidemic in Chernobyl from
Chernobyl and that is hundreds of kilometers away. The
Pilgrim Nuclear Plant studies prove the leukemia rates go
up around plants emitting perfectly legal and routine
amounts of radioactive material. The Oak Ridge National
Laboratory and Portsmouth Naval Shipyard workers have

H.2.24
33
34

H.2.25

1 excess lung cancers and leukemias with a tiny and extra
2 dose, single rem which is one-third of what the Navy is
3 permitted to administer to each of us without thinking
4 about it.
5 of grave importance to San Diegans faced with
6 living near dozens of low radiation emitting plants and
7 naval facilities, the Oak Ridge data show that low doses
8 of radioactivity delivered slowly over decades are ten
9 times more likely to make a human cancer than are high
10 doses of radiation delivered quickly.
11 One-third of those who work at Rocketyne in
12 Simi Valley receiving only doses way under those
13 considered safe by current law and used in your risk
14 assessment numbers died of cancer. That's eight times the
15 number that should be dying of cancer.

H.2.26

16 There is already radioactivity alpha and beta
17 emissions in our bay's fish, and although it is natural to
18 fear an accident with massive uncontrolled releases, the
19 medical literature is starting to warn that it's really
20 the slow environmental accumulation from each one of
21 dozens of allowable naval point sources during routine
22 operations, repairs, transportation, and storage that's
23 going to do us in. Once out in plants, fish or humans,
24 these molecules do damage for up to thousands of years,
25 and they are not recoverable or made less dangerous over
26 time. In fact, having chlorine or chlorination in our
27 drinking water makes some of them more apt to stick into
28 the body and cause cancer. What an ironic twist of

H.2.25

1 biology that is.
2 From a physician's point of view, basing the
3 nuclear Navy and its dangerous onshore support facilities
4 in a large population center like San Diego defies reason
5 and comes with unacceptable health and environmental
6 risks.

H.2.26

7 CAROL JOHKAW: I'm Carol Jonkaw. I'm the executive
8 director of Peace Resource Center.
9 One of the things that I would like to
10 address tonight are the claims made here and elsewhere by
11 the Navy that an all nuclear carrier force is necessary
12 because it provides a military advantage.
13 In truth a new report released by the general
14 accounting office this August revealed that nuclear
15 powered carriers offer no discernible military advantages
16 over conventionally powered carriers and concluded that
17 they are far more expensive to operate and maintain.
18 I recommend this is some good reading. It is a little
19 more easier user friendly reading for folks than the EIS.
20 Good reading.

H.2.27

21 I'd like to say to you that what needs to
22 happen is the Navy has got to stop perpetuating myths
23 about the superiority of nuclear carriers and start
24 talking about some real facts.

H.2.28

25 Fact: As revealed in the G.A.O. report,
26 nuclear carriers are far more expensive to operate and
27 maintain costing over \$8 billion over a 50-year life span

each. That's 58 percent more than a conventional carrier cost to operate over 50 years, and these costs do not include the cost of decommissioning nor the cost of storage of the reactors, spent nuclear fuel for thousands of years.

Fact: The Navy stopped building other nuclear powered service vessels after 1975 because of the high cost.

Fact: Remaining nuclear powered surface vessels have been decommissioned early because they were not cost effective to operate and maintain.

Fact: Conventional and nuclear carriers both have been effective in meeting requirements of our military strategy requirements. They share many of the same characteristics and capabilities and are employed interchangeably.

Fact: A carrier force of 12 conventional carrier groups, battle groups, actually can provide a greater level of overseas presence at a far cheaper cost than a nuclear carrier force.

And a fact to put some of this into real perspective, some of these claims, do they get there faster? Sure, a little bit. As a G.A.O. report points out, on a trip from the east coast to Mediterranean, the nuclear carrier will get there two hours sooner. Six hours sooner from the Pacific to the Persian Gulf.

Now, I want to ask you is two hours or six hours worth the cost? Is it worth putting the health and

risk, health and safety of our communities at risk from radiation exposure to save a few hours?

THE AUDIENCE: No.

CAROL JONKAW: There is really no sane, rational reason to develop nuclear carriers. Nevertheless, San Diego is faced with becoming the largest West Coast concentration of nuclear carriers in the U.S. People here might be interested to know that on September 25th less than one month, less than one month after this report came out the Department of Defense approved the Navy's request that the next generation of carriers, the CVXs be outfitted with nuclear propulsion plants.

This is not a surprising decision given the Navy predictions, nuclear propulsion and the influences of the nuclear industry, but one has to really question the continued loss of democracy that is demonstrated when a decision such as this which impacts the health and welfare of so many people is once again with the public knowing very little if anything about it and certainly not being included in the decision making process.

Let's get very clear about this. Nuclear carriers do not add to our security. In fact, they make us less secure. They make us less secure by stealing money away from needed social programs that would enhance our quality of life and by increasing the health and safety dangers to our community.

Your Draft Environmental Impact Statement has a lot of serious flaws, but the most fundamental one is

H.2.29

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2 radiation exposure to save a few hours?

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H.2.36

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H.2.37

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H.2.38

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H.2.39

a lot of serious flaws, but the most fundamental one is

H.2.40

a lot of serious flaws, but the most fundamental one is

1 the assumption that nuclear carriers are necessary. You H.2.37 1
2 don't really need them, and we certainly don't want them. 2

3 PAULA FORTERS: Good evening. My name is Paula H.2.38 3
4 Forters, and I am staff counsel for the Environmental 4
5 Health Coalition. In these public hearings tonight and 5
6 last night you have heard concerns of many members of 6
7 public. You are going to keep hearing those concerns 7
8 tonight. You also heard from elected officials, technical 8
9 experts, and they are all telling you about the problems 9
10 that we have with this project. 10

11 I want to talk a little bit about the legal 11
12 problems that exist with the EIS in order to build on some 12
13 of their concerns. 13

14 First, the Environmental Impact Statement 14
15 analyzes the impacts of this project by using the 15
16 assumption that two CVNs will replace two CVs that will be 16
17 leaving San Diego. This just serves to minimize the 17
18 appearance of impact on this project. In fact, San Diego 18
19 is currently a home port to only one CV. It has not been 19
20 a home port to more than two CVs since the U.S.S. RANGER 20
21 was decommissioned in 1993. Thus in reality only one CV 21
22 will be leaving San Diego, not two as the EIS claims. 22

23 In contrast with what the Navy has done, the 23
24 law requires that the Navy analyze this project compared 24
25 to what is on the ground now, and the potential impacts 25
26 from this project must be analyzed compared to what exists 26
27 now. If this analysis is done according to law, the real 27
28

1 impacts from this project will start to show up. H.2.38 1
2 Second, as the Navy is well aware, the EIS H.2.39 2
3 must consider all of the potential health impacts to the 3
4 people of this region, and yet there are several gaping 4
5 holes in this analysis. 5

6 You have heard from some of the folks as to 6
7 problems of the analysis of the radiation impacts. I want 7
8 to talk about are for a second about problems of the 8
9 analysis of the toxic air contaminants that are going to 9
10 be released as a part of this project. 10

11 The EIS fails entirely to analyze the impacts 11
12 from potential increases and emissions of toxic air 12
13 contaminants at NASNI. Now, realize that NASNI already 13
14 ranks second in San Diego county for posing the highest 14
15 industrial cancer risk to surrounding neighborhoods. It 15
16 is second only to the Point Loma Naval complex. This is 16
17 already a huge burden on the people of this region and yet 17
18 the increases in cancer causing emissions from the added 18
19 burden of two more carriers has not been established, and 19
20 the added burden of servicing those carriers. That has 20
21 not even been mentioned in this EIS. 21

22 In order for the EIS to give full information 22
23 to the public about the existing environment at NASNI and 23
24 the potential impacts of this project, all existing 24
25 emissions of both toxic criteria pollutants from all NASNI 25
26 operations must be documented and all future emissions of 26
27 both toxic and criteria pollutants from this project must 27
28 be documented. 28

H.2.40 1 Additionally, the potential impacts from the
2 air wing which is attached to those carriers hasn't even
3 been addressed. The EIS cites the close proximity of the
4 multiple airfields to this project is being necessary for
5 this project and yet does not even mention the potential
6 from impacts from the air wing that's associated with
7 those fields. It would lead us to believe that those
8 fields would not even be used, even though they are
9 necessary for this project.

H.2.41 1 In sum, the current analysis is flawed and
2 legally insufficient. Does not rise to the standards of a
3 National Environmental Policy Act, and that act was
4 developed and passed so that people like this could have
5 full information about government actions before they were
6 taken.

H.2.42 1 You haven't done that. You haven't complied
2 with the law, and we are calling on you to do just that,
3 to provide complete information about this project to the
4 public and finally come clean.

5 Thank you.

H.2.43 1 not provided to the Court Reporter.)
2 BETTY HIMLY: I'm Betty Himley. I am a volunteer
3 with the Peace Resource Center, and I would like to read
4 the names of the people from Pacific Beach who could not
5 be here and support our efforts to be heard.
6 (Written list of names with proper spellings
7 not provided to the Court Reporter.)
8

H.2.44 1 not provided to the Court Reporter.)
2 JASON FLORES: Good evening. My name is Jason
3 Flores. I am a resident of Pacific Beach, and I would
4 like to voice my support for the earlier testimony of the
5 Environmental Health Coalition and the Peace Resource
6 Center.
7 The following are the names of people I
8 collected in the Ocean Beach vicinity who are also opposed
9 to nuclear homeporting:
10 (Written list of names with proper spellings
11 not provided to the Court Reporter.)
12 Thank you.

H.2.45 1 not provided to the Court Reporter.)
2 ALAN McAFFEE: I'm Alan McAfee speaking in support
3 of the Peace Resource Center and the Environmental Health
4 Coalition and other people also wish to have their names
5 entered in support of those groups:
6 (Written list of names with proper spellings
7 not provided to the Court Reporter.)
8

1 JOE VARLEY: Good evening. My name is Joe Varley.
2
3 I'm a native San Diegan. I was raised in Rosecrans Street
4 just near the subbase in San Diego near the (inaudible)
5 Point subbase. I lived there when it was an atomic
6 submarine base.

7 My wife and I now live next to the Sparwars
8 facility on Point Loma. The reason I mention this is I
9 want to establish that I know what kind of neighbor the
10 United States Navy can be. The Navy has always been
11 responsive to the community needs. The Navy brings the
12 best and the brightest people to our city. The future
13 citizens and leaders of this city will have a heavy
14 representation of former Navy personnel. The Navy also
15 brings with it the cutting edge of technology.

16 The world leader of nuclear technology is the
17 United States of America. And the leader of that
18 technology of ship powered nuclear propulsion is the
19 United States Navy. No one in the world is better
20 prepared to use nuclear power than the United States Navy.

21 The Navy has always in the past accepted its
22 responsibility to mitigate the impacts to traffic
23 congestion, education, and the environment. There is no
24 reason to believe that their dedication will change any
25 time soon.

26 To those concerned with the possibility of a
27 nuclear disaster, I would remind you that more people died
28 at Chappaquidic Creek than died at Three-Mile Island.

I would urge everyone to support the homeporting of these ships. It's good for the Navy and it's good for our city.

Thank you very much.

STEVE MCWILLIAMS: My name is Steve Mc Williams.

I'm currently on trial for providing marijuana medicine to patients in San Diego. I find it absolutely offensive that our government spends billions of dollars to provide death to people all around the world, while at the same time prosecuting our own citizens right here in the United States, simply for trying to take care of themselves.

I am offended that indigenous people, native Americans, mainly in South Dakota and other parts of the United States are digging up uranium ore and making plutonium in highly dangerous situations, and all of that has to come here; and as it travels here it is incapable of endangering many people as it is being transported.

After all the Navy has done with it, the waste products have to be disposed of, and we haven't even figured all of that out either.

All of this is meant to just provide death and destruction for people around the world. All these ships can do is rain terror and death on people, and I am offended by that. I'm offended by a government that has nothing better to do than to hurt other people while leaving its own people homeless and desperate and bedridden and diseased and illiterate and poverty

stricken. I'm offended by this government. And you represent that. And so you offend me too.

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reasonable person can analyze the volume of information by simply subtracting out one CV to make it true. It's very, very difficult.

MILES HARVEY: I represent the Landing Homeowner's Association which is the homeowner's association for the 92-unit condominium complex at 1st and Orange Avenue in Coronado.

For many years we have been interested in the traffic problem, and because of this DEIS we have reviewed it in some detail; and we have the following comments on the DEIS itself: We are embarrassed to say that we believe that it is fundamentally and fatally flawed and that the information in the DEIS does not speak as of the date of its issuance and the facts relied upon do not exist today.

'Throughout the DEIS refers to the quote, current situation, close quote, as being two CVS homeported at the air station and throughout gives credit to the removal of two CVS. This simply is not the case. As the only major ships homeported at the air station are one CV CONSTELLATION and one CVN the newly arrived STENNIS. The references to removal two CVS, see pages ES-8, 9, 17, 19, pages 2-44, 2-49 and the, quote, status quo, close quote, described on page 2-44.

It also stated that beginning in 1998 three aircraft carriers will be homeported at the air station. Again, this is at page 2-8 and 9. This is not true. Has not been true, and will not be true. There is no way a

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The Navy is currently in the process of redesigning the main gate so that the entrance will be aligned with 3rd Street at Alameda Boulevard and the exit aligned with 4th Street,

close quote, pages 3.9-4 and 3.18-11. The implication is that the gate will be realigned and this will mitigate traffic problems. This, however, does not comport with the recent statement of Coronado's Mayor Smisek that due to the cause of the realignment and SANDAQ's lack of funding, such realignment is, quote, dead, close quote.

So many of the facts and figures used in the DEIS are outdated and should be updated to the current situation. That is downsizing one CV, one CVN, current terrorists threats by increased security at the air station, et cetera.

Traffic trip rates based on a mid-1980 study at May Port Naval Station in Florida would be laughable if they were not contained in a serious DEIS, page 3.9-5. Quote, daily traffic volumes, close quote, were collected from Caltans, the City of Coronado, and the Navy in 1995, close quote. Page 3.9-5. There must be information that is less than three years old that reflects the different population and ship mix at the air station at the present time.

We also now have experience with delays in

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1 traffic caused by threat alert condition. We also have
2 the suicides, the accidents on the bridge that completely
3 snarl up the access to Coronado Island.

4 Unfortunately by trying to justify conclusion
5 there are what we believe to be substantial emissions of
6 two vital mitigation measures. There is no mention of the
7 realignment of the main gate as a mitigation measure,
8 although the DEIS seems to erroneously assume that it will
9 happen. There is no mention in the proposed bore tunnel
10 although it is on the Coronado Municipal ballot this
11 week -- or next week.

12 Last but not least we believe that there must
13 be discussion probably under health and safety that the
14 increased threat of terrorist activity for strategic
15 targeting by foreign powers caused by accumulation of
16 three and four if transient dock is used of the world's
17 largest war ships in a very confined space. This must
18 have an impact on the desirability of gaining maximum
19 results from illegal acts. This really needs to be
20 treated in the DEIS. If it is to, quote, evaluate
21 potential impacts, close quote, from the proposed
22 homeporting of three nuclear carriers of transient dock of
23 visiting nuclear carrier.

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24 Because of the factual foundation of the
25 DEIS, it does not fulfill its purpose of evaluating,
26 quote, the environmental effects from constructing and
27 operating facilities and infrastructure needed to support
28 three NIMITZ-class carriers, close quote, and requirement

H.2.53 1 of informing, quote, of reasonable alternatives to avoid
2 or minimize adverse impacts, close quote.
3 It is interesting to note the DEIS, quote,
4 acknowledges that the air station cannot support three
5 additional CVNs for a total of four. That's page 2-69.
6 We respectfully request that the DEIS be
7 rewritten in the present factual situation using current
8 information and providing data on mitigation measures.
9 There is also a new noise study that has come
10 out this week that certainly could be included.
11 This is one of the most important matters
H.2.54 12 facing the city of Coronado. Unfortunately although the
13 law requires the Navy to prepare a supplemental EA or EIS
14 should new information relevant to the environmental
15 concerns bear on the impacts of the proposed action become
16 available, the Navy really should go back to the drafting
17 board and prepare a new DEIS to avoid the confusion that
18 it would entail if they merely issued a supplement to the
19 current draft.
20 Thank you.

H.2.55 21

ED KIMERUP: Thank you. My name is Ed Kimerup. I H.2.59
22 am speaking here on behalf of the Sierra Club. Excuse my
23 voice. I'm getting over the flu. The DEIS really really
24 has a lot of flaws in it, and I think it's seriously
25 flawed; and I would like to point out several instances
26 here where we are submitting comments that will outline
27 many of these.

1 One comment here that reflects the comment
2 that is made about the traffic. They mentioned that there
3 is a six-month maintenance cycle every two years. When
4 you have three carriers that means there is an 18-month
5 cycle that these 450 specialists have to come down to do
6 the servicing, and yet in the EIS it treats it as if there
7 is only a temporary crew here, like six months out of two
8 years. And that's carried throughout the EIS.

9 It doesn't recognize the traffic impact and
10 the 450 people that will be coming. In the DEIS the air
11 quality impacts of a commuting traffic because of this
12 additional crew is not considered. Furthermore, it
13 assumes that the traffic car emissions are based on the
14 California standards when, in fact, many cars that are
15 used for commuting are licensed out of state and states
16 which have less strict air quality standards.

17 There is also failure in the DEIS to mention
18 a fire aboard the carrier. Nor is there any discussion of
19 fire boats that could handle the situation. This is
20 covered under the utilities and services section.

21 The impacts on the bay water quality have
22 been glossed over. For example, there is no discussion on
23 the storm water runoff or from the carriers itself or the
24 water runoff during maintenance where you are scrubbing
25 painting and so forth.

26 There is also a call that we had made for an
27 independent committee with security clearance to overview
28 the nuclear propulsion program. The E.P.A. may be part of

H.2.60 1 that, but we have asked for a special committee to do
2 that, and that was ignored.
H.2.65 3 The radiological risk assessment that may be
4 heard previously is seriously at fault. We don't believe
5 that the elderly were included contrary to the comment
6 that was made by the speaker. It only included the
7 children. And I checked that this afternoon. And
8 furthermore, if you look at the SANDAG studies, they show
9 the demographics from all the cities surrounding these
10 impacted areas and many of them have populations that have
11 higher rates of elderly, Coronado, for example. You go
12 across the bay to National City, the children, the ages
13 there are much higher, and so that has to be factored in
14 when you do a radiological test. But that hasn't been
15 done and, furthermore, by averaging these numbers you do
16 not give a true picture of the statistics; for example, we
17 don't know what the maximum risk might be or what even the
18 standard deviation of what that risk is, only the averages
19 were taken. Two-and-a-half million people and you divide
20 that into the risk, you are going to get a small number no
21 matter what you think. But that isn't really giving you a
22 realistic assessment of the people who are really to be
23 factored.
H.2.66 24 And that's -- those are my concluding
25 comments. Like I said we will be submitting additional
written comments.
26 Thank you.
27
28

1 JANICE JORDAN: Hello my name is Janice Jordan.
2 I'm a Peace and Freedom candidate for the 49th
3 Congressional District, and I know a lot about democracy
4 or lack of, I should say, in this country. And I saw a
5 lot of lack of Democracy in your representation and your
6 presentation here tonight, and I'm disappointed in you
7 greatly; and hopefully as an elected official after
8 November 3rd my words will be the words of the community,
9 not only the community that's in here tonight but the
10 community of the thousands of people in their homes and on
11 the streets tonight where they are saying no more nuclear
12 aircraft carriers.

I worked for the County of San Diego ten
years ago. And one of the jokes that used to go around
the office was that we had the cleanest bay in the nation
because so many chemicals have been spilled in there that
it killed off everything. Instead of pouring bleach into
the water of the basin of your sink. And I remember
taking a call that the Navy had dumped some paint on the
rocks out on Coronado, and they were never held
responsible for that because we could not site you for
that because you were a government agency above us.

If we can't hold you responsible for
something as simple as spilling paint, how are we to hold
you responsible for a nuclear disaster?

H.2.67 1 that means you need to listen to us and be a part of us.
2 We can't work against each other. My concern is your
3 concern. I care about what happens to the Navy if
4 anything should ever go wrong. You are a human too. We
5 need to work together. You can't ignore us. Work with
6 us. We are your community.

WILLIAM E. CLAYCO: I'm William Clayco. I'm
speaking on behalf of Save Our Bay, Inc., Imperial Beach.
Usually we put comments in writing, but we
don't expect any consideration of our comments, so we are
going to save some paper. We have been conned for just
about -- I have been conned for 53 years now. When
somebody conned Harry Truman into dropping bombs on
Nagasaki and Hiroshima I thought he had saved my life
because I was slated to go hit the beach with the marines,
and he saved me because he dropped those bombs. But then
a found out years ago, I found out that he didn't have to
drop those bombs because we had bombed Japan so badly, and
we could keep it up for a few more months; and they were
already at the consistency of watery jelly. The war would
have been over in six months without the bombs. So
somebody conned Harry, and he dropped the bombs.

Then the next president, good old Ike, he was
conned too. He was conned into using nuclear power, the
peaceful atom. And the con keeps going on.

But I like to know -- the last time I heard,
one atom of plutonium in your lungs would give you lung

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1 cancer. One atom. So I would like to know how many atoms
2 of plutonium are produced each day by each of your
3 reactors.

4 Finally, Germany has just decided to quit
5 using nuclear power. And I think it's time our Navy did
6 the same.

7

8 WILLIAM HARRIS: I'm the founder of the Health
9 Optimizing Institute.

10 I can't really -- I can't believe this is
11 happening. It's just like I think I'm going to wake up
12 this is a bad dream. I can't imagine at this point in
13 time that the Department of the Defense and Navy would be
14 presenting such a situation in San Diego. I mean, we were
15 looking at, you know, a campaign to create San Diego being
16 a model optimal health community, and the real issue is,
17 you know, it was the Department of War and the Department
18 of War I think is all over, and they changed it to
19 Department of Defense. Okay. So we look at what it takes
20 in military for logistics, over 80 percent of the military
21 is logistics, and so this money could be -- I mean, the
22 conversation at this time -- I mean, the wisdom and the
23 intelligence here, I mean, it's incredible; but I think we
24 must be being run by the system. Is that the problem?

25 Because, I mean, the wisdom and the integrity of the
26 people here, all of us, I mean it's so incredible, I would
27 expect that the conversation here would be about a
28 conversion of creating a new job for the industrial

H.2.71 1 military complex, raising the pay, because you would be
2 able to raise the pay, because what you are doing, the
3 discussion would be how to use this money to take the
4 warhead off, you would have the warhead ready, and put the
5 peace head on which is creating war in reverse.
6 My goodness, the need is there in the world.
7 We got the money. We got the wisdom. We got the
8 technology. And I can't believe that this is happening.
9 I mean, this is totally unreal.

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H.2.74 11 RANDY BERGMAN: Randy Bergman representing River
12 Valley Preservation Project.
13 My first comment is a repeat of the report,
14 the G.A.O. report about no discernible military advantages
15 over non-nuclear carriers and that Navy commanders don't
16 request nuclear rather than conventional carriers for
17 battle situations. Doesn't that say it all?
18 Certainly the independent G.A.O. report is
19 more incredible than the nuclear Navy with its vested
20 interest. Furthermore, each carrier costing 8 billion
21 more to build and operate than a conventional carrier.
22 This is a ludicrous waste of our tax dollars and should be
23 widely reported on national evening news segments
24 describing boondoggling.

H.2.75 25 Congressman Bob Filner in response to the
26 G.A.O. report agreed that we can avoid the massive costs
27 of public safety risks of nuclear carriers by simply
28 building conventional carriers instead. I have asked the

H.2.75 1 congressman to introduce legislation which would stop all
2 funding of nuclear carriers. I hope everyone here will do
3 likewise.

I also plan to write the President to ask him
4 to veto any bills which would fund nuclear carriers. As
5 San Diegans we need to take the lead in making people
6 throughout the country aware of such fiscal insanity. It
7 is projects like these that have led us into a 6 trillion
8 federal deficit. Congressional investigators are looking
9 into these matters, and I understand that they should also
10 include in-depth (inaudible) with profiting from such
11 instruction and to see if such profiting is legal.
12 With billions of dollars at stake, it should
13 be not surprising to find massive under-the-table-payoffs.

The Navy representative was quoted as saying
15 that each time we drive a car over here we are at more
16 risk of an accident than with a nuclear accident from
17 these carriers. Yet it also -- this argument presumes
18 that there would be no sabotage as others have pointed
19 out. And the argument also misses the point, if anyone is
20 in an auto accident, it does not have regional
21 consequences. For thousands of lives both now and for
22 hundreds of years to follow this technology is potentially
23 so deadly on a massive scale it should be illegal.

In sum as a resident of San Diego and
25 taxpayer I strongly object to the Navy taking further
26 risks with our health and life when far cheaper options
27 are readily available. The purpose of the EIS is to

H.2.77 1 protect the public from ridiculous projects. We can only
2 hope that with increasing public awareness and pressure on
3 Congress and the President this proposal will melt down.

ALLISON ROTH: My name is Allison Roth. I'm a
4 Southern California coordinator for Environmental
5 Non-Profit known as Biological Diversity. I'm here on
6 behalf of the southwest center tonight, and also to
7 reiterate the comments that were raised by the Audobon
8 last night, and I'm representing Audobon as well tonight.
9 Our primary concern is that mitigation for
10 the previous nuclear powered aircraft carrier resulted in
11 a reduction of intertidal habitat. The mitigation --
12 eelgrass was required to be mitigated. It was mitigated
13 in North Island, and the shoreline was pulled back, and
14 well, the intertidal habitat was lost.
15 The intertidal habitat is for shore birds and
16 fish. There is an amazing amount of -- there is an
17 amazing reduction in their foraging habitat as a result of
18 their mitigation. This is the exact same mitigation that
19 is being proposed in the current EIS.
20 Fine (inaudible) are also impacted to loss of
21 intertidal habitat. They are the critters that keep our
22 water clean. And what we are afraid of is that there is
23 only a few hundred yards of natural shoreline habitat left
24 in North Island. And so while the proposed mitigation
25 site may not look to be a significant amount, it is

1 significant cumulatively.

2 The EIS addresses upland and marine habitats,
3 but it doesn't even mention the value of the intertidal
4 habitat or mention intertidal habitat at all.
5 So we are very concerned that the cumulative
6 impacts of this loss of interest tidal habitat as well as
7 the project specific impacts which would result from
8 eelgrass mitigation being proposed be addressed in the
9 EIS. It is required by the Clean Water Act. It's not
10 addressed, and it would be an inadequate Environmental
11 Impact Statement. And I think that that sums it up.
12 Thank you.

13 ROSA LOPEZ ANGELES: (In Spanish. Not reported by H.2.79
14 the Court Reporter. List of names and correct spellings
15 not provided to the Court Reporter.)

16 EDWARD SIEGEL: I'd like to make a few comments. I H.2.80
17 was planning to give something more definitive tonight.
18 But seeing no overhead projector again, I guess the Navy
19 feels anything we have to say doesn't deserve an overhead
20 projector.
21 You gentlemen know why the Nazis lost World
22 War II? Let me say previously to that. I'm Jewish. I
23 think we need more carriers. Not here. Our biggest
24 danger of people who are wanting to meet our ally. They
25 are waiting for a nuclear attack. They want it. That's
26 part of their mission in life.

1 Why did the Nazis lose World War II? They
2 believed their thing, own propaganda would conquer the
3 Soviet Union in three months. They marched in Russia with
4 leather soles and nails in their boots. I'm a Russian
5 Jew. So I'm (inaudible). Real cold. We invaded Russia
6 (inaudible).

7 Okay. I notice you gentlemen -- I hate to be
8 sarcastic, but I'm going to have to be sarcastic. I had a
9 substantive thing prepared, but it ain't going to
10 happen.
11 You are very well dressed. Have any of you
12 ever been in a reactor? Have you ever crawled around in
13 one? I doubt it, especially you. You folks seem like
14 public relations folks and you are doing your job.
15 Unfortunately, you are not the people the citizens want
16 speak to. They want to speak to experts from the Navy,
17 and no offense, higher level people.

18 Let me say something unrelated to metallurgy.
19 When you fly from here to Asia or you fly from New York to
20 Europe, what direction are you headed? You go north,
21 northwest, northwest. That means carriers in Bremerton,
22 Washington are much closer to Soviet Union and China
23 everywhere except maybe Fiji, Tonga and South America.
24 Carriers 1500 miles south of here are in
25 Norfolk versus up north on Eastern U.S. coast are much
26 further from anywhere but the Mediterranean. There is a
27 large equator. It takes 15 hours to fly from Jakarta,
28 Tokyo. It is a very big player in our travel (inaudible).

1 You want to go north to Nova, that's the way missiles go.
2 There is no need for carriers to be 1500 miles south of
3 Bremerton. It is called the great circle route. Okay.
4 This looks like a nuclear fuel. It looks
5 like a zirc alloy two or zirc alloy four. It happens to
6 be a Saporro beer can, and I bring it to show that if I
7 didn't show you the beer can, you folks might think it's
8 radioactive fuel element. I would like to meet people in
9 a closed hearing of this nature with congressmen present
10 and senators who know something technical about nuclear
11 reactors. Okay.

12 And not to insult Mr. Beckett, I'm sure he is
13 doing his job. But we are experts in nuclear reactors all
14 of us. You are obviously very good looking, very well
15 dressed. You are in public relations. It is word for
16 word what we heard last night.

17 I would like to meet some experts. Getting
18 near the end, what I want mentioned is purposeful fraud
19 against the Navy by especially Westinghouse. Also General
20 Electric, also Lockheed Martin, I've got cartons of
21 documents, some of them 40 years old. Purposeful fraud.
22 I hope it is to the point that they are very large false
23 claims act suit.

24 Paper I published which I will be providing
25 you gentlemen with some evidence to show you the profiting
26 of whomever, probably not the Navy. The general magnetism
27 against materials (inaudible) 347 1978 has been deleted
28 from all U.S. international data bases except for this.

H2.80 1 It is gone from the D.O.E. People can't believe it. It
2 has been ripped out of many library books. It has been
3 ripped out of the journal and the pages have been
4 renumbered. If you look for a magnifying glass you can
5 find it.

Mention two last things. I mentioned the
other night this business about the EMERAUD the French
nuclear submarine. I would like to meet anyone in the
nuclear U.S. Navy who knows about this. This is an
INCO-182 steam explosion.

Lastly, something very amusing to sort of
close, next to lastly. Interesting article, I'll give you
the reference and I'll have it in what I submit. San
Diego Tribune, Wednesday, February 4th, 1998. Last night
I talked about some very metallurgic detailed obscurities.
There is a much more dangerous ship than any of your
carriers that seems to have sank because of embrittlement
welds and bolts. This is the TITANIC. Very interesting
article. The ice didn't crush the plates. It ripped the
welds open. The reason is they used, according to this,
this is still being analyzed -- they used rivets and welds
with much higher brittle impurities. I think at the time
accidents were 2 and 3 percent, and 18 percent is the one
they analyzed the one they brought up from the TITANIC.
Very similar to what happens to reactors.

Last I would like to close with something
very practical. I noticed a total lack of security. You
folks may think you have a secure base out there. You

H.2.80

1 don't. There is a bunch of crazies around the world that
2 pray to different Gods than you and I who would love to
3 attack your submarines and carriers here. My suggestion
4 is if you port these in Coronado, don't depend on your
5 M.P.s and your marines. Hire yourself (inaudible) 50 or
6 100 retired Israeli intelligence guys, who smell an Arab a
7 mile away and want to show pictures relatives (inaudible)
8 20 or 30 isles in Indonesia. They picked out what
9 countries they were from and what part of the country.
10 You need people like that to safeguard your facilities.
11 The reason being you have no concept of who you are
12 dealing with in the middle east. They want to die for the
13 glory of their cause, and they want to take you with them.
14 They get very near your ships, from above, from the sides
15 to the streets. Much too near for your comfort. These
16 are not practical things, not metallurgical.

H.2

17 Thank you.

18

19 MARIA LOPEZ: My name is Maria Lopez and I
20 represent the San Diego city. I support the concerns
21 expressed by Environmental Coalition and Peace Resource
Center, and I would like to read the names for the record
that are from my neighbors who also oppose the nuclear
megaport. Thank you.
25 (List of names and correct spellings not
provided to the Court Reporter.)

JOE JAFFE: My name is Joe Jaffe. I'm a resident

H.2.82

1 of Mira Mesa, been living there for about 15 years, and I
2 would like to live there for another 15 years.
I have spent almost 50 years designing state
of the art equipment for the science industry, medicine,
and one of the devices that I'm most proud of was the
development of ultrasonic equipment which has been used in
the last 35 years for the examination of pregnant women;
and the use of this equipment instead of the use of x-rays
has contributed substantially to a decrease in fetal birth
defects.

Mr. Beckett presented some very interesting
data. I wish I could believe it. I wish these people who
have presented that data who developed that data had
visited and participated in a symposium last month at the
New York Academy of Medicine at which the effects --
health effects of low level nuclear radiation were
discussed in detail, and the evidence is mounting that
these low level radiation that we have been dismissing for
many years is not really dismissible. It is causing
deaths, not only in cancer but in immune diseases and in
other medical aspects.

I would like to say that it would be nice if
we could convince the Navy that the presence of nuclear
reactors in the midst of a over million residents of San
Diego County did not represent a health jeopardy.

National security I don't believe is -- can
be measured against the health effects that might occur in
the event of all of these reactors here and the release of

H2.82

1 their radiation.
2 One of the things that has been mentioned
3 here tonight, the gentleman from Point Loma mentioned a
4 Three-Mile Island nuclear accident. The people there were
5 told for the first 24, 48 hours that there had been an
6 incident at the nuclear power plant; that there was no
7 danger to human health. But 48 hours after the release of
8 the immense amount of radiation then Governor Thornberg
9 ordered the evacuation of all pregnant women and children
10 within a five-mile radius of the plant. This has been the
11 record of nuclear operations throughout the United States
12 in the last 35 40 years. First you deny it and then you
13 say, well, it didn't really hurt anybody. This is not
14 true. I'm sorry to say, it is not true. Fortunately the
15 people around Three-Mile Island no longer have to depend
16 on the nuclear power plant or anybody else but themselves
17 because they have installed a nuclear monitoring system
18 which is under their control. They get the data, and they
19 have the information immediately in real time and not one
20 month or one year after the release.

H.2

21 If the Navy is not going to be persuaded to
22 remove their nuclear carriers and their reactors from the
23 San Diego area, then I wish they could be persuaded to
24 provide the citizens of the area a monitoring system which
25 would in real time tell them what is happening and
26 reassuring them if the Navy is so confident that this is
27 not going to be -- they are not releasing any
28 extraordinary abnormal releases they would be reassured by

H2.83

1 this, and it would certainly improve the relationship
2 between the Navy and the residents of San Diego.
3 It's not really enough for the Navy to do its
4 own monitoring, and this is recognized by the
5 Environmental Protection Agency which earlier this year
6 announced a program called "Impact" which provided --
7 which is going to provide funds for a number of cities
8 which are threatened by pollutants of various types
9 including radiological pollutants. And the requirements
10 of the people who will get these grants is that it will
11 not only involve municipalities but it will also involve
12 universities, research institutions and very importantly
13 the citizens, the residents of the area who will actively
14 participate in whatever measurements are made and have
15 immediate access to them through this data, and that the
16 data should be in a form which is easily recognized even
17 by non-technical people. Lay people should be able to
18 look at the information from these monitoring systems and
19 be able to make a sensible judgment from that.
20 So I leave you with those thoughts. If you
21 preferably remove the reactors somewhere else, that would
22 be best. If you insist on keeping them here, please let
23 the citizens, the residents of the area know you have a
24 system that will tell them in real time as it happens what
25 is being released from your reactors.
26 Thank you.

NORA LEAH RAMOS: My name is Nora Leah Ramos, and

H2.84

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H.2.84

1 I'm representing my mom Luz Hernandez. I'm also
2 representing the following residents of National City.
3 The people here tonight oppose the homeporting of the
4 nuclear aircraft carriers in North Island:
5 (List of names and proper spellings not
6 provided to the Court Reporter.)

7 The question asked by one of the residents
8 was how can the military defend us when it will hurt us
9 more than the enemy?
10 Thank you.

11 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I hate to put the
12 credibility of the Navy on line, but as a citizen of this
13 city for 30 years I have just watched one of the major
14 fiascoes of all time. The dredging of the harbor and
15 getting ready for the STENNIS. And after we have had a
16 major cost overruns, air pollution that needed to buy air
17 credits promises to put sand on the beach of San Diego,
18 while all we got was bombs on the beach and we got no sand
19 yet on the beach, and we still have cost overruns; and I
20 just heard tonight we need more dredging.

21 Point one: Credibility. The Navy tells me,
22 and I used to work for the Navy, I used to work for the
23 Sup Ship of San Diego as the chief inspector, and I
24 watched the contractors who work. I have to remind the
25 Navy that Navy nuclear systems were designed by the human
26 being built by the lowest cost contractor, installed by
27 the low cost contractor, are maintained by low bidder
28

1 contract, operated by continuing with personnel who nobody
2 is perfect.
3 I also am in a financial community, and I
4 have made a point whenever a belief is too good to be
5 true, it is required for me to tell my clients that past
6 performance is no guarantee of future results.
7 The Navy in its EIS that every time they
8 make -- that there is only a one chance in a million for
9 somebody to get some radiation, past performance is no
10 guarantee of future results.
11 The results I believe are flawed. I believe
12 the data is torqued. I believe the P.R. people have spent
13 hundreds of hours.

H.2.85

14 I also have another observation about San
15 Diego. More time has been spent in public dialogue to
16 promote a stadium bringing in the people of San Diego than
17 the Navy has in trying to slowly, slowly plan it, they
18 have had it for years, to foist three nuclear aircraft
19 carriers on the city of San Diego.
20 No city official would allow the local power
21 company to build a nuclear power plant in the heart of San
22 Diego. No city official would allow a factory that
23 produces dust, dirt, air pollution, grit into the sand,
24 sandblast grit, paint stamp and everything else would be
25 permitted to be built in Coronado. The Navy has its
26 absolute right to put aircraft carriers because they have
27 the right of eminent domain, but they do not have the
28 moral -- they have no moral thought. I can't even think

H2.87 1 of a word, capability to actually think that we should be
2 foisted with the possibility of three nuclear aircraft
3 carriers with the health risks with everything else.

The aircraft industry has promised us how
safe it is to fly. But in Northpark, San Diego fell and
killed hundreds of people and destroyed several homes.
The City of San Diego can be wiped out.

I believe that the Navy will always be in
existence, but the aircraft carriers need to be in a place
where those aircraft carriers can be cut immediately and
floated out to see without having to wait two-and-a-half
hours and tide to rise to bring four tug boats to get the
nuclear aircraft carrier out to sea. My defense has been
weakened. My confidence in the Navy capability keep
telling me the full truth and getting disclosure has been
thoroughly flawed. I ask the Navy to redo their EIS and
while they are doing it, please rethink the whole nuclear
possibility.

Remember that past performance is no
guarantee of future results.
And I thank you.

H2.88 23 FRANCES JIMENEZ: My name is Frances Jimenez.
24 (Inaudible) Sherman Heights. We are agreeing with the
25 testimony of the (inaudible), and the names are:
26 (List of names and correct spellings not
27 provided to the Court Reporter.)
28 Thank you.

H2.89 1 BILLY PAUL: Good evening. I'm sorry I wasn't here
2 earlier, so I didn't get to hear the rest of the
3 testimony. I was working today. My name is Billy Paul
4 I'm president of SEAPAW. SEAPAW stands for Safe
5 Environmental Areas, Public Access and Wildlife.
6 I'm president of an environmental agreement,
7 and very concerned about the carriers coming to San Diego
8 and any radiation or contamination of the environment that
9 may occur. I'm also an ex-marine, and I'm proud of it. I
10 want to welcome the carriers to be here.

My concern is that the carriers be here and
not pollute. I worked at General Atomics in their nuclear
fuel plant years ago. I worked there for two years. We
had a couple people who were idiots in dealing with
nuclear fuel. I'm sure the Navy doesn't have these kind
of people. No, I am serious about that because there were
a few people there who didn't know what they were doing,
and being a marine I do know the training that the Navy
gives the people, especially working with nuclear fuel.

There was one person there who did think if
he couldn't see it it wouldn't hurt you. He took tools
from the hot side worked on his car outside, also took
them home. When they did a radioactive test, the
radiation outside the walk by his car and the Geiger
counter went off and they had to confiscate the car,
squash it and haul it off to a radiation waste yard. They
also had to go to his apartment and strip out the inside
of the apartment and take that -- because of the

1 radioactive waste that occurred there.

2 What is important is that this radiation does
3 not escape, and that you monitor it, and I think people
4 here are telling you that we want to know what's
5 happening. We don't want the Navy to hide the facts. We
6 want to know what's going on, and as an environmentalist I
7 want you to protect the environment. We have too many
8 contaminants in the bay. As you know, when the bay was
9 dredged, we pulled up bombs and fake bombs and ammunition
10 and several things that were dangerous. We don't want the
11 Navy to do this anymore, and I don't think they purposely
12 did, but you need to be conscientious.

13 And we also want to know what is happening
14 and be truthful with us, and I personally want to welcome
15 the Navy here. I would like to welcome the carriers. But
16 please, make it safe, make sure the radiation is monitored
17 and tell the public what is happening.
18 Thank you.

19
20 MARK SMITH: I'm a resident of Coronado. I support
21 the Environmental Health Coalition and Peace Resource
22 Center. I'd like to read into the record the names of
23 Coronado residents who oppose the nuclear megaport who
24 couldn't be here tonight.
25 (List of names attached as Exhibit 3.)
26 I also want to say that due to the maturation
27 of this country's economy, many people have had to lower
28 their expectations. I think it's time that you join the

club.

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H.2

PATRICIA JALALLA: I'm Patricia Jalalla. I'll also be reading names of people who are opposing the nuclear aircraft carriers and also have supported the testimony given by the Peace Resource Center and Environmental Health Coalition.

(Inaudible. Written list of names with proper spellings not provided to the Court Reporter.)

SONIA RODRIGUEZ: (In Spanish. Not reported by the Court Reporter.)

EARL CALLAHAN: Earl Callahan, Coronado.

MR. BECKETT: the Navy Nuclear Propulsion Program sitting there said tonight there are nuclear radiation releases from Navy nuclear ships, but they are infrequent, small, and do not hurt the environment. Records indicate there are also larger radiation releases not reported or reported after days or weeks.

Why would the Navy keep nuclear accidents and incidents secret? The Navy must maintain a clean public record because if they didn't, foreign governments would not allow U.S. Navy nuclear ships into their ports. They could be restricted from U.S. ports as well like San Diego. It's unfortunate that the Navy cannot tell the truth to the American public. That is why radiation monitoring stations are needed in Coronado and San Diego.

H.2.89 69
H.2.90 70

1 and alarms or sirens like there are at nuclear plants
2 should be placed in this locations so that the people
3 could be notified immediately.
4 Thank you.

5 PETER ECKMAN: I'm Pete Eckman. I recently came
6 back to San Diego. My family and I have lived here many
7 times off and on.
8 I'm retired Vice-Admiral United States Navy.
9 I served for over 30 years in nuclear power. I also
10 worked in the Department of Energy as a senior manager on
11 their largest site and six years as an advisor in the
12 civilian nuclear power programs. The gentleman who wanted
13 to be the man who stayed inside the reactor will never
14 find one because you don't go in those things. Unless
15 they are in manufacture.

16 I want to talk a little bit about the costs
17 though, not about the others. I took on the cost issue in
18 the BRAC in 1994 because I felt that Long Beach was a
19 better port. They had the facilities. They had the
20 piers. They had the depth. They had the repair
21 facilities. But the political process of the BRAC, and
22 particularly the City of San Diego and your elected
23 representatives, Base Realignment And Closure Commission.
24 You were very, very strong in your desire to
25 see Long Beach go away, and that issue was lost, where the
26 costs were much much higher. The risks were not a factor.
27 But let's get back to nuclear carriers. I

1 was -- I'd like to say maybe we should think how many
2 people make decisions just on cost. And when you go buy a
3 car, you do something, you put an awful lot of factors
4 into besides costs. This G.A.O. study that was cited
5 talks only about cost.

H.2.94 1 H.2.95 6 In 1971 I was chief engineer of the carrier
2 ENTERPRISE. We had been deployed for eight months, and
3 then we were vectored into the Indian Ocean for another
4 three-and-a-half months. And we were able to fill that
5 commitment with a ship showing up about every two weeks
6 with some aviation fuel. We were replaced by a
7 conventional carrier. In less than a month we had to shut
8 down all Navy operations, carrier operations in the Gulf
9 and two carriers. We had 22 boilers en route to the
10 Indian Ocean from Pearl Harbor and the West Coast just to
11 support one aircraft carrier. The reason was because we
12 couldn't get oil from the Persian Gulf. They said we are
13 not going to sell oil to you during this particular
14 incident that is going in the world.

15 Congress at that time in the 1971
16 deliberations of the budget and the appropriations and
17 authorization committees of the Senate and the House --
18 and you can read the record if you would like, it is there
19 in the congressional record -- said we are shifting to
20 nuclear carriers, because we don't want this situation to
21 occur ever again. And since that time we have been going
22 to nuclear carriers. They may cost a little more. In the
23 long run, that's debatable. They last 50 years. It's
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1 sort of a wash, and on terms of cost, up front costs, are
2 higher, but not in the long rung.
3 But what is the price of being able to follow
4 those commitments? Our national authorities haven't
5 changed their mind. The Navy has tried many times to go
6 back to conventional carriers only to be shunned by the
7 national authorities and your elected representatives.
8 So when you point at these gentlemen here in
9 the blue suits and you talk about that, I think you are
10 talking to the wrong people.
11 Now, I support moving the carriers here
12 because we don't have very many alternatives left, and we
13 need those carriers. So I support it. I didn't think it
14 was the best alternative four years ago, but I think it is
15 now. And with all my experience in this business, you
16 know, all the fingers are still here, all that. I respect
17 the gentleman that talks about low level radiation -- I
18 know the system very well and I work inside the nuclear
19 plants and plutonium separation plants and have been at
20 officials in charge of making sure all of the safeguards
21 are in place, very familiar with them. Yes, there is a
22 risk. It's tiny, but it's there.
23 But I think the benefit of the nation and the
24 benefit of the carrier here in San Diego, you should be
25 the best advised to look at this thing with the broad
26 perspective and say what is really in our best interest.
27 Freedom's work is never done. But Veteran's Day is coming
28 up here very soon. An awful lot of veterans, they have

H.2.95 1 gone to a lot of places they never really wanted to go to,
2 and a lot of ships they never really wanted to be on.
3 Four years on ENTERPRISE my wife saw me 52 times, 52 days.
4 There is a price to pay. It's a high price. When you get
5 into the business of nuclear components, they are not
6 built by the low bidder, (inaudible) has built every piece
7 of reactor fuel ever since the NAUTILUS and continues to
8 do so. No other company ever has. I can tell you I just
9 came from being president of one of their companies, and
10 they are not low cost. And I paid the Navy a systems
11 command when I ran that. And the other component makers
12 are not low cost. They are best quality, and the cost is
13 way down the line someplace.
14 So I just wanted to give that approach to
15 you. I'm happy to be back in San Diego. And I say I
16 support this initiative.
17 Thank you.

H.2 18 JULIE LOWELL: My name is Julie Lowell. I happened H.2.96
19 to be a resident of Coronado. I'm also a Navy dependent
20 to be a resident of Coronado. I'm also a Navy dependent
21 and a strong Navy supporter.
22 However, I do share a lot of concerns, and
23 safety concerns that were brought up tonight. I consider
24 myself rather impartial party here. However, I am very
25 surprised at some of the things I'm hearing, for example,
26 that the Navy doesn't have a concern with the traffic in
27 the area. That seems to be a concern of yours with
28 Everett and also at Pearl, and yet it doesn't seem to be

1 an issue at this location. That very much surprises me.
2 This morning there was over an hour delay on the bridge.
3 Routine. Routine. You hear it every morning in the news.
4 Bridge traffic is backed up again. You see in the local
5 papers routinely, the traffic is an issue. I have with me
6 tonight the local -- today's issue of the "Eagle." You
7 have two features on the first page. One is traffic
8 concern, and the other is the "EIS Evaluation Raises
9 Questions," and I'd like to have that go into the record
10 so that that can be addressed, some of the questions that
11 come up in there.

(Attached as Exhibit 4.)

I'm very surprised that you're concerned with
the quality of life issues with the crew members, and I'm
pleased about that because my husband is in the military;
but I don't think it can be at the expense of the
community. I would like to see the Navy -- I would like
to see the Navy be a good neighbor. I'm part of this
organization from both sides. If you lower the
neighborhood standards, the community standards, and the
quality of life standards for the community, you're
lowering those standards for your crew men also and your
crew women and their families.

H.2

1 yet less than 18 percent of the morning commuters going to H.296
2 the Navy are practicing car pooling. That's not very
3 effective mitigation, yet 40 -- over 40 percent of the
4 afternoon commuters coming into the city, which is
5 normally residential people and not Navy personnel are
6 using the car pool lane.

7 According to the tunnel proposition the H.297
8 expedient people that are taking steps to mitigate the
9 problem, the afternoon-commuters would do without the
10 benefit of having the free pass lane, but the morning
11 users that are coming to the base still get the free pass
12 lane. That just doesn't make sense to me. It doesn't
13 make sense to me that the Navy can't put forward any money
14 to mitigate the over 50 percent travel that they use on
15 the local, state and federal roads that are within
16 Coronado backing up on 5 and past 94 today with federal
17 money. We are hearing that the Navy can't propose any
18 money and can't mitigate that with the Navy money. And
19 yet we have state and federal roads that are beyond
20 capacity, beyond any standards that are set at the federal
21 and state level and yet there is no mitigation being done
22 at this time, and we are proposing bringing in more
23 traffic.

24 Also I think it is somewhat suspect that we H.298
25 can see an increase of perhaps 50 cars increased traffic
26 when we are saying the crew of one home port carrier is
27 over 3,000 crew members. I mean, the numbers just aren't
28 playing out here, and I would like to see and would like

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1 to know how these independent analysis are being
2 considered, and I would seriously suggest that the EIS be
3 re-evaluated with more factual information to provide
4 these people with answers and factual information that
5 they are asking for.

6 Thank you.

7 JIM BELL: I'm Jim Bell. I have a radio show on
8 KFMB every Sunday night during 11 p.m. We have addressed
9 this topic a number of times.
10 Let me get this straight. You know, we pay
11 our taxes to support the military, and I'm certainly not
12 against the Navy and the other services that have served
13 the country well; but the job of the Navy and the job of
14 the other services is to protect our life, liberty and
15 the pursuit of happiness of the citizens of this country. How
16 do you do that? Well, you have a world situation where we
17 have people training terrorists, suicide bombers,
18 whatever, to look for weaknesses in our situation, so what
19 do we do, we bring in a bunch of nuclear reactors into the
20 middle of the sixth largest city. Not even bear in mind
21 the attack of carriers, all you have to do is sink
22 something at the mouth of the bay and the carriers can't
23 even get out of there to begin with.

H.2

25 And you got guys like this Bin Laden in the
26 Middle East. This is not against Muslims or Arabs or
27 anything, but we have terrorists that got enough money to
28 buy any weapon that is available. It seems like we are

1 setting up a pretty good sitting duck situation here with
2 these carriers.

3 Not only does it make sense in terms of
4 making the civilian population more secure, it is a bad
5 idea for the Navy. When you give the opportunities to
6 knock out three carriers and whatever else, destroy the
7 whole infrastructure -- it is not just San Diego, it is

8 the Tijuana region too. We are talking about five million
9 people who live here locally.

10 I just can't see the reasoning, and I haven't
11 heard anybody in the military tell me why clustering a
12 bunch of nuclear carriers or other nuclear powered vessels
13 in one area makes us more secure.

14 I ran for Mayor of the City of San Diego in
15 the last election, actually I came in second on six
16 candidates, but I didn't have much money. But I guarantee
17 you if I had been Mayor, there would have been a whole
18 different picture here.

19 Thank you very much.

20 RUSSELL HOFFMAN: Hi my name is Russell Hoffman,
21 and I'm not here to promote the library. Although I think
22 that one librarian job is worth about a hundred popcorn
23 vendors.

24 I want to start with a quote. I want to
25 start with a quote. "It will do us precious little good
26 to protect ourselves from the Soviets or any other
27 potential aggression if in the process we poison our own
28 buy 78

1 people." I don't know if the author of that quote was
2 referring to nuclear aircraft carriers or not, but the
3 author was John Glenn, 1987.

4 I got a quote from Admiral Rickover, father
5 of the nuclear Navy. In 1982 I believe by then his son
6 had died from leukemia. He said, "I do not believe that
7 nuclear power is worth it if it creates radiation. Then
8 you might ask me why do I have nuclear powered ships.
9 That is a necessary evil. I would sink them all. I am
10 not proud of the part I played in it. I did it because it
11 was necessary for the safety of this country. That's why
12 I am such a great exponent of stopping this whole nonsense
13 of war. Unfortunately limits -- attempts to limit war
14 have always failed. The lesson of history is when a war
15 starts every nation will ultimately use whatever weapon it
has available." And he also said at the same hearing,
16 "Every time you produce radiation, you produce something
17 that has a certain half-life, in some cases for billions
18 of years. I think the human race is going to wreck
19 itself, and it is important that we get control of this
20 horrible force and try to eliminate it."

H2.100 1 wrote a tutorial about pumps. A nuclear aircraft carrier,
2 any ships is nothing more than pumps, pipes, valves and
3 vessels, and poison if it is a nuclear aircraft carrier.
4 I wrote the C.D. ROM on pumps, and I got a call from the
5 Navy yesterday, and they found my tutorial on line; and
6 they wanted to know if they could use my pictures in their
7 future training manual.

8 So the guy that was here who said the Navy is
9 the most modern in the world, they are behind the times.
10 They haven't moved up. They told me they want to
11 eliminate a million dollars worth of printed documents. I
12 told them go ahead and use my photos because I write
13 interactive educational material, and I'm not really that
interested in stills; and they said, oh, we can't pay you
14 for them. I said, that's okay. Go ahead and use them. I
15 don't mind. You save my shores from foreign aggression.
16 Now, I have a couple of documents here.
17 see the red light is already on so I'll try to be quick.
18 This one is from 1945 by H.D. Smith by chairman of the --
19 Under the Auspices Of The United States Government," 1940
20 department of physics of Princeton University, consultant
21 to the Manhattan district. That's Manhattan as in the
22 Manhattan Project of the U.S. Core Of Engineers. The
document is called the "General Account of The Development
23 of Methods Of Using Atomic Energy, Necessary Purposes
24 Under The Auspices Of The United States Government," 1940
25 to 1945. And it starts off with the following sentence:
26 "The ultimate responsibility for our nation's policy rests
27 on its citizens, and they can discharge such
28

responsibilities wisely only if they are informed."

Okay. It closes: "The people of the country must be informed if they are to discharge the responsibilities wisely." It also says in the middle of the book here, "Properties of Plutonium." "Although we were embarking on a major enterprise to produce plutonium, we still have less than a milligram to study and still had only limited familiarity with its properties. The study of plutonium therefore remain a major problem for the metallurgical laboratory."

So what did they do? They went to a man named John Gothman. John Gothman worked at Berkeley at the time. He has written this book called "Radiation And Human Health" since then. He is the man who isolated the plutonium for those first bombs. He knows what he is talking about, and he is against the use of nuclear reactors on board ships.

Now, that book was full of lies. It includes a statement that the health risks were covered. How could they have been covered if they didn't have enough plutonium to make your bomb. You had to go to Gothman to get it. You guys have forgotten about Gothman.

Now, in this book -- this is from -- "The Effects Of Nuclear Weapons." 1962. And it has a statement here, "The purpose of this book is to present as accurately as possible within the limits of national security a comprehensive summary of this information."

And if I can find my other marker here, comprehensive

summary includes the following statement about leukemia:

"It has been suggested that chronic exposure to moderate doses of nuclear radiation is conducive to leukemia." My brother died of leukemia a couple years ago.

This is a book called "Toxics A to Z." It also talks about plutonium. There is little question about the type of damage caused by exposure to plutonium, both lung, bone, and liver cancer, and leukemia are the most frequently occurring serious results of exposure. It goes on to say that the various estimates are -- of how deadly low level radiation is, vary by a factor of a thousand; and then you can't really assume that the middle ground is the right ground. The people that think it's a thousand times more dangerous than what you think, they might be right.

This book is called "Navy Ship Handling," third edition by Captain R.S. Crenshaw, Jr., United States Navy. Do any of you know this book? Any of you seen this book? It is a great book. I enjoyed it. This book is called "Fighter In Combat Tactics And Maneuvers," and I was hoping that Al Ducane would be here so that I could get his autograph. It says "Only air power can defeat air power. The actual elimination or even stalematting of an attacking Air Force can be achieved only by a superior Air Force." It also says -- and that quote was from Major Alexander P. Jake Suversky (phonetic). I'm sure you know that name. It also says here, "We carry out" -- they know that name.

H.2

H.2.100

1 "We carried out many trials to try to find the answer to
2 the fast, low level intruder, but there is no adequate
3 defense." That's "Air" by Marshal J.E. Johnny Johnson of
4 (inaudible). That's still true today. You guys are in
5 danger of being hit by (inaudible) for instance or some
6 other character. The SHEFFIELD during the Falklands war
7 was hit by an XSF. That was the equivalent of our
8 (inaudible) class that is the one that was supposed to
protect the other ships from such an attack, and it didn't
work.

The truth is you have a silent bomb, and you
are just not admitting it; and we would like to put it
away. We think there are much better methods of
protecting our shores. We think that the countries that
don't want you anywhere near them are going to cause you
problems. We think that the people in this city have
expressed their desire to not have you here with your
nuclear weapons.

As I said, I love the Navy. I think you are
important. I think you are doing vital work. And I wish
you would do it right.

Thank you very much.

NANCY CASSIDY: Good evening. I am Nancy Cassidy.
I'm no nuclear expert, but I am a life
expert. I'm a mom and a grandmother and a general manager
of a 6,000 member food co-op which is directly in the path
of wind currents from Coronado.

H.2.101

Tonight you are witnessing a local population which is waking up to the very real threat that nuclear homeporting poses to us and to our families. The following San Diegans join me in expressing concern about the nuclear Navy safety record which includes the loss in peacetime of two nuclear submarines, the THURSHER and the SCORPION with all hands aboard lost at sea.

We strongly oppose sighting nuclear reactors and nuclear storage facilities a mile from our downtown with no evacuation or warning systems for the public in place. Joining me are:

(List of names attached as Exhibit 5.)

CAPTAIN ROCKLAND DEAL: Derek, if we can hold you right there, we need a five-minute break

(A recess was taken.)

DEREK CASSIDY: Good evening. I'm Derek Cassidy, and I wanted to read into the record the names of some other San Diegans who oppose the nuclear megaport, and they are from Ocean Beach.

(List of names attached as Exhibit 6.)

And I think it's also interesting that as stated earlier, we cannot have nuclear carriers in Yokosuka, and I believe Yokosuka, Japan will not allow nuclear ships into their country, and I envy Yokosuka and wish that San Diego could become like Yokosuka and not

have nuclear carriers.

for democracy and such disdain for the will of the people

BOB LINDEN: I'm Bob Linden, and I live in Escondido. Good evening. Buenos Noches. And good evening to the agents of the nuclear conspiracy against the people of the United States and the citizens of California and San Diego.

We keep asking ourselves what kooks would bring us so many nukes. And here you are tonight. Are you foreign subversives, terrorists eager to poison land and sea?

How did you infiltrate our borders,
Did you cleverly divert our attention
border south of us for concern of invasion when a
while you are smiling at us under Padres caps and
Charger games making us believe -- leading us to

you were like us. Americans. San Diegans.
But no Americans and no San Diegans would
threaten our children's health and lives as you would. No
Americans, no San Diegans would threaten our air, our
water, animals and marine life. Indeed quality of life,

property values, tourist industry, (inaudible). No true American, no true San Diegan would concoct a plan that plunked so many nuclear reactors that are nuked under such a populous American city and irresponsible and contemptuously risk American lives with no emergency notification or evacuation plans.

No true American would showcase such disdain

for democracy and such disdain for the will on the people and in so doing squander eight thousand million taxpayer dollars per vessel to build nuk over conventional, when the U.S. government's general accounting office proclaims no strategic advantage of nuk over conventional.

Don't you read your own government reports,
or haven't you special interest bomb terrorists
infiltrated that department yet.

those who use those

savings for salaried increases for Navy personnel. The true heroes of the Navy who, let's face it, are the ones

most likely to contract the tumors and cancer and become
of your deadly folly.

If your plan continues and we must rename our

"**Education Day**" when your nuclear conversion

...the finest city to

"America's frightest city" or "America's finest toxicity."

How will you live with yourself: now will you live with yourself at night?

We connect principle, honor and integrity from

our people in the services. We expect and get less from

politicians who are supposed to protect us get "Nuk Waste Wilson" and a "Sellout Susan Golding" off

today trying to attract the Super Bowl here, but they
will have to travel far to find it.

FRONTLINE. Attention NFL fans, travel at your own risk

San Diego is now the nuclear megaport and the nuclear planes back a lead impasse to wear at the stadium

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H.2

1 Bring radiation block instead of sunblock. Free Geiger
2 counter with car rental. And bring the family back to San
3 Diego your radiation vacation destination.

4 Gentlemen, we the people are here tonight to
5 demand that you do the right thing. Terminate the nuclear
6 occupation of San Diego. Your nukes are not welcome here.
7 No new ones, and STENNIS the menace has got to go. Don't
8 be a disgrace and embarrassment to your uniform. It's a
9 sad day when America is under attack by and needs
10 protection from its own Navy. Don't do the evil that will
11 cry out four future Court Marshal investigations and
12 trials.

13 Come on, guys, join the human race. Be a
14 part of civilization. Remember many centuries after your
15 great grandchildren have long been buried, the waste that
16 you decide to leave behind will still be here.

17 Do you want that to be your legacy?

18 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Good evening. I hope to
19 offer a view which hasn't been expressed yet, which I hope
20 will get us both off the hook and on a new path. I'm a
21 resident of San Diego. I'm a member the Peace Resource
22 Center, and I wish to publicly thank Karen Jankow for all
23 that she has done, and her passionate concern to keep this
24 issue alive.

25 While I can't speak for these other
26 organizations of which I am a member and a board on two of
27 them, the United States Nations Association, San Diego

H.2.106 1 (inaudible) Economic Conversion Council, League of Women
2 Voters, the Audobon Society and Sierra Club, many
3 colleagues of those organizations share my views but do
4 not speak for the organizations.

I join the Secretary of the Navy William
Cohen, Secretary of Energy Bill Richardson, Vice-president
Gore, and President Clinton, and their testimonials quoted
in the statements recognizing the 50th anniversary of
naval nuclear propulsion program, its record of
achievement.

However, their words speak of a past record.
I am concerned about the future, specifically January 1,
the year 2000. My concern arises out of more recent
statements of these four leaders together with Senator
Robert Bennett and Chris Dodd, co-chairs of the Senate
Committee of the Year 2000 problem or 2000 bug or Y2K
together with representatives Steven Horne and Connie
Morella, co-chairs of the House committee on the year 2000
problem.

H.2.108 The Senate committee has raised serious
questions about the Y2K safety of nuclear generating
plants. This concern must extend also to the naval
nuclear propulsion systems. The House committee based on
the study of federal agencies' efforts toward year 2000
compliance and a study done by the House by the office of
management and budget revealed at an across the board
average of a D grade of federal agencies. And as
Representative Horne said, no one graduates from college

1 with a D average. The '98-'99 budget bill last week was
2 augmented in the last days by \$1 billion specifically
3 stuck in there to help the Department of Defense play
4 catch-up in its efforts to certify as compliant with
5 military computer clocks safely turn over from 99 to 00.
6 I have four urgent questions on the naval
7 nuclear propulsion plants:

8 One, has the Navy begun the assessment of

9 its compliance for emission critical systems?

10 If not, why not?

11 If yes, has the Navy begun remediation for

12 compliance?

13 And if, Yes what is its status?

14 Third, has the Navy begun testing its

15 remediation efforts for integrated compliance?

16 Four, if not yet begun testing, when will it
17 begin -- when do you expect to be certified as compliant
18 ready for the computer clocks to roll safely from 12-31-99
19 to 01-01-2000?

20 Thank you.

21 Thank you.

22 MICHAEL IVORY: Hello. My name is Michael Ivory.

23 And I have been a commercial fisherman in San
24 Diego Bay since 1985. I have operated in the proximity of
25 the South Bay, San Diego Gas And Electric power plant, and
26 over the years I have accumulated dozens and dozens of
27 tumored fish, diseased fish, ranging in attractiveness
28 from disturbing to nauseating. There is specific problems

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H.2.108 1 related to power plants and discharge on the marine
2 environment.

3 One of my big questions is, you're going to
4 be having three nuclear carriers in San Diego each with
5 two nuclear reactors, which means you are going to be
6 pumping bay water to use for your cooling systems, and I
7 would like to know what kind of chemicals that you use to
8 clean your heat exchange system.

9 Do you use chlorine?

10 Can you tell me that?

11 (Mr. Beckett shakes head.)

12 It's pretty darn scary to see this come to
13 San Diego. It's not a question of whether we are going to
14 have an accident, it's when.

15 Like I say, San Diego Bay is a very fragile
16 ecosystem. We have green sea turtles, a lot of rare fish.
17 It is probably the most unique bay in California.
18 I just shutter to think that we have got
19 three nuclear carriers on their way to town. I hope it
20 doesn't happen.

21 Thank you.

22 Also I'd like to complain that I was told
23 that we would be called in order of turning our cards in,
24 and that certainly hasn't happened. If you run your
25 safety facilities the way you administered this meeting I
26 think we are all in big trouble.

27 GINNA McDONOUGH: My name is Ginna McDonough.
28 I'm H.2.111

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H.2.111 1 resident of Coronado.
2 And what I'd like to state first of all is
3 that it's about time there was a hearing held here in San
4 Diego of this matter. For three-and-a-half years now
5 since I have been involved in this, everything has been
6 purposely, I think, isolated on Coronado so that the Navy
7 could make it seem like it was strictly a Coronado
8 problem. A lot of people left, it's getting late, but I
9 think you saw by the people here that it is not just a
10 Coronado concern. It's about time this happened.
11 Anyway, nice to see you gentlemen, again, by
12 the way. And I don't know who these two people are. Are
13 they connected with you? I would like to know who they
14 are. They have been here at the whole meeting in the
15 background.

H.2.112 16 I'm Ginna McDonough.
17 You are?
18 DR. ANDREW LISNER: Andrew.
19 GINNA McDONOUGH: And your function here is?
20 DR. ANDREW LISNER: We are with SAIC. We are
21 helping the Navy on the project.
22 GINNA McDONOUGH: And you are?
23 JOHN: My name is John.
24 GINNA McDONOUGH: And, John, what do you do?
25 JOHN: I work with the Navy.
26 GINNA McDONOUGH: I'd just like everything even.
27 You know, I guess having been involved with
28 the opposition -- by the way, I came here to support the

H.2.111 1 views of the Environmental Health Coalition, but maybe you
2 already knew that, the Peace Resource Center, all the
3 other organizations and individuals here represented
4 tonight, I'm in opposition to this project. I have been
5 for a long time. And I'm seeing many of you people come
6 and go through all the different hearings I have been
7 through, and to be perfectly honest with you, I'm sure you
8 are all nice men. You probably have families and children
9 of our your own, but you are under orders here to be here.
10 You are really not paid to think, you are just paid to sit
11 and listen to us.
12 I have a problem with that because we get no
13 response from you no matter what. I know this is not a
14 question-and-answer period, but I don't feel like any of
15 the concerns have ever been answered in the series of
16 these whole Navy hearings. One thing that I would like to H.2.112
17 know, I was told early on in this process that fueling and
18 defueling would never happen at North Island; that all of
19 that would be conducted on the east coast in Northern
20 Virginia or wherever that is based over there.
21 Well, this really doesn't make sense to me
22 because if there are going to be two home ports here in
23 the Pacific, what sense does it make by the Navy's
24 standards to be taking all of those carriers to the east
25 coast to be fueled and defueled.
26 suspicion is well, obviously, you have been so honest and
27 straightforward with us so far, that that's going to
28 happen here at some point.

H.2.112 1 I want to know if that is, and I want your
assurance that it is never going to happen.
Also, one of your transparencies or slides up
there says that in the event of an accident civilian
services will be sufficient to deal with whatever might
happen. Well, I have been a Coronado resident for years.
I know many of the police officers and personnel. I know
many of the fire department personnel and emergency
response people. I have talked to a lot of them. None of
them have had any coordinated efforts with any of you
people how to deal with any sort of an accident.
Now, we have two fire stations; one that's in
the city proper and one that's down at the Cays. At any
given time there is three personnel at each station. A
lot of the -- especially with the fire department -- a lot
of the personnel live off of Coronado. Now, in the event
of any kind of emergency, whether it's an earthquake,
whatever, God knows what, they are not going to be able to
get back to Coronado to help with any kind of problems.
There is going to be maybe a total for our whole city five
to six people in the emergency services with the fire
stations.

H.2.113 2 The risk assessment you use, I'm sorry, are,
terribly flawed because you state that it's 50-mile radius
where the risk assessments are -- I don't know, calculated
for. So you are saying that someone who lives in El Cajon
is under as great a risk as I am living right next to it.
Well, that's absolutely absurd.

H.2.114 3 Also, well, I own a small health food store
in Coronado, and I hear so much stuff which obviously
people will assume is only anecdotal evidence. But in the
last five years I have been in business, I can't -- I am
cataloguing it, so eventually I maybe will be able to
present some kind of report, but of the residents of
Coronado there is a huge increase in skin and eye
irritation, problems with respiratory illnesses and
allergies and asthmas. I know in the last year eight
women personally who have miscarried. All women have had
healthy pregnancies up until now and have miscarried for
like very weird, you know, very weird circumstances. I
don't want to go into the details.

H.2.115 4 This to me represents -- I'm not blaming all
this on the Navy, please understand -- but we in San Diego
are already at toxic overload, and you are asking us to
assume more. I don't want anymore. I'm finished with it.
Last year the American Lung Association came
out with the board saying that San Diego has the third
worst air quality in the entire country, and you are
asking me to accept more pollution, more air pollution.

H.2.113 1 whatever your sign may say.

H.2.114 2

H.2.115 3

H.2.112 5
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H.2.113 24
H.2.114 25
H.2.115 26
H.2.113 27
H.2.114 28
So the civilian plants are not sufficient,

H.2.115

That dredge was a total farce. I was in this hearing room three times on three separate occasions when the Navy had to come back and ask for variances on their (inaudible) because they needed to spew more into our atmosphere. A dredge machine that was calculated as -- I can't remember how many hundreds of thousands of vehicles it was the equivalent of putting through our air. The health of this community is already at risk. I don't want to accept any more. That's it. I'm done.

Thank you.

H.2.116

JOE BACON: Yes, good evening. I'm Joe Bacon. I have been a resident of Coronado for 11 years. My family has had roots in Coronado for over 50 years. My grandfather was an Admiral in the U.S. Navy. My uncle and my father both served in the U.S. Navy.

I would like to say that I really put my health first, and I really feel that the Navy will probably go along with this project because it's economically feasible and because there is probably little alternative in the short range.

H.2.117

But I would voice my concern that the Navy could work with the community in putting up some kind of a monitoring system so that people can feel a little better when they go to bed at night. And that's not just people in our community, that's people in the naval community as well who would like to know if their children are at risk of getting some kind of radiation which could cause bone

damage and cancer in the future.

Now, I know you are probably going to make your decision based on a military point of view. So I have a military question I want you to consider, and that is, what military risk does the Navy envision in bringing more boats, more carriers, and more personnel to Coronado?

And this would be a risk which could come from a foreign country which has got new super advanced guidance systems and missiles, for example, the Chinese.

And in layman's terms I suppose we could say that does San Diego become a potential Pearl Harbor target, and if so, what plan does the Navy have to do about it?

Do you really feel that bringing more ships and personnel into Coronado in spite of it being economically feasible is good military strategy from this point of view?

My grand father was in Pearl Harbor, and I can say I would say that's not a mistake that would be repeated.

Thank you.

H.2.119

PENNY McCLELLAN: My name is Dr. Penny McClellan, and I am no stranger to the Navy either. I have been a member of the Navy League. I'm also a former employee at the Navy Ship Research And Development Center back in Bethesda, Maryland.

I'm not here representing anyone other than

H.2.117

H.2.118

95

1 myself at this point. I have been a resident here for 18
2 years, and my concern is about what the nuclear carriers
3 bring to San Diego.

4 It's been a long night for you I know, and
5 for us as well. There has been a lot of information. And
6 my deepest concern at this point, because you are our
7 neighbors, our friends and our family, and we all share
8 San Diego, there is a lot that's been presented tonight
9 about what the nuclear carriers are going to bring and
10 potentially bring to San Diego.

11 And the safety risks for those of us
12 individuals for our ecosystem, for members who work
13 closest or live closest, I can tell you one of my deepest
14 concerns has been the process of this. I heard about this
15 on the news last night, changed all my plans, all my
16 appointments to be here tonight. There wasn't much
17 notice. The doors were locked downstairs. We have been
18 in a heated room for a long period of time. I saw no
19 press coverage other than maybe briefly when the Navy
20 spoke. I have been part of the Environmental Impact
21 studies. I have seen how the Navy works, and I know that
22 you have a plan set in motion.

23 But I appeal to each of you as individuals
24 and not just someone who obeys commands and does, quote,
25 your duty. And that is as an individual I really want you
26 to take this part and not a matter of you have to sit here
27 and you have to put up with the abuses all night long. I
28 think that there are really some important things that

H.2.119 1 were said, and if you listened to what people are saying,
2 we don't want the nuclear carriers here. Not that we
3 don't care about the Navy, but we don't trust that anyone
4 could handle that situation without incredible risks, and
5 we have talked about a lot of those tonight. Everything
6 from terrorists actions, to accidents, I mean, if you have
7 been part of the system, as I was part of research, there
8 is going to be accidents for it's human. We make
9 mistakes. This is not something we can make mistakes on.
10 We have possible storage of nuclear material. I hear all
11 kinds of rumors. We are in an earthquake zone here.
12 I really want to feel that those of us who
13 have come tonight and spent all this time that we have
14 been heard. And that's what worries me the most, is that
15 all the information and we have had -- I have been
16 impressed with some of the expertise we have had.
Everyone from fisherman noticing what's happening to the
fish, to doctors talking about the effects of low level
nuclear waste. And I really want you to take this at
heart, because we really don't want it here. We are
really afraid of it.

17 Thank you.

H.2.120 1 JEAN BRUCHIERS: My name is Jean Bruchiers, and I
know you have heard from a lot of people, so I'll try to
be short.
2 You have heard from a lot of people, and you
3 have been given so many reasons why not to do this. And I
4

H.2.120

1 don't need to go over the long list of all these reasons
2 why not.
3 Basically I'm here to say that the people
4 concerned about this are the community here. We are the
5 community here. And the people objected to this. When I
6 look around the room and I hear the names being read, you
7 are not from here so maybe you don't recognize what those
8 names mean; but I have worked in the community. The
9 people here of this community, we recognize those names,
10 and those are the community leaders, the people that
11 provide the very services and training to the people in
12 need, the people of expertise in our community. Many of
13 the people have left that you have heard the names -- they
14 are busy people with a lot of responsibilities, that
15 they -- information that they could impart. These are a
16 wide section of our community that is objecting to this,
17 and these are the people that make the real improvements
18 to this community that otherwise -- frankly this community
19 might otherwise explode in rage and, you know, if you are
20 thinking am I trying to threaten you somehow, the answer
21 is no. This is threatening us. This is threatening our
22 very lives, our health, our way of life, and we are the
23 people that live here.

And, you know, you have heard so many people,
I'm wondering are you even listening anymore. I hope you
are, and, you know, I hope you are taking lots of notes;
and I just want to say if any of you really serve any role
at all in making the decision in this process, any

H.2.120

1 authentic input of the role on this, I ask you to
2 please -- we are the ones that you are subjecting to this,
3 we are telling you we don't want it; and I would ask you
4 to please work with us towards stopping the placement of
these carriers here.

H.2.121

SAM FLORES: Good evening. My name is Sam Flores.
I live in San Diego. First I would like to express my
appreciation to Captains O'Brien and Deal and Mr. Beckett
here for sitting here and listening. It is information
probably given to you that might do better to your boss
the Secretary of Navy in Washington. I appreciate that
personally.

Unlike many of the speakers, I'm not quite as
concerned about notification of what's going on down
there. I assume I will be alerted by the mushroom cloud
over the bay. Seriously.

Over the last several years I've been an
occupational safety and health coordinator for my company.
And as much as I cajole and train and inspect my fellow
employees, they are fallible. And I really found we are
only as good as our last accident.

The last 50 years or so we have never had a
person fall through a skylight until it happened this
summer. By the Grace of God the person wasn't hurt. The
roof project was done by competent people, and in
retrospect we find it wildly flawed.

I trust, and I'm sincere in that trust that

1 our sailors are much more motivated, as I think anybody
2 would be living 300 or 600 feet away to nuclear reactors,
3 and less fallible than our employees.
4 However, I do remember some number of years

5 ago that a battleship -- I'm not sure whether it was the
6 NEW JERSEY or not -- but one of the main guns blowing up
7 on that which actually had never happened until it
8 happened.

9 Finally, while the risk of a major accident
10 or incident -- I know the safety terminology also -- may
11 be small if the results are so dire, then the risk
12 logically is unacceptable.

13 Thank you kindly.

14 CAPTAIN ROCKLAND DEAL: Those are all the cards I
15 have. Does anyone wish to speak this evening? Anyone at
16 all?

17 All right. Thank you for your attendance
18 this evening and for your input.

19 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: When will we be notified of
20
21 any other hearings?

22
23 CAPTAIN ROCKLAND DEAL: First of all, let me say
24 the closeout for written comments is 12 November for this
25 period, and it depends on how long it takes us to answer
26 all the questions that have been entered in five locations
27 that we have held five public hearings before the next

document is released.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Will they be answered in
that document?

CAPTAIN ROCKLAND DEAL: Yes. Every written, every
oral comment will be answered in that document, and those
whose names we have will receive a copy of the answer.

(The hearing was concluded at 10:20 p.m.)

--ooo--

H.2

SD Co. Hearing 10-28-98 Comments in Spanish

Luz Palomino

Good evening. My name is (Unintelligible) and I live at 2463
(Unintelligible) street, San Diego.

(Unintelligible) the nuclear aircraft carriers and the nuclear wastes
plant will bring to our streets and our people. I neither understand
why none of the documents regarding this project were translated
into Spanish, nor do I understand why this is the only hearing that
was held in San Diego.

My community is very, is already very infected. There is terrible
pollution caused by industrial emissions and disposal of toxic
wastes.

Fish in the bay are totally polluted. They cannot swim. It is not
healthy to eat them.

One of the important aspects of this project was not analyzed in
the documents that recently, that recently three local shipyards
were bought by defense contractors.

The buyers said that the reason for the purchase was the promise
of having a site for nuclear repairs.

This will even bring more pollution to our community and is an
indirect impact (Unintelligible) nuclear aircraft carriers. This was
never mentioned in any previous document.

I live down the hill. Take this into consideration. If there is an
accident, my family and the families in this entire community will
be at risk.

(Unintelligible)

Sonia Rodriguez

I oppose it. I do not want any more nuclear aircraft carriers in San
Diego.

(Unintelligible)

H.2.79a

I (Unintelligible) the list of the names I am going to read
represents the area of (Unintelligible) and we agree on the
testimony from (Unintelligible)

Hilaria Cañuelas

Cintia Palacios

(Unintelligible)

Maria Gonzalez

Agustin Salgado

Valeria Perez

Delia Gonzalez

Nieta Lisboa

Sandra Gomez

Cecilia Randell

Hector (Unintelligible)

Silvia Hernandez

Maria Flores

Jesus (Unintelligible)

Davici Martinez

Celia Lopez

Teresa Duran

Mark Zoraino

Daniel Murillo

Silviano Palomino

Joaquin Balboa

Omar Lopez

Araceli Perez

Carmen Brandes
María de La Sana
Ofelia Brandes
Heredia Galíndez
Esperanza Verón
Mario Torero

(Unintelligible)

Angeles Velázquez
Rosario Miguel
(Unintelligible)
Maria Sánchez
Alfredo Sánchez
Ángelica Guerrero
María Navarra
María Rosales
Guadalupe Echeverría
Leticia Delgado
(Unintelligible)
Violeta Flores
Cecilia Medina
Ariel Espinosa
Miguel Rodríguez
Teresa (Unintelligible)
Terence Ramos
Candelaria López
Paula López
(Unintelligible)
Laura Rosales
Nora Molina
Mariana Linares
Helena González
Rosa Richmond

H.2

Guadalupe Rosa
Cristina Ledesma
Marta (Unintelligible)
Guadalupe Hernández
Guadalupe Miranda
Sara González
Mónica Villegas
Stephanie García
Soledad (Unintelligible)
Verónica Martínez
(Unintelligible)
Josefina Romero
Antonio Tara
Cristina Ramírez
Gloria Espinosa
Cristina Bautista
Delia Figueroa
Jessy Barroso
Enrique Gala
Francisco Rodríguez
Agustina Rodriguez
Stephanie Romero
Florida Susana
(Unintelligible)
Heredia Medina
Guadalupe Medina
Ana Camacho
Helena (Unintelligible)
Maria Gimenez
Catalina Palacios
Paula Cristina Maldonado
Cristina Romero

Thank you.

Audiencia SD Co. 28/10/98 - Comentarios en español

Luz Palomino

Buenas noches. Mi nombre es (Ininteligible) y yo vivo en el 2463 de la calle (Ininteligible) San Diego.

(Ininteligible) de los portaaviones nucleares y la planta de desechos nucleares traigan a nuestras calles y a nuestra gente. Tampoco entiendo por qué ninguna de la documentación sobre este proyecto fue traducida al español. Ni tampoco entiendo por qué es la única audiencia que se ha llevado a cabo en San Diego.

Mi comunidad es muy, ya está muy infectada. Es una gran contaminación generada por las emisiones industriales y los desechos tóxicos.

Los peces de la bahía están muy contaminados. No pueden nadar. | H.2.79b
No son sanos para comer.

H.2

Uno de los importantes aspectos de este proyecto no fue analizado en la documentación que recientemente. Que recientemente tres de los astilleros locales fueron comprados por los contratistas de defensa.

Los compradores han dicho que la promesa de un lugar de reparación nuclear cerca fue el motivo por lo cual compraron.

Esto traerá aún más contaminación a nuestra comunidad y es un impacto indirecto del (Ininteligible) de portaaviones nucleares. Al cual nunca fue asesorado en ninguno de los documentos previos.

Yo vivo cuesta abajo. Por ejemplo esto. Si hay un accidente, mi familia y la familia de toda la comunidad entera está en riesgo.

Y me opongo. No quiero más portaaviones nucleares en San Diego. | H.2.93

↑ H.2.93
(Ininteligible)
Sonia Rodriguez
Yo (ininteligible) la lista de los nombres que voy a leer representamos el área del barrio (ininteligible) y estamos de acuerdo con el testimonio de (Ininteligible)

Hilaria Cañuelas
Cintia Palacios
(Ininteligible)

Maria Gonzalez
Agustin Salgado
Valeria Perez
Delia Gonzalez
Nieta Lisboa
Sandra Gomez

Cecilia Randell
Hector (Ininteligible)
Silvia Hernandez
Maria Flores
Jesus (Ininteligible)
Davici Martinez
Celia Lopez
Teresa Duran
Mark Zoraino
Daniel Murillo
Silviano Palomino
Joaquin Balboa
Omar Lopez
Araceli Perez
Carmen Brandes
Maria de La Sana
Ofelia Brandes
Heredia Galindez

Esperanza Verón
Mario Torero

(Ineligible)

Angeles Velázquez
Rosario Miguel
(Ineligible)
María Sánchez
Alfredo Sánchez
Angélica Guerrero
María Navarra
Maria Rosales
Guadalupe Echeverría
Leticia Delgado
(Ineligible)
Violeta Flores
Cecilia Medina
Ariel Espinosa
Miguel Rodríguez
Teresa (Ineligible)
Terence Ramos
Candelaria López
Paula López
(Ineligible)
Laura Rosales
Nora Molina
Mariana Linares
Helena González
Rosa Richmond
Guadalupe Rosa
Cristina Ledesma
Marta (Ineligible)
Guadalupe Hernández

H.2

Guadalupe Miranda
Sara González
Mónica Villegas
Stephanie García
Soledad (Ineligible)
Verónica Martínez
(Ineligible)
Josefina Romero
Antonio Tara
Cristina Ramírez
Gloria Espinosa
Cristina Bautista
Delia Figueroa
Jessy Barroso
Enrique Gala
Francisco Rodríguez
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Stephanie Romero
Florida Susana
(Ineligible)
Heredia Medina
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Ana Camacho
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Maria Gimenez
Catalina Palacios
Paula Cristina Maldonado
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Thank you.

The San Diego Union-Tribune

Public needs information about the nuclear carriers

By Bob Filner

While the military downsizes overall, its activity is increasing in San Diego. Currently, San Diego houses over 67,000 military personnel, and this number is expected to increase in the future as a number of key projects come on line.

While we all applaud the economic benefits brought to us by the Navy, we also want the Navy to respect all aspects of our quality of life. The noise and air pollution from the new Marine helicopters coming to Miramar have been hotly contested by residents — with inadequate response from the Department of Defense.

Perhaps most important, the Navy is aggressively building a nuclear megaport in San Diego Bay — and many in the San Diego area have been kept in the dark about what is coming.

On August 26, the John Stennis, the first of an expected three nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, arrived to be homeported in San Diego. To accommodate these ships, 9 million cubic yards of sediment was dredged from San Diego Bay, and radioactive and hazardous waste facilities are being built on North Island. What are the impacts to the bay from this massive dredging project? What public health risks are created with the presence of nuclear and toxic waste? What could happen in the event of an accident?

Many San Diego residents have been asking these questions, and raising concerns, as they are allowed to under the law. They have utilized the processes that are available to them — attended public meetings, written letters and requested information through the Freedom of Information Act.

There should have been much more openness about this project from the beginning.

Information has been slow in coming, if it comes at all, and Channel 8 reported that some of these people have themselves been investigated by the Navy. While I support the Navy, I believe that any governmental agency that doesn't divulge information upon request but instead tries to do background checks on the citizens requesting information, should itself be investigated.

San Diego area residents have a right to know about and participate in decision-making about major changes to our region. Compared to the debate over stadiums and ballpark, information and discussion about the arrival of the nuclear-powered aircraft carriers has been virtually nonexistent.

There is a high-level public task force — the Padres ballpark proposal — yet no such body exists for the nuclear megaport project. In fact, in the 4 years this project has been under development, there has never been a meeting about the entire project!

There should have been much more openness about this project from the beginning, but it is too late. The public is now demanding a far more open discussion about all the ramifications of the nuclear megaport project — and they deserve to have it. There have been serious accidents at other nuclear ports and on nuclear-powered vessels. The Navy has to explain in basic and the potential for future ones, honestly and straightforwardly, to the San Diego public.

The Navy should open up the process to discuss the risk of nuclear accidents and the evacuation that should be in place and the ongoing hazards associated with the

statement associated with the second carry-over. To its credit, the Navy has responded positively and has agreed to hold a hearing in San Diego on Wednesday, Sept. 30 at 7 p.m. at the County Administration Building on Pacific Highway. That hearing is in addition to one that already had been scheduled for Tuesday, Sept. 29 at 7 p.m. at Coronado High School.

These are good first steps. I call on the Navy to go further, however, and provide complete information at that hearing about the entire Nuclear Megaport Project. That means analyzing the potential environmental and public health impacts from all three carriers and the associated waste handling operations and disclosing the emergency procedures that will be utilized in the event of an accident.

The economic benefits derived from Navy operations must be weighed against the potential harm that may be caused. Only when all the facts are on the table will San Diego be able to make a truly informed decision about this critical aspect of our region's future.

FILNER represents the 50th Congressional District, which includes much of South San Diego.

A Short History of Naval Nuclear Accidents

According to the Navy, "...there has never been a reactor accident in the history of the U.S. Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program..." (1995 FEIS, p.I-75). However, according to Navy records obtained through Freedom of Information Act Requests (FOIA) and independent research on the subject the following accidents have occurred and resulted in releases of radiation into the environment.

1. **Release of Radioactive Steam, 1996 - USS Arkansas**
Release of radioactive steam from a nuclear powered vessel at the Puget Sound Naval Shipyard. The Navy waited 15 hours to inform the State and did not inform the public until an informant called the press. (*Bremerton Sun*, 3-5-96)
2. **Radiation Contamination of Sailors, 1997 - USS Portsmouth**
USS Portsmouth (SSN 707) two SubBase workers were exposed to radiation during radiological work. (Navy news release issued 04-28-97)
3. **Radiation Contamination of Sailors, 1995 - USS California**
Three crew members were contaminated with small amounts of radioactivity after 100 gallons of radioactive water spilled from the ship's propulsion system. One sailor was burned with 160-degree water during an accident involving testing of equipment in the cruiser's reactor compartment. (*Union Tribune*, 6/4/95 and *Navy Times*, 06-19-95)
4. **Release of Radioactive Water into San Diego Bay, USS Truxtun, 1979**
Thirteen gallons of radioactive "high-purity water" was spilled into San Diego Bay on September 2, 1979. Initial reports stated that the ship spilled as much as 80 to 100 gallons of radioactive water. (*Neptune Papers*, p.57)
5. **Release of radioactive water into San Diego Bay, USS Gurnard, 1980**
The submarine USS Gurnard spilled 30 gallons of water containing radioactive material into San Diego Bay on July 20, 1980 (*Neptune Papers*, p.57)
6. **Repeated releases of radioactive water released into US Ports, USS Long Beach**
The cruiser USS Long Beach reportedly leaked hundreds of gallons of low-level radioactive water in five Navy ports because of a malfunctioning valve, including a total of 139 gallons of primary coolant while moored in San Diego. (*Union Tribune*, 11-27-91) Excerpts from that article by Greg Vistaica, are worth repeating:
"...Copies of pages from a log on the ship that lists discharges of radioactive liquids were brought to the San Diego Union by concerned sailors who accuse the Navy of sacrificing safety in order to meet scheduled operations...Four of the sailors on the ship, over an undetermined time period, have developed cancer, the crewmen said. Two had brain tumors and two had leukemia..."

Prepared by Environmental Health Coalition, 1717 Kettner, Suite 100, San Diego, CA 92101, (619) 233-0281. Website: www.environmentalhealth.org

Exhibit No. 2
For Information
M. B. Filner
Date 11-29-98
Narrative Justice

Exhibit No. 2
For Information
M. B. Filner
Date 11-29-98
Narrative Justice

- 7. Radiation Contamination of Sailors, 1973--USS Guardfish**
 Contamination with radiation of 5 sailors aboard the USS Guardfish in 1973. Documents released under FOIA. What is interesting about this accident is that the Navy has repeatedly refused to release the report of investigation for this 25-year old accident. EHC's appeal of this denial has also been denied by the Navy.
- 8. Release of radiation, 1977, USS California**
 Discharge of primary coolant water on two occasions and many reports of sailor misconduct when on duty for nuclear plants on the ship.(11-20-77, *Virginia Pilot*)
- 9. Release of radiation- USS Enterprise**
 A radiation accident caused a \$6 million clean up when a shipyard worker improperly wielded a propellant system valve contaminating 9 workers and 4 compartments. USS Enterprise, while in dry-dock in early August, 1994, experienced a fire in the reactor room leading to a spill. (Navy Times, 07-31-95)
- 10. Release of radiation kept secret, USS Gullarro, 1989**
 This vessel dumped at least 235 gallons of radioactive coolant into the harbor in Guam. This incident was kept from the public for six months. An official from the U.S. Naval Institute stated "Any spill is potentially dangerous, if it happens with a small amount it can happen with a large amount." (*Union Tribune* 6-14-90).
- 11. Release of radioactive water, USS Nimitz, 1980**
 Navy admits to a primary coolant leak on 11 May 1979. The accident record of the Nimitz-Class ships as released to Greenpeace in 1991, showed that Nimitz-class ships have been involved in more than 40 incidents over the last two decades, with at least five accidents in California ports. (Nephe Papers p.6)

OTHER ACCIDENTS/INCIDENTS OF CONCERN

- 1. Dangerous Working Conditions in the Nuclear Navy, 1996--DSU Mystic**
 Excerpts from the FOIA documents received regarding the mercury spill into San Diego Bay in the NASNI Training Basin by the Nuclear Navy Submarine personnel aboard the DSU Mystic. The Navy released the court-martial transcript to us as well as many other documents demonstrating fatigued personnel, impossible scheduling, and an overworked crew. The Engineer of the Mystic even had a breakdown prior to the incident. One crewman received a court-martial for making false statements and for dereliction in performance of duty. There are 155 documents still denied to EHC regarding this accident even though it did not involve radiation, or even a nuclear vessel, and there is no litigation threatened or pending.
- 2. Evacuation of a Navy Nuclear Facility, 1998- Naval Reactors Facility.**
 The Associated Press reports that 200 people were evacuated from the Idaho Naval Reactors facility on May 21, 1998 when elevated radiation was detected.

SPORTS

CHRIST CHURCH DAY SCHOOL "Message-In-A-Bottle" Returns After 14 Years Page 5
CORONADO OPTIMISTS H2O Tote: Shudder Varsity comes up big & wins 23-21
 Club Members Return From Recent Junket Page 11
High School Victory over University City
 See Page 21

ELECTION

It's Voting Time!
 Cardinals voter summary and review of local propositions
 Special section inside

CORONADO EAGLE & JOURNAL

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San Diego

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im Guen	Robert Bacon
Dash Bond	Randy Hedgecock
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Alex Ampraran	Eirain Galavre
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EXHIBIT NO. 5
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7/1/67
 Date 10-25-98
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Lyle Neputun

Chery Traut

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Randy Guirquis

Martha Frost

John J. Peckham

Katherine Faulconer

Lillian Laedon

Foothills Democratic Club

Escondido

Dawn Chaloux

Jennifer Douras

Jennifer Douras

Poway

Sue Doyle

Mike Mellon

Mike Mellon

Laura Madden

Laura Madden

Kevin Kempka

Kevin Kempka

Ocean Beach

Lucy Concercao

Mattie Forga

Mattie Forga

Kristina Orantes

Kristina Orantes

Bradley Gordon

Bradley Gordon

Maureen Fassbaugh

Maureen Fassbaugh

Morris Blaze

Morris Blaze

Chris Strompolos

Chris Strompolos

Debbie Siegelman

Debbie Siegelman

Julie Taylor

Julie Taylor

Beverly Warner

Beverly Warner

Ramona Vallejo-Olin

Ramona Vallejo-Olin

Stephanie Mood

Stephanie Mood

Tanya Ford

Tanya Ford

Mary Ann Brewer

Mary Ann Brewer

Elizabeth Anne Loeb

Elizabeth Anne Loeb

Bryan Cambell

Bryan Cambell

Cynthia Conti

Cynthia Conti

Kim Emerson

Kim Emerson

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Hanna Sturtz

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Toila Thomas

Jeff Manis

Jeff Manis

Dillard Leon Duke Jr.

Dillard Leon Duke Jr.

John Millman

John Millman

Oscar Bogostaw

Oscar Bogostaw

Jean M. Manor

Jean M. Manor

Irma Gonzales

Irma Gonzales

Lauron Skye

Lauron Skye

Teddy Shine Jr.

Teddy Shine Jr.

Rebecca Callahan

Rebecca Callahan

Dustin Galat

Dustin Galat

Marilyn Gregg

Marilyn Gregg

Hal Brody

Hal Brody

Lyle Neputun

Lyle Neputun

Patricia Alberda

Patricia Alberda

Joan Adessa

Joan Adessa

Elizabeth Panetery

Elizabeth Panetery

Matthew O'Grady

Matthew O'Grady

Ardis Weise

Ardis Weise

Lou Georgino

Lou Georgino

William Logsdon

William Logsdon

Stephanie Kaup

Stephanie Kaup

Harold Ansel

Harold Ansel

Jacqueline Benson

Jacqueline Benson

Gary Carter

Gary Carter

Laurie Curtin

Laurie Curtin

Carmen DeCordova

Carmen DeCordova

Shirley Kriet

Shirley Kriet

Alec Mackenzie

Alec Mackenzie

Bette McClimon

Bette McClimon

Peter McRae

Peter McRae

Rita Perwach

Rita Perwach

Ann Schroeder

Ann Schroeder

Evelyn West

Evelyn West

H2**Isabel Baeza**

Isabel Baeza

Carlos Richardson

Carlos Richardson

Marty Saul

Marty Saul

David Robertson

David Robertson

Elaine Stevens

Elaine Stevens

Peter Miesner

Peter Miesner

Bob Inlay

Bob Inlay

Jean Deangelis

Jean Deangelis

Greg Deangelis

Greg Deangelis

John Stull

John Stull

Susanne Stull

Susanne Stull

Kendon Anderson

Kendon Anderson

Cat D'Camp

Cat D'Camp

Mike Matasiak

Mike Matasiak

Helen L'annunziata

Helen L'annunziata

Nathan R. Stevenson

Nathan R. Stevenson

Scout Forrest

Scout Forrest

Kelly Jackson

Kelly Jackson

Awesa Kortsoglou

Awesa Kortsoglou

Bruce Allen Nixon

Bruce Allen Nixon

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Bob Yanian

Jan Sopiter

Jan Sopiter

Lisa Hutton

Lisa Hutton

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Matt Coleman

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Mark Walder

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Sue Oxley
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Oasis Benson
Karen McConlogue
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Barbara Gormlie
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Oceanside
Jose Tara
Nicole Lynn Pugh
Deborah Quander
Francys Streano

Carlshad
Fawn Boynton
Freddie Trevizo
Anita Sallie
Sam Sallie
Bernice Bernardo
Barbara Neel

San Marcos
Lorraine Demi
Dan Paris
Ray Wolf

Leucadia
Carolyn Tamall Aralos
Marcia Jones

Fallbrook
Kenneth Weaver

Edith Helen Monsus
Penny Cohen
Elizabeth Rickett
Ruth Heifer
Isha Leinow
Mrs. Robert Cleary
Bruno Verbeck
Minnette Ehrenfreund
Linda Fuchs

Herbert Katz
Juawayne Keitler
Elizabeth Leslie
Anita Schiller
Robert Alexander
Martha Sabados
Jane Bishop
Raford Boddy
Larry Stolourov

Cardiff

David Miranda
Margie Lazor
John Lazor
Jai Ranchand
Susan Cooper

Encinitas

Yonah Offner
Naomi Offner
Barbara Boulter
Richard Hubbard
Vickie Stone
Timothy Blalock
Kathryn Gould
Andrea Calbow
Randall Conish
Rick Jahnkow
Toriy Neel
Angie Stroot

Del Mar

Alice Goodkind
Susan Churchill
Greg Osmerk
Sinclair Hatch
Deborah Rutherford

Vista

Alfredo Ventura
Jennifer Ballard
Judith Brown

Lakeside
Gail Sabbadini
Roger Sabbadini

Jamul

Betty Smith
Potero
 Karen Rodgers

Poway

Sue Doyle
 Mike Mellon
 Laura Madden
 Kevin Kempka

Escondido

Dawn Chaloux
 Jessica Thomas
 Rebecca Arnold

6

Exhibit No.	10-2-2
For Offender	Offender
Date	10-2-2
A-Yrneo, Jeffries	

Pacific Beach

Jason Flores
 Antanas Sada
 Matthew E. Sand
 Liliasara Bagner-Cermak
 Marilyn Williams
 Nancy Madison
 Adrienne Green
 Cheri Joseph
 Katrina Schnieder

Ocean Beach

Karen Willow
 Nicole Mister
 Catherine Kline
 Stewart Kline
 Joseph Levine
 Dana Bevel
 Scott Foy
 Chris Strompolos
 Dolorie Siegelman
 Debbie Taylor
 Beverly Warner
 Ramona Vallejo-Olin
 Stephanie Mood
 Tanya Ford
 Mary Ann Brewer
 Elizabeth Anne Loeb
 Bryan Garballi
 Cynthia Conti
 Kim Emerson
 Hanna Sturtz
 Tola Thomas
 Jeff Manns
 Dillard Leon Duke Jr.
 John Millman
 Oscar Bogoslaw
 Jean M. Manor
 Irma Gonzales
 Lauren Skye
 Alberto N. del Flores
 Amelina Sanchez
 Joe Schaefer
 Alyssa Swizer
 Leslie Sepulveda
 Darlene Springs
 Yvonne Lu
 Reid Steiner
 Ella Gibbany

Lucy Concercao
 Matie Forga
 Kristina Orantes
 Bradley Gordon
 Maureen Fassbaugh
 Morris Blaze

Isabel Baera
 Carlos Richardson
 Marty Saul
 David Roberson
 Elaine Stevens
 Peter Miesner
 Bob Imay
 Jean Deangelis
 Greg Deangelis
 John Sull
 Susanne Sull
 Kendon Anderson
 Cat D'Camp
 Mike Matsiak
 Helen L'annunziata
 Nathan R. Stevenson
 Scout Forest
 Kelly Jackson
 Awesa Konisoglu
 Bruce Allen Nixon
 Bob Vanian
 Jan Sopier
 Lisa Hutton
 Matt Coleman
 Mark Walder
 Michael Dogan
 Norman Williams
 Madeline O'Brien
 Joseph Raifa

VOLUME 7 CVN HOMEOPTING EIS — NASNI RESPONSE TO COMMENTS

Comment Number	Response
San Diego Hearing	
H.2.1	Your comments are noted and are included in the Final EIS.
H.2.2	Your comments are noted and are included in the Final EIS.
H.2.3	Section 1.1 of the EIS discusses the process of public participation required under NEPA. The Navy will use this EIS, including the public's comments on the Draft EIS, in conjunction with other relevant materials, in making their decision regarding the homeporting of the three CVNs in the Pacific Fleet currently under consideration.
H.2.4	NNPP-related comments in this testimony are also made in the EHC's letter, O.12. Please see the Navy responses to these comments.
H.2.5	The comment addresses the process the Navy has used to make decisions regarding the homeporting of CVNs in the Pacific Fleet. The sequence of events affecting the decisions to home port CVNs in San Diego, and the chronology of CVN homeporting, along with the decommissioning of CVs in the Pacific Fleet, is discussed in detail in response to comment L.4.5. The Navy had not, at the time of preparation of the 1995 EIS for the BRAC CVN, formulated a proposal for how to meet the need of facilities for two more CVNs in the Pacific Fleet. However, the Navy did anticipate that in the future, a proposal would be formulated, and that the alternatives could include facilities at NASNI. Therefore, a larger project was not segmented into two smaller projects for the purpose of avoiding more rigorous environmental analysis. Further, although a "proposal" had not been formulated such that it could be analyzed on a "co-equal" basis in the 1995 EIS, it was reasonably foreseeable that a future project could include additional facilities at NASNI. Since it was reasonably foreseeable, the potential effects were included in the analysis of cumulative effects in that document. The 1995 EIS states, "This EIS, therefore, considers the potential cumulative impacts of CV replacement and homeporting a total of three CVNs in San Diego." See Volume 1 of the 1995 EIS, Chapter 6 (DON 1995a).
H.2.6	Two public hearings on the Draft EIS have been held in the San Diego region and public testimony received, as required under NEPA. The Navy does not currently have plans to have a follow-on community workshop for an informal dialogue. Concerns generated during the public review of the EIS will be considered by Navy personnel responsible for making decisions regarding the proposed action. Navy representatives at the EIS public hearings are directly involved with this decision-making process, and provide recommendations to the Secretary of the Navy regarding the preferred alternative to be implemented.

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Comment Number	Response
	Furthermore, the Navy ensures that the EIS decisionmaker has a complete copy of the public hearing transcripts. The Navy believes that the objective sought by the comment is met by the fact that the transcript of the public hearing is prepared and reviewed as part of the NEPA process leading up to the Record of Decision.
	The Department of Toxic Substances Control, in an Order Denying Petition For Review of the Environmental Health Coalition, Peace Resource Center of San Diego, and Stephanie Kaupp's challenge to the permitting of the Mixed Waste Storage Facility at NASNI (ID No. CAR 000 019 430; Docket HWCA 98/99 – P012), responded to this issue with the following:
	Petitioners are incorrect in their assertion that members of the public have a "right" to speak directly to the decision-maker (i.e., that the Department official that signs the Permit must also be the hearing officer). Nevertheless, the Department ensures that the official who signs the Permit has a complete transcript of the public hearing for review. The Department believes that the objective sought by Petitioners is met by the fact that a transcript of the public hearing is prepared and reviewed as part of the final permit decisionmaking process. Furthermore, there is not basis to believe that the permit decision or conditions would be altered if the hearing officer for the public hearing also signed the Permit itself.
H.2.7	Please see response to comment O.10.23.
H.2.8	Please see response to comment H.2.6.
H.2.9	Your comments are noted and are included in the Final EIS.
H.2.10	Construction of the Depot Maintenance Facility was covered in the Navy's 1995 Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Development of Facilities in San Diego/Coronado to Support the Homeporting of One NIMITZ-Class Aircraft Carrier. However, it is important to note that all aspects of facilities design, construction, and modification conform to national and local regulatory codes, which include distance limits for siting from an earthquake fault. The design of the facility follows conservative methods widely accepted by the engineering community and provides additional "factors of safety" in redundant structural design features. For radiological facilities, the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program uses standard design features that have been developed to minimize potential risk to the environment, to the general public, and to workers. Stringent design criteria comply with all building codes, including those applicable to earthquakes. During construction, "state-of-the-art" construction techniques along with rigorous field observation and inspection are used where

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Comment Number	Response
	appropriate to ensure a solid and competent foundation under all credible seismic loading conditions.
	Also, contrary to the commentor's assertion, the Navy is not proposing to make North Island a nuclear waste disposal facility. As was described in the response to O.12.69, low-level radioactive waste will be shipped to off-site treatment and disposal facilities as soon as practicable, with consideration given to minimizing the number of truck shipments and the availability of those facilities. The Navy does not dispose of its low-level radioactive waste at its facilities.
H.2.11	Please see response to comment O.12.216.
H.2.12	Please see responses to comments O.12.86 and O.12.44.
H.2.13	Please see responses to comments L.4.47 and L.4.36.
H.2.14	Your comments are noted and are included in the Final EIS.
H.2.15	Although no specific issues were noted by the commentor, the Navy notes the commentor's general opinion regarding the proposed action.
H.2.16	Please see responses to comments L.4.34, O.12.25, and O.12.190.
H.2.17	Your comments are responded to in this Final EIS (see above responses).
H.2.18	The Navy does not consider that translation of the Draft EIS into Spanish is required to ensure that low income and minority populations have the opportunity to fully participate in the NEPA process. A scoping meeting to discuss the issues to be addressed in the EIS was held in Coronado on 10 February 1998. Since that time, the Navy has acknowledged the necessity of including a public hearing in San Diego. Notices of availability for the Draft EIS were placed in <i>La Prensa</i> . All responses to public comments generated during the public comment period provided in Spanish are translated into Spanish. The comments are annotated to ensure that the reader has sufficient understanding of the EIS materials without needing to read the EIS itself. The Notice of Availability (NOA), is translated in Spanish, and a telephone 888 support hot line is available in Spanish as well.

La Marina de los Estados Unidos no considera que la traducción al español del Draft EIS (Estudio de Impacto al Medio Ambiente) es requerida para asegurar que la población de bajos recursos y las minorías tengan la oportunidad de participar totalmente en el proceso conocido como NEPA. Una reunión para analizar los temas que serían tratados en el EIS (Estudio de Impacto al Medio Ambiente) se llevó a cabo en Coronado el 10 de febrero de 1998. Desde aquel momento, la Marina de los Estados Unidos ha reconocido la necesidad de incluir al público en la reunión de San Diego. Los avisos de

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Comment Number	Response
	<p><i>disponibilidad para el Draft EIS (Estudio de Impacto al Medio Ambiente) fueron publicados en La Prensa . Todas las respuestas a los comentarios públicos generados durante el período de comentarios públicos que fueron provistos en español son traducidos al inglés. Los comentarios son anotados para asegurar que el lector tenga un entendimiento suficiente de los materiales del EIS (Estudio de Impacto al Medio Ambiente) sin la necesidad de tener que leerlo en su totalidad. El Aviso de Disponibilidad (NOA), está traducido al español y hay una línea telefónica 888 que también está disponible en español.</i></p>
H.2.19	<p>The air quality analysis in the Draft EIS is based on compliance with national and state ambient air quality standards. These standards represent allowable atmospheric concentrations at which the public health and welfare are protected and include a reasonable margin of safety to protect the more sensitive individuals in the population, such as elderly people and children. Since the proposed action alternatives would not exceed any ambient air quality standard, public health would be protected from the effects of the proposed action alternatives. Toxic air contaminants (TACs) emissions from the proposed dredging and disposal actions at NASNI would produce insignificant health impacts to the public.</p>
	<p>Cumulative impacts from past projects that affect local air quality and toxic waste emissions were taken into account in this EIS. This EIS presents data that concludes there would be no significant impacts to the fish community from the proposed action. Fish would avoid dredge areas, so they would likely not be affected by any contaminants resuspended during dredging.</p>
	<p><i>El análisis de la calidad del aire en el Draft EIS (Estudio de Impacto al Medio Ambiente) está basado en el cumplimiento con las normas de la calidad del aire ambiental nacional y estatal. Estas normas representan las concentraciones atmosféricas permisibles en las cuales el bienestar y la salud pública están protegidas e incluye un margen razonable de seguridad para proteger los individuos más sensibles dentro de la población, tales como las personas mayores y los niños. Como las acciones alternativas propuestas no excederían ninguna norma de la calidad del aire ambiental, la salud pública estaría protegida de los efectos de las acciones alternativas propuestas. Las emisiones de los contaminantes tóxicos del aire (TAC) causadas por el dragado propuesto y por las acciones de deshecho en NASNI, producirían un impacto insignificante en la salud pública.</i></p>
	<p><i>Los impactos cumulativos de proyectos pasados que afectan la calidad del aire local y las emisiones de residuos tóxicos, fueron tomados en cuenta en este EIS (Estudio de Impacto al Medio Ambiente). Este EIS (Estudio de Impacto al Medio Ambiente) presenta datos que concluyen que no habría impactos significativos en la vida marina debido a la acción propuesta. Los peces evitarían las áreas de dragado, así que probablemente no serían afectados por ninguno de los contaminantes en suspensión después del dragado.</i></p>

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Comment Number	Response
H.2.20	<p>Purchases of local shipbuilding companies by other defense contractors, and the fact that these defense contractors are pursuing bids on ship repair, are common business practice and are beyond the scope of this EIS. The fact that defense contractors may be qualified to perform NNPP radiological work does not imply that NNPP radiological work would be performed: (1) in locations other than the NASNI CIF or (2) in any different manner than the uniform standards established by the NNPP. The purchases would not affect the amount of maintenance performed on homeported CVNs.</p> <p>Pollution impacts of the Navy's action to homeport USS JOHN C. STENNIS at NASNI were addressed in the Navy's 1995 Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Development of Facilities in San Diego/Coronado to Support the Homeporting of One NIMITZ-Class Aircraft Carrier. Please see response to comment H.2.19a for a discussion of air quality impacts in this EIS.</p> <p>The EIS has evaluated a wide variety of accidents and has determined that the radiological risks are not significant. No vessels would be constructed as part of the proposed action. The CVNs homeported there would receive maintenance at the facility at NASNI, with out-of-water maintenance, the Docking Planned Incremental Availability (DPIA) occurring once every 6 years at PSNS, in Bremerton, Washington. Hazardous material use and storage would occur at NASNI consistent with existing practices. Adequate hazardous waste capacity exists to accommodate material generated by the capacity to homeport two additional CVNs. No impact to neighborhoods outside of NASNI would occur.</p> <p><i>Las compras de compañías locales de astilleros por otros contratistas de defensa, y el hecho que estos contratistas de defensa están llevando a cabo licitaciones para reparaciones de buques, son un práctica comercial común y están más allá del alcance de este EIS (Estudio de Impacto al Medio Ambiente). El hecho que los contratistas de defensa puedan estar capacitados para desempeñar trabajos radiológicos NNPP no implica que el trabajo radiológico NNPP pueda ser desempeñando: (1) en otras ubicaciones aparte de la NASNI CIF o (2) en alguna manera diferente que los estándares uniformes establecidos por el NNPP. Las compras no afectarían la cantidad de mantenimiento llevada a cabo en los CVN que están en el puerto base.</i></p> <p><i>Los impactos de contaminación de la acción de la Marina al USS JOHN C. STENNIS en el puerto base en NASNI fueron tratados en 1995 en la Declaración Final de Impacto Medio Ambiental para el Desarrollo de Instalaciones en San Diego / Coronado para el Soporte de Puerto Base de un Portaaviones Clase NIMITZ. Por favor véase la respuesta al comentario H.2.19 a para la discusión sobre el impacto a la calidad del aire en este EIS (Estudio de Impacto al Medio Ambiente).</i></p> <p><i>El EIS (Estudio de Impacto al Medio Ambiente) ha evaluado una amplia variedad de accidentes y ha determinado que los riesgos radiológicos no son significativos. Ningún buque será construido como parte de la acción propuesta. Los CVN's en el puerto base</i></p>

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Comment Number	Response
	<p>recibirán mantenimiento en la instalación en NASNI, con mantenimiento en seco, con la Disponibilidad Incrementada de Atraco Planeado (DPIA) ocurriendo una vez cada seis años en PSNS, en Bremerton, Washington. El uso y el almacenaje de materiales peligrosos ocurriría en NASNI, consistente con las prácticas actuales. Existen capacidades adecuadas para materiales peligrosos para acomodar el material generado por la capacidad de tener dos adicionales CVN's en el puerto base. No ocurrirán impactos a los vecindarios afuera de NASNI.</p>
H.2.21	<p>A wide range of hypothetical accidents was considered in the development of the analysis presented in the EIS. The results of all the analyses of both normal operations and hypothetical accidents indicate that there would be no significant radiological impacts from homeporting and maintaining NIMITZ-class aircraft carriers or operating NIMITZ-class aircraft carrier maintenance facilities.</p>
	<p><i>En el desarrollo de los análisis presentados en el EIS (Estudio de Impacto al Medio Ambiente) se consideraron una amplia diversidad de accidentes hipotéticos. Los resultados de todos los análisis, tanto de operaciones normales como de accidentes hipotéticos indican que no habrán impactos radiológicos significantes por el puerto base y mantenimiento de portaaviones clase NIMITZ, ni por la operación de instalaciones de mantenimiento de portaaviones clase NIMITZ.</i></p>
H.2.22	<p>The Navy's plan for emergency response is included in section 7.5 of the EIS. The EIS states that emergency planning and emergency response is included as an integral part of ongoing NNPP operations to ensure the Navy is prepared to handle accidental releases of radioactivity. In the highly unlikely event of an emergency, the Navy would promptly notify State and local officials, and would communicate with those officials. Any action needed to protect the public would be handled by State and local officials using existing plans for emergencies from natural events, such as earthquakes or hurricanes. In addition, it is important to note that since the inception of the NNPP almost half a century ago, there has never been a reactor accident associated with the Program, which has accumulated over 5,000 reactor years of operation. In addition, there has never been any release of radioactivity that has had a significant effect on the public or the environment. The Navy's historical record of safe and responsible operation of nuclear powered warships is discussed in Volume I, Chapter 7 of the EIS.</p>
H.2.23	<p>Two public hearings on the Draft EIS have been held in the San Diego region and public testimony received, as required under NEPA. The Navy does not currently have plans to have a follow-on community workshop for an informal dialogue. Concerns generated during the public review of the EIS will be considered by Navy personnel responsible for making decisions regarding the proposed action. Navy representatives at the EIS public hearings are directly involved with this decision-making process, and provide recommendations to the Secretary of the Navy regarding the preferred alternative to be implemented.</p>

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Comment Number	Response
	Furthermore, the Navy ensures that the EIS decisionmaker has a complete copy of the public hearing transcripts. The Navy believes that the objective sought by the comment is met by the fact that the transcript of the public hearing is prepared and reviewed as part of the NEPA process leading up to the Record of Decision.
H.2.24	Please see responses to comments L.4.48, O.12.78, and O.12.190 regarding issues raised in this comment.
H.2.25	Information on low-level radiation exposure and risk are addressed in Appendices E and F of the EIS and in response O.12.190. Non-cancer risks are addressed in comment O.12.27.
H.2.26	The Navy is aware of two studies that specifically address alpha and beta radioactivity in San Diego Bay. The first is the San Diego Bay Health Risk Study, which is described in response O.12.127. The second is a study chartered by the San Diego Association of Governments. The SANDAG 205(J) study included efforts to characterize the levels of total alpha and beta radiation in bottom sediments throughout the bay, but outside of the Naval restricted areas. The results of this study (San Diego Bay Cleanup Project Under Section 205(J) of the Clean Water Act, January 1992) identified that all radioactivity levels were evaluated to be at background levels by the California Department of Health Services. Since the predominant radionuclide associated with NNPP work is cobalt 60, which emits gamma radioactivity, it is impossible to conclude that NNPP work is the source of the radioactivity detected based solely on gross alpha and beta activity. Extensive Navy radiological monitoring in the San Diego Bay area, performed quarterly and publicly reported annually for 30 years by the Navy, and independent radiological surveys performed by EPA in 1967, 1986, and 1997, discovered no radioactivity associated with nuclear propulsion in any Bay aquatic life.
H.2.27	The EIS concludes that there are no significant impacts to the public's health and safety (please see sections 3.15 (Volume 1), and Appendix E, Appendix F, and Appendix J in Volume 2).
H.2.28	Notwithstanding the GAO analysis, the Defense Acquisitions Board (DAB) decided in September 1998 that CVX would be nuclear powered. This decision was based on a careful analysis of all pertinent data including the Department of the Navy's evaluation of tactical flexibility, operational and technical risks, and funding requirements of the various alternatives. For further detail, please see the response to comment H.1.5.

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Comment Number	Response
H.2.29	Please see responses to comments O.12.55 and I.80.2.
H.2.30	Please see responses to comments O.12.55 and I.80.2.
H.2.31	Please see responses to comments O.12.55 and I.80.2.
H.2.32	Please see responses to comments O.12.55 and I.80.2.
H.2.33	Please see responses to comments O.12.55 and I.80.2.
H.2.34	Please see responses to comments O.12.55 and I.80.2.
H.2.35	Your comments are noted and are included in the Final EIS. Please see the response to comment H.1.5 above. Please see responses to comments O.12.55 and I.80.2.
H.2.36	Please see responses to comments O.12.55 and I.80.2.
H.2.37	Your comments are noted and are included in the Final EIS.
H.2.38	A chronology of events resulting in the potential replacements for aircraft carriers planned for decommissioning in the San Diego area is provided to help the reader understand how NASNI has customarily been home port for three aircraft carriers. In the 1980s, the Navy reduced the size of its active aircraft carriers from 15 to 12: six in the Atlantic Fleet and six in the Pacific Fleet. Before that time, NASNI had been the homeport for at least three aircraft carriers. In the early 1970s, this included USS TICONDEROGA, USS KITTY HAWK, and USS CONSTELLATION; in the mid-1970s, USS RANGER, KITTY HAWK, and CONSTELLATION; throughout the 1980s, RANGER, KITTY HAWK, and CONSTELLATION; and in the early 1990s, a combination of USS INDEPENDENCE, (while KITTY HAWK and/or CONSTELLATION were undergoing their Service Life Extension effort in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania), KITTY HAWK, CONSTELLATION, and RANGER. All ships listed above are or were conventionally powered carriers, or "CVs." In 1993, RANGER was decommissioned at the end of its service life and removed from NASNI, temporarily reducing the port-loading to two CVs.
	The closure of Naval Air Station (NAS) Alameda, California, and the relocation of two CVNs to fleet concentrations in San Diego and the Pacific Northwest were carried out in compliance with the 1993 Defense Base Realignment and Closure Commission (BRAC) recommendations. Consequently, the Department of the Navy constructed homeporting facilities for one CVN at NASNI (DON 1995a)

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	<p>and one at Puget Sound Naval Shipyard (PSNS), Bremerton, Washington (DON 1995b). Because there were no CVN homeport-capable berths at NASNI, the Navy was allowed to shift both NAS Alameda CVNs to the Pacific Northwest, pending completion of construction of suitable homeport facilities at NASNI. Those facilities were the subject of an EIS entitled <i>Environmental Impact Statement for the Development of Facilities in San Diego to Support the Homeporting of One NIMITZ Class Aircraft Carrier</i> (DON 1995a). The actual vessel that fulfilled the BRAC mandate and assumed the role of RANGER was USS JOHN C. STENNIS (CVN-74). Arriving in August 1998, STENNIS took over one CVs worth of facility support infrastructure at NASNI. NASNI has had the historical capacity to support three aircraft carriers.</p>
	<p>The environmental analysis in an EIS correlates to the level of planning for a particular project. If the planning has evolved such that the agency has formulated a project to meet a particular need, the EIS should reflect analysis of all aspects of that project, and the alternative methods of meeting the identified need should be addressed on a "co-equal" basis. In this case, the Navy had not, at the time of preparation of the 1995 EIS, formulated a proposal for how to meet the need of facilities for two more CVNs in the Pacific Fleet.</p>
	<p>However, the Navy did anticipate that in the future, a proposal would be formulated, and that the alternatives could include facilities at NASNI. Therefore, a larger project was not segmented into two smaller projects for the purpose of avoiding more rigorous environmental analysis. Further, although a "proposal" had not been formulated such that it could be analyzed on a "co-equal" basis in the 1995 EIS, it was reasonably foreseeable that a future project could include additional facilities at NASNI. Since it was reasonably foreseeable, the potential effects were included in the analysis of cumulative effects in that document. The 1995 EIS states, "This EIS, therefore, considers the potential cumulative impacts of CV replacement and homeporting a total of three CVNs in San Diego." See the 1995 EIS, Volume 1, Chapter 6 (DON 1995a).</p>
	<p>The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California approved the Navy's implementation of NEPA, and concluded that the Navy had not understated the potential effects of a larger project by preparation of two documents (segmentation). In an Order dated May 12, 1997, the Court stated, "Because the Court finds that no proposal to homeport three CVNs existed prior to the issuance of the Final EIS, the Final EIS's analysis of the possible cumulative impacts of potential additional home ports suffices under NEPA."</p>
	<p>In 1998, INDEPENDENCE (at that time the Navy's "forward deployed" carrier) reached the end of its service life and was decommissioned. KITTY HAWK was designated as its replacement and left NASNI in July 1998, 20 months after the Notice of Intent for this EIS, and relocated to Yokosuka, Japan. This resulted in a</p>

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	reduction of the port loading at NASNI to two homeported aircraft carriers. The USS NIMITZ is currently undergoing an extended maintenance period on the East Coast and will require a homeport berth within the Pacific Fleet area. Long range plans indicate that the most likely arrival date on the West Coast for NIMITZ would be early 2002. <i>Were the Preferred Alternative selected</i> , this would bring NASNI back to its historical three carrier port-loading baseline.
	USS CONSTELLATION is expected to reach the end of its service life in approximately 2003. At that time, NASNI would once again experience a reduction to two homeported carriers <i>if the Preferred Alternative were selected by the Navy</i> . The same long range plans addressing NIMITZ also involve replacing CONSTELLATION with the USS RONALD REAGAN. It is anticipated this will happen in 2005. Once again, <i>if the Preferred Alternative were selected</i> , it would bring NASNI back to its historical three carrier port-loading baseline.
H.2.39	As mentioned in the response to comment O.12.104, TAC emissions from the proposed dredging and disposal actions at NASNI would produce insignificant health impacts to the public. As stated in the response to comment O.12.136, the cumulative impact of toxic emissions from the proposed dredging and disposal activities and existing operations at NASNI would be insignificant. It is possible that the staggered maintenance schedules of CVNs homeported at NASNI could occasionally result in more than one PIA in a calendar year. However, the NASNI DMF would limit annual emissions of VOC and PM ₁₀ to 15 and 3 tons, respectively. Therefore, performance of 2 PIAs per year at NASNI would not exceed these emission levels. As part of the SDCAPCD permit process, TAC emissions from the DMF were evaluated at their maximum annual permitted rate and were determined to produce insignificant health risks to the public. Therefore, compliance with the SDCAPCD permit conditions would ensure that with the addition of two CVNs at NASNI, the health risk to the public from the DMF would remain insignificant.
	Since the completion of most recent health risk assessment for NASNI in 1993, emissions of HAPs have decreased from the facility, especially in regard to the reduction of hexavalent chromium from painting operations. As a result, the public health risk from NASNI has decreased since 1993.
	Section 3.10, Volume 3 of the Final EIS has been revised to include the most recent toxic air contaminants (TAC) emissions inventory for operations at NASNI.
H.2.40	There will be no increase in the amount or frequency of aircraft arriving at or departing from NASNI as a result of providing capacity for two additional CVNs. The air wing on a CVN is the same size and composition as an air wing

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	on a CV. No additional aircraft maintenance will be performed at NASNI as a result of this action.
	There will be no additional impacts to the affected environment due to training conducted in SOCAL by the CVN air wing. The training a CVN air wing does is exactly the same as the air wing of a CV. There is no net increase in the number of aircraft carriers at NASNI. The proposed action would only create the capacity to homeport two additional CVNs.. Please refer to Volume 1, paragraph 1.1.
H.2.41	The Navy complied with all applicable regulations in the preparation of the Draft EIS. Therefore the Navy, as Lead Agency, disagrees that the document is deficient in meeting NEPA requirements. The Final EIS has been revised to provide minor clarification in a number of areas in response to public comment. Responses to comments include evaluation of recent traffic and noise data presented by the City or Coronado. Evaluations of these data verify that the environmental effects of the proposed action were assessed correctly in the Draft EIS. Please see responses to comments H.2.53 (traffic) and L.4.29 (noise).
H.2.42	Your comments are noted and are included in the Final EIS.
H.2.43	Your comments are noted and are included in the Final EIS.
H.2.44	Your comments are noted and are included in the Final EIS.
H.2.45	Your comments are noted and are included in the Final EIS.
H.2.46	Your comments are noted and are included in the Final EIS.
H.2.47	Your comments are beyond the scope of this EIS.
H.2.48	Please see response to comment O.12.72.
H.2.49	Your comments are beyond the scope of this EIS.
H.2.50	The chronology of CVN homeporting, along with the decommissioning of CVs in the Pacific Fleet, is discussed in detail in response to comment L.4.5. The Navy had not, at the time of preparation of the 1995 EIS for the BRAC CVN, formulated a proposal for how to meet the need of facilities for two more CVNs in the Pacific Fleet. However, the Navy did anticipate that in the future, a proposal would be formulated, and that the alternatives could include facilities at NASNI. Therefore, a larger project was not segmented into two smaller projects for the purpose of avoiding more rigorous environmental analysis. Further, although a "proposal" had not been formulated such that it could be analyzed on a "co-equal" basis in the 1995 EIS, it was reasonably foreseeable that

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	a future project could include additional facilities at NASNI. Since it was reasonably foreseeable, the potential effects were included in the analysis of cumulative effects in that document. The 1995 EIS states, "This EIS, therefore, considers the potential cumulative impacts of CV replacement and homeporting a total of three CVNs in San Diego." See the 1995 EIS, Volume 1, Chapter 6 (DON 1995a).
H.2.51	The Navy still has intentions to relocate the NASNI Main Gate to align with Third Street. Relocation of the Third Street gate is a multi-faceted effort that required first the relocation of the NASNI commissary and Navy exchange. Once construction of the new commissary and exchange construction were completed, the old commissary and exchange could be razed, and the Third Street gate could be moved. Until funding was secured to relocate the commissary and exchange, only limited activity associated with the Third Street gate relocation could occur. Funding for relocation of the NASNI commissary and Navy exchange is now available and design for the new commissary/exchange is nearly completed, with construction scheduled to begin in summer or fall of 1999. Steps have been taken to initiate the Third Street gate relocation as an official navy project. Parametric costs have been collected and preliminary design considerations have been formulated. The Navy is committed to continue to seek these funds. Therefore, planning associated with the project continues, but will be subject to congressional approval as a naval budget item. In any event, relocation of the gate could not have proceeded until preliminary activities of commissary and exchange redesign had been completed. This gate relocation project is not needed as mitigation for the proposed CVN homeporting, but is being planned as a measure to improve access to NASNI, reduce traffic congestion, and reduce traffic volumes on First Street (trucks in particular).
H.2.52	The relationship of CVs and replacement CVNs are addressed in response to comment H.2.50. The Navy does not perceive that having three CVNs at NASNI increases the threat from terrorists beyond the potential that has existed for the past several decades. In fact, while the potential for terrorist acts may not have changed, the robustness of a naval vessel designed to withstand combat damage lessens the potential impact that such an act might incur. The very nature of a military assets diminishes its attractiveness as a target for terrorist. Not only is there a constant posture of security maintained through tightly controlled access and roving patrols, but the ability of the trained "targeted personnel" to react with deadly force increases the risk to the terrorist.
H.2.53	The transportation analysis has been revised to incorporate more recent traffic data that were not available to the EIS preparer when the Draft EIS was initially prepared (i.e., the traffic volumes documented in the October 1998 SANDAG report). For example, Table 3.9-1 is revised to show a average annual volume of

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	71,000 vehicles per day on the Coronado Bay Bridge. The trip generation rate used in the Draft EIS has been revised to reflect calculations based on 1996 personnel counts (see Table 2-1, Volume 3) and actual gate counts taken during that same year (see Table 3.9-7, Volume 3).
	With regard to the use of 1995 traffic data to represent existing conditions, that was considered current for average daily traffic volume information when the EIS traffic analysis was initiated in 1997. Table 3.9-1 has now been revised to represent 1996 and 1997 traffic data. The revised numbers represent the highest traffic volume cited in the various source references. The traffic impact analysis, which was based primarily on the peak hour levels of service at the critical study area intersections, used traffic counts that were taken August of 1996 to represent existing conditions. These counts were taken during a peak summer tourist season when two aircraft carriers were in port.
	Unique circumstances such as threats, suicides, and bridge accidents certainly have an effect on traffic conditions on the day of the incident; however, it would not be appropriate to model or analyze such unique circumstances in conjunction with the EIS traffic study.
H.2.54	As the Draft EIS traffic analysis indicates that the proposed action would not have a significant traffic impact. The Navy still has intentions to relocate the NASNI Main Gate to align with Third Street. Relocation of the Third Street gate is a multi-faceted effort that required first the relocation of the NASNI commissary and Navy exchange. Once construction of the new commissary and exchange construction were completed, the old commissary and exchange could be razed, and the Third Street gate could be moved. Until funding was secured to relocate the commissary and exchange, only limited activity associated with the Third Street gate relocation could occur. Funding for relocation of the NASNI commissary and Navy exchange is now available and design for the new commissary/exchange is nearly completed, with construction scheduled to begin in summer or fall of 1999. Steps have been taken to initiate the Third Street gate relocation as an official navy project. Parametric costs have been collected and preliminary design considerations have been formulated. The Navy is committed to continue to seek these funds. Therefore, planning associated with the project continues, but will be subject to congressional approval as a naval budget item. In any event, relocation of the gate could not have proceeded until preliminary activities of commissary and exchange redesign had been completed. This gate relocation project is not needed to mitigate less than significant impacts associated with the proposed CVN homeporting, but is being planned as a measure to improve access to NASNI, reduce traffic congestion, and reduce traffic volumes on First Street (trucks in particular). Although a tunnel between the Coronado Bay Bridge and the NASNI Main Gate would alleviate many of the traffic congestion problems on

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	the Coronado streets, such a project is not needed to mitigate less than significant impacts associated with the CVN homeporting project.
H.2.55	Please refer to the responses L.4.44 and I.37.1 to similar questions. NASNI has been a three-carrier homeport for decades; a period in excess of 30 years. The proposed action would only create the capacity to homeport two additional CVNs.
H.2.56	The Navy disagrees with the comment's assessment of the adequacy of the EIS. The Navy complied with all applicable regulations in the preparation of the Draft EIS. Therefore the Navy, as Lead Agency, disagrees that the document is deficient in meeting NEPA requirements. The Final EIS has been revised to provide minor clarification in a number of areas in response to public comment. Homeporting three additional CVNs at NASNI was concluded in section 2.7.1 of the EIS to not be a reasonable alternative to the proposed action. Response to comments include evaluation of recent traffic and noise data presented by the City or Coronado. Evaluation of these data verify that the environmental effects of the proposed action were assessed correctly in the Draft EIS. Please see responses to comments H.2.53 (traffic) and L.4.29 (noise).
H.2.57	The Navy has reviewed the traffic noise data provided in the recently completed "City of Coronado Noise Study — 1998" (RECON October 1998), which was not available at the time the Draft EIS was prepared. The new data have been incorporated into the EIS analysis and the older data from the 1993 noise study have been removed. The new data show that the existing traffic noise situation exceeds the City of Coronado General Plan Noise Element noise standard of 65 dBA. Volume 1, section 3.11.1 and Volume 3, section 3.11 have been revised to incorporate this information. The analysis conclusions for proposed action noise impacts, however, remain unchanged.
H.2.58	The Navy, as Lead Agency, believes that it has complied with all applicable regulations in the preparation of the Draft EIS; therefore, the Navy disagrees that the document is deficient in meeting NEPA requirements. Although Draft EIS comments resulted in minor changes in the analysis, no comment has changed the Navy's original assessment of significant impacts in any environmental category. In absence of significantly changing the results reported in the draft EIS, the Navy believes that a request to recirculate the Draft EIS is unwarranted per 40 CFR 1502.9(a). If the Navy determines that significant new circumstances or information emerges that is relevant to environmental concerns that bear on the proposed action or its impacts, then the Navy shall prepare a supplement to the EIS. Responses to public comments on the Draft EIS have been provided in this Final EIS. In response to some comments, additional information has been added to the text.

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H.2.59	The Navy, as Lead Agency, complied with all applicable regulations in the preparation of the Draft EIS; therefore, the Navy disagrees that the document is deficient in meeting NEPA requirements. Responses to public comments on the Draft EIS have been provided in this Final EIS.
H.2.60	Please refer to the responses L.4.13 and L.4.14.
H.2.61	In regard to PIA maintenance worker commuter vehicles associated with the proposed actions, please see the response to comment L.4.13. Data on California/non-California vehicle registration associated with CV and CVN personnel have been used to revise the commuter vehicle emission calculations for the proposed actions in the Final EIS. Emissions from California and non-California registered vehicles have been estimated with the use of the ARB EMFAC7G and EPA MOBILE5 models.
H.2.62	Fire protection level of service currently meets the requirements specified by the Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 60.555.5. Adequate fire protection has existed for CVs at NASNI, and will continue to exist for CVNs as well. Adequate fire lanes and equipment exist to combat any shipboard fire at NASNI. Section 3.14.1 of the EIS has been revised to state that sufficient resources at NASNI exist to combat any shipboard fire. For additional detail, see the response to comment O.10.18.
H.2.63	Section 3.3 addresses impacts to water quality from CVN operations, and indicates that best management practices would be implemented by the Navy to minimize the magnitude of any accidental waste discharges to the bay during normal operations. . Section 3.3.2 (page 3.3-9, lines 5-6 of the Draft EIS) will be revised to indicate that BMPs would also be implemented to minimize waste discharges to the bay during maintenance operations. Section 3.3.2 (page 3.3-9, line 32 of the Draft EIS) will be revised to read "All operational discharges, including stormwater runoff, would meet applicable regulations and permit standards." As indicated in the text of the EIS, potential impacts to the Bay associated with storm water runoff have been mitigated to a level of insignificance by components of the project design. Specifically, storm water runoff and associated impacts and mitigation measures have been discussed on pages 3.2-1, 3.2-3, 3.2-4, 3.2-5, 3.2-6, and 3.2-7. Therefore, the text remains unchanged.
H.2.64	Please see response to comment O.10.23.
H.2.65	Please see responses to comments O.13.24 and I.43.13.
H.2.66	Comment noted.

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H.2.67	Your opinions are noted. Regarding your comment about an alleged incident involving spilling paint, it has nothing to do with this EIS or the proposed action.
H.2.68	Please see response to comment O.12.10.
H.2.69	The Navy considers itself to be a part of the community. This EIS identifies the potential environmental effects that the proposed action would have on the local and regional environment as appropriate.
H.2.70	Your comments are beyond the scope of this EIS.
H.2.71	Plutonium is not among the radionuclides released as part of NNPP operations.
H.2.72	Your comments are beyond the scope of this EIS.
H.2.73	Your comments are noted and are included in the Final EIS.
H.2.74	Please see the response to comment H.1.5.
H.2.75	Please see responses to comments O.12.55 and I.56.5.
H.2.76	Please see response to comment H.2.21.
H.2.77	Your comments are noted and are included in the Final EIS.
H.2.78	<p>The USS STENNIS mitigation site was constructed in accordance with permit conditions set forth by the resource agencies. The new wharf mitigation site would also be constructed in accordance with permit conditions and it is proposed that this site would provide like-and-in-kind replacement of intertidal and subtidal habitat at a ratio of 1:1.</p> <p>There would be 1.5 acres filled by construction of the new wharf. The fill would eliminate about 0.8 acres of intertidal and 0.7 acres of subtidal at this location. Mitigation of the 1.5 acres would be as described above and further detailed in the response to F.2.10 and F.2.11 and Volume 1, section 3.5.</p>
	<p>As stated above, the size of the fill area would be 1.5 acres. The anticipated duration for dredging is 5-6 months. It is not expected that other dredging projects would occur simultaneously in this region of the bay. Therefore, no cumulative impacts from dredging projects are expected (see Section 3.18 for additional discussion).</p>
H.2.79a	The Navy does not consider that translation of the Draft EIS into Spanish is required to ensure that low income and minority populations have the

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	<p>opportunity to fully participate in the NEPA process. A scoping meeting to discuss the issues to be addressed in the EIS was held in Coronado on 10 February 1998. Since that time, the Navy has acknowledged the necessity of including a public hearing in San Diego. Notices of availability for the Draft EIS were placed in <i>La Prensa</i>. All responses to public comments generated during the public comment period provided in Spanish are translated into Spanish. The comments are annotated to ensure that the reader has sufficient understanding of the EIS materials without needing to read the EIS itself. The Notice of Availability (NOA), is translated in Spanish, and a telephone 888 support hot line is available in Spanish as well.</p>

The air quality analysis in the Draft EIS is based on compliance with national and state ambient air quality standards. These standards represent allowable atmospheric concentrations at which the public health and welfare are protected and include a reasonable margin of safety to protect the more sensitive individuals in the population, such as elderly people and children. Since the proposed action alternatives would not exceed any ambient air quality standard, public health would be protected from the effects of the proposed action alternatives. Toxic air contaminants (TACs) emissions from the proposed dredging and disposal actions at NASNI would produce insignificant health impacts to the public.

La Marina de los Estados Unidos no considera que la traducción al español del Draft EIS (Estudio de Impacto al Medio Ambiente) es requerida para asegurar que la población de bajos recursos y las minorías tengan la oportunidad de participar totalmente en el proceso conocido como NEPA. Una reunión para analizar los temas que serían tratados en el EIS (Estudio de Impacto al Medio Ambiente) se llevó a cabo en Coronado el 10 de febrero de 1998. Desde aquel momento, la Marina de los Estados Unidos ha reconocido la necesidad de incluir al público en la reunión de San Diego. Los avisos de disponibilidad para el Draft EIS (Estudio de Impacto al Medio Ambiente) fueron publicados en La Prensa. Todas las respuestas a los comentarios públicos generados durante el período de comentarios públicos que fueron provistos en español son traducidos al inglés. Los comentarios son anotados para asegurar que el lector tenga un entendimiento suficiente de los materiales del EIS (Estudio de Impacto al Medio Ambiente) sin la necesidad de tener que leerlo en su totalidad. El Aviso de Disponibilidad (NOA), está traducido al español y hay una línea telefónica 888 que también está disponible en español.

El análisis de la calidad del aire en el Draft EIS (Estudio de Impacto al Medio Ambiente) está basado en cumplimiento con las normas de la calidad del aire ambiental nacional y estatal. Estas normas representan las concentraciones atmosféricas permisibles en las cuales el bienestar y la salud pública están protegidas e incluye un margen razonable de seguridad para proteger a los individuos más sensibles dentro de la población, tales como las personas mayores y los niños. Como las acciones alternativas propuestas no excederían ninguna norma de la calidad del aire ambiental, la salud pública estaría

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	<p><i>protegida de los efectos de las acciones alternativas propuestas. Las emisiones de los contaminantes toxicós del aire (TAC) causadas por el dragado propuesto y por las acciones de deshecho en NASNI, producirían un impacto insignificante en la salud pública.</i></p>
H.2.79b	<p>Cumulative impacts from past projects that affect local air quality and toxic waste emissions were taken into account in this EIS. This EIS presents data that concludes there would be no significant impacts to the fish community from the proposed action. Fish would avoid dredge areas, so they would likely not be affected by any contaminants resuspended during dredging.</p> <p><i>Los impactos cumulativos de proyectos pasados que afectan la calidad del aire local y las emisiones de residuos tóxicos fueron tomados en cuenta en este EIS (Estudio de Impacto al Medio Ambiente). Este EIS (Estudio de Impacto al Medio Ambiente) presenta datos que concluyen que no habría impactos significativos en la vida marina debido a la acción propuesta. Los peces evitarían las áreas de dragado, así que probablemente no serían afectados por ninguno de los contaminantes en suspensión después del dragado.</i></p>
H.2.79c	<p>Purchases of local shipbuilding companies by other defense contractors, and the fact that these defense contractors are pursuing bids on ship repair, are common business practice and are beyond the scope of this EIS. The fact that defense contractors may be qualified to perform NNPP radiological work does not imply that NNPP radiological work would be performed: (1) in locations other than the NASNI CIF or (2) in any different manner than the uniform standards established by the NNPP. The purchases would not affect the amount of maintenance performed on homeported CVNs.</p> <p>Pollution impacts of the Navy's action to homeport USS JOHN C. STENNIS at NASNI were addressed in the Navy's 1995 Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Development of Facilities in San Diego/Coronado to Support the Homeporting of One NIMITZ-Class Aircraft Carrier. Pollution impacts of the proposed action were found not to be significant.</p> <p>A wide range of hypothetical accidents was considered in the development of the analysis presented in the EIS. The results of all the analyses of both normal operations and hypothetical accidents indicate that there would be no significant radiological impacts from homeporting and maintaining NIMITZ-class aircraft carriers or operating NIMITZ-class aircraft carrier maintenance facilities.</p> <p><i>Las compras de compañías locales de astilleros por otros contratistas de defensa, y el hecho que estos contratistas de defensa están llevando a cabo licitaciones para reparaciones de buques, son una práctica comercial común y están más allá del alcance de este EIS (Estudio de Impacto al Medio Ambiente). El hecho que los contratistas de defensa puedan estar capacitados para desempeñar trabajos radiológicos NNPP, no implica que el trabajo radiológico NNPP pueda ser desempeñado: (1) en otras</i></p>

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	<i>ubicaciones aparte de la NASNI CIF o (2) en alguna manera diferente que los estándares uniformes establecidos por el NNPP. Las compras no afectarían la cantidad de mantenimiento llevada a cabo en los CVN que están en el puerto base.</i>
	<i>Los impactos de contaminación de la acción de la Marina al USS JOHN C. STENNIS en el puerto base en NASNI fueron tratados en 1995 en la Declaración Final de Impacto Medio Ambiental para el Desarrollo de Instalaciones en San Diego / Coronado para el Soporte de Puerto Base de un Portaaviones Clase NIMITZ. Se ha determinado que los impactos de contaminación por la acción propuesta serán insignificantes.</i>
	<i>En el desarrollo de los análisis presentados en el EIS (Estudio de Impacto al Medio Ambiente) se consideraron una amplia diversidad de accidentes hipotéticos. Los resultados de todos los análisis, tanto de operaciones normales como de accidentes hipotéticos indican que no habrán impactos radiológicos significantes por el puerto base y mantenimiento de portaaviones clase NIMITZ, ni por la operación de instalaciones de mantenimiento de portaaviones clase NIMITZ.</i>
H.2.80	Your comments are beyond the scope of this EIS.
H.2.81	Your comments are noted and are included in the Final EIS.
H.2.82	Information on low-level radiation exposure and risk is addressed in Appendix E of the EIS and in response O.12.190. In addition, it is important to note that the results of all the radiological analyses in the EIS, which included cumulative effects, indicate that there would be no significant radiological impacts from homeporting and maintaining NIMITZ-class aircraft carriers or operating NIMITZ-class aircraft carrier maintenance facilities under the proposed action.
H.2.83	Please see response to comment L.4.36.
H.2.84	Your comments are beyond the scope of this EIS.
H.2.85	Your comments are noted and are included in the Final EIS.
H.2.86	Please see response to comment I.4.1. In addition, as described in Chapter 7.0, the stringent procedural and control policies of the NNPP are applied consistently to all locations where nuclear-powered ships are berthed and maintained. All features of design, construction, operation, maintenance, and personnel selection, training, and qualification have been oriented toward minimizing environmental effects and ensuring the health and safety of workers, ships' crew members, and the general public.
H.2.87	The conclusions in the EIS are that there are no significant impacts on health and safety. Please see section 3.15 (Volume 1) and appendices E, F, and J (Volume 2) of the EIS.

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H.2.88	Your comments are noted and are included in the Final EIS.
H.2.89	Your comments are beyond the scope of this EIS.
H.2.90	The Navy's comprehensive radiological environmental monitoring program, which would be continued with implementation of the proposed action, is described in section 7.4.4 of the EIS.
H.2.91	Your comments are noted and are included in the Final EIS.
H.2.92	Your comments are noted and are included in the Final EIS.
H.2.93	<i>Sus comentarios han sido tomados en cuenta y están incluidos en el EIS (Estudio de Impacto al Medio Ambiente) final.</i>
	Your comments are noted and are included in the Final EIS.
H.2.94	Please see responses to comments O.12.33 and L.4.36.
H.2.95	Your comments are noted and are included in the Final EIS.
H.2.96	The traffic analysis presented in the Draft EIS is based on the incremental increase in traffic that would occur as a result of the proposed action. The existing condition has facilities at NASNI to support two conventional aircraft carriers (CVs) and one nuclear carrier (CVN) for a total of three carriers, while Alternatives One, Two, and Three have three CVNs. The proposed action would not result in two additional aircraft carriers, but would simply provide capacity for the homeporting of up to two additional CVNs. As the number of personnel on the CVNs is greater than that on the CVs, the proposed action would generate approximately 27 additional vehicle trips during the peak hours and 150 trips throughout an average day, as outlined in the EIS. The analysis indicates that a traffic increase of this magnitude would not be significant. Please refer to response to comment L.4.12 and Table 3.9-4 in the Final EIS, Volume 1.
H.2.97	Issues regarding which commuters can or cannot take advantage of the toll free status of the carpool lane at the Coronado Bay Bridge are within the jurisdiction of Caltrans and are not addressed in conjunction with this CVN homeporting EIS. With regard to physical roadway improvements to alleviate traffic congestion in the area, the Navy is not responsible for such measures as a mitigation for the CVN homeporting proposed action because the analysis indicates that the proposed action would not result in a significant traffic impact. Although specific traffic-related mitigation measures are not needed to mitigate less than significant impacts of the proposed action, the Navy does have an ongoing series of strategies designed to reduce the level of traffic generated by NASNI, such as a ferry system, carpool/vanpool programs, installation of

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	bicycle racks, a guaranteed ride home program (for rideshare users with a mid-day emergency), and an educational program to promote these strategies. In addition, the Navy is seeking funding to redesign of the Main Gate so that the entrance would align with Third Street and thereby provide a more direct connection into and out of the base.
H.2.98	The traffic analysis presented in the Draft EIS is based on the incremental increase in traffic that would occur as a result of the proposed action. The existing condition has facilities at NASNI to support two conventional aircraft carriers (CVs) and one nuclear carrier (CVN) for a total of three carriers, while Alternatives One, Two, and Three have three CVNs. The proposed action would not result in two additional aircraft carriers, but would simply be providing capacity for homeporting up to two additional CVNs. As the number of personnel on the CVNs is greater than that on the CVs, the proposed action would generate approximately 27 additional vehicle trips during the peak hours and 150 trips throughout an average day, as outlined in the EIS. The analysis indicates that a traffic increase of this magnitude would not be significant.
H.2.99	Please refer to responses L.4.44 and I.37.1 for a response to the issue of terrorist acts in San Diego.
H.2.100	Our publicly-elected U.S. Congress and President of the United States make programmatic decisions regarding Naval ships (e.g., application of nuclear power), and thus comments regarding these decisions are beyond the scope of this EIS. The results of all the analyses of both normal operations and hypothetical accidents indicate that there would be no significant radiological impacts from homeporting and maintaining NIMITZ-class aircraft carriers or operating NIMITZ-class aircraft carrier maintenance facilities. Information on low-level radiation exposure and risk is addressed in Appendix E of the EIS and in response O.12.190. Non-cancer risks are addressed in response O.12.27.
H.2.101	Issues associated with constructing and operating the NASNI Depot Maintenance Facility, including the Mixed Waste Storage Facility and Controlled Industrial Facility, were analyzed in reference DON 1995, and are beyond the scope of this EIS. In addition, please see responses to comments L.4.36, I.17.3, and I.4.1.
H.2.102	Your comments are noted and are included in the Final EIS.
H.2.103	Your comments are noted and are included in the Final EIS.
H.2.104	Please see responses to comments L.4.36 and O.10.31.
H.2.105	Please refer to responses O.12.55 and O.12.169 and see comment on responses to GAO report in response to comment I.56.5.

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H.2.106	Your comments are noted and are included in the Final EIS.
H.2.107	Your comments are noted and are included in the Final EIS.
H.2.108	Please see response to comment O.12.57.
H.2.109	While CVs and CVNs use different sources of fuel (oil vs. nuclear), both types of ships rely upon steam propulsion plants that require seawater cooling. The seawater cooling requirements are similar and the thermal and marine life impacts from CVs and CVNs are comparable. Maintenance of heat exchangers is accomplished mainly while in dry-dock. When heat exchangers are taken out of service, they are isolated from the environment, cleaned, flushed, tested, and then returned back to service. All cleaning fluids are retained and processed according to their chemical nature.
H.2.110	Your comments are noted and are included in the Final EIS.
H.2.111	Your comments are noted and are included in the Final EIS.
H.2.112	Please see response to comment I.43.16.
H.2.113	Please see response to comment O.12.73 and L.4.36.
H.2.114	Please see response to comment I.43.13.
H.2.115	Your comments are noted and are included in the Final EIS.
H.2.116	Your comments are noted and are included in the Final EIS.
H.2.117	Please see response to comment L.4.36.
H.2.118	Please refer to responses L.4.44 and I.37.1 for a response to this comment on the potential for San Diego to become a military target.
H.2.119	Your comments are noted and are included in the Final EIS. Please see responses to comments O.12.10, O.12.182, O.12.190, and H.2.109.
H.2.120	Your comments are noted and are included in the Final EIS.
H.2.121	Please see response to comment I.4.1.